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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the information age’s influence on war, and 
attempts to establish both an understanding of what information age war is and 
how it may change warfare. Specifically, the thesis focuses on the question of 
military paradigm shift, and asks whether information age war constitutes a 
change of sufficient magnitude to challenge the established models for 
understanding warfare.
The first chapters examine the information age’s role as a force of 
change: demonstrating that the question of information age military paradigm 
shift clearly warrants a more detailed investigation. The thesis then examines 
sequentially four critical aspects of war, and the information age’s influences on 
each. The how, what, why, and who of warfare are identified as the most salient 
barometers of paradigm shift given that significant changes in each of these 
elements would necessarily and fundamentally alter both the practice and 
understanding of warfare. This thesis’ argument that information age war does 
not clearly fulfil any of these criteria, and therefore does not require a new 
military paradigm, is perhaps its main and most important finding.
While information age war will doubtless introduce many significant 
and notable changes to modem wai*, the present models for explaining war 
should accommodate the majority of these changes relatively easily - though 
perhaps not necessarily always in the manner expected. One exception is 
particularly notable. The infoimation age’s influence on the ‘who’ of war 
proves difficult to reconcile with the current paradigm because of its potential to 
shift the balance of military advantage between state and non-state actors. Such 
a profound change could ineluctably challenge the traditional understanding of 
who can wage war. This, added to the significant, if not paradigmatic shifts in 
the other three criteria, points to the need not so much to establish a new 
paradigm of war, but to reinteipret and adjust the paiadigm that currently 
explains this phenomenon. The thesis therefore concludes with an analysis of 
this reinterpretation and its implications both for the understanding of war and 
for the consequences of waging war in the information age.
Ill
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The close of the twentieth century has prompted many predictions about 
the end of the world and the beginning of a new era. Not the least of these is the 
claim that a new age has emerged, heralding an end to the era of industrialism 
that defined the pinnacle of development for the past two centuries and more.
Its successor, named for the information technologies that spawned it, has been 
labelled the ‘information age.’ Signs of this age have already begun to appear in 
the form of pervasive changes in the way the world conducts business, 
education, politics, and even social interaction. The changes themselves present 
compelling evidence that the information age - and the new infoiination 
technologies and practices that it introduces - holds the potential to spark 
significant societal shifts. The extent of the changes already evident, however, 
suggests the possibility of still further, more far-reaching shifts, and begs the 
question ‘what might this information age mean for the world as we know it?’
Of its many possible effects on society, the information age’s potentially 
most profound impact falls within the realm of war.  ^ For that reason, this thesis 
focuses on how the information age may affect warfare, and what it may mean 
for the way the world conducts and understands war.^ More specifically, this 
thesis will attempt to discern the implications of the information age’s influence 
on war primarily through an examination of the proposition that the information 
age war form will create a paradigm shift in war. In the course of this 
investigation, this study addresses not only the issue of what information age
 ^ Changes in war are likely to introduce some of the information age’s most profound effects 
because they may alter not only war - an impact important in and o f itself due to war’s status 
as the final arbiter o f conflict in the international system - but also the individuals and 
organisations who wage war and the system ordered by it. This possibility will be more 
thoroughly investigated in chapter seven.
war is, but how it differs from previous ways of conducting war, how significant 
those differences are, and what these differences suggest for those who wage 
war as well as for those who are affected by war.
As a preface to this investigation, it is useful to understand that the 
examination of information age war falls within a larger, ongoing debate over 
the typology of war. Throughout history, those who wage war and those who 
study war have made many attempts to categorise the phenomenon.^ In 
response to the many and varied chances introduced to warfare over the years, 
practitioners and theoreticians alike have identified various means to 
differentiate between one form of war and another. The most common (and 
generally most easily recognised) of these methods draws distinctions based on 
the tools and/or the tactics a war form employs. Heavily influenced by 
technological developments, forms of war defined by their tools most 
prominently include nuclear, chemical, and biological warfare.^ Categories of 
war defined by their tactics range from medieval siege warfare to industrial era 
trench warfare to guerrilla warfare. Secondary tactical differentiation is also 
based upon the medium in which battle is waged, for example land wars and air 
wai'S.  ^ Such tactical distinctions are most commonly influenced by
 ^Thi'oughout this thesis, the concept o f ‘war’ should be understood to mean episodic and at least 
potentially violent conflict conducted with the strategic aim o f compelling an opponent to do 
one’s will against his own.
 ^Cf. Fastabend, David. “The Categorization o f Conflict.” Parameters. Summer 1997: 75-87. 
P-2
Or perhaps in the belief that a certain ‘type’ o f war could be more readily understood than 
warfare in general.
 ^Cf. Paret, Peter, ed. Makers of Modern Strateev: from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986.
 ^Some, who see ‘cyberspace’ or ‘the infosphere’ as a fourth or fifth dimension o f the battlespace 
- after land, water, air, (and space) - would argue that IW fits this typology. This study, 
however, takes the view that information is a tool and target in lAW , not a new medium for 
battle.
technological developments in combination with doctrinal developments, and 
are often coloured by political and/or socio-cultural concerns/
A third method of war classification combines these factors with others
- like, for instance, the character and organisation of the military forces involved
- for a more holistic (but consequently often less distinct) typecasting which has 
given rise to the conceptions of 18^  ^century ‘limited warfare,’ ‘modern war,’ 
and ‘total war.’  ^ In addition to these traditional modes of categorising wars, a 
fourth feature has been added to the war typology over the past decades, the 
concept of a ‘spectrum of conflict.’ During the last years of the Cold War, this 
concept, which was heavily influenced by the prevailing geopolitical situation, 
placed particular emphasis on the intensity level of wars, classifying them as 
high-intensity and low-intensity conflict.^ Since the Cold War’s end, that 
emphasis has shifted more towards the purpose of the operation, leading to 
discussions of Operations Other than War (OOTW), peacekeeping, 
peacemaking, and other elements that fall between ‘peace’ and ‘war’ on the 
conflict spectrum.
 ^Consider, for example, NATO operations in Kosovo in the spring of 1999. The decision to 
confine initial military activity to an air war was almost entirely politically motivated. 
Likewise siege warfare was heavily influenced by political and socio-cultural concerns - 
principally the fact that the ruling nobility typically reside in fortress towns or personal 
strongholds during the era in which siege warfare held sway.
 ^Cf. Epstein, Robert M. Napolean’s Last Victory and the Emergence of Modern Warfare.
Lawi ence, KS: University Press o f Kansas, 1994. p.3 and Parker, Geoffrey., ed. The 
Cambridge Historv o f Warfare: the Triumph o f the West. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995. p.233 Howard, Michael, George J. Andreopoulos, and Mark R. 
Shulman, eds. The Laws o f War: Constraints on Warfare in the Western World. New  
Haven: Yale University Press, 1994. p.4, and Pearton, Maurice. The Knowledgeable State: 
Diplomacv. War. & Technologv Since 1830. London: Burnett Books, 1982. p .l86 .
 ^Fastabend, David. “The Categorization of Conflict.” p.3 The latter is a concept o f war that 
was particularly widespread during the Cold War, with its shadow o f nuclear Armageddon.
United States Department o f the Aimy. FM 100-5: Operations. Washington, DC: 
Government Printing Office. June 1993. pp. 2 -0 ,2-1 . Fastabend. “The Categorization of 
Conflict.” pp.4-5, Libicki, Martin C. “What is Information Warfare?” Washington, DC: 
National Defense College, 1995. C hi, p.2 and Owens, William A., Adm,, USN. The
This thesis examines war through the lens of yet another contribution to 
the typology of war - one that emerged contiguous to military interest in the 
spectrum of conflict, yet has achieved a much more controversial popularity. 
This most publicised of the typologies of war is based upon the idea that the 
conduct and character of war varies according the ‘age’ in which it is waged. 
The idea that the agricultural, industrial, and now information ages each gave 
rise to distinctive forms of war has captured the imaginations of many who 
study warfare and the changes it currently seems to be undergoing. However, 
this concept of an age of warfare has been much questioned - not least because 
the definition of such an age is both indistinct and problematic. In particular, 
the issue of when such an age begins, and what exactly it entails has not yet 
been settled with the necessary rigour. The prevailing ambiguity is due in no 
small part to the fact that the concept was popularised by futurists and social 
forecasters, namely Alvin and Heidi Toffler, among others, whose research has 
been in many areas more provocative than it is empirically conclusive.
Yet the concept of an ‘age’ of warfare holds a certain utility despite its 
detractions. As the following chapter will discuss, the idea of an information 
age carries with it a sense of change brought on not only by new information 
technology, but by the new methods, processes, organisational foims, and other 
societal and political innovations introduced to capitalise on the advantages that
Emerging U.S. Svstem-of-Systems. Washington, DC: National Defense University World 
Wide Web page, February 1996. p.4 
“ Cf. DiNardo, R.L. and Daniel J. Hughes. “Some Cautionary Thoughts on Information 
Warfare.” Air Chronicles. 1996. p.2 
Cf. Toffler, Alvin. The Third Wave. New York: Bantam, 1980. Drucker in Coates, Joseph 
F. and Jennifer Jarratt. What Futurists Believe. Mt Airy, MD: Lomond Publications, 1989. 
Bell, Daniel. The Coming o f Post-Industrial Societv: A  Venture in Social Forecasting. New  
York: Basic Books, 1973. This issue will be addressed in greater detail later in the chapter. 
See p.34
the recent explosion of information technology offers. Classifying warfare by 
its connection to the information age, therefore, allows one to account for 
military shifts resulting from technological change, as well as from 
methodological and organisational change, and from political and societal shifts, 
providing a more comprehensive means to categorise and understand cunent 
developments in warfare. That, coupled with the fact that the idea of a war form 
particular to a certain age holds wide currency among those who are studying 
the present changes in w arfarem akes the concept of classifying, and 
understanding war through its association with the information age very 
attractive.
Having established the reasons for studying today’s military 
developments through the lens of the information age, it is now possible to 
begin the investigation into the information age’s effects on warfare. That 
investigation, however, will be by no means straightforward, as evidenced by 
the fact that the field of ‘information warfare’ (IW) has been fraught with 
debate since it took the spotlight in the aftermath of the 1991 Persian Gulf War. 
This debate is exemplified by the fact that common attempts to explain the 
current relationship between information and warfare run the gamut from ‘a new 
way to do the same old things,’ to a Revolution in Military A ffa irs ,to  a new 
paradigm of war, to a misguided justification for padding military budgets. At 
the heart of the debate lies great uncertainty over what, precisely, information
DiNardo and. Hughes. “Some Cautionary Thoughts on Information Warfare.” p.2 Changes 
which, this thesis recognises, have been brought on by the revolution in information 
technology, the end o f the Cold War, increasing economic interdependence, and other 
factors.
A revolutionary change not only in the weapons o f war, but also in the strategies, tactics, and 
organisation employed by warmakers. The phenomenon o f revolution in military affairs.
warfare is. With the very fundamentals of the field at question, this thesis 
examines the issues suiTOunding IW from the bottom up - beginning with the 
very definition of the phenomenon - in order to present a more rigorously 
analytical account of the information revolution’s impact on war.
One of the few points of agreement within the infoimation warfare 
debate provides testimony to the glaring need for such an account: that war is 
cuiTently undergoing some sort of change. There is thus a general sense that, 
whatever the information revolution may ultimately mean for the nature of war, 
this phenomenon will inescapably affect the military and the way the military 
wages warfare. Consequently, while the significance of impending 
information age military shifts may still be very much in question, strategic 
thinkers must nonetheless take the information revolution into account when 
considering future conflict. Whether in the end they believe that the information 
age will transform war beyond recognition or that it will merely augment 
previous capabilities, if their preparations for waging war are to be relevant, 
military planners must at least attempt to come to terms with the concept most 
widely known by the name information warfare.*^
Such an understanding unfortunately is not easily reached. One of the 
principal difficulties in arriving at a grasp of the ‘information waif are’ concept
along with the militaiy technology revolution, will be discussed further in chapter two’s 
‘Military Revolution’ section.
Cf. sources as diverse as the US Department o f Defense’s Joint Vision 2010, John Aiquilla 
and David Ronfeldt’s seminal “Cyberwar Is Coming!,” and Lawrence Freedman’s sceptical 
“Will Battle Ever be Joined?” Shalikashvili, John, M. Chairman, Joint Chiefs o f Staff. 
Joint Vision 2010. Washington, DC; United States Department o f Defense, 1997. John 
Aiquilla and David Ronfeldt. “Cyberwar Is Coming!” Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1992. 
Freedman, Lawrence. Information Warfare: Will Battle Ever B e Joined?. London: 
International Centre for Security Analysis, October 1996
This concept has been called by many names, o f which ‘information warfare,’ IW, Infowar, 
and Information Age Conflict or Warfare are only the most common. Other appellations in
arises from the fact that, even among those who agree that information warfare 
may pose a significant new challenge to national security, there is dissension 
over what precisely the term actually refers to. For instance, the US Department 
of Defense once defined IW as “actions taken to affect adversai y information 
and information systems while defending one’s own information, and 
information systems.”^^  However, in recognition of the fact that many such 
actions will not entail organised, strategically directed campaigns worthy of the 
name ‘war,’ the Pentagon has more recently applied this definition not to 
information warfare, but to the concept it now calls ‘infonnation operations.’ 
Information waif aie has, instead, become more specifically “information 
operations conducted during time of crisis or conflict.”^^  The distinction is an 
important one, as the field has long been lacking a useful differentiation 
between information age military tactics (which can be employed across the 
conflict spectrum from peace to peacekeeping, insurgency, etc., to war) and full- 
fledged strategic information age war. With the establishment of this 
distinction, the new definitions now allow meaningful treatment both of true 
information age war and of mere trouble-making that employs information age 
tactics, leaving room in between to account for medium-scale information age 
threats as well. Despite the usefulness of the distinction, however, the fact that 
such basic definitions are changing even at this level of doctrinal definition is a
the literature include: Information-Based Conflict, ATnowWge-Based Conflict, Third Wave 
War, Post-Industrial Warfare, and the Pentagon’s current choice. Information Operations.
Paige, Emmett, Jr. “Directive 3600.1 - Information Operations.” Arlington, VA: Office of 
the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and 
Intelligence, 9 December 1996 Cf. also Everett, Chailes D., Moss Dewindt, and Shane 
McDade. “The Silicon Spear: An Assessment of Information-based Warfare and US 
National Security.” National Defense University Sun Tzu Ai t o f War in Information 
Warfare Prize 1997. Washington, DC: National Defense University Web page, 1997.
conspicuous sign of the confusing predicaments that afflict the information 
warfare debate.
Conceptions of War in the Information Age
This study interprets warfare in the information age very specifically as a 
war form in which information is, definitively, the centre of gravity. As such, 
information constitutes both the most valuable tool for attack and the most 
desirable object of attack, and is therefore also the most vital subject of defence. 
According to this view, information age war does not simply “affect adversary 
information systems” in the course of defending one’s own. Such an 
interpretation of information’s role in warfare is insufficient to account for the 
claims that the information age will produce a new paradigm of warfare.
Rather, if one is to examine the assertion that information age war represents a 
new form of war - as this thesis does - one must consider warfare in the 
information age to be a mode of conflict which employs information and 
information age technologies in a very distinctive manner. For this reason, the 
present study defines war in the information age not merely as military actions 
involving information systems, but as a form of war which leverages a synergy^  ^
of information and information systems to produce a decisive advantage at all 
levels of combat, beyond that available from firepower or manoeuvre alone.
That is to say, true information age war should not only employ, but rely on a
Paige, Emmett, Jr. “Directive 3600.1 - Information Operations.” Arlington, VA: Office of 
the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and 
Intelligence, 9 December 1996.
The emphasis on ‘synergy’ incorporates the US Department o f Defense’s current thinking on 
the “system o f systems” concept and its recognition o f the importance of integration and co­
ordination in information age war. Cf. Shalikashvili. Joint Vision 2010.
multitude of co-ordinated and complementaiy information systems that act in 
concert to provide information that multiplies the effectiveness of every military 
action, from planning to mobilisation to the application of force itself.
This thesis deliberately uses this particular definition of information age 
war in the belief that a careful and explicit delineation of the war form’s 
characteristics is an essential prerequisite for the analysis of the information 
age’s influence on warfare. Before considering the advantages this definition 
holds for such an inquiry, however, one should note that this conception of 
warfare in the information age is significantly different from those put forward 
by the two major schools (discussed below) currently dominating the 
information warfare debate. Consequently, though one is understandably leery 
to add yet another term to the IW lexicon, it is desirable to achieve a distinction 
between ‘information warfare,’ ‘Conflict in the Information Age’ or 
‘information operations,’ and the information age’s impact on war as it is 
understood here. The first term has been appropriated narrowly to describe 
attacks on information infrastructure, whereas the latter two are applied more 
broadly in reference to all aspects of conflict involving ‘information;’ both are 
to be differentiated from the focus of this thesis - warfare that specifically 
exploits information synergistically. For this reason, the thesis will use the 
terms ‘war in the information age’ and information age wai*^ ® (lAW - as opposed 
to IW), and rely on the reader to attach the implied distinction to the semantic 
wordplay.
This semantic hair-splitting cannot hold any significance, however, until 
one recognises the distinguishing features that make the ‘information age wai ’
definition a useful and effective foundation for the investigation into the 
information age’s effects on warfare. First, crucial to the definition of 
information age war presented here is the premise that synergistic reliance on 
information systems provides the key to creating a decisive military advantage 
in the information age. In practical terms, this means that future militaries will 
not win information age wai's merely by exploiting the latest information 
technologies. Instead, they must employ these technologies in systematic co­
operation, with each other and with every activity of the military force, in order 
to create the decisive advantages infonnation age wai' advertises. Individual 
information technologies, or even multiple information technologies applied to 
individual activities, will simply allow a military force to do what it has always 
done, but faster and more accurately. However, leveraging^^ information 
systems in co-ordination on every level of war from planning to implementation 
- training, organisation, logistics, doctrine, strategy, operations, and tactics - 
should allow an information age military to act with an aggregate speed and 
accuracy without which an adversary cannot compete.
Consider, for instance, the advantages of an information age fighting 
force which goes into war with, among other assets: military strategies and 
doctrines tested exhaustively through computer modelling and war-games; 
soldiers who have augmented their conventional training with time in 
sophisticated, realistic simulators; supply lines which function smoothly and 
efficiently with minimal confusion; up-to-date, detailed intelligence which 
allows troops to implement plans with maximum effectiveness; precision
™ To be used interchangeably.
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munitions which enable soldiers to capitalise on the available intelligence/^ and 
fast, high-capacity, flexible communications which enable commanders and 
troops alike to discuss orders at a speed compatible with the fast pace of battle. 
The list could go on, but the above examples are sufficient to illustrate that one 
information system, or even several elements in one type of system, cannot 
compete with the advantages potentially available from the co-operative 
employment of many different types of systems that have widely differing 
functions, each of which augments and multiplies the benefits of the others.
The synergy of these many and varied systems should create a pace - a level not 
only of speed, but of accuracy - in war which no opponent can equal without 
that same conscious, exacting co-ordination of information and actions.
Secondly, this study’s definition of information age war is paiticularly 
useful for investigating infoimation age military change because it explicitly 
emphasises the fact that the decisive role of information in lAW is its capacity 
to create efficiency. Manifested in the speed and accuracy made possible 
through the synergistic leveraging of information, efficiency is the factor upon 
which victory or defeat may depend in information age war. In this role, 
efficiency has come in large part to replace mass, the factor that proved so 
decisive in industrial age wars. This replacement is most famously exemplified 
by the fact that one or two precision guided munitions can in some cases destroy 
a target more effectively than scores of WWII-era bombs which could not
Employing an asset to multiply the gains from other assets, with the intent o f creating 
advantage.
^  Such precision weapomy, in fact, not only enables the use o f highly accurate intelligence, but 
demands it. These weapons could not be effective without the detailed intelligence required 
to target them. Some might aigue that this creates a new vulnerability - and indeed it does, 
as does every aspect o f lA W ’s reliance on synergised information efficiency - but the
11
reliably hit their intended targets/^ More prosaically, information also replaces 
mass in the implementation of focused logistics, a system which integrates 
computerised information management to insure reliable delivery of supplies, 
thus necessitating smaller contingency suipluses and fewer support troops to 
manage logistic distribution/'^ Such replacements of mass with information are 
possible today because modem information technologies increasingly enable an 
actor to bring force to bear at the right place and time (that is, quickly and 
accurately), hence reducing the number of weapons, supplies, and soldiers a 
military force requires by increasing the likelihood that its strikes will succeed 
the first time/^
This argument in no way attempts to claim that future militaries will not 
need firepower and manpower. Rather, the quantity of this power should matter 
less than the quality. In a true infoimation age war, the quality of a fighting 
force will depend on its capacity for leveraging information in a synergistic 
manner (i.e. its capacity for employing information and information 
technologies in concert, in order to create advantages such as those achieved 
through co-ordinating training simulations and computer-managed logistics 
functions with precision weapons and versatile command and control systems, 
as detailed in the previous paragraphs)^^ that allows the force to attack with the
decision to adopt the methods o f information age war is predicated on the assumption that 
the potential risks o f such dependencies are outweighed by the benefits they should bring.
^  Libicki, Martin C. Information and Nuclear RMAs Compared. Washington, DC: National 
Defense University Web page, July 1996.
^  Both the delivery of bombs and o f logistical supplies are familiar functions o f war. It should 
be noted that the information age is also likely to improve efficiency by introducing new 
tools to war - such as EMP (electromagnetic pulse) weapons or cyber attacks against 
information infrastructure - that can be co-ordinated with airstrikes to reduce the utility of 
enemy air defences and decrease the likelihood o f losses for the striking force. See also p.20 
The same is also true o f supply and aid, because they are more likely to arrive where they are 
needed and where they were originally intended.
26 See page 11. |
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requisite munitions at exactly the time and place that its opponent is most 
vulnerable/^ The ability to strike this point of critical vulnerability can reliably 
be achieved only by depending on calculated information, not on the 
comparatively blind luck of numbers and probabilities as in past wars/^
This role of information in warfare is unique to the information age. 
Although information has played a crucial part in wars since the beginning of 
hi s to ry ,th e  dependable ability to use vast quantities of data proactively and 
expeditiously to create a decisive advantage emerged only with the explosion of 
sophisticated information technologies capable of collecting, processing, 
manipulating, and storing large amounts of complex information.^® However, 
the creation of this advantage is dependent not merely on the use of these 
technologies, but on the ability to use them in concert. Information technologies 
maximise efficiency only when they are employed in every phase of an action 
from inception to execution, creating an effect that is greater than the sum of its 
parts. Efficiency cannot be maximised, that is, exploited to its fullest extent, if 
any one part of an operation is canted out with less accuracy and speed than it 
might otherwise be, as would be the case if available information were not 
utilised in each and every phase.
Recognising the importance o f this principle, the US military has begun to prepare for 
“dominant manoeuvre” and “precision engagement, both o f which stress the ability to be at 
the right time and place, no matter where or when. Cf. Shalikashvili. Joint Vision 2010.
This is not to say that military men o f the past lacked military genius or creativity, merely that, 
without the technology to make and communicate the relatively more informed calculations 
that are possible today, these men had to rely more on intuition and probability than 
information age commanders theoretically should have to.
Cf. especially Sun Tzu. The Ait o f War. Griffith, Samuel B., ti'ans. London: Oxford 
University Press, 1963. This point will be dealt with in detail in chapter two.
Cf. United States Department o f Commerce. Report o f the National Critical Technologies 
Panel. PB9I-156869. Springfield, VA: National Technical Information Service, March 
1991.
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Consider, for example, the fact that a military force’s capacity to hit the j
point of its opponent’s most critical vulnerability depends on integrated
1information not only for the strike itself, but also throughout the course of |
military planning and implementation. In information age war, a strike against I
an opponent’s command network, for instance, will not be decisive without I
capitalising on the vast array of available intelligence to know where and when 
the enemy is most assailable. Nor can such a strike achieve conclusive 
efficiency without utilising precision-guided munitions (with or without 
accompanying stealth) to deliver firepower at the correct point with minimum 
warning. For that matter, even information age operational techniques such as 
split-based or focused logistics, which enable a military to deploy to the field 
with the smallest possible support infrastructure and management force,^  ^ are 
crucial in a war where an action may succeed or fail because of its efficiency.
When deployed in concert these elements can bring force to bear with the speed 
and precision fundamental to the creation of a more efficient, and therefore 
more effective information age war machine.
The pivotal role of efficiency, and of information’s part in creating 
efficiency, will be discussed further in chapter three.
Focused logistics, in the terminology o f Joint Vision 2010, or split-based logistics in the 
words of TRADOC’s General Frederick Franks, is a supply strategy which replaces 
extensive in-theatre logistics infrastructures and surpluses with remote computerised tracking 
o f inventory and shipment information. This system drastically reduces the number o f 
logistics managers and the size of the supply structure needed near the battlefield, leaving the 
majority based at home, hence Franks’ use of the term “split-based.” Shalikashvili. Joint 
Vision 2010. And Franks, Frederick M., Jr, Gen USAimy. “Winning the Information War.” 
Vital Speeches. 15 May 94, VoI60, nl5: pp.453-459. For more details, see chapter three, 
‘Efficiency’s Rise to Power.’
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other Views in the Debate
One must remember, however, that this view of infoimation age war 
falls within a larger debate over the nature of ‘information warfare.’ Since this 
work has been informed by that debate, and readers of these pages will no doubt 
carry with them assumptions derived from the positions of other authors, it is 
important to situate the view of information age war presented here within the 
larger school of information waifare.^^
To begin with, that school is but one component of a still greater dispute 
over the nature of war and its relationship to change. The military establishment 
as a whole remains divided not only over the issue of information age war and 
its significance, but, more fundamentally, over the question of whether 
significant change is even occurring. Those proclaiming that such a change, in 
the foim of an information age revolution in military affairs - the result of 
concurrent technological, doctrinal, and organisational innovation^^ - is on the 
military’s doorstep have perhaps received the most attention, and certainly the 
most hype, in this dispute. Other views, however, have vied for similar 
recognition. Principal among them is the notion that current developments in 
war result more from an evolutionary process than a revolutionary one. While 
this school suffers its own differences over the ultimate significance of that 
evolution (some propose moderate change will result, others recognise the 
possibility that evolutionary change could have revolutionary effects),^"  ^its
For the purposes o f this thesis, the school o f IW should be understood to include the literature 
on the RMA and MTR as well as information warfare per se.
For further discussion o f revolutions in military affairs, please see chapter two.
Dunn, Martin. “RMA = Revolution in Military Acronyms? A Contrary View.” Research and 
Analysis. Canberra, Australia: Australian Directorate of Army Research and Analysis Web 
page, March 1996. Lovelace, Douglas C., Jr. “The Evolution in Military Affairs: Shaping 
the Future US Armed Forces.” Carlisle, PA: US Army War College Strategic Studies 
Institute Web page, 16 Jun 97.
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members are unanimous in the belief that the shape of contemporain warfare 
results not from a sudden transformation in the fabric of war (or of society), but 
from a long, measured, and continuous process that has driven military progress 
throughout the modem age.^^
A related, and increasingly popular view offers still greater scepticism, 
questioning the validity of the assumptions upon which the views of the 
evolutionary, and particularly the revolutionary schools rest. Like the 
evolutionary school, this argument emphasises the continuity of warfare, noting 
that even change has been continuous, particularly during the 20‘^  century. This 
third school, however, does not share the evolutionists’ view that giadual 
chance could also have significant effects. Rather, these sceptics see no great 
departure for warfare as a result of the information age, and caution against 
making more of current changes than they waixant.^  ^ In particular, subscribers 
to this school point out that the promises of modem militaiy technology may not 
be fulfilled as enthusiasts expect. Many of these technologies still function far 
below the optimal levels projected for them. More significantly, they argue, 
many of these ‘silver bullets’ seem unlikely to prove useful at all in the conflicts 
the West is most likely to face - asymmetrical conflicts against non-peer 
competitors who avoid pitched battles and aim almost exclusively for their
Cf. Biddle, Stephen. “The RMA and the Evidence.” Institute for Defense Analyses. 
Delivered at the JCISS and Security Studies Revolution in Military Affairs Conference, 
Monterey, CA: 26-29 Aug 1996. DiNardo and. Hughes. “Some Cautionary Thoughts on 
Information Warfare.”
Gray, Colin S. “The American Revolution in Military Affairs: An Interim Assessment.” 
Camberley, England: Strategic and Combat Studies Institute, 1997. pp. 5-7, 33-34.
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enemies’ w eaknesses.These voices, however, are only some among the many 
who do see potential for significant military change in the information age.
However, even among those who agree that the information age seems 
to be introducing significant change to warfare, the case for IW is not 
particulaiiy straightforward. In addition to the ongoing disagreement within the 
greater military community, the school of information warfare faces internal 
confusion exacerbated by the fact that two disparate and opposing sets of IW 
proponents have emerged in response to the Pentagon’s signs of interest in the 
t o p i c . E ac h  side champions the belief that information warfare presents the 
next great challenge for international security, yet they differ widely on how that 
challenge will manifest itself. The dissenting opinions fall loosely into two 
camps which can be chaiacterised at opposite ends of the debate as naiTow and 
wide views of information waifare.^^ This study’s interpretation of information 
age war does not fit clearly into either camp, though it has drawn from both.
The naiTOw school - which includes such thinkers as Winn Schwartau 
and Roger Molander"^® - chaiacterises information warfare primarily as attacks 
against the information infrastructure, as well as attacks directly on the
Freedman, Lawrence. “The Revolution in Strategic Affairs.” Adelphi Paper #318. London: 
Institute for International Strategic Studies, 1998. Matthews, Lloyd J., ed. “Challenging the 
United States Symmetiically and Asymmetrically: Can America be Defeated?” Carlisle, 
PA: US Aimy War College Strategic Studies Institute Web page, July 1998. It should be 
noted that this point is far from proven. In fact, Bennett, Twomey, and Treverton believe 
asymmetrical opponents are likely to exploit lAW  strategies for their own gains. It seems 
unlikely, in this scenario, that information age militaries will be unable to develop 
information age defences and counterattacks in answer to such strategies. See Bennett, 
Bruce W., Christopher Twomey, and Greg Treverton. “What are Asymmetric Stiategies?” 
Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1999.
This conundrum exists without even taking into account the fact that there are still others who 
do not believe that war is significantly changing in the first place.
Ronfeldt, David. Senior researcher, RAND Corporation. Interview with the author. 24 June 
1997.
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assumptions which that infrastructure upholds/^ This emphasis on 
infrastructure is the most prominent feature distinguishing the naiTOW 
interpretation of information warfare both from the inteipretation presented here 
and from the rest of the school in general. A second distinguishing feature is the 
naiTOW school’s position that IW is a war on information, as differentiated from 
the wide school’s understanding of information warfare as a war with 
information, which will be elaborated below."^  ^ Consequently, many of the 
nanow school’s adherents champion the ideal of a future in which war will not 
necessarily be lethal. According to this view, information occupies its own 
realm - cyberspace - upon which the developed world has become so dependent 
that damage to this realm alone can be sufficient to coerce independent actors to 
bend to the will of another.
Among the myriad objections to the narrow school’s argument'^  ^is the 
proposition that such infrastructure attacks can only be strategically significant 
when implemented in concert with other military operations. For example, the 
failure of a long-distance telephone system at the moment when a militaiy force 
launches an air attack could indeed have a crucial impact on the outcome of a 
battle, whereas that failure by itself would likely cost only a few hours of 
inconvenience and confusion to repair."^ Martin Libicki also offers a
See also, Schwartau, Winn. Information Warfare. New York: Thunder’s Mouth Press, 1994. 
and Molander, Roger. Strategic Information Warfare: A New Face of War. Santa Monica, 
CA: RAND, 1996.
The latter principally take the form of perception management efforts.
Libicki, Martin. National Defense University. Interview with the author. September 1997. 
For further arguments against this interpretation o f information warfare, see also Freedman. 
Information Warfare: Will Battle Ever Be Joined?. Thompson, Mark. “If War Comes 
Home.” Time, vol. 146. n8. 21 Aug 95. p.2 
Cf. Freedman, Lawrence. Information Warfare: Will Battle Ever Be Joined?. London: 
International Centre for Security Analysis, October 1996. p.4 also Libicki in Morton,
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compelling objection to the naiTow school’s emphasis on infoimation 
infrastructure attack with his assertion that components of the information 
infrastructure will, in response to a credible threat, harden their security so 
rapidly that infrastructure attacks alone will be unable to have real strategic 
impact/^ Yet despite widespread dissatisfaction with this naiTOW conception of 
IW, the narrow school has laigely won claim to the term ‘information warfare.’ 
Their appropriation of the term is evident in the fact that, among the general 
public, the phrase ‘information warfare’ most typically evokes an image of the 
narrow school’s information infrastructure attack-oriented interpretation of 
information age conflict/^
Proponents of a wider interpretation of infoimation warfare, on the other 
hand, have long held different ideas about what ‘information warfare’ means.
As the narrow school’s definition has taken over the popular understanding of 
IW, however, the wider school has largely abandoned efforts at changing the 
definition of the phrase ‘information warfare.’ Instead, many have begun to 
offer allegiance to other turns of phrase - from Information Operations to 
Information-Based Warfare to Conflict in the Information Age - in no small part 
to avoid confusion with ideas to which they do not subscribe."^  ^ The wide view,
Oliver. “The Information Advantage: Defence Technology Survey.” Economist. v 3 3 5 ,10 
Jun 95: 8-17. p .l7
Libicki. Interview with the author. Also Brown, Michael, (Senior Fellow, SAIC). Interview 
with the author. 16 D ec 1996.
One might speculate that the appropriation o f the term ‘information warfare’ by its narrow 
interpreters - a school with which even proponents o f IW find considerable fault - has 
contributed to the widespread scepticism regarding the significance o f information age 
changes in conflict.
Or ideas which form only a part o f the wide school’s interpretation. Cf. Jeffrey Cooper, p.4. 
“...the multiplicity of legitimate perspectives suggests that we would perhaps be better 
adopting a different term than Information Warfare, one less burdened with baggage and 
confusion, with which to discuss this rich spectrum of diverse phenomena.” Cooper, Jeffrey, 
“Understanding Information Warfare: Another View.” Transcript o f the Center for 
Information Strategy and Policy Inaugural Seminar. 30 Aug 95. In Arquilla, John and
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a school which includes Jeffrey Cooper, Martin Libicki, Richard Szafranski, and 
the Tofflers,"^  ^considers IW (under its various new names) to comprise all 
elements of conflict which relate to information/^ This interpretation espouses 
the idea that a Revolution in Military Affairs is at hand, and looks beyond 
information infrastructures to take into account all the innovations of the 
information revolution that affect war.
These include both improvements on old ways of operating, like 
enhanced communication capabilities, and introductions of utterly new tactics, 
like hacking false information into enemy targeting computers. Significantly, 
the wide school takes into account tangible products of the information age - 
e.g. Precision Guided Munitions (PGMs) or the Global Positioning System 
(GPS) - and intangible products like the rise of networked organisations. 
Attention to intangibles like organisation and doctrine is, in fact, a 
distinguishing feature of this school since, unlike their colleagues at the opposite 
end of the IW debate, members of the wide school acknowledge that the 
information age’s impact on waif are goes beyond the mere introduction of new 
technology. To that end, the wide interpretation of information age conflict 
encompasses not only hacker attacks, electronic warfare, and physical 
destruction of information systems, but also the use of those information 
systems to enhance the capability to conduct intelligence, communications, 
command and control, targeting, logistics, and psychological warfaie operations.
David Ronfeldt, eds. In Athena’s Camp: Preparing for Conflict in the Information Age. 
Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1998.
See also Toffler, Alvin, and Heidi Toffler. War and Anti-War: Making Sense o f Today’s 
Global Chaos. Boston: Little Brown, 1993. Libicki. “What is Information Warfare?” 
Cooper. “Understanding Information Warfare.” Szafranski, Col. Richard, USAF. “A 
Theory o f Information Warfare: Prepaiing For 2020.” Air Universitv.
Ronfeldt. Interview with the author.
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as well as the organisational and doctrinal modifications necessary to exploit 
these new capabilities to their fullest.
In this respect, the view of information age wai* contained in the pages of 
this thesis could indeed be classed as a member of IW’s wide school. Like the 
members of that school, the author contends that information age war will be 
distinguished as war with information, a form of conflict in which information is 
pivotal not simply as the target but also, indeed, primarily as the decisive tool 
with which military aims are achieved. The attentive reader may note that this 
inteipretation carries with it not only a separate conception of information 
warfare but also a different understanding of the meaning of ‘information’ itself. 
Whereas ‘information’ in the naiTow school’s ‘information warfare’ refers 
primarily to the information infrastructure and the systems of information 
technologies which comprise it, the wide school’s employment of the term 
‘information’ (which here includes the present work) encompasses not only the 
physical technology, but also the know-how required to create the technology, 
and the information content made so much more accessible by this technology.^^
Yet the understanding of information age war in this study does not 
conform to the thinking of IW’s wide school in all respects. This author agrees 
that the term ‘information’ should not be hijacked to refer only to infoimation
See also Aiquilla, John and David Ronfeldt. Information. Power, and Grand Strateev: in 
Athena’s Camp. Santa Monica, CA; RAND, 1995. Bially, Janice. Information: Conceptual 
Considerations for the Analvsis o f State Power. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1997. P-7998. 
Fogleman, Ronald R. And Sheila E. Widnall. Cornerstones o f Information Warfare. 
Washington, DC: US Department of Defense, 1995. p.2-3. Paige. “Directive 3600.1 - 
Information Operations.” While this distinction in the two schools’ use o f the term 
‘infoimation’ is not always so clear cut, the narrow school’s emphasis on information 
technology over information is most readily evident in the school’s focus on information 
infrastructure attack - attack which sometimes includes propaganda that exploits information 
(particularly in the use o f ‘netwar’ - cf. Arquilla, John. The Advent o f Netwar. Santa 
Monica, CA: RAND, 1996. And Arquilla, John, and David Ronfeldt. “Cyberwar Is
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technology, and that the wide school has appropriately expanded the 
understanding of ‘information warfare’ beyond merely information 
infrastmcture attacks. However, by including so much in their understanding of 
information warfaie, members of the wide school have perhaps gone too fai'. 
Such statements as Oliver Morton’s assertion that “all war is information war”^^  
highlight the principal flaw of IW’s wide school: in attempting to encompass all 
forms of conflict which involve information, the wide interpretation of 
information warfare sheds little light on what is new and different about war in 
the information age.
The problem, as John Arquilla aptly notes, is that many contributors to 
the school say both too much and too little about what information warfaie is:^  ^
too much because members of the wide school tend to embrace every activity 
which attacks or defends information, and too little because they rai'ely stipulate 
how these activities rely on information. To be fair, the need to leverage 
infoimation and information systems synergistically is increasingly becoming 
implicit in much of the wide school’s literature. However, if information age 
war is to be understood as introducing profound changes to warfare, definitions 
of the phenomenon must offer distinct and explicit explanations of 
information’s role in future wars. This is the wide school’s principal failing, 
since many wide school writers leave readers for the most part to assume that 
some unspecified interaction between the innovations of the information 
revolution and the use of information in war has caused the emergence of
Coming!” Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1992.), but most commonly targets information 
systems rather than information itself.
Morton, Oliver. “The Information Advantage: Defence Technology Survey.” Economist. 
v335, 10 Jun 95: 8-18. p. 18
22
‘information w a r f a r e . T h e  implication is simply that information has become 
vastly more crucial to warmaking since the information revolution’s explosion 
of new information technologies. However, as chapter two discusses at length, 
soldiers have always depended on information, just as they have always enjoyed 
periodic advances in the tools of war. Thus, the wide school’s treatment of IW 
offers meagre grounds for understanding information’s present role in wai", or 
the significance of the changes it may introduce to warfare. As a consequence, 
it has failed to build any meaningful consensus about the future of war.
This thesis aims at remedying that failing by specifically examining how 
the relationship between war and information has changed in the infoimation 
age. It attempts to establish what is different about information’s role in future 
war, and how these differences may affect the world’s understanding about war. 
The following chapters also consider the nature of the change, seeking a 
resolution to the claims and counter-claims that information age war is a 
revolution or an evolution of war, a new paradigm or a meaningless justification 
for down-sizing. The ultimate goal is to establish whether the information age 
changes in war could mean new uses or aims for war, or even a new role for war 
in the international system. For if this is to be the case, an understanding of 
information age war is vital not only for those who wage war, but also for those 
whose lives and security may be shaped by war - that is, for the world in 
general.
Arquilla. Interview with the author. 21 Aug 97.
Notable exceptions include Owens. The Emerging U.S. Svstem-of-Svstems. And Cooper, 
Jeffrey. “Dominant Battlespace Awareness and Future Warfare.” in Johnson, Stuart, and 
Martin Libicki, eds. Dominant Battlespace Knowledge. Washington, DC: National Defense 
University Web Page, 1996 Also, Mazarr, Michael J., Don M. Snider, and James A. 
Blackwell, Jr. Desert Storm: the Gulf War and What We Learned. Boulder: Westview
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Paradigm Shift
The vehicle to this understanding is an inquiry into what kind of change 
the information age will introduce in the first place. Throughout the course of 
the information warfare debate, several phrases have been employed to label the 
information age’s transformation of war, ranging in tone according to the image 
of change they intend to convey. The most conservative of these is the 
description of IW as the product of ‘evolution,’ used by those who argue that the 
current changes represent a simple continuation of the many incremental shifts 
which have affected war throughout history. This incremental view will be 
refuted in chapter two. Contradicting the evolution label, the term revolution,^"  ^
used to describe a sudden, radical shift, is the most common of the change 
descriptors. The popularity of the term is testimony to the fact that it has a 
certain utility, particularly to the extent that it can be compared to a political 
revolution, which carries the sense of replacing inadequate methods with newer 
ones.^  ^ However, as chapter two demonstrates, the concept of a ‘revolution’ in 
warfare is widely understood to refer to a particular- phenomenon of change,^^ 
one which does not by itself account for the full transformation lAW may entail. 
The most extreme of the terms applied to the emergence of information age war 
describes the changes in warfare as a ‘paradigm shift.’ In the information 
warfare literature, this term carries the sense of a transformation both more far-
Press, 1993. p.99, Although the synergy spoken o f here does not explicitly apply beyond the 
battlefield.
Often applied as part o f Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), Revolution in Political and 
Military Affairs (RPMA), Military Technology Revolution, or simply military revolution. 
Kuhn, Thomas. “The Structure o f Scientific Revolutions.” International Encvclopedia of 
Unified Science. Vol2, n2. Ed.2. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970. p.92
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reaching and more fundamental than the other terms imply. It is this 
classification of the significance of the information age war transformation that 
is under investigation in this thesis.
The present study, in fact, began as an attempt to prove that information 
age war constitutes a paradigm shift in warfare. The author chose this 
controversial proposition in no small part because the assertion that lAW will 
constitute a new paradigm of war represents the most radical claim about the 
information revolution’s effect on warfare. Proving or disproving the 
appropriateness of the paradigm shift label is therefore a tempting goal because 
it seems to promise a greater contribution to the study of war, and to the 
understanding of the information age’s effect on warfare. A still greater 
influence on the decision to study the paradigm shift argument, however, arises 
from the observation that certain factors in information age society and in the 
practice of war seem to point to the likelihood of such a fundamental 
transformation of wai\ As the following pages will explain, circumstances from 
the coalition’s stunning victory in the Gulf War to the information revolution 
and its parallels to the industrial revolution seem to signify that the information 
age holds the potential to profoundly alter conventional conceptions of war.^  ^
These clues provide a strong inducement to investigate the many claims that 
information age war is a paradigm shift in warfare.
That investigation, however, presents a peculiar challenge: not only do 
participants in the infoimation warfare debate lack consensus on the definition 
of their subject, they have also been unable to foimulate a generally accepted
See chapter two. 
See pp.29, 36
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classification for the changes that subject embodies. In fact, although many 
writers have toyed with the claim that information age war represents a 
paradigm shift,^  ^not a single author in the infoimation warfare field has 
presented answers to such elemental questions as: What is a paradigm? What, 
then, is a paradigm shift? What are the criteria used to ascertain that such a 
transformation is taking place? Does information age war fulfil them? In fact, 
the field is so far from finding answers that to date no one has even asked these 
questions in print.
As a result, the author has turned to a treatment of paradigms outside the 
information warfare debate - outside, even, the canon of international relations - 
in the field of the history of science, namely Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of 
Scientific RevolutionsP Kuhn’s efforts to explain radical shifts in science are 
particularly relevant to the present investigation of information age war, for 
science, like war, is defined by the beliefs, methods, and tools of its 
practitioners. Hence, radical shifts in the understanding of the scientific field do 
much to illuminate the same phenomena in the realm of war.
The term ‘paradigm’ plays a pivotal role in this illumination, as Kuhn 
uses it to label that which is overthrown in the course of a revolution.^® A 
pai'adigm, in wai- as in science, describes the model used to understand the basic 
principles of the discipline. Paradigms set the standard for what can be
Cf. Muni'o, Neil. “The Pentagon's New Nightmare: An Electronic Pearl Harbor.” Washington 
Post. 16 Jul 95. p.2, Lider, Julian. Military Theory: Concept. Structure. Problems. 
Aldershot, Hants: Gower Publishing Co. Ltd., 1983. p.67 James. “Information Warfare: A  
Phenomenon, an Innovation, or a New Paradigm?” As implied by his title, Lieut. James 
goes farthest toward investigating the idea o f paradigm shift, but even this auspiciously titled 
paper never rigorously addresses what a paradigm of war is.
Kuhn, Thomas. The Structuie o f Scientific Revolutions. 1970.
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considered a relevant component of the discipline, as well as for what its 
behaviour is predicted to be/^ Kuhn identifies a scientific community’s 
paradigms as the set of “recuiTent and quasi-standai'd illustrations” of its various 
theories as they are applied conceptually, observationally, and instrumentally/^ 
That is, the paradigm explains why - for instance - light refracts, why refraction 
appears as it does to the human eye, and how we construe refraction as one of 
the characteristic behaviours of light. Likewise, a paradigm of war is the 
military community’s set of standard principles that explain various doctrines as 
they are applied to strategy, operations, and tactics. The paradigm explains why 
a mobile strike of industrialised forces should prevail over cavalry with swords 
and shields, how that victory will manifest itself, and why this illustrates 
inherent advantages of industrialised forces over less advanced militaries.
However, it should be emphasised that while paiadigms are models to 
explain and predict how the world should work, they do not dictate rules for 
proving said predictions. Kuhn stresses that the making of rules requires a step 
beyond that of establishing a paradigm. Rules, in fact, are “isolable elements 
abstracted” from paradigms in the attempt to define something more concretely 
than a paradigm itself can.®^  Yet, the very fact that rules classify a phenomenon 
more rigidly signifies that fewer practitioners will be able to agree with and 
subscribe to any given set. Thus Kuhn asserts that paradigms are “prior to, 
more binding, and more complete than any set of rules for research that could be
It should be noted that the term ‘paradigm shift’ will be used here in place o f Kuhn’s 
‘revolution,’ largely for the reason, stated above, that the term ‘revolution’ has already been 
appropriated to refer to a different sort o f change in the military realm.
Kuhn. The Structure o f Scientific Revolutions, p. 103
Ibid., p.43 Cf. Kuhn’s textbooks, lectures, and laboratory exercises with military doctrine, 
training methods, and field operations
Ibid., p.43,47
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unequivocally abstracted from them,” and as such they are the more appropriate 
unit for the investigation of change/"*
What, then, constitutes paiadigmatic change? A paradigm shift occurs 
when an established model for understanding the world becomes unable to 
explain the realm it once defined. This state of affairs renders an old paradigm 
inadequate and often iiTelevant, and necessitates that a new standard model be 
found.®  ^ Such shifts most commonly occur in response to the appearance of a 
factor which is both so anomalous that the existing paradigm cannot account for 
it, and so significant that it cannot remain unexplained. The coalition’s easy 
victory over Iraq in the 1991 Gulf War is a classic example of such a paradigm- 
challenging factor. In January 1991, Iraq’s army was the fourth largest in the 
world; after years of war with Iran its soldiers were exhausted, but also 
thoroughly trained and experienced.®^ Every industrial age understanding of 
war pointed to a very difficult war between Ir aq and the coalition. Instead, the 
US-led forces drove Saddam’s troops back to Iraq after an air war of 40 days 
and a ground war* that lasted a scant 100 hours.®  ^ Military models based on the 
industrial age understanding of war could not readily account for the ease of the 
victory, in part because the coalition utterly overwhelmed the Iraqis with quick, 
precise operations, relying on an efficiency of action which defied the traditional 
conception of war as an effort requiring a totality of mass. As a consequence,
Ibid., p.46 
Ibid., p.23
Hauss, Charles. Beyond Confrontation: Transforming the New World Order. Westport, CT: 
Praeger, 1996. p.27 This experience, while not up to the standards o f the US, Britain, or 
many o f their Western allies, was still expected to make the Iraqis more formidable enemies 
than they turned out to be in 1991. Of course, one must also take into account that 
experience can act against an army if it is experienced in fighting the wrong sort o f war, as 
proved to be the case for the Iraqis in the Gulf War.
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although the Gulf Wai* did not yet represent a new paradigm of war, it certainly 
did not fit the old paradigm as it was expected to. This discordance has 
necessitated a reassessment of the old models for understanding war, sparking a 
flood of interest in revising old models and devising new ones to explain the 
information age’s impact on warfare.®^
It is worth noting, though, that significant anomalies such as the Gulf 
War’s easy victory may result from either revolutionary or evolutionary factors. 
Paradigm shifts may occur in reaction to the sudden introduction of something 
utterly new and revolutionary which shakes the very foundations of a model. 
Alternatively, they may also result from the gradual emergence of inexplicable 
deviations from the paradigm’s predictions which accumulate over time until an 
incremental tilt of the balance finally challenges the coherence of the entire 
paradigm. Regardless of what sort of changes induce paradigm shifts, however, 
these shifts invariably produce revolutionary effects. As Kuhn himself asserts, 
the assimilation of a new theory always “requires the reconstruction of prior 
theory and the re-evaluation of prior fact, an intrinsically revolutionary 
process.”®® By definition, a paradigm shift necessitates the revolutionary 
transfoimation of a practitioner’s view of the world because it requires him to 
abjure his former model of explaining that world and how it functions.
Taylor, Philip M. War and the Media: Propaganda and Persuasion in the Gulf War. 
Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992. p. 152, 324 
In fact, the Pentagon ordered the first study o f ‘information warfare’ in response to the 
paradigmatic anomalies that the Gulf War brought to the fore. Cf. Tyrrell, Patrick, OBE, 
Capt, Royal Navy. “Information Integrity: the Challenge o f Cyberspace.” Royal College of 
Defense Studies, 1996. p. 19, also Cohen, Eliot. “A Revolution in Warfare.” Foreign 
Affairs. Vol75, n2: 37-54. p.39 
Kuhn. The Structure o f Scientific Revolutions, p.7 By way o f illustration, Kuhn points out 
that the discovery o f oxygen did not simply add one additional element to the world, but 
required scientists to rethink experimental procedures, conceptions o f molecular 
constituency, and other basic assumptions.
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In light of the fact that paradigm shifts typically require scholars to 
change the assumptions on which they may base their life’s work, it is not 
surprising that these sea-changes usually meet with considerable resistance. 
Where a discipline lacks a paradigm, such resistance can be sustained in debate 
and competition with other contending theories. Once a standard of 
understanding is established, however, resistance fades away. This occurs 
because the establishment of a paradigm in the first place rests on the consensus 
of its partisans that said paradigm is able to explain the principles of the field 
better than other available models. Once an ai'ea of inquiry has reached this 
‘mature’ stage,^® theories that do not conform to the paradigm and do not 
surpass the paradigm’s ability to explain the field are simply rejected as 
irrelevant. Seen to offer no contribution to the understanding of the discipline, 
such ex-paradigm ideas are gradually “read out of the discipline.” *^
Therefore, when debate and resistance return to a mature field, it is 
noiTnally a sign that some development has challenged the paradigm’s utility as 
a model for understanding. This resurgence of debate is the first indicator that a 
paradigm shift may be at hand. The present proliferation of plausible 
explanations of information age war thus indeed seems a telltale sign that the 
current changes may represent a paradigm shift. If there were a sense that some 
universally acceptable model (either old or new) could account for infoimation 
age war - as military revolutions such as nuclear deterrence, blitzkrieg, and even 
Air Land Battle are accounted for - then there would be no such multiplicity of
At which point, Kuhn ai'gues, it may first be termed a distinct ‘discipline’ or ‘field.’ Kuhn.
The Structure o f Scientific Revolutions, p.22 
Kuhn. The Structure o f Scientific Revolutions, p. 19
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widely-supported opinions/^ While it is plausible to expect some dissenting 
opinions within any field, the wide-spread support for these varied theories, and 
the utter lack of consensus about them, point to the conclusion that there is - at 
this stage at least - no model which can be said to explain the current 
developments in war better than any other contender. This is becoming an 
increasingly unavoidable indicator that military thinkers must either find some 
way to reconcile the new developments to the old ways of understanding wai*, or 
they must prepare to accept and work with a new paradigm of warfare.
Of these two prospects, investigation of the latter is at first glance the 
more compelling. If proven, a paradigm shift of war would be a radical new 
development in strategic studies, and thus also a fascinating subject of study. 
More prosaically, investigation of this proposition is enticing because several 
signs indicate that information age war might indeed constitute a paradigm shift. 
The most telling of these indications is the fact that old ways of explaining war 
are failing not only in theory - as evidenced by the debate discussed above - but 
also in deed. Although no true information age war has yet occurred to provide 
empirical evidence of a paradigm shift, as previously argued the Gulf War offers 
significant testimony to the inability of the old paradigm, under its present 
interpretation, to account for new information age developments. The failure of 
the industrial age military paradigm adequately to predict - and, especially, to 
explain afterwards - the routing of Saddam’s not inconsiderable military forces
While it is plausible to expect some dissenting opinions, the wide-spread support for these 
varied opinions, and the utter lack o f consensus point to the conclusion that there is at this 
point no model which can be said to explain the cunent developments in war better than any 
other contender.
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is a conspicuous sign that the paradigm itself may be failing, and might soon 
give way to a new model of understanding.
Understanding Paradigm Shift in Context
Anomalies that challenge an old paradigm’s power of explanation do 
not, however, constitute grounds for declaring a paradigm shift in and of 
themselves. There must also be some reason to believe that such a profound 
change could occur now, some cause capable of transfoiTning the way the world 
understands wai*. Yet the roots of such a fundamental shift in warfare must 
certainly lie deeper than the simple introduction of new ways of doing things, 
deeper than the innovation of new weapons and other tools for the war machine. 
Such changes have occurred countless times and are most commonly 
accommodated within the framework of existing paradigms,whereas the 
overthrow of a paradigm is a truly rare occasion. In fact, such a profound 
transformation occurs only when it becomes clear that established military 
wisdom is unable to account not simply for changes in the methods of 
waifighting, but for more fundamental changes in the very principles governing 
warfare.
One might ask then, if the logical sources of change in war - the 
introduction of new weapons and/or new methods - do not account for paradigm 
shift, what could possibly affect war so deeply as to alter the very principles of 
war? And why might one suspect that such a transformation could be occurring 
now? The answer, this thesis argues, is not one sought by most theorists of 
military change, for the source of such fundamental shifts in the understanding
See chapter two, particularly the sections ‘Historical Manifestations o f Information Warfare’ 
and ‘Military Revolution.’
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of war lies outside war itself. It is, instead, rooted in the context within which 
war occurs.
Military paradigm shifts occur as the result of extensive and profound 
societal transformation. Context is a crucial barometer of this phenomenon, 
because such a transformation affects not only the power contests of warfare, 
but all of the relationships that hold a civilisation together. Thus, the 
phenomenon that requires the paradigm for understanding wai* to be rewritten 
also alters the stage upon which war is played. That stage, moreover, has 
historically begun to change before the new script for war first emerges - a fact 
evidenced by the advent of the industrial revolution and its subsequent effect on 
warfare. "^* For these reasons, extensive shifts in the context of wai* constitute a 
powerful foreshadowing that a similar transformation in the content of war may 
follow.
This assessment of context’s role in understading military paradigm shift 
draws heavily on the work of Alvin and Heidi Toffler. The Tofflers, futurists, 
social theorists, and self-described ‘post-Marxists,’ began writing about the rise 
of the information age in the late 1960s. They first achieved real fame, though, 
when they captured the imagination of the US military^^ with 1993’s War and 
Anti-Wai*. So enthralled were elements of the military with the Tofflers ideas 
that works as significant as the Army Focus 94; Force XXI doctrine position 
paper trace a direct and evident influence back to the book.^® This heyday, 
however, was short-lived. Critics of the Tofflers quickly proliferated, citing
Similar parallels between the industrial age and the information age will provide significant 
illustrations throughout the thesis.
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their irrealism, their blatant lack of familiarity with subjects as fundamental to 
the books as military history, and, above all, their general lack of rigour/^ 
Almost as quickly as they had risen to prominence, the Tofflers fell out of 
favour.
Despite the many and valid criticisms of their work, however, the 
Tofflers’ ideas have left a lingering impression on the field of information 
warfare studies. They may have taken their enthusiasm for the Third Wave too 
fai* (and their research not far enough), but the Tofflers broke valuable ground 
with their books and, perhaps most importantly, they popularised a vocabulary 
and methodology^^ for thinking about the infoimation age that still holds 
cuiTency today.^ ® For this reason, it is still useful to understand the Tofflerian 
thinking about information age context and its role in understanding the 
potential for military paradigm shift.
According to the Tofflers and their proponents, the cause for believing a 
change as profound as a paradigm shift might be occuiiing now is the societal 
transformation sparked by the information revolution. The hallmarks of the 
resultant information age constitute the changes in context that lead one to
Newt Gingrich is also a noted long-time fan. Judis, John B. “Newt’s Not-So-Weird Gurus.” 
The New Republic. Vol213, 1995; 16-18. Gingrich, Newt. To Renew America. New York: 
Harper Collins Publishers, 1995. p.52 
DiNardo and. Hughes. “Some Cautionary Thoughts on Information Warfare.” p.2 
DiNardo and. Hughes. “Some Cautionary Thoughts on Information Warfare.” p. 2 Cohen, 
Eliot A. “War and Anti-War Book Review.” Foreign Affairs. Vol73, n3. May-June 1994. 
p.l56. Jablonsky, David. “The Owl o f Minerva Flies at Twilight: Doctrinal Chance and 
Continuity and the Revolution in Military Affairs.” Carlisle, PA: US Aimy War College 
Web page. May 1994. pp.7-10.
Mayfield, Terry; Senior Fellow, IDA. Interview with the author. 17 December 1996. Judis.
“Newt’s Not-So-Weird Gurus.” p. 16 
Cf. Security Policy Board. “White Paper on Information Infrastructure Assurance.” 
Federation of American Scientists. Project on Government Secrecy. Dec 95. p.7, Jensen, 
Owen. “Information Warfare: Principles o f Third-Wave War.” Airpower Journal, vol. 8. 1 
Jan 94: 35-44. p.35, Szafranski, Col. Richard, USAF. “A  Theory of Information Warfare:
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suspect that information age war may require a new paradigm for understanding 
warfare. Since the information revolution and its impact on the context of 
warfare will be treated in depth in the first chapter, suffice it to say here that, 
unlike that of its military progeny, the significance of the information revolution 
is a subject of relatively little debate. Evidence of its profound impact is 
everywhere one turns: in the speed with which long-distance telephones make it 
possible to speak to someone on the other side of the world, the wealth of 
information available on the internet, the accessibility of political leaders via e- 
mail, the competitive edge of corporations which integrate the advantages of 
information management, the education potentials of multi-media and of long­
distance collaboration, the vast sums of money transfened electronically, and 
even in the danger of crippling vulnerability should we lose the information 
systems that support all of these transactions on which we have come to depend 
so much.
The pervasiveness of these changes arises from the fact that the 
information revolution not only alters technology and its uses, but in so doing, it 
is shifting the configuration of power.^® While information has always been an 
important component of power (indeed, Francis Bacon asserted that “knowledge 
is power” over three hundred years ago) it is becoming exponentially more 
important in the infonnation age. Information technologies now enable people 
to direct the collection, management, and use of information with high 
precision, allowing the information-savvy to create advantages on the basis of
Preparing For 2020.” Air University Web page, 1995. p.2. Burton, Daniel F,, Jr. “The 
Brave New Wired World.” Foreign Policy. No 106, Spring 1997: 23-38. p.23.
Cf. Fast, William R. Lt. Col. “Knowledge Strategies: Balancing Ends, Ways, and Means in 
the Information Age.” National Defense University Sun Tzu Art of War in Information
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information with unprecedented reliability. As a result, access to and control 
over information is increasingly playing a much more regularised role in the 
accmal of power.
Again, examples from everyday life in the information age provide the 
best illustration of information’s power. The economic realm furnishes an 
optimal source for such testimony, since it is here that the methods of the 
information age have become most entrenched. Consider that a company can 
use such information technologies as computer-assisted design and 
manufacturing (CAD-CAM) to plan precisely what resources and tools it needs 
to produce a good or service; this should allow the company to purchase only 
those resources it requires, which costs less than stocking smpluses for 
contingencies. If the company then moves from this planning stage to a 
production system which integrates information management to insure that all 
systems operate in optimal co-ordination, the company should be able function 
on a production cycle^  ^considerably faster than that of its competitors. Such an 
abbreviation of production time confers a natural advantage on the open 
market.
Moreover, if the company then employs computer tracking (such as bar 
codes, for example) in its inventory management, it can carefully monitor its
Warfare Prize. Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1997. p.3, Levi, 
Werner. The Coming End o f War. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1981. p.90 
Fogleman, Ronald R. Gen., Chief o f Staff, USAF. Horizon. Washington, DC: US Air Force 
Web page, August 1995. p .l, Nye, Joseph S. Bound to Lead: the Changing Nature of  
American Power. New York: Basic Books, 1991. p. 196 
The period o f time required to create a finished product from a prototype.
Cf. also Herrera, Geoffrey L. “N ew Information Technologies and the Future o f State 
Security.” Monterey, CA: Proceedings o f the Security Studies Conference on Revolutions 
in Military Affairs, Naval Post-graduate School, August 1996. p. 14 Cf. also Nichiporuk, 
Brian and Carl Builder. Information Technologies and the Future o f Land Warfare. Santa 
Monica, CA: RAND, 1995. p .22
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supply of goods, which ought to cut down on the need to maintain stockpiles for 
contingencies and drastically reduce inventory wasted through misplacement. 
The same system can also enable the company to track customer demand for 
particular products, which can help it tailor supply patterns to reduce waste 
further. In this way information can replace both monetary and physical 
resources to a significant extent by enabling a company to produce goods 
cheaper, faster, and more easily than it could have before the information 
revolution.^"* If the company also combines these advantages of efficiency with 
information-intensive marketing techniques, its market edge may become still 
more difficult to surpass. Vast computer data-bases of consumer preferences 
and buying practices should allow companies to custom-design advertising and 
target their markets where they will reach the most consumers with a demand 
for their product. Using this information, a company may be able to increase its 
market share - even if it does not increase its supply of its product - simply by 
insuring that the customers who would want their product have access to it.
Such grand-scale leveraging of information technologies represents a 
distinctly new way of creating economic advantage. Any competitor who does 
not employ information as well - or does not rely on information at all - is likely 
to be simply unable to match the pace, the targeting, the cost, or the level of 
resource-reliance of a leading infoimation age company. Moreover, each 
additional infoimation technology the latter employs serves to multiply further 
the company’s benefits from infoimation integration, a factor which could 
propel fully information age companies not geometrically, but exponentially
^  Fast. “Knowledge Strategies.” p.7. and Drucker, Peter F. “The Economy’s Power Shift.’ 
Wall Street Journal. 24 Sept 92: A16.
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ahead of their less advanced competition. With this decisive advantage over the 
competition, the more successfully information age-integrated companies gain 
the means of influencing the market in which they compete. That influence 
represents a new form of power of which infoimation is a calculated, critical, 
and decisive component.
As the information age progresses and peimeates successive areas of 
life, information’s pivotal role in power will likely extend beyond the economic 
realm to affect all forms of power relationships. The Tofflers have been 
prominent among those who argue that this expansion can be predicted with 
reasonable certainty on the model of historical example.®  ^ When the industrial 
revolution began to transform the agricultural age into the industrial age, its first 
effects were also felt in the economy. Just as information age technologies now 
render physical resources less important to manufacturing by making production 
cheaper, faster, and easier, so industrial machines introduced by the industrial 
revolution diminished the importance of land by increasing the speed, ease, and 
quantity of food that could be produced on each unit of land.^ ® As a 
consequence, economic power shifted from those who had land to those who 
possessed the modes of production.^^ Moreover, political power also gradually 
shifted from the landed aristocracy to the merchant class as land (and the 
amount of crops and vassals it could support) declined as a source of influence. 
Social relationships likewise changed as nuclear families more easily
Cf. especially Toffler, Alvin. The Third Wave. New York: Bantam, 1980.
Peter Drucker predicts that, by 2010, the proportion o f the labour force in blue collar work 
will equal that in agricultural work. This prediction rests on the assumption that the rising 
significance o f knowledge workers will lai gely replace the importance o f industrial workers, 
just as the latter once supplanted the primary role o f agricultural workers. Coates, Joseph F. 
and Jennifer Jarratt. What Futurists Believe. Mt Airy, MD: Lomond Publications, 1989. p. 
139.
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maintained in urban life - where many jobs were in factories - replaced the 
multi-generational families that had dominated society when more family 
members meant more hands to work the land. Signs that the information 
revolution will have similarly pervasive effects are discussed at length in 
chapter one.
The historical parallel between the impact of the information revolution 
and that of the industrial revolution supports the argument that the effect of such 
profound societal transformations on the context of war is a prelude for their 
effect on war itself. The industrial revolution not only industrialised economic, 
political, and social power relationships, but by introducing mechanised 
warfare, it industrialised military power as well. This is a logical progression, 
for if the hallmark of such extensive social transformations is the fact that they 
alter the configuration of power, they must necessarily affect war, since war 
represents the supreme contest for power. The argument for understanding 
lAW’s claims to the title of military paradigm shift through the contextual 
changes of the information age will be the subject of chapter two.
With the establishment of the understanding that war’s context is 
cuiTently in transformation, and that this transformation signifies the possibility 
of a similarly significant transfoimation in warfare, the bulk of the remaining 
chapters focus on determining whether or not information age war actually will 
fulfil the multiplying expectations for a new paradigm of war. Each chapter 
deals with a separate barometer of paradigm shift, investigating the extent to 
which lAW satisfies the various criteria that delineate the significance of the 
current transformation. These criteria entail fundamental shifts in the standards
Toffler and Toffler. War and Anti-War. Ch. 3
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for how wars proceed, at what and where war is directed, who can and will 
wage wai', and why wars are waged. They have been chosen as the most salient 
measurements of military paradigm shift because changes in each of these may 
affect not only the waging of war, but the way in which the world understands 
war. The study of information age war’s potential to bring such changes should 
therefore illuminate whether the information age’s influence on warfare 
necessitates the establishment of a new model for explaining war.
The Interplay of Context and Content
The ultimate significance of this investigation into the possibility of an
information age military paradigm shift, however, lies beyond a mere academic 
interest in the models for explaining warfare. It lies beyond curiosity in the 
information revolution’s parallels to previous paiadigmatic shifts, and beyond 
the desire to prove the most radical claims about lAW’s significance as well. 
Rather, the real significance of the investigation lies in the fact that, if a 
paradigm shift truly is occurring, the world would need to revise the way it 
thinks not only about war, but also about how war affects the world. New 
principles of warfare might mean that war in the information age would have a 
different role in the international system, a new position among the interactions 
between states, and new implications for the involvement of individuals. These 
wider effects of paradigm shift result from a second link between the content 
and context of warfare: changes in the context of warfare not only illuminate 
paradigmatic changes in war’s content, but also result from these very content 
shifts. The link between context and content is therefore neither strictly parallel 
nor strictly causal, but rather an interplay of both.
40
On the one hand, changes in the context of warfare are the first 
indication of the emergence of a societal transformation radical enough to alter 
the models for understanding warfare. Such contextual changes result directly 
from the societal transformation itself, and both forecast the chaiacter of a 
coming military paradigm shift, as well as influence the manner in which that 
paradigm shift manifests itself. For example, the industrial revolution produced 
an industrial age that revolved around mechanisation and massed resources; 
looking at history with the benefit of hindsight, the introduction of this age also 
foreshadowed the rise of mechanised warfare centred on attrition of numbers. 
Moreover, the existence of mechanisation and the emphasis it created on mass 
allowed the industrial age wai' form to leverage mass-produced mechanical tools 
of war, for without the factories and the transferral of power to those who 
controlled the means of mass production, industrial age war could not have 
emerged as it did.
On the other hand, in cases of paradigm shift some changes in the 
context of warfare result from the very content changes first foreshadowed by 
shifts in context. As direct products of the new content of warfare, such 
contextual changes are indirect products of societal transformation, and 
represent a further shift in context beyond that which first forecasted the military 
paradigm shift. To expand on the above assertion, consider the fact that 
industrial warfare led to the emergence of total war, which changed the way 
states viewed war as a tool of politics. The devastation of the world wars created 
a feai* of war which led first to the policy of appeasing Hitler - designed to avoid 
a return to war after World War I - and later to the centrality of nuclear 
detenence, a strategy in which the main puipose of the supeipowers’ most
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devastating arsenals was to insure that war never erupted. This fear of the 
totality of industrial age war, and the accompanying reluctance to use war as a 
tool for shaping the anarchical affairs of the international system, lay behind the 
Kellogg-Briand Pact, the League of Nations Charter, and the United Nations 
Chai'ter, all of which were state-sanctioned attempts to outlaw war (to one 
extent or another) for the first time in history. By introducing such levels of 
devastation to warfare, industrial age war not only altered war, it influenced the 
system in which such war was waged.
In this manner a paiadigm shift in the content of waif are represents not 
only the culmination of changes in war’s context, but also the source of further 
contextual change. This interlinked relationship between the context and 
content of war is perhaps the most urgent reason for studying the information 
age’s potential to produce a military paradigm shift. Because, if the information 
age war form truly does alter the way the world understands war, it may also 
change the way the world uses war, as well as the way war affects the world - 
consequences which strategists and scholars alike should recognise and prepare 
for before launching such a wai*. This is a theme hinted at throughout the body 
of the thesis, but it will be dealt with most directly in the seventh, and 
concluding, chapter.
A Word about Format
Chapter one is concerned particularly with the context of information 
age war. The chapter examines what the information revolution is, and how it 
has already begun to affect developed societies, especially with respect to the 
roles of man (individuals) and the state in those societies. Chapter two
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examines the reasons for studying the information age militar y paradigm shift 
argument through the lens of context. The chapter investigates two of the 
arguments most commonly used to explain the emergence of lAW - the claims 
that information age war is an extension of information’s historical role in war, 
and that the war* form is a revolution in military affairs - and determines that 
both fail to account for the myriad assertions of lAW’s significance. The 
contextual reading of the paradigmatic shift offered in this chapter attempts to 
provide a more appropriate foundation for the further investigation of these 
claims.
Chapters three through six consider in greater detail whether or not 
today’s profound contextual changes really do point to a paradigm shift of war 
in the information age. Each chapter deals with one of the barometers of 
paradigm shift: changes in the how, what, who, and why of warfare. Chapter 
three investigates how information age war will likely be waged, detailing how 
the means of war seem to have taken on a new imperative for efficiency. Under 
this imperative, the speed and accuracy of militaiy action provide the key to 
victory. Chapter four discusses what information age war may target, arguing 
that a new ‘civilianisation’ of war is at hand. This phenomenon may 
increasingly blur the distinction between civilian and military both in the tools 
and the targeting of information age war.
Chapter five deals with why information age war will be waged, 
examining the manner in which changes in how war is waged may further affect 
the choice to wage LAW, and the reasons why actors might make that choice. 
This chapter also addresses whether information age shifts in the context of wai* 
will affect the motivations and objectives over which actors wage war, and
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considers the extent to which new actors could introduce new objectives for war 
in the information age. Chapter six looks at who can wage war in the 
information age, examining lAW’s dual widening and weakening influences on 
the two principal sets of actors in war: states and non-state actors. Infoimation 
age war’s paradoxical influence on these actors comes closest to fulfilling the 
criterion for paradigm shift because, by shifting the balance of relative military 
advantage between states and non-state actors, this widening and weakening 
effect holds the potential to alter the conventional perception of who can wage 
war. The seventh, and final, chapter discusses the thesis’s conclusions. It 
assesses whether or not information age war fulfils the criteria for paradigm 
shift, and what this means for the way the world understands war. After 
identifying how lAW is likely to change war, the concluding chapter also 
examines the implications of this change for man, the state, and the international 
system, and discusses directions for future research to deepen our understanding 




Man, the State, and the Information Revolution
This is the dawn of the information age. Compared to the continuing 
confusion over the nature and impact of information age war, relative consensus 
exists about the significance of the information age itself.^ The information 
revolution drives the emergence of this age with the introduction of new 
information technologies, as well as new methods and organisational forms 
designed to exploit the advantages of these technologies to the utmost.^ Such 
innovations have already clearly begun to induce profound changes in business, 
education, government, and even society in general. Yet the effect of the 
infoimation revolution on wai" remains considerably more ambiguous. This 
dissertation aims to address that ambiguity and to elucidate not only what 
information age war is, but how it differs from previous manifestations of war 
as a result of the information age’s influence.
Before one can even begin to investigate how the information age will 
affect war, however, one must first establish an understanding of the 
infoimation revolution, since it is the vehicle of all information age change. To 
that end, this chapter will examine the information revolution both as a general
 ^ This comparative agreement owes primarily to the existence o f tangible and increasingly 
measurable evidence that attests to the emergence o f this age and hints, at least, to the 
significance o f its eventual impact. Cf. Drucker, Peter. The Frontiers o f Management. New  
York: Dutton, 1986. Bell, Daniel. The Coming of Post-Industrial Society; A Venture in 
Social Forecasting. New York: Basic Books, 1973, Freedman, Lawrence. Information 
Warfare: Will Battle Ever Be Joined?. London: International Centre for Security Analysis, 
October 1996. p.2 (Freedman is himself an IW sceptic), Bankes, Steve, & Carl Builder. 
“Seizing the Moment: Harnessing the Information Technologies.” The Information Society. 
V ois, 1992: 1-59. p7, Szafranski, Col. Richard, USAF. “A Theory o f Information Warfare: 
Preparing For 2020.” Air Universitv. p.3, Wriston, Walter B. “Technology and 
Sovereignty.” Foreign Affairs. Vol 67, n2, 1988-89: 63-75. p.65, and Jensen, Owen. 
Information Warfare: Principles o f Third-Wave War.” Airpower Journal, vol. 8. 1 Jan 94: 
35-44. p.2
transformative force, and as a specific influence on the shifting roles of ‘man’ 
(i.e. the individual) and the state in the coming age. These two elements play a 
crucial part in the prelude to understanding how the information revolution will 
affect war for two reasons. First, as relatively obvious and concrete examples of 
the infomiation revolution’s transformative potential, the prospective shifts in 
the status of man and the state are useful because they provide readily grasped 
evidence of the information age’s impact on the world. More importantly, man 
and the state, with the international war system itself, form the three levels at 
which social scientists - most famously Kenneth Waltz - commonly locate the 
causes of war.^ These three levels of analysis thus form the most relevant 
context of warfaie. That context, as the introduction notes, plays a vital role in 
understanding changes in war itself, since the concept of information age 
military paradigm shift under consideration in the following chapters draws 
close links between the context and the content of war.'  ^ Comprehending shifts 
in the context of war, therefore, is in its own right a necessary prerequisite for 
understanding information age war and the nature of its changes.
 ^Ronfeldt, David F. “Cyberocracy Is Coming.” Information Society. VoI8: 243-296,1992.
Santa Monica, CA: RAND Reprints, 1996. p.245 
 ^Cf. Waltz, Kenneth N. Man. the State, and War: A  Theoretical Analvsis. N ew York, 
Columbia University Press, 1954. Also Rapoport, Anatol. The Origins o f Violence: 
Approaches to the Studv of Conflict. New York: Paragon House, 1989. Brodie, Bernard. 
War and Politics. N ew York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1973. Brown, Seyom. The 
Causes and Prevention o f War. New York: St Martin’s Press, 1994.
 ^See also this chapter’s section on the context o f  lAW , particularly p.47, and chapter two’s 
section “Taking lAW  in Context.”
The Information Revolution
What is the information revolution, that it is capable of introducing a 
new era? In its modem incarnation,^ the teim ‘information revolution’ 
encompasses the explosion of information technologies (or ITs) over the course 
of the last several decades. The phrase most commonly refers to the recent 
advances in computing and network capabilities which have yielded such 
impressive developments as: the proliferation of personal computing, the 
increasing miniaturisation and sophistication of processing capabilities, the 
improvement of random-access memory capacity and modem baud rates, as 
well as the introduction of new developments like cd-rom information storage 
and retrieval, electronic mail and, particularly, the internet. In addition, the 
information revolution also incorporates such inventions as mobile telephony, 
facsimile machines, direct broadcast satellite communications, and even video 
recording, which involve the collection, storage, and/or transfer of information 
though they do not strictly fall under the rubric of computing or networking 
technology.
The information revolution is not, however, only a technological 
phenomenon: Webster defines “revolution” as “a sudden, radical, or complete 
change.”  ^ The information revolution is so named not simply because it 
introduces radically different technologies, but because the influx of these 
technologies dramatically alters the way the world uses information, and what
 ^The introduction o f phonetic writing systems and o f the printing press were themselves also 
‘information revolutions,’ but only the modern information revolution will be under 
discussion here. For discussion o f earlier information revolutions, cf. Dewar, James A. The 
Information Age and the Printing Press: Looking Backward to See Ahead. Santa Monica, 
CA: RAND, 1997. Eisenstein, Elizabeth L. The Printing Press as an Agent of Change.
New York: Cambridge University Press. 1979. Beniger, James R. The Control Revolution: 
Technological and Economic Origins of the Information Society. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1986. p.2.
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people use infoimation for7 The revolution’s innovations in information 
technology make more information available more quickly and easily than ever 
before, a trend which is encouraging people to rely on information in entirely 
new ways. From the use of computer integrated manufacturing to speed and 
streamline production, to the leveraging of networked databases cataloguing 
consumer preference to heighten the effectiveness of advertising campaigns, to 
the employment of Global Positioning System satellites to maximise the 
military’s operational effectiveness, members of information age societies have 
already begun to depend on information-based advantages across many diverse 
areas of human activity. This revolutionary reliance on information will 
culminate ultimately in the revolution’s most radical change of all: a shift in the 
recipe for power which renders information the most important ingredient in the 
equation.
In the information age, Francis Bacon’s adage that “knowledge is 
power” will become more true than ever before. Power, which Hans 
Morgenthau defines as “man’s control over the minds and actions of other 
men,”  ^has always relied to some extent on the ability to control information. 
The scope of that extent, however, is changing dramatically. As the infoimation 
age spreads, information-based forms of power increasingly eclipse more 
traditional power conceptions (commonly based on economic and military
 ^Merriam-Webster Dictionary. New York: Pocket Books, 1985.
 ^Laughridge, Gene. “Recent and Not-so-recent Thinking on Information Operations and the 
Knowledge War.” Army Communicator. Vol20. 1 Apr 95: 32-39. p.38. also The 21st 
Century Army: Roles. Missions, and Functions in an Age o f Information and Uncertainty. 
Ann Arbor, MI: Vector Research, 1995. p.x Aiquilla and Ronfeldt even go so far as to 
predict that the innovations o f the information age may “change how people spend their time 
and what and who they know and care about.” Arquilla and Ronald. “Cyberwar Is 
Coming!” p.3.
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might) as the most important manifestations of influence.^ Not only is 
information itself more influential - from education, to the influence of the news 
media, to civil activism over the internet - but force and wealth depend more 
and more on knowledge as the root of their influence. Modern military and 
economic giants would be lost without computers to guide their missiles or 
regulate their stock markets; they would be crippled without sophisticated, 
knowledge-intensive technologies to run their communications or to aid the 
manufacture of their goods. As a result of this new dependence, information’s 
role in the power equation has shifted from that of playing adjunct to the other 
components, to serving instead as the most decisive (though still not the only) 
element of the equation.’® Since power relations influence and govern almost 
every aspect of human interaction, such a profound change in the composition 
of power necessaiily holds considerable implications for the conduct of human 
relationships on every level from individual, to state, to global system.
Recognising this as a fruitful - and profitable - ground for investigation, 
forecasters predicting fundamental social changes resulting from the 
information revolution have multiplied at an alarming rate since the early 
1990’s. Among the most prominent of these are the futurists Alvin and Heidi 
Toffler,”  who maintain that the information revolution is the third great societal
Morgenthau, Hans J. Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. Thompson, 
Kenneth W., revised. New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1985. p.32 
 ^Alvin Toffler identifies a ‘power triad’ o f knowledge, wealth, and force. While he makes a 
distinction between information and knowledge, the two are simply different levels o f the 
information hierarchy, which ranges from raw data to refined wisdom. Toffler, Alvin. 
Powershift: Knowledge. Wealth, and Violence at the Edge of the 21st Centurv. New York: 
Bantam Books, 1990. p .l9  
Toffler. Powershift. p. 18 
" Cf. Toffler, Alvin. The Third Wave. New York: Bantam, 1980. Toffler. Powershift.
Toffler, Alvin and Heidi. Creating a New Civilization. Turner Publishing. 1995. and 
Toffler, Alvin and Heidi. War and Anti-War: Making Sense o f Today’s Global Chaos. 
Boston: Little Brown, 1993.
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transformation of its kind, following the agricultural revolution and the 
industrial revolution.’  ^ For this reason, the Tofflers dubbed the information 
revolution, and the resultant rise of the information age, the “Third Wave” of 
radical civilisation change.’^  The imminence of this new era, they assert, is 
evident in current “shifts in the way we make wealth,” since such shifts are the 
hallmarks of a transition from one wave to the next.’"’ As the agricultural 
revolution transformed nomadic hunter-gatherers into farmers tied to their lands, 
and the industrial revolution shifted the farmers into cities dependent on 
manufacturing, so the information revolution is poised to change human 
civilisation at its roots. Though the Tofflers attained national prominence only 
in the 1990s, they first predicted such information age transformation as early as 
1 9 7 0  15 predictions, with those of Daniel Bell, Peter Drucker, Marshall
McLuhan (who forecasted the rise of a knowledge class, the transition from 
mechanised work to knowledge work, and the emergence of a ‘global village’ 
based on the connectivity of global communications, respectively), and others, 
were among the eailiest claims that information was attaining a new 
significance with the coming of the post-industrial age.’®
Though the world has seen systemic change outside these transitions (e.g. in the invention of 
the printing press in the 15th century, or the atomic bomb in the 20th century) the Tofflers 
argue that only these three movements have revolutionised the very sources o f both wealth 
and power.
Toffler, Alvin and Heidi. War and Anti-War: Making Sense o f Today’s Global Chaos. 
Boston: Little Brown, 1993. p.8
Toffler and Toffler. War and Anti-War. p.21
Alvin Toffler’s first prominent book on the subject. Future Shock was published in this year.
McLuhan, Marshall. Understanding Media: The Extensions o f Man. London: Routledge, 
1964, Drucker. The Frontiers o f Management. Bell, Daniel. The Coming o f Post-Industrial 
Society: A Venture in Social Forecasting. New York: Basic Books, 1973.
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While the Tofflers may overstate their argument to a certain extent,’^  the 
agricultural and industrial ages are useful precedents from which to understand 
the rise of the information age. One might compare today’s changes to the 
industrial revolution’s transformation of the agricultural age in order to illustrate 
the revolutionary new role which information will play in everything from the 
running of individual lives to the maintenance of the international system. The 
industrial revolution introduced machines that negated the leverage of 
possessing an advantage in land and agriculture by making farming cheaper, 
faster, and easier. Industry then replaced farming as the chief method of 
securing prosperity and a better standard of life. During this transition from 
agricultural to industrial age, power shifted from those who had land to those 
who possessed the modes of production; the state and loyalties of nationalism 
replaced the feudal system and loyalties to land and lord; and warfare changed 
from a contest between a skilled few with horses and swords to a battle of 
masses armed with machines.’^
If the predictions of the futurists are comect, the changes introduced by 
the infoimation age will do to manufacturing what manufacturing did to 
agriculture, rendering the methods and advantages of industry as iiTelevant to 
power as agriculture has become.’  ^ Just as today no one would consider a lack
See the introductory chapter, ‘Understanding Paradigm Shift in Context,’ for critiques on the 
Tofflers’ work.
Toffler and Toffler. War and Anti-War. Ch. 3 The ‘skilled few’ o f the feudal age is, o f 
course, relative. Medieval armies were composed not only o f knights, but o f massed infantry 
drawn from feudal levies o f the peasantry. The size of that feudal massed infantry, however, 
was dwarfed by the numbers raised by the Napoleonic levée en masse.
Wriston, Walter B. “Technology and Sovereignty.” Foreign Affairs. Vol67, n2. 1988-89: 
63-75. p.65
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of farmland as a detriment to the massing of economic or political p o w er , in  
the future, factories and production may matter little to people who use 
knowledge-intensive technologies to do their work more cheaply, quickly, and 
efficiently. Their power will stem from their command of information systems, 
with which they will build more sophisticated weapons, create more efficient 
means of production, and organise more orderly societies. Like farming, 
manufacturing will be far from obsolete and unnecessary in the information age, 
but as it increasingly rules the success of manufacturing, information will 
eclipse the significance of industry in power.
One might ask, however, why many are predicting the recurrence of such 
systemic change in our own time. Not surprisingly, the advent of the 
information age, and the changes it brings, owes a great deal to the 
technological side of the information revolution, that is, the recent explosion of 
increasingly sophisticated innovations in information technology. Specifically, 
the development of computers since the discovery of the binary system and the 
invention of the silicon chip has opened the door to entirely new horizons of 
information processing.^’ While one might argue that the information 
revolution actually began long before these innovations,^^ it only really started 
to gather steam in the early 1970s with the introduction of silicon
^  Consider Japan, which uses machines to maximise production on its farmlands, and relies on 
the air and shipping industries to import the rest o f what it needs. The country can afford this 
practice because it has dominated industrial production and amassed significant leverage 
horn economic power. Toffler. Powershift. p.432 
Szafranski, Col. Richard, USAF. “A Theory o f Information Age War: Preparing For 2020.” 
Air University, p.3
^  Cf. James Beniger, who saw the beginning o f a “control revolution” with the introduction of 
such industrial age information technologies as the telegraph and the telephone. Beniger, 
James R. The Control Revolution: Technological and Economic Origins of the Information 
Society. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986.
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microprocessor chips?^ From then on computing capacity has grown 
exponentially, doubling every two years since the early 1980s.^'’ Further 
innovations in telecommunications have converged with the rise of computers 
to truly revolutionise infoimation systems and pave the way for a 
revolutionisation in the use of information in turn/® Though far from 
determining the rise of a new age, the combination of these technologies for the 
first time enables the creation of that age. The information age is thus emerging 
now in part because the transformation has only just become technically 
possible.
The mere existence of the new information technologies cannot, 
however, transform the world all on its own. In fact, the technological 
significance of the information revolution owes, in large part, to the 
unprecedented accessibility of information age innovations and the power they 
make available. In the words of Steve Bankes and Carl Builder, “it is the world­
wide spread of cheap, reliable, and powerful information devices that is truly 
revolutionary.” ®^ This distribution of information technology began 
innocuously, independent of any intention to spark global change. Instead, the 
increasingly global reach of the information revolution was driven primarily by 
the market forces behind the world-wide sale of computers and other 
sophisticated ITs. In a trend evident in the introduction of virtually every 
invention from the walkman to the laptop computer, once on the transnational 
market, global competition over the production and sale of a new technology
Nichiporuk, Brian and Carl Builder. Information Technologies and the Future of Land 
Warfare. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1995. p.8. Also Beniger. The Control Revolution.
p.6
^  Ronfeldt. “Cyberocracy Is Coming.” p.257
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increases. Suppliers’ attempt to undersell each other to gain a greater share of 
the new market, which drives the product’s price down, and the increases the 
obtainability of the technology.As access to these information technologies 
(and thus to resources like the internet and the information found there) 
becomes more universal, information, and the power it conveys in the 
information age, will likewise become more widely, and potentially also more 
evenly distributed.^^
Yet the spread of new information technology is not in itself a force 
significant enough to spark the rise of a new age. The factor which most 
directly lays the foundation for the information age is the emergence of 
significantly new practices, methods, and organisational forms designed 
specifically to exploit the advantages of infoimation - advantages now made 
readily available through the spread of modem information technologies with 
their heightened capacities for collecting, storing, processing, and 
communicating information.^^ These practical changes, in combination with the 
global distribution of sophisticated IT advances, provide the missing catalyst for 
the emergence of an age defined by its decisive leverage of infoimation.
Principal among these new developments in information use is the 
growing popularity of network organisational patterns over traditional 
hierarchical institutions. Throughout much of history, hierarchical
Wriston, Walter B. “Technology and Sovereignty.” Foreign Affairs. 1988-89. p.65 
^  Bankes and Builder. “Seizing the Moment.” p.4 
Vogler, John. “Technology and Change in International Relations: on the Independence of a 
Variable.” Change and the Studv o f International Relations: The Evaded Dimension. 
Buzan, Barry, and R.J. Barry Jones, eds. London: Frances Pinter Ltd., 1981. p. 149 
The equality of information dissemination is, however, by no means assured. Daniel Bell 
predicted the rise o f a knowledge elite and the division o f information age society into 
information “haves” and “have-nots” as early as 1973. Cf. Bell, The Coming of Post- 
Industrial Society, p.426 also Ronfeldt. “Cyberocracy Is Coming.” p.270
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organisational structures have governed every part of human life from family, to 
job, to government and security.^® Hierarchies traditionally maintain themselves 
through a rigid structure of information distribution, often monopolising certain 
information in the uppermost tiers of the organisation to establish a de facto 
advantage over the lower tiers by leaving them out of the infoimation loop. 
However, the information revolution’s widespread distribution of ITs - and the 
information to which those technologies provide access - challenges that 
capacity for information monopolisation and contributes to a gradual erosion of 
many (though, as will be seen, not all) hierarchical structures.^’ Increasingly 
these crumbling hierarchies have begun to be replaced by networks. This 
organisational form, usually composed of autonomous cells linked horizontally 
rather than vertically, is uniquely suited to information age activities because it 
thrives on the ‘pull’ system^^ of horizontal information dissemination, a system 
which the information revolution naturally encourages. In addition, networked 
organisations characteristically promote fast and precise action by allowing each 
node to perform the task for which it is best suited, unencumbered by the need 
for successive layers of approval from superiors. As a consequence, networks 
are also singularly able to maximise the information age’s cardinal advantage of 
efficiency.
Arquilla and Ronfeldt. “Cyberwar Is Coming!” p.2
As Ronfeldt notes, networked organisational forms have also appeared in history, in tribal and 
clan-based societies. The hierarchy has, however, virtually eclipsed these organisational 
types in the West throughout the 350-year existence o f the Westphalian state system. 
Ronfeldt, David. Tribes. Institutions. Markets. Networks: A Framework About Societal 
Evolution. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1996.
Bankes and Builder. “Seizing the Moment.” p .l
In such a system the user, not the overseer, decides which information he or she needs.
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The rapidly growing popularity of such networks in business and civil 
activism^^ is one of the most obvious and tangible signs that the developed 
world is cunently experiencing not only an information revolution, but the 
beginning of an information age. One should not, however, overestimate the 
implications of even this seminal shift. While networks are in many ways 
perfectly tailored to exploit the opportunities of the information age, they will 
not entirely replace hierarchical institutions. Indeed, the hierarchy remains the 
most appropriate form of organisation for activities that require high degrees of 
regulation and leadership, such as military and governmental operations.^'’ The 
success of these institutions in the information age will, however, depend to a 
significant degree on their ability to adapt to the imperatives of that age. In 
many cases, including those of the military and government, hierarchies will 
benefit from mixing hierarchical principles with those of networks, establishing 
a degree of autonomy and flexibility among the middle and lower levels of their 
organisations, yet maintaining a recognisable chain of command as well as 
valuable topsight.^®
Cf. the recent successes o f networked businesses like Microsoft over those, like IBM, 
employing more hierarchical models. Likewise on the level o f civil society, petitions 
circulated by networks o f individuals in cyberspace to protest the enactment o f the U S’ 
“Clipper Chip” legislation, played a significant role in defeating the government’s attempts 
to establish a backdoor into encryption programs. Whittle, David B. Cvberspace: The 
Human Dimension. New York: W.H. Freeman and Company, 1997. p.370 and Fogleman, 
Martin. “Freedom and Censorship in the Emerging Electronic Environment.” in Alberts, 
David S., and Daniel S. Papp. Information Age Anthologv. Volumes 1-4. Washington, DC: 
National Defense University Press, 1997. p.408 
Ronfeldt, David F., and Cathryn L. Thorup. North America in the Era o f Citizen Networks: 
State, Societv. and Securitv. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1995. p.5
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CONTEXT
As a new bout of information revolution fever began to grip the 
developed world in the early 1990s, RAND’s Steve Bankes and Carl Builder 
wrote a think-piece examining the possible implications of the coming 
information age. In it, they predicted that age will “not only be new but new in 
entirely new ways.” ®^ This prediction goes a long way towards explaining why 
more concrete attempts at forecasting the information age have proved difficult, 
since divining prospective changes becomes much more challenging when one 
cannot even conceptualise those changes. As a consequence, analysts of the 
information age, uncertain of the future, often tend to become caught up in a 
tidal wave of enthusiasm for the new world ahead. Those that are not entranced 
by new possibilities usually tend to the opposite extreme of scepticism, 
expecting dire, Orwellian consequences from the explosion of new information 
technologies and practices. The truth is that both possibilities exist.
Information technologies themselves cannot dictate how the information 
revolution will affect the world; rather, only the choices people make in 
applying these technologies can determine what impact the information age will 
have.^^ Therefore, in attempting more closely to examine the implications of 
the information revolution and the emerging information age, this section will 
investigate both positive and negative potentialities.
Ronfeldt and Thorup. North America in the Era o f Citizen Networks, p. 11 This mixing o f old 
and new practices and methods should serve as a caution against succumbing to the rising 
tide o f predictions claiming that the information age will transform the developed world 
beyond recognition within decades. While the information age does certainly seemed set to 
affect modern society profoundly, in many significant ways life will continue as it has always 
done.
Bankes and Builder. “Seizing the Moment.” p.5
Whittle. Cvberspace. p.xi. Cf. Also Vogler. “Technology and Change in International 
Relations.” p. 144
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The implications under consideration are those the information age holds 
for man and the state. Establishing an understanding of the information age’s 
possible impact on man and the state is a useful prelude to the examination of 
information age war, in part because it offers an opportunity to flesh out more 
concretely the effects of the shifts outlined in the previous section. More 
importantly, these paiticular examples are apt for this study because man, or 
individuals, and the state are two elemental building blocks of the international 
system within which wai' takes place. Following Kenneth Waltz’s classic 
paradigm, these two elements, with the war system that encompasses them, 
form the immediate context for war. That context plays a pivotal role in the 
subsequent examination of information age war’s claim to the status of military 
paradigm shift. That pivotal role derives, firstly, from the fact that the same 
force that alters the context of war also influences shifts in war ’s content. If 
lAW fulfils the criteria of paradigm shift, the historical precedent of the 
industrial revolution augurs that the pattern of contextual changes should 
foreshadow not only similar, but parallel shifts in war’s content. Secondly, to 
the extent that a paradigm shift reflects shifts in the causal relationships between 
man, the state, and war, changes in the first two elements of this triad should 
signal further changes in the third if lAW’s claim to the title of military 
paradigm shift are justified. Thus, establishing an understanding of the context 
of information age war is a necessary first step for investigating the nature of 
changes in that war form’s content.
Man
According to the optimists’ view of the information age world, 
individuals face a significant potential for empowerment as a result of the
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explosion and global dissemination of sophisticated information technologies. 
This empowerment is the product of two information age trends: the growing 
correlation between information and power, and the horizontal dispersion of 
information to everyone with access to modern ITs. The convergence of these 
two trends may create a shift not only in the nature of power, but in the nature of 
those who possess it. For, “as knowledge is redistributed, so, too, is the power 
based on it.”^^
This redistribution may hold particularly favourable implications for the 
empowerment of the individual. Indeed, many optimists believe the diffusion 
will potentially offer considerable benefits for “what may be considered weaker, 
smaller a c t o r s . T h e s e  benefits aie already becoming evident in the fact that 
even the smallest information age actor, that is, an individual, can use 
information resources from fax machines and direct broadcast satellites to 
telephones and the World Wide Web to reach other individuals on the opposite 
side of the globe. With this connectivity they can promote awareness of human 
rights abuses or disseminate racist propaganda, disrupt the secure financial 
transactions of international banks or raise money for world hunger, attack a 
country’s information infrastructure or warn a government of an outside threat. 
Such capabilities grant everyday individuals in the information age more access 
to power than any of their agricultural or industrial age counterparts ever 
imagined.
The new dispersion of information that empowers the individual in many 
cases gives him (or her) virtually the same resources as those possessed by the
Bankes and Builder. “Seizing the Moment.” p.8
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people in power over him. US President Ronald Reagan recognised the 
significance of this shift in power distribution as early as 1988: “Linked by a 
network of satellites and fibre optic cable, one individual with a desktop 
computer and a telephone commands resources unavailable just a few years ago 
to even the largest governments, and can reach out to the entire world.”'’® As a 
result, some elements of global-scale power - to influence trade, to create 
conflict, to promote peace - that once belonged exclusively to the state'” are 
now accessible to ordinary individuals. Inevitably, the new availability of such 
far-reaching power affects not only the individual, but also the role of the 
individual within the system.
Furthermore, the information age’s dispersion of information and 
information power may mean not only that more individuals will have access to 
the power of knowledge, but that that access will be more equally distributed. 
Some have foreseen a danger that, as the information age progresses, an 
“information elite” dividing the information ‘haves’ from the ‘have-nots’ may 
emerge to prevent the more equal distribution of information and the power it 
conveys.'’^  Given the nature of modem information technologies, however, it 
seems likely that this danger can be avoided, especially in the long run. Many 
information technologies are becoming increasingly accessible - both because 
their prices aie plummeting and because the rising “user-friendliness” of 
programming and other user-interfaces fosters ease of use even for the
Wehling, Jason. “RAND Warns US Against Cyber War from the Left.” Cv.Rev. vol3, Sep 95. 
p.24
Alleyne, M.D. “Thinking About the International System in the Information Age.” Journal o f 
Peace Resolution. Vol31. Nov 94. p.409 
Recently, large non-governmental institutions like Multi-National Corporations and 
transnational organisations have shared in some of states’ global-level power. This too is an 
indication o f the redistribution o f power that marks the waning o f the industrial age.
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technically disinclined.'’^  If liberal-minded governments then further encourage 
the equality of IT distribution through funding and support of public access and 
training for computer network users/'’ a relatively equitable dispersion of the 
power of information should certainly be possible.
If the information age’s potential for a more equal dispersion of power is 
eventually achieved, such equity could feasibly challenge the long-standing 
practice of concentrating influence among a limited number of elite groups 
while depriving the majority. First of all, the distribution of information erodes 
the authority of outside forces to dictate an individual’s choices, because that 
authority - once based upon the claim that privileged leaders and elites knew 
what was best - crumbles under the heightened ability of informed individuals to 
act for themselves. In the information age, each individual has access to 
information which allows him to decide for himself which doctor, which car, 
which diet, which job, which government is best for him.'’® Secondly, since 
information is “increasingly required for competitiveness in nearly all human 
activities,”'’® the relatively equal diffusion of information power will also 
contribute to equalising access to forms of power which have traditionally relied 
more obviously on non-information components to build advantage. Notably, in 
business, information can improve competitiveness by employing efficiency -
In Bell 1977, Cf. also Ronfeldt. “Cyberocracy Is Coming.” p.270 
‘’^ Whittle. Cyberspace, p. 15 
Cf. Anderson, Robert H., Tora K. Bikson, Sally Ann Law, and Bridger M. Mitchell. 
Universal Access to E-Mail: Feasibility and Societal Implications. Santa Monica, CA: 
RAND, 1995.
The benefits o f this access have become increasingly tainted by the growing 
commercialisation o f cyberspace, which threatens to constrain consumer choice through 
advertising and other means o f perception manipulation. However, the greater accessibility 
o f information - from advertising influences to consumer interest - and the consequent 
encouragement o f informed decision-making, should to a certain extent outweigh the 
disadvantages arising from this commercialisation.
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through waste-free computer integrated manufacturing, computer tracking of 
inventories, and information intensive marketing techniques'’^  - to supplement 
or replace physical resources. This practice may thus allow smaller businesses 
to compete more feasibly against the economies of scale and other resource 
advantages enjoyed by large coiporations. The same information efficiency 
should, moreover, also improve small actors’ ability to compete against the 
great powers in warfare, as chapters three and six will illustrate. Through these 
means and others, the infoiTnation revolution holds significant potential to shift 
the disparity between the influence of the strong and that of the weak, realigning 
(if still not equalising) the balance of power between individuals and large 
conglomerate actors in the world system.
In addition, the information revolution’s potential to distribute 
information - and information power - should empower individuals not only in 
relation to traditional elites, but also in relation to their own previous standing. 
For example, the globalisation of information technology should provide more 
impartial access to power by granting more people access to a better quality of 
information. Direct broadcast satellites, fax machines, and the internet carry 
news farther, faster, and in higher quantities as a result of the information 
revolution. Since more information about events in the headlines will be 
available from multiple sources, there is greater likelihood that individuals will 
be able to compare the veracity and reliability of the different versions of events, 
and will develop their own truer, more complete understanding of the issues.
Bankes and Builder. “Seizing the Moment.” p.5
Such techniques include, for instance, relying on databases o f consumer preferences or 
demographics to determine both where to sell one’s products, as well as what kind of 
advertising will sell them most effectively.
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Although the proliferation of infoimation channels may also jeopardise the 
quality of available information by facilitating the spread of disinformation as 
well as that of true information, the net result should still favour the truth, since 
the great volume and speed of infoimation possible on modem information nets 
will facilitate the countering of such false reports almost as soon as they 
appear/^ Armed with the true stories behind media headlines or politicians’ 
rhetoric, concerned individuals will be empowered to make more educated 
choices which will affect not only their own lives but also their participation in 
the state and the international system around them.
The potentially far-reaching effect of these informed choices owes itself 
to the fact that the connectivity of the information revolution presents 
opportunities not only for individuals to form educated opinions, but also to act 
on those opinions. The increasing linkage of telecommunications expedites 
individuals’ efforts to make themselves heard because it opens the door to new 
modes of interaction and collaboration, even between people separated by 
thousands of miles. This connectivity improves opportunities for co-operation 
not only within business and education, but also in the realm of grassroots civil 
activism. The linkage of information networks enables individuals to contact 
others with similar concerns, thus facilitating the co-ordination of group action, 
the recruitment of support, and the raising of public awareness, despite 
challenges of time or distance. Such collaboration across cyberspace promotes
Watson, Russel, et al. "When Words Are the Best Weapon. How Rebels U se the Internet and 
Satellite TV." Newsweek. 27 Feb 95: 36-40. p.39. For example, e-mails warning against 
viruses have been a fixture o f on-line communication almost as long as such communication 
has been accessible to the mainstream. In recent yeais however, these e-mail warnings have 
increasingly been greeted by an informal barrage of counter-attacks assuring users that such 
warnings are hoaxes. Often these are accompanied by reasoned accounts o f how viruses 
actually work, proof that ‘e-mail subject header’ viruses and the like are merely shams.
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the emergence of epistemic “virtual communities,” a new set of actors which 
create an opportunity for smaller, geographically dispersed groups to make a 
greater impact on civil society in the information age/®
One of the potential implications of this empowerment and the effect it 
has on individuals’ roles in the world is the possibility of wider democratic 
participation in the information age. RAND’s David Ronfeldt has put forward a 
concept of infoimation age government that he calls “cyberocracy.” The term 
(which, literally translated from its roots, means “rule by way of infoimation”) 
describes Ronfeldt’s conceptions of how bureaucracy may change to 
accommodate the information age. These conceptions include visions of 
political systems in which information is a key source of power, and 
governments organised around the exploitation of information networks.®® 
While Ronfeldt himself cautions that cyberocracy may not necessarily “make 
democratic societies more democratic, [njor totalitarian ones impossible,”®’ the 
form’s relatively flattened hierarchy, and its reliance on a mix of information 
from both the public and private sectors, could render the cybercratic state more 
amenable to the involvement of individual citizens in the political process.
Designed more like an interactive, parallel network, a cybercratic 
government could reduce the need to burrow through bureaucratic channels and 
red tape in order to reach legislative representatives and senior civil servants, 
increasing their accessibility to the proverbial ‘man in the street.’ Furthermore, 
cyberocracy may not only enable individuals to reach the government more 
readily, but may also create incentives for the government to reach out to every
Bankes and Builder. “Seizing the Moment.” p.9 
Ronfeldt. “Cyberocracy Is Coming.” pp. 244 ,255
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day individuals as well. According to Ronfeldt, successful governance in the 
information age may increasingly rest on leaders’ ability effectively to tap the 
wide variety of available information resources. If the government is to remain 
competitive, this spectrum of resources should necessarily include information 
sources outside traditional government circles, from large group components of 
the private sector down to individuals themselves.®^ Both of these aspects of 
cyberocracy could advance the empowerment of the individual by facilitating 
the creation of a truer democracy which allows all citizens to have a voice - not 
just in educated voting, but in the possession of their own input in the policy- 
making process. Because of this potential, the term cyberocracy (despite 
warnings to the contrary®®) has come to evoke popular images of an information 
age government predominantly characterised by a cyberspace grassroots 
democracy in which individuals will hold greater influence over governmental 
affairs than they have for centuries.®'’
Cyberocracy may seem no more than a utopia of the distant future, but 
aspects of the phenomenon have already begun to emerge in the developed 
world. The World Wide Web even now gives citizens unprecedented access to 
information about the issues before their government, as well as records of how
Ibid., p.278.
^^Ibid., pp.268 and 274 ,256  
Whittle. Cvberspace. p.382. Cf. also Ronfeldt. “Cyberocracy Is Coming.” p.280. Both 
Whittle and Ronfeldt caution that, rather than bringing information age societies together, the 
proliferation o f highly tailored information could instead have a splintering effect. Whittle, 
in fact, posits that information age may be characterised less as a democratic melting pot than 
as a “boiling cauldron o f tribes and special interests.” p.382 
Fogleman. “Freedom and Censorship in the Emerging Electronic Environment.” p.402, also 
Fast, William R. Lt. Col. “Knowledge Strategies: Balancing Ends, Ways, and Means in the 
Information Age.” Sun Tzu Ai t o f War in Information Warfare Prize. Washington, DC: 
National Defense University Press, 1996. p . l l
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their representatives voted.^^ Local civil action networks like Santa Monica, 
California’s PEN (Public Electronic Network) and Blacksburg Virginia’s BEY 
(Blacksburg Electronic Village) offer information on government services as 
well as candidate profiles in election years. On a national scale, information 
about political candidates is also becoming increasingly available through 
private official web sites - in fact, every major candidate in the 1996 US 
Presidential election had his own web site.^  ^ Along the lines of more active 
participation in information age governance, “virtual community” interest 
groups, maintained via telecommunications and computer networks, have 
sprung up across North America, and have begun spreading internationally as 
well.^’ By allowing borderless collaboration with others who have similai* 
interests, such computer-coordinated groups could someday wield as much 
influence over the government as America’s Israel lobby and its gun lobby. 
Furthermore, the increasing e-mail accessibility of legislative representatives 
and other government officials is an indication that information technologies 
may, in the not so distant future, compel governments to open up direct lines of 
communication with their citizens. Fax, e-mail, and internet could all readily 
facilitate more direct popular input into the decision-making process.^®
In light of the many changes which should empower the individual in the 
information age, Bankes and Builder have observed that, “it seems not
Anderson, Bikson, Law, and Mitchell. Universal Access to E-mail, p. 138 
‘^’ Whittle, Cyberspace, p.397. Ironically, information-savvy incumbent President Bill Clinton 
was the last candidate to establish a web site, though according to Whittle, once eventually 
established, Clinton’s site was the most sophisticated.
The international collaboration o f the Neo-Nazis is one rather pernicious example of such a 
virtual community.
RAND Research Review. Fall 1995, p. 12 If this begins to sound fantastic, consider the fact 
that the President of the United States already has a public access e-mail address, which at 
least one o f his aides reads.
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improbable that the power of infonnation in the hands of individuals will come 
to be seen as a rival to that of the nation-state; that information can be used 
effectively to prevent war or to wage it; and that infonnation can be exploited to 
perfect or destroy entire s o c ie t i e s .Y e t  this enumeration of the 
simultaneously constructive and destructive nature of information power brings 
to light the fact that few, if any, of the information revolution’s changes will be 
entirely positive. Just like the proverbial coin, there is also a negative side to 
the innovations of the information age and their implications for individuals.
The primary challenge to the information age’s potentials for individual 
empowerment lies in the Orwellian scenario that information technologies in the 
hands of those who wish to control and monopolise information present a 
considerable potentiality for the repression of individuals and small groups. 
Consider the fact that, as more and more of our life histories are stored in 
computer networks, those with access to the networks will possess a frightening 
new capacity for monitoring everything from health records and credit histories 
to video rentals and electronic coiTespondence.^® Such monitoring capability 
poses a disturbing challenge to the right of individual privacy, which becomes 
further convoluted by the argument that electronic monitoring has positive uses 
(e.g., in helping to track criminals) as well.
Alternatively, the information age’s potential for empowering 
individuals may be countered not by the overt use of information to control 
others, but by a more subtle, even voluntary form of control. Rather than 
empowering individuals, the wealth and complexity of information may instead
Bankes and Builder. “Seizing the Moment.” p.4
Vogler, John. “Technology and Change in International Relations,” p. 141
68
overwhelm them. An overflow of unfiltered infonnation could cause
individuals simply to shut out all but what immediately interests them and
succumb to the sophisticated niche marketing that will target consumers with
tailored information in addition to more tangible products and services. This
urge to block out the increasingly wide world may even be encouraged and
facilitated by the proliferation of virtual communities which can provide the
disaffected with a cyberspace support network of others who share similar
beliefs. Such a retreat away from the complexity and diversity of larger society
and into the arms of narrow-minded yea-sayers could have disastrous
consequences for the individual and his role in society, fostering the rise of new
prejudices based not on where people come from or what colour their skin is,
but on what they think. Richard Neustadt gave voice to these concerns as early
as 1985, asserting that:
. . .the greatest impact [of the information age] may be to 
fragment our politics, naiTowing people’s perspectives, shifting 
more power into special interest groups, and weakening the glue 
that holds our system together.^^
In addition to the possibility of societal fragmentation, information may 
serve to overwhelm rather than to empower by tempting individuals to become 
slaves to the wealth of available information. Rather than shutting out the over­
abundance of information, some individuals may instead take too much in 
without questioning it. This could encourage the undiscerning to act on the idea 
or opinion of the moment, flitting from one cause to the next without ever really 
accomplishing anything. More frighteningly, a tendency to absorb but not 
question the information age’s vast infoiTnation flows might also facilitate
Neustadt, p.561 in Ronfeldt. “Cyberocracy Is Coming.” p.280
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Orwellian-style brainwashing of information-overloaded individuals. David 
Ronfeldt includes these potential unfavourable outcomes among his cautions 
about cyberocracy’s possible negative side. In a disturbing litany he asserts that, 
far from fostering a truer form of democracy, the infonnation age may instead 
promote:
.. .increased susceptibility of the individual to outside 
manipulation, a rise in the number and diversity of ad-hoc 
interest groups and social movements, increased fragmentation 
and fractionalisation of society and politics, greater stratification 
and centralisation of society around infonnation resources, and 
greater efforts by some policy-makers to control access to 
information and use it to manipulate the public.
Thus, as the above examples illustrate, many of the information age’s
implications for the individual level of analysis remain uncertain and
ambiguous. There will likely be both new benefits and new dangers for
individuals in the information age, but although positive effects cuiTently seem
to predominate, the question of which will ultimately prevail must remain
unanswered until the era develops further.
The State
The infonnation revolution’s impact on the state level of analysis is no 
less ambiguous than its effect on individuals. However, since the state cunently 
represents the highest source of order and governance in human society, the 
information revolution’s impact on that institution is significantly more likely to 
affect the way the rest of the world works as well. The state system is, 
moreover, the arena within which war presently takes place. As such, shifts 
occurring on this level of analysis potentially represent the most direct changes 
in the context of future conflict. Deciphering information age changes in the
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State system - whether on balance good or ill - is therefore essential to 
understanding information age war and the content of future conflict.
Broadly, the dual impact of the information revolution is manifested on 
this level of analysis through the simultaneous “widening and weakening” of the 
state’s role in the international system.^^ Hotly disputed across the spectrum of 
international relations theory, each trend can be assessed as both positive and 
negative. For the purposes of this paper, however, it is necessary only to judge 
how both trends may affect the context of future conflict.
Weakening
The “weakening” of the state refers to a looming erosion of the state’s 
role as the principal actor in the international system, and as the only entity 
capable of wielding power on a global scale. This shift is a consequence of a 
number of both geographical and information age trends, from the growth of 
interconnectedness and the collapse of boundaries, to the spread of 
interdependence and the rise of non-state actors as significant players in the 
international system. Each of these developments begs the question, what role 
will statehood play in the infonnation age?
At the root of states’ shifting status is the expansion of interconnection 
within the state system. From long-distance telephone networks and 
international air travel to transnational trade and foreign diplomacy, the 
activities of individual states cannot help but touch, and affect, those of others in 
the modem world. As these links increasingly allow international activities to
Ronfeldt. “Cyberocracy Is Coming.” p.280
Smith, Michael. “Modernization, Globalisation, and the Nation-State.” Global Politics: 
Globalisation and the Nation-State. McGrew, Anthony G., Paul G. Lewis, et al., eds. 
Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992. p.259
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flow through and across borders, interconnection in turn sets the stage for the 
collapse of boundaries and the growth of interdependence. Yet interconnection 
has always been a factor in the state system, for it is impossible to have a system 
that does not in teract .Thus it is not merely the existence of interconnection 
that transforms the system, but the exponential growth in that 
interconnectedness sparked by the infoimation revolution. That explosion of 
sophisticated information technologies has added considerably to the linkage 
begun with the industrial revolution, producing numerous technologies that 
make the world today a smaller place than it was even half a century ago. 
Aeroplanes and cars, telephones and televisions have connected people all over 
the world, allowing the creation of economic, social, and political networks on a 
global scale. These connections have been further speeded and facilitated by the 
information age’s introduction of nearly real-time communications in the form 
of fax machines, e-mail, video conferencing, and satellite broadcasting, to name 
only a few. As a result, human interaction - whether for business, friendship, 
criminal activity, or otherwise - has become increasingly able to ignore the 
political and geographical boundaries that once kept the world 
compartmentalised within separate states. Thus multi-national corporations, 
internet web pages, and international drug smuggling all now operate in a global 
arena, all but oblivious to old borders of space, time, and law.^^
This globalisation seems certain to spread still more as the information 
age progresses, since technological innovations have a tendency to act as “a
Holsti, K.J. Change in the International System: Essays on the Theory and Practice of 
International Relations. Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1991. p.56 
^  Arquilla and Ronfeldt. “Cyberwar Is Coming!” p.3
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global force which recognises no national boundaries .Already,  industrial age 
technological developments have imposed a certain global interconnection on 
isolationists and integrationists alike.^  ^ For example, the pollution from modem 
industrial technologies poses a world-wide threat to the environment regardless 
of states’ policies towards environmental protection or non-involvement. Still 
more deadly are nuclear weapons, which can not only reach anywhere in the 
world in a matter of moments, but can kill friend as well as foe with fallout 
carried in global weather patterns. In the face of these threats, borders and 
citizenship become iiTelevant, because every state is equally dependent on the 
maintenance of global environmental integrity.
Interconnection, of course, does not necessarily create interdependence. 
However, the resultant muddling of boundaries encourages collaboration, 
whether for trade, politics, or academia. As people and states become more and 
more accustomed to this collaboration, they increasingly come to depend on it. 
Consciously or not, many states have linked themselves right out of self- 
sufficiency, subscribing themselves to interdependence before they even 
considered voting on the policy.^^ The global economy, for instance, has 
already become integral to the prosperity of almost every state, so much so that 
any government wishing to separate itself from the international market could
McGrew, Anthony G. “Military Technology and the Dynamics o f Global Militarisation.” 
Global Politics: Globalisation and the Nation-State. McGrew, Anthony G., Paul G. Lewis, et 
al., eds. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992. p. 104 
This is not to be interpreted as support for “technological determinism.” In no way does the 
author believe that man did not have a choice in, for example, the development o f atomic 
weaponry. Vogler. “Technology and Change in International Relations.” p. 143 
Smith. “Modernization, Globalisation, and the Nation-State.” p.259
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do so only at great cost to itself.^^ Thus, for perhaps the first time since the 
modern state system was de facto formalised by the Treaty of Westphalia in 
1648, interdependence constrains nation-states by a force that does not bow to 
their sovereignty/^ This force does not take the form of rules, or of 
international government, but rather of states’ own reliance on other states.
This trend towards interdependence has become a source of great debate 
between those uncertain whether the trend marks a positive or negative change 
in the state system. Many thinkers - most notably those from the Pluralist and 
Modernist camps - contend that interdependence will reduce conflict, and claim 
that the trend is the best hope for peace in the information age.^  ^ Even the 
Realist Karl Deutsch, in his earlier years, wrote, “if the entire world were 
integrated into a security community, wars would eventually be eliminated.”^^  
Nor are these optimistic assertions entirely groundless, for history has shown 
that integrated peoples who share common identities and common political 
loyalties tend to quarrel less often and less lethally.^^ However, even the highly 
interdependent world of the information age will be far from reaching a point of 
integration total enough to rule out conflict.
^  Though this seems impossible today, Burma is an example both that separation from the 
global economy can be done, and that it carries a high price. Holsti. Change in the 
International System, p.65, also Johnson, Jeff. “The Information Highway from Hell: A  
Worst-Case Scenario.” Computer Scientists for Social Responsibility Web page, 1996. p.5 
™ Some might contend that the power-balancing system o f alliances that dominated Europe 
during the 19*^ ' century was more accurately the first great example o f interdependence’s 
challenge to state sovereignty. Yet this system was, arguably, voluntarily (if not always with 
open eyes) entered into, and thus at least theoretically was not a force entirely beyond states’ 
ability to control.
Smith. “Modernization, Globalisation, and the Nation-State.” p.261
Holsti. Change in the International Svstem. p.59
Ibid., p.60 In contradiction o f this point, many analysts have cited the fact that “civil” wars 
tend to be the bloodiest kinds o f wars. However, the division o f a state into warring factions 
reflects a fundamental difference in belief or practice, which itself implies that such a society 
was never truly integrated in the first place.
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Meanwhile, the cuiTent period of transition toward full interdependence 
poses as much threat of upheaval and conflict as the final stage offers potential 
for peace. In this transitional phase, the old system will exist alongside the new, 
and the dichotomy will add its own tensions to the problem of change. The old 
state system is ill-equipped to deal with new, transnational challenges: for 
example, the questions of how to control multinational coiporations, organise 
common resources, or establish jurisdiction for international communications 
networks are “inherently beyond the management capabilities of a decentralised 
and fragmented states system.” '^^  The information revolution will not follow the 
old state-centric rules of interaction; if the state cannot accept and adapt to this, 
the information age may well render the classic anarchical system an 
anachronism as information age politics increasingly transcend sovereignty.
Just as the transition from anarchical society to global integration will 
not happen overnight, not all states (or, more accurately, regions) will 
experience that transition in the same way. Interdependence will reach different 
areas at unequal rates, and to varying extents. Many states (for instance, the less 
developed, especially those who have barely entered the industrial age) will 
suffer from “asymmetrical interconnectedness” in which they depend more - for 
trade, security, guidance, etc, - on the advanced states than those states are 
“interdependent” on them. In this scenario there is only a fine line between the 
opportunities for integration and the opportunities for absorption that are both 
inherent in the concept of interdependence.^^ This naiTow division between the 
positive and negative sides of interdependence indicates a strong likelihood that
Vogler. ‘Technology and Change in International Relations.” p. 141
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asymmetry will possess the same potential for inciting conflict in the 
information age as it did at the end of the colonial age.
Even ignoring the potentials for conflict intrinsic to the transition to 
interdependence, the phenomenon itself holds a number of challenges to the 
future stability of the state system. First, by linking states to other equally 
sovereign actors, interdependence constrains the choices open to each. As 
states’ concerns become more and more intertwined, they will increasingly be 
unable simply to act in their own interest if that action conflicts with the good of 
others in the system. In short, by joining states politically, economically, and 
even socially, interdependence “erodes the effectiveness of [domestic] policies 
and hence threatens national autonomy in the determination and pursuit of 
[national] object ives.Second,  and more ominously, interdependence 
presents a threat to system stability that is inherent in the very nature of the 
phenomenon. For, the linkage that may define the successor to the present state 
system entails that a challenge to any point in the network will necessarily affect 
every other element of the system.^^ As such, the interdependent global system, 
unless it eliminates all strife, will be especially vulnerable to future conflict.
Interdependence, however, is not the only possible future for the 
international system. K. J. Holsti predicts a rise of fragmentation concuiTent 
with, if not in reaction to, the trend toward interdependence.^^ He maintains 
that there will be as many voices against interdependence as there are for it, and 
the former will not be without recourse to challenge the trend. Holsti foresees
Holsti. Change in the International Svstem. p.62 Cf. also Levi, Werner. The Coming End of 
War. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1981. p . l l 5  
Holsti. Change in the International Svstem. p.56 
Szafranski. “A  Theory of Information Age War.” p.8
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that interdependence may itself become a source of conflict by inducing 
isolationist states or groups to cut themselves off from the system and build 
‘national moats’ around themselves in a struggle against integration and its 
consequent loss of identity and autonomy/^ While such isolationism is not 
without cost in a highly interdependent system, the bloody nationalism of the 
war in Bosnia and the violent secessionist movements pursued by Basques, 
Chechens, and Irish Republicans provide ample evidence that some groups are 
indeed willing and even eager to pay the price fragmentation requires.
The Implications of Weakening
Interdependence, fragmentation, and other geopolitical forces whose
weakening of the state may be magnified by the information age, challenge the
traditional role of statehood in the international system and beg the question of
the state’s place in the information age. In light of the changes introduced by
the information revolution, as well as those brought to light by the end of the
Cold War, it seems dubious that states can maintain their role as the sole
legitimate practitioners of organised conflict, and thus as the primary shapers of
the international system.^® Yet to many, the existence of an international system
without states seems inconceivable. And indeed, the world is as far from
abrogating the institution of statehood as it is from reaching true integration.
However, the ambiguous forces of the information revolution do hold the
potential to shift fundamentally the relationship between states, their people, and
the international system. In light of this potentiality, it is necessary to re-
Holsti. Change in the International Svstem. p.54 
Ibid., p.55
This point will be elaborated fui'ther in chapter six.
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examine the nature of statehood in order to understand the altered role of the 
state in the information age.
However, after three and a half centuries, one might understandably have 
difficulty with this revaluation of the state, difficulty in imagining any global 
system other than the institutionalised anarchy of sovereign nations balanced 
against each other under no higher law than national interest and war. However, 
the world has survived without states in the past, and may do so again. At the 
present stage of modernisation, it is more than doubtful that the current system 
could be succeeded by its feudal predecessor, but this precedent for such a 
fundamental change provides important perspective for the present reassessment 
of the state and the state system.
Before that assessment of information age change can begin, however, 
one must first establish an understanding of that which is being changed, that is, 
the industrial age conception of statehood. Though international relations 
theorists differ widely on the role of states in the international system, they seem 
to have a consensus on the fundamental characteristics of statehood, agreeing 
that a “state” is an independent political entity which possesses a form of 
government and exercises sovereignty over a people and a territory. Implicit in 
this is the principle that states are obligated to maintain order among their 
people and to preserve security within their territory.^^
The information revolution primarily strikes at the state system by 
challenging the nature of the territoriality and sovereignty that have
Rothgeb, John M., Jr. Defining Power: Influence and Force in the Contemporary International 
Svstem. New York: St Martin’s Press, 1993. p.23 See also Herrera, Geoffrey L. “New  
Information Technologies and the Future o f State Security.” Monterey, CA: Proceedings of 
the Security Studies Conference on Revolutions in Military Affairs, Naval Post-graduate 
School, August 1996.
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characterised the building blocks of that system. First, territoriality has changed 
because the information revolution has eroded the significance of geography, 
tearing down barriers of time and space required for communication even across 
great d is tan ces.In  the information age, e-mail, mobile phones, and reliable, 
almost universal telephone networks will render long-distance communication 
cheaper, faster, and easier than ever before. Such connectivity has already 
begun to encourage people to confer, collaborate, and conspire with others 
anywhere in the world. As a consequence of this international idea sharing, 
what people identify with, what they include in their spheres of comprehension, 
is likely to shift from the village, city, or even state, to encompass the entire 
world. This may cause the state to lose its significance as the logical delineation 
of tenitory within which people feel commonality.®^
States face a further challenge to temtoriality - and its status as the 
natural division of government - from the absence of boundaries in cyberspace. 
Information, whether carried by messenger, post, radio, or fax machine, has long 
been able to penetrate borders. The rise of the World Wide Web further 
facilitates the trans-border dissemination of infonnation, and highlights a 
number of questions about states’ rights and abilities to control access to 
information across political boundaries.F or instance, what happens if a 
Frenchwoman sends information openly available in France to someone in 
China, where the possession of such information is illegal? Or if a computer 
hacker in Estonia penetrates a restricted American database and uses the
Arquilla and Ronfeldt. “Cyberwar Is Coming!” p.3
Loader, Brian D., ed. The Government of Cyberspace: Politics, Technology, and Global 
Restructuring. London: Routledge, 1997. p.9 
Whittle. Cyberspace, p.383
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information he found there to commit an act regarded as criminal under US law, 
but legal under Estonian, can the American authorities prosecute him? And if 
they are not allowed to uphold US law, does that not undermine the US’ 
sovereignty over its own territory? Information’s imperviousness to physical 
and political boundaries means states will have to re-evaluate not only their 
international information policies, but also their jurisdiction over territory itself.
In this way the shrinking of the world and the devaluation of borders 
have converged to undemiine territoriality as a basic characteristic of statehood. 
James Rosenau sees this devaluation of territory as evidence “that human 
loyalties are increasingly transcending national frontiers and that governments 
have lost their ability to control transnational processes and to command the 
unalloyed obedience of their citizens and subjects.”®^ This assertion, moreover, 
also highlights the fact that information age changes hold significant 
implications not only for territoriality, but for traditional conceptions of 
sovereignty as well. These implications are particularly noteworthy, for 
sovereignty is the one characteristic that most epitomises the concept of 
statehood. Since the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia, states have characteristically 
been sovereign entities, entities whose actions, in the words of Grotius, “are not 
subject to the control of any other power, so that as to be annulled at the 
pleasure of any other human will.”®*^ By definition, sovereign states have
Holsti. Change in the International Svstem. p.206 
Grotius. The Rights o f War and Peace, p.62
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heretofore acted only in accordance with their own will and interests, and could 
only be forced to act against those interests through defeat in war.®^
Information age technologies, however, pose a growing challenge to 
state sovereignty. In deepening the interdependence begun in the industrial age, 
these technologies have extended states’ links not only in commerce and 
collaboration, but also in vulnerability.®® The more interconnected states 
become, the more vulnerable they are to adverse affects from disturbances 
anywhere within the linked system. This vulnerability puts constraints on 
states’ sovereignty by forcing them to consider not only the immediate effect of 
their actions, but also the longer-term, systemic effect. For example, consider 
1997’s financial crisis in Southeast Asia. In a less connected system prosperous 
states would no doubt take advantage of economic struggles in South Korea, 
Indonesia, Thailand, and elsewhere. Instead, with requisite consent from the 
prosperous, the International Monetary Fund approved a $17 billion bail-out of 
the Thai economy, followed by a $40 billion shore-up of the Indonesian 
economy, and a further $58 billion for the struggling South Koreans. These 
actions were not purely philanthropical, but intended to stave off the threat of 
global recession which might have easily spread from Southeast Asia to blanket 
the globe.®  ^ The developed world’s reaction to this possible threat is testimony 
that states are becoming so susceptible to outside pressures that they cannot act
That is to say, though states may be persuaded or coerced to act outside their national interests 
through the tools o f diplomacy, there is no higher entity to dictate that they must act 
otherwise. For this reason, war has been a primary instrument in shaping the character o f the 
international system since the advent o f statehood. For further discussion o f this point, see 
chapter five.
See also p.77 and p.73
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with total sovereignty, but must instead temper their national interests to 
harmonise with interdependence and avoid unnecessary disturbances in the 
system/^ As noted above, this susceptibility is not unique to the information 
age, but has been an obvious constraint on state sovereignty since the 
development of aeroplanes and nuclear bombs. The increasing interlinkage of 
the information age’s proliferating international computer networks and 
telecommunications, however, is likely to impose ever greater constraints on the 
choices and methods open to states, calling into question the very sovereignty 
upon which state government is predicated.
Moreover, information itself presents a problem for sovereignty, to the 
extent that it does not readily conform to government regulations. Even in 
closed societies where the government restricts the dissemination of the most 
prosaic information, the state cannot monitor every letter and phone call, every 
fax and e-mail.^^ In open societies where citizens regard privacy and freedom of 
information as basic rights, the state wields even less control over information.^^ 
Since rules are as permeable to information as boundaries are, states may never 
claim complete control over information. However, by definition, sovereignty 
entails the right to claim the highest jurisdiction, the ultimate control, over all 
within a state’s power. Because of protections for privacy, confused jurisdiction
CNN Interactive. August, November, and December 1997. Cf. Fischer, Stanley. “The Asian 
Crisis: A View from the IMF.” Address at the Midwinter Conference o f the Bankers’ 
Association for Foreign Trade. Washington, DC. International Monetary Fund Web page. 
22 January 1998.
Fast. “Knowledge Strategies: Balancing Ends, Ways, and Means in the Information Age.” 
p.6. See also Holsti. Change in the International Svstem. p.55
Cf., the fact that even George Orwell’s ‘Big Brother’ was not all-seeing, but could monitor 
only about 10% o f the population at any one time. Ronfeldt. “Cyberocracy Is Coming.” 
p.277.
This is unavoidable, as any democracy that attempted to increase its conbol over information 
would threaten the democratic nature o f its government.
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over knowledge, and the lack of boundaries in cyberspace, governments simply 
cannot be fully sovereign over information/^ Yet as the information revolution 
places an exponentially higher emphasis on the power of knowledge, the 
unchecked flow of information becomes an ever greater threat to the state’s 
control of power.
Widening
Just as the erosion of temtoriality and sovereignty point to the 
weakening of the state, however, some aspects of the information revolution 
indicate a possible increase in the power of the state, as well as a widening of its 
role in the international system. In fact, interdependence and fragmentation, the 
two cardinal phenomena behind the weakening of the state, can stand as 
evidence for the widening role of statehood as well. For example, as Robin 
Brown points out in defending the nation-state, the present stage of 
interdependence is predicated upon the interaction of states. “It is the 
globalisation of the state that has done more than anything else to create the 
modern w orld.Interdependence would be impossible under conditions of 
total anarchy, but the relative order imposed by the system of sovereign states 
allows groups to learn co-operation within that framework. Thus, rather than 
negating the role of the state, the interdependent system may actually rely on 
states to continue as the building blocks of international order.
Similarly, the move toward fragmentation may contribute to the 
widening of states’ significance in the system, because the trend is largely
Morton, Oliver. ‘T he Information Advantage; Defence Technology Survey.” Economist. 
V0I335, 10 Jun 95. p. 19
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driven by the desire of separatists to secede and create their own states/^ Since 
the information age renders infonnation a more valuable component of power 
than physical resources, smaller states are likely to be more viable than ever 
before, allowing secessionist governments to claim true statehood/*^ Although 
this increasing practicability of fragmentation could certainly alter 
circumstances for individual states, it would not, aside from slight disruptions in 
power balances, significantly alter the state system as such. In fact, 
fragmentation, by promoting conflict over who has the right to be called a state, 
may increase the prestige of statehood. A shift to a new form of system 
certainly would stir up a great deal of instability, but eventually fragmentation 
may give rise to a more stable system of homogeneous state actors whose 
national interests reflect true consensus.
Beyond these wider trends of system change, information age 
technologies themselves may aid the continuing importance of statehood. 
Innovations in ITs may help states perform their duties and exercise their 
prerogatives as much as they empower individuals within the state. The 
information revolution can enable governments to become more streamlined, 
more efficient, and more effective, just as it is already helping to reshape 
business and commerce.^^ In addition, as administration and government 
increasingly move “on-line,” the process of monitoring threats and maintaining
Brown, Robin. “Globalisation and the End o f the National Project.” Boundaries in Question: 
New Directions in International Relations. Macmillan, John and Andrew Linklater, eds. 
London: Pinter Publishers. 1995. p.56 
Ibid.
Toffler and Toffler. War and Anti-War, p.27
David Ronfeldt notes that “[t]he government world lags behind the business world in feeling 
the effects o f the information technology revolution and related innovations in organisation. 
But government may change radically in the decades ahead.” Ronfeldt. “Cyberocracy Is 
Coming.” p.243
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order should become easier/® The internet, for instance, can aid state functions 
from catching criminals to gathering political intelligence/^ Likewise, news 
management may become a powerful tool for shaping public opinion and 
moulding consensus as capabilities for manipulating the media converge with 
the public’s increased reliance on media i n format ion / In  these ways and 
more, information technologies may help transform the state into a better and 
even more vital institution in the information age.
Thus, the forces of interdependence, fragmentation, and technological 
change also hold varied potentials for increasing both the power of the state and 
the role of that institution in the international system. The more positive 
influences of these forces led one author to claim that, although “their 
significance may have changed to reflect the realities of increasing 
interconnectedness and coexistence,... states remain a vital and vigorous force in 
global p o l i t i c s . T h i s  is certainly true for the immediate future, and seems 
likely to remain so for years to come. As the previous section demonstrated, 
however, one should not forget that the coins of interdependence, fragmentation, 
and technological change all have a flip-side, and could also undermine the 
institution of statehood and perhaps even render it anachronistic in a distant- 
future global system. The coincidence of these contradictory trends points to 
the paradoxical conclusion that “the widespread application of science-based 
technology to industiy (and, incidentally, to waif are and weapons), the growth 
of global markets, and the politicisation of ever growing areas of human
Loader, Brian D,, ed. The Government o f Cyberspace, p. 130.
^  Vogler, John. “Technology and Change in International Relations.” p. 141 
Ibid.
Smith. “Modernization, Globalisation, and the Nation-State.” p.257
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activity, have led to a global transformation which has simultaneously extended
and undermined the authority of the nation-state.”102
Conclusion
The ambiguity of the infonnation revolution’s effect on the state reflects 
its contradictory impact on men, for the dispersion of infonnation power 
simultaneously increases and constrains the power available both to the 
individual and the state. Only time will tell which trend will prevail. For the 
present, the immediate significance of these trends lies in the fact that their 
impact on the context of conflict is driven by information. Despite their 
ambiguities, these contextual shifts provide important evidence about the 
consequences of information age change, because the fact that the information 
age can alter the roles of man and the state (even though the result of these shifts 
remains unknown) is a strong sign that the same forces of change may similarly 
transform war in the information age. Moreover, the pattern of the infoimation 
age’s contextual changes may also provide a useful indication of how such a 
transformation of war might manifest itself. This evidence is of course not 
sufficient to prove that information age war will represent a fundamental, 
paradigmatic change in waifare but, as the following pages will examine in 
greater detail, it is a necessary precondition for that proof. The next chapter will 
take this evidence of information age contextual change - and its testimony to 
the potential for military paiadigm shift - a step further by establishing that 
information age war’s claim to the title of paradigm shift could only be valid in 




WAR and INFORMATION: 
Understanding How the Information Age Affects War
Historical examples clarify eveiything and also provide the best kind of proof 
in the empirical sciences. This is pai ticularly true o f the art o f war. "
- Carl von Clausewitz’
The information age, in altering the context of warfare, seems to hold the 
potential to transform war itself. In light of the far-reaching, if ambiguous, 
changes the infonnation age has already begun to introduce in society, many in 
fact believe this transformation is underway even now. Among these 
enthusiasts, one can differentiate three predominant modes of explaining how 
the information age is affecting waifare. The more sceptical of the adherents 
maintain that information age war is not a significantly new phenomenon at all, 
but the culmination of a long evolution in military technology and strategy.^ 
Others, more enthusiastic but still cautious, take a middle ground, explaining 
lAW’s influence on warfare as a military revolution. They recognise that the 
information revolution will likely introduce important changes in waging war, 
but argue against the claim that these changes will affect the principles of war. 
Instead, these cautious enthusiasts typically view the introduction of information 
age war as one among a long progression of military revolutions which
* Clausewitz, Carl von. On War. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, eds., trans. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1976. p. 170 
 ^E.g. Biddle, Stephen. “The RMA and the Evidence.” Institute for Defense Analyses. 
Delivered at the JCISS and Security Studies Revolution in Military Affairs Conference, 
Monterey, CA: 26-29 Aug 1996. p.3 Freedman, Lawrence. “The Revolution in Strategic 
Affairs.” Adelphi Paper #318. London: Institute for International Strategic Studies, 1998. 
Gray, Colin S. “The American Revolution in Military Affairs: An Interim Assessment.” 
Camberley, England: Strategic and Combat Studies Institute, 1997. Pp.5-7. Jablonsky, 
David. “The Owl o f Minerva Flies at Twilight: Doctrinal Chance and Continuity and the 
Revolution in Military Affairs.” Carlisl, PA: US Aimy War College Web page. May 1994. 
O’Hanlon, Michael E. “Bewaie the RMA’nia!” Washington, DC: Brookings Institution 
Web page, September 1998.
transform war without markedly affecting the understanding of wai* nor the 
context within which it is waged.
Neither of these conventional explanations for the changing relationship 
between information and war, however, accounts for the greatest extreme of 
lAW enthusiasm. Proponents of the third and most radical view of infonnation 
age wai* blanket the field of information waifare studies with sweeping claims 
that the information revolution will profoundly transform the content of conflict. 
They hold that the information age will alter not only how the world makes war 
on a superficial level, but also on a more fundamental level, affecting even the 
way the world understands the very principles of warfare.^
This chapter will investigate each of these opinions on information age 
military change in turn, endeavouring to establish how each explains the 
relationship between information and war in the infonnation age, and the extent 
to which that relationship represents a change in warfare. The following pages 
will demonstrate that both the school treating lAW as an evolution of 
infonnation’s historical role in warfare and the school approaching LAW as a 
military revolution hold a certain degree of explanatory power. However, 
neither argument sufficiently accounts for the context within which the 
emergence of information age war is occurring, nor for the assumption that 
changes in this context are somehow linked to changes in wai* itself. Both the
 ^Cooper, Jeffrey. “Understanding Information Waifare: Another View.” Center for
Information Stiategy and Policy Inaugural Seminar. In Arquilla, John and David Ronfeldt, 
eds. Society and Securitv in the Information A ge. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1998. p. 14, Libicki, Martin C. The Mesh and the Net: Speculations on Armed 
Conflict in a Time o f Free Silicon. Washington, DC: Institute for Strategic Studies, National 
Defense University, McNair Paper 28, Maich 1994. Ch.2, p.9, Mayfield, Terry; Senior 
Fellow, IDA. Interview with the author. 17 December 1996., Everett, Charles D., Moss 
Dewindt, and Shane McDade. “The Silicon Spear: An Assessment o f Information-based
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conventional views treat information age wai* as an extension (to one degree or 
another) of a historical pattern, all but ignoring the profound shifts which the 
information revolution is concurrently causing in almost every other aspect of 
human interaction. The school that treats information age war as a military 
paradigm shift, on the other hand, is particularly concordant with the 
information age’s far-reaching societal changes, because its argument is based 
on the assumption that the information age will produce similarly profound 
changes in warfare. Unfortunately for those wishing to understand information 
age war’s claims to the title of paradigm shift, however, proponents of this third 
view rarely offer viable explanations for how or why their predicted 
transformation of waifare will come about.
This chapter therefore endeavours to establish a reasonable explanation 
for the information age’s potential to produce a new military paradigm, a 
justification for the widespread belief - and indeed, for this dissertation’s 
investigation of this belief - that information age war constitutes a paradigm 
shift of war. It argues that the information age’s changes in the context of war 
are not only consonant with the paradigm shift view of lAW, they are the key to 
understanding this school’s myriad predictions that the infoimation age will 
bring a fundamental transfoimation in war’s content. In fact, this most radical 
interpretation of the information age’s affect on warfare can only really be 
understood in context. That is to say, the claims that information age war 
constitutes a paradigm shift only make sense in light of the far-reaching changes 
the information age is introducing to human society, the context within which
Warfare and US National Security.” Art o f War in Information Warfare Prize. Washington, 
DC; National Defense University Press, 1997. National Defense University Web page, p.5
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war is waged. These contextual changes provide a more adequate backdrop for 
the investigation of the information age’s potential for military paradigm shift 
because, as the following pages will illustrate, similar shifts have presaged, and 
perhaps contributed to the emergence of new military paradigms in the past.
However, before this investigation can return to the issue of infoimation 
age context and its role in military paradigm shift, it is necessary first to 
examine the two more conventional explanations for the changing relationship 
between information and war. Establishing an understanding of these schools’ 
successes and failings in accounting for lAW is a necessary foundation for the 
inquiry into the contextual reading of information age war. It is necessary for 
the simple reason that, if either the historical interpretation of lAW or the 
military revolution interpretation succeeded in adequately explaining the 
emergence of information age war and its changes in warfare, there would be 
little need for a third, incompatible explanation. The shortcomings of the two 
more popular views of lAW’s origins must therefore be identified before the 
investigation of the third, contextual account can be meaningful.
Historical Manifestations of Information Warfare?
The school that employs historical manifestations of information 
warfare"  ^to explain the cuiTent relationship between infoimation and war depicts 
the development of information age war as simply a logical extension of 
historical information warfare principles under the influence of new, 
sophisticated infoimation technology. Proponents of this explanation for the
91
emergence of lAW view information age military principles as little 
differentiated from the historically vital application of information in war. To 
such thinkers, information age war is only separated from past instances of 
information warfare by the sophisticated tools it employs. The emergence of 
these tools - with their unprecedented speed, efficiency, and pervasiveness - is 
the primary factor behind information’s exponentially increased importance to 
warmaking. By categorising lAW as nothing more than the product of 
evolution, this inteipretation of the modem relationship between information 
and war stands in emphatic opposition to the idea that lAW introduces a new 
paradigm of warmaking.^ Such an account is patently inappropriate as an 
explanation for the claim that information age war will require a new model for 
understanding warfare, since the historical argument considers the possibility of 
change only in the tools of wai*, utterly ignoring any potential for concurrent 
changes in the targets, objectives, and actors in information age war. In so 
doing, the historical account for lAW dismisses possible changes that would be 
definitive to an information age military paradigm shift, if one is indeed 
occuning. Furthermore, the evolutionaiy account not only fails to explain how 
and why such a profound shift might occur, but does not even acknowledge that 
information age war might represent a radical departure from the past.
To a certain extent, of course, the proponents of this historical 
interpretation are correct. Information age war is expanding the role which 
information has played in warfare since conflict began. Far from being unique
Throughout this section, the term ‘information warfare’ will be used to refer to the intensive 
exploitation o f information in war, rather than to the ‘information infrastructure attack 
concept discussed in the introduction.
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to the information age, several pivotal elements of lAW - notably command and 
control, intelligence, and psychological operations - are very old indeed. In fact, 
“in the sense that wai- is about strategies, command, and morale, it has always 
been about information.”*^ Soldiers have always needed timely intelligence in 
order to determine a plan of action; they have always needed well-organised 
command and control systems to disseminate the orders for implementing that 
plan; and they have always needed news from the battlefield to maintain the 
troops’ esprit de corps. Moreover, the military has always attacked intelligence 
networks to blind their enemies and cripple their strategies; they have always 
tai'geted command centres to create undirected chaos on the battlefield; and they 
have always levied propaganda against troops and civilians to undennine war 
efforts. Thus, in both offensive and defensive manifestations, the intelligence, 
command and control, and psychological operations so crucial to JAW are all as 
old as conflict itself.
Today’s infonnation age war, however, is much more than simply a hi- 
tech descendant of its tactical ancestors. A cross-section of cases from history 
holds two important lessons about the cunent relationship between infoimation 
and warfare; First, it illustrates the long-standing importance and prevalence of 
information tactics across many phases of warmaking. The foundations of 
information age war do lie in history, and the examination of these alone 
highlights the significance of current changes in the relationship between 
information and war, even regardless of today’s increasingly information-rich
 ^Libicki, Maitin C. “What is Information Warfare?” Washington, DC: National Defense 
College, 1995. p .l
 ^Morton, Oliver. “The Information Advantage: Defence Technology Survey.” Economist.
v335, 10 Jun 95: 8-17. p.18
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context. Secondly, the investigation of information age war’s foundations 
illustrates by comparison the distinctiveness of strategic lAW from its 
predecessors.
The first, and most legendary, evidence of information’s importance in 
warmaking is found in the writings of Sun Tzu. Sun preached the importance of 
leveraging information almost twenty-five centuries ago, yet, amazingly, some 
of his advice on the use of intelligence is even more relevant now than it was 
then.^ According to Sun, “the reason the enlightened prince and the wise 
general conquer the enemy whenever they move and their achievements surpass 
those of ordinary men is foreknowledge.”  ^ The leader who sent scouts to 
discover what the army should expect - where his enemy’s aimy was, how 
prepared it was, what the terrain was like - held a great advantage, because the 
scouts’ information told him where his troops were most needed, and allowed 
him to avoid wasting manpower on uncertainties or unexpected obstacles. Sun 
held intelligence to be the most crucial ingredient in warmaking, and believed 
that if a military force could “know the enemy, know yourself; your victory will 
never be endangered.”^
Several centuries later and several leagues to the West, the Huns, in their 
battles against the Romans, also proved themselves masters of manipulating 
information for military advantage. The forte of the Huns, however, was not 
intelligence but propaganda. They employed this tactic to great effect in 
levelling the Romans’ advantages of superior military training and organisation.
 ^Morton. “The Information Advantage.” p. 10
Sun Tzu. The Ai t of War, p. 144 
 ^Asprey, Robert B. War in the Shadows: the Classic History of Guerrilla Warfare from Ancient 
Persia to the Present. London: Little, Brown, and Company, 1994. p.23
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Even in the ancient world, word of the Huns’ ferocity spread far, enabling them 
to intimidate their enemies by reputation alone. Thus, according to Robert 
Asprey, the Huns defeated their neighbours less by having larger armies, than 
“by the terror of their looks, inspiring them with no little honor by their awful 
aspect and by their honibly swarthy appearance.” ®^ Added to this was the fact 
that their leader Attila was famous for being the “scourge of God;” the 
combination lent the Huns a potent information weapon.^*
No less tenifying than Attila the Hun, Genghis Khan used infonnation to 
strike not at his enemies’ fears, but at their command systems. The Mongol 
commander recognised that his opponents’ command systems were vulnerable 
through their reliance on conect and timely information. The Khan and his 
Mongol hordes exploited this reliance by depriving their enemies of 
intelligence: sending swift, skilled Mongol horsemen to waylay their opponents’ 
scouts, capturing them and, more importantly, the information they earned. By 
depriving their opponents of infonnation about everything from the terrain and 
the receptiveness of the local people to the Mongols’ own deployments and 
preparedness for battle, the Mongols effectively blinded the enemy army. At the 
same time, the Mongols employed their own network of scouts on fast horses to 
keep themselves apprised of their enemy’s location. Then, like the classic 
example of the sighted man playing chess with the blind man, they simply
Gilbert, Felix. “Machiavelli: the Renaissance of the Ai t o f War.” in Paret, Peter, ed. Makers 
of Modern Strategy, from Machiavelli to the Nuclear A ge. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1986. p.25 
Asprey. War in the Shadows, p.28
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circled around behind the opposing army and defeated their enemy’s 
undefended cities.
If Genghis Khan personified militaiy genius in the late agricultural age, 
his nearest counteipart in the early industrial age was Napoleon Bonaparte. Like 
the Khan, Napoleon understood the importance of information to command and 
control; Napoleon’s greatness, however, lay not in exploiting faults in his 
enemy’s command and control practices, but in the innovations he introduced in 
his own command system. The emperor instituted historic changes in French 
military command stmctures by centralising strategic planning, but 
decentralising tactical decision-making and allowing his subordinates to use an 
unprecedented degree of initiative. This approach eliminated the practice of 
disseminating operational information to headquarters, thus freeing information 
channels for the strategic information Napoleon needed and delegating the 
short-term planning to the field generals who were better informed to deal with 
it. At the same time, by centralising strategic planning, Napoleon’s system 
provided a clearer focus of the bigger picture since it allowed all the information 
important to long-range planning to be concentrated at one level. Such selective 
centralisation helped to ensure that the information necessary for strategic 
decision-making was available at the right time to the right person. This 
command system proved a decisive factor in Napoleon’s initial conquering of
John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt. “Cyberwar is Coming!” Santa Monica, CA; RAND, 1992. 
Also in Comparative Strategy. vol2, 1993: 141-65. p .10
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the Continent, and it owed its success to the continuous flow of information that 
alone maintained the balance between centralisation and decentralisation/^
In the twentieth century, another leader with hopes of controlling Europe 
recognised the importance of leveraging information in war. Like the Huns, 
Adolf Hitler primarily prized information not for its value to intelligence or to 
command and control, but for its use as propaganda. By manipulating 
information from Nazi party ideology to nationalist rhetoric, from radio news 
stories to myths of the Vaterland, Hitler forced national consensus on Geimany. 
He (and, not to be forgotten, his propaganda minister Joseph Goebbels) stole 
from the lore of Geiman culture to manufacture a quintessentially “German” 
cause fit to Nazi ends. This manipulated information proved so compelling that 
Germans from all walks of life succumbed to it - a fact which is perhaps more 
understandable when one recognises that every story and bit of news available 
to the people of Nazi Germany underlined the rightness of the Nazi cause, and 
emphasised that the Nazis only worked to bring Germany what she deserved. 
Hitler and Goebbels fostered this terrifying unity of the German people to create 
a daunting opposition against the enemies of National Socialism, and to bolster 
Germans’ will to continue the war well past the point at which many societies 
would have conceded d e f e a t . S o  effective was the Nazi’s manipulation of 
infoimation that remnants of it survive to blight the world’s view of German 
nationalism to this day.
To support his innovations in command, Napoleon instituted a practice o f issuing regular 
reports from the army’s headquarters, and organised a staff specifically to deal with an 
expanded traffic in information. Van Creveld. Command in War, p.62 
Earl, Edward Mead. “Hitler: the Nazi Conception of War.” In Earl, Edward Mead. Makers 
o f Modern Strategy: Militarv Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler. Princeton: Princeton 
University press, 1943,1971. p.510
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However, perhaps the ultimate example of decisive infonnation 
dominance can be found not in the propaganda, but in the exemplary use of 
intelligence during World War II. The decisive Battle of the Atlantic, which 
hinged on the Allies’ shifting intelligence advantage, provides the clearest 
foreshadowing of the pivotal relationship between infonnation and warfare in 
the information age. During that long battle, Britain relied on intelligence from 
the Ultra Project’s decryption of German Enigma machine codes. When their 
supply of intelligence was steady and reliable, the British handily avoided 
Germany’s U-Boat wolfpacks, and took over the initiative in the battle. 
However, both at the outset of the war and during a ten-month period in 1943, 
the Ultra project was unable to decrypt the U-Boats’ codes. During this 
blackout the Allies suffered huge losses, and very nearly conceded victory to the 
Germans, only to find their fortunes utterly reversed by the return of Ultra’s 
information s u pp ly .Th e  Allies ultimately won the Battle of the Atlantic (and 
therefore, ai*guably, the war) on the strength of their superior intelligence.^*^
Thus history ably illustrates the importance of mastering infoimation in 
war. These examples, ranging across twenty-five centuries of warmaking and 
encompassing information-intensive militai-y activities as widely varied as 
command and control, intelligence, and psychological operations, illuminate the 
possibilities for creating strategic advantage from information in any age. In so 
doing, military history underlines the established importance of the relationship
Calvocoressi, Peter. Top Secret Ultra. London: Cassell, 1980. p.86. Winterbotham, F.W., 
C.B.E. The Ultra Secret. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1974. p.84. and Rohwer, 
Jürgen. “The Operational U se o f ‘Ultra’ in the Battle o f the Atlantic.” in Andrew, 
Christopher, and Jeremy Noakes, eds. Intelligence and International Relations. 1900-1945. 
Exeter: University o f Exeter Press, 1987. p.291; Cf. McPherson, March 1996 
Strachan, Hew. European Armies and the Conduct of War. London; George Allen and 
Unwin, 1983. p .l77
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between infonnation and warfare. Furthermore, by enumerating what soldiers 
have accomplished with information in the past, the historical account of 
information’s role in war hints at the increased applicability of information to 
war in the information age. While examinations of historical information tactics 
elucidate how information age war is possible, however, historical precedents 
neither offer an explicit rationale for the exponential increase in information’s 
importance in war, nor a satisfactory explanation of the infoimation age’s 
contextual changes and their relationship to the emerging changes in war. As 
subsequent pages will explain in greater detail, the historical account for lAW 
can therefore not feasibly be applied to account for the expectation, established 
in the introductory chapter , that  infoimation age war could constitute a 
paradigm shift with profound implications both for war and the society that 
wages it.
Military Revolution
While the historical account for lAW attempts to explain the emergence 
of information age war through information’s traditional role in conflict, the 
second major interpretation of the cuirent military changes seeks instead to 
explain the shifting relationship between information and war by focusing on 
periodic manifestations of change and innovation in warfare. This account 
views information age war as a military revolution, explaining the emergence of 
the war form in light of historical innovations in the art of war evidenced by 
military revolutions in the past. Similar to those who view lAW as an extension
This expectation was established by the dual evidence of the Gulf War’s significant anomaly 
and the historical precedents set by previous societal revolutions on the scale of the
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of historical applications of information warfare, proponents of the military 
revolution account for lAW see the phenomenon as an important innovation in 
warmaking, but a change not unlike thousands of previous military revolutions 
which have reshaped weapons - as well as strategy, doctrine, and organisation - 
since war began.
The military revolution account, then, represents an improvement over 
the historical explanation for lAW to the extent that it acknowledges that 
information age war introduces revolutionary changes. This argument, 
however, still fails to provide a sufficient explanation for the claim that lAW 
will be a pai adigm shift. It categorises the explosion of information 
technologies that fuels information age war as no more significant than the rail- 
rifle-telegraph or tank-long-range aircraft-radio revolutions, and certainly not as 
a cause for introducing a new model for warfare. Moreover, like their 
colleagues who explain lAW historically, proponents of the military revolution 
explanation focus too much on how the changing tools of war will affect 
waimaking, and ignore the very factor which would distinguish information age 
war as holding unique implications for waif aie: the potential that the cuiTent 
shifts in the tools of war may not simply affect how militaries conduct war, but 
also what they target, why they fight, and whom they fight for.
Again, however, the military revolution chaiacterisation of information 
age war is not entirely wrong. Change has always affected war. So familiar is 
this fact that the phenomenon has even acquired two separate catch phrases: 
both the terms ‘military technology revolution’ (MTR) and ‘revolution in 
military affairs’ (RMA) have been widely used to describe radical military
information revolution. See the Introduction’s section entitled “Paradigm Shift.”
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change. The former refers primarily to the introduction of new weapons and 
other physical tools for war, including non-weapon technological innovations 
like railroads and radios. The latter phrase, revolution in military affairs, more 
explicitly acknowledges that military revolutions do not entail changes in 
technology alone, but affect also doctrine, strategy, and organisation - the other 
tools of war without which weapons innovations may be useless. Since few 
who use the term ‘military technology revolution’ would argue that a 
technological innovation could truly transform war without a coiTesponding 
shift in doctrine, strategy, etc., the two terms are to a certain extent 
interchangeable. For the purposes of this paper, they are regarded as having the 
same denotation, if different connotations. The following pages therefore 
employ the teirni MTR to emphasise a focus on technological change, and the 
term RMA to underscore a focus on non-technological change. The two aspects 
of change are not only complementary, but also equally important to the 
phenomenon of military revolution. However, the non-technological aspect of 
radical military change is considerably less recognised, especially outside 
specialist circles. This section will therefore focus on the technological and the 
non-technological, ‘military affairs’ aspects of military revolution in turn, in 
order to emphasise the interdependent influence of both.
The MTR - Technological Innovation and Military Revolution
As with the established role of information in wai*, history illustrates the 
impact of military technology revolutions in every period of warmaking: from 
the introduction of gunpowder to the development of ballistic missile delivery 
systems, from the telegraph to tanks, MTRs have long affected the practice of
See also p. 109
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war. Military technology revolutions have been responsible for decisive 
advantages from the age when the Greeks beat the bronze-wielding Egyptians 
with sturdier iron weapons, to the battles when the British defeated the French 
with farther-ranging longbows, to the present day. In fact, military technology 
has never stood still. The tools of wai* have been steadily evolving as long as 
people have used violence as a means to political ends. Until the mid-1800’s, 
this evolution was relatively gradual; fundamental changes like the shift from 
oared ships to sail-driven vessels were intermittent at best. During the latter half 
of the 19th century, however, warfare caught up to the industrial revolution. 
Radical change in the tools of warmaking became so fast and frequent that 
navies of 1900 resembled those of 1880 less than the latter resembled navies of 
80 years previous.^® The rate of change has continued to accelerate during the 
twentieth century, to the point that by 1960, according to Herman Kahn, a 
complete military revolution was occumng once every five years.^'
Although even a rapid succession of military technology revolutions do 
not necessitate the institution of new principles for warfighting or a new 
paradigm for understanding warfare, any change sufficiently radical to be 
termed a “revolution” in military technology will have a noticeable impact on 
the methods of warmaking available within each paradigm. This impact 
primarily manifests itself through the capacity of military technology 
revolutions to act as force multipliers, as sources of superior destructive power.
*** Buzan, Barry. An Introduction to Strategic Studies: Militarv Technology and International 
Relations. London; Macmillan Press, 1987. p. 18 
Parker, Geoffrey., ed. The Cambridge History o f Warfare: the Triumph o f the West.
21 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995. p.243 Baylis, John, Ken Booth, John Garnett, and Phil Williams. Contemporary Strategy: Theories 
and Concepts. New York: Holmes and Meier, 1987. p.96
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as enhancers of military cost-effectiveness, and as suiprise advantages. These 
effects of MTRs are evident throughout the history of military technology.
The MTR as Force Multiplier
The most noticeable impact of many advances in militaiy technology is
their function as force multipliers. Military forces going into battle with a new 
tool of war commonly accomplish more per number of troops and per unit of 
effort. Such force multipliers are typically conceived primarily in the form of 
improvements in technologies which enhance the effectiveness of the weapons 
available to each soldier - like, for instance, the increased range and accuracy 
offered by the introduction of the breech-loading rifle. The force multiplying 
effect of an MTR does not, however, necessaiily mean only that the same 
number of soldiers will be able to kill more of the enemy. Militaries have 
historically achieved ‘more bang for the buck’ by exploiting technological 
innovations which emit no bang whatsoever. Improvements in military 
mobility, for instance, act as force multipliers: the introduction of the stirrup 
allowed the Huns to manoeuvre more readily about the battlefield than their 
opponents, enabling each soldier to reach, and therefore defeat more 
opponents.^^ Centuries later, the Prussian army exploited the invention of 
railroads to mobilise troops faster than ever before. The practice lent them a 
significant logistical advantage in the speedy supply of their troops, and allowed 
them therefore to field more soldiers in each campaign.
Non-weapon force multipliers also manifest themselves as 
improvements in communications capabilities. The introduction of the
^  Laughridge, Gene. “Recent and Not-so-recent Thinking on Information Operations and the 
Knowledge War.” Aimy Communicator, vol. 20. 1 Apr 95: 32-39. p.33
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telegraph in the mid-1800’s revolutionised the practice of command and control 
(C2). Using this invention, commanders could co-ordinate plans and 
movements across great distances, bridging in moments separations which 
messengers on horseback took days to cover. The use of the telegraph thus 
greatly facilitated communication between headquarters and their troops, as well 
as among various atomies in the field. This capacity for long-distance co­
ordination acted as a force multiplier because it allowed traditionally unitary 
armies to disperse and cover more territory. As a result, armies could be in 
more places - and meet more of the enemy - at once.^^
The development of radio technology during the first half of the 20*^  
century further contributed to commanders’ ability to position their troops for 
maximum effectiveness: both the use of radio and of radar allowed the Allies to 
avoid defending areas that would not be targets. Radio, for its part, represented 
a significant improvement on the telegraph’s long-distance co-ordination 
capabilities, allowing further dispersion and still faster co-ordination of 
planning. Radar, on the other hand, proved to offer a completely new 
advantage, creating a critical transparency of military operations. In its early 
days, radar famously acted as an effective force multiplier against the Luftwaffe 
in the Battle of Britain by providing information about the direction of attacking 
German planes and thus allowing Britain’s Royal Air Force to concentrate its 
smaller fleet exactly where it was needed most. '^^
^  Van Creveld, Martin. Command in War. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985. p.57 
Bnzan. An Introduction to Strategic Studies, p.25
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The MTR as Augmentation of Destructive Power
A second common product of military technology revolutions is an
increase destructive power, a factor that usually amounts to the improvement of 
available firepower. One notable such innovation occurred before Western 
conceptions of firepower had anything to do with burning gunpowder, in a time 
when the command to shoot produced not a gunshot, but a deadly barrage of 
arrows. This was the introduction of the longbow, a weapon which archers 
could fire five times faster than the cross bow, and whose missiles flew further 
and more accurately to pierce even chain mail.^  ^ At the Battle of Agincourt 
during the Hundred Years War, longbows created such an advantage in 
firepower that they enabled an outnumbered Henry V to defeat the French 
decisively. His English archers shot their enemy down before the Frenchmen 
could even reach the English line. The heightened destructive power of 
longbows proved so devastating that it continued to influence wamiaking for the 
next century and a half.^ *’
The advantages of the longbow, however, were eventually superseded by 
the introduction of firearms. Almost from the first, destructive power became 
increasingly synonymous with the capacity to bum gunpowder and project 
missiles. As firearms became more and more entrenched in the practices of war, 
improvements in gunpowder-driven technology came to alter both the way 
soldiers fought, and what kind of soldiers did the fighting. The evolution of 
guns - from matchlock musket to flintlock to bayonetted rifle - gradually
Parker. The Cambridge History o f Warfare, p.92 
Ibid., p .9 5 ,92
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increased the importance of infantry relative to that of cavalry.^^ With their 
armour-piercing bullets, firearms first rendered mounted knights outmoded, 
then, as their accuracy and range increased, guns allowed the infantry to 
appropriate the domination of the battlefield which had traditionally been the 
purview of the cavalry charge.
The development of firearms, in a race against technology, also altered 
tactics at various points of military history. Early use of gunpowder nullified 
the defender’s advantage in medieval sieges, temporarily interrupting the 
popularity of siege warfare until the advent of gunpowder resistant fortifications 
like multi-bastioned Italian traces shored up the position of the defender in the 
late 15®’ century.^® During the mid-19*® century, the breech-loading rifle’s 
replacement of the slower, less powerful musket caused a tactical shift from the 
use of shock to that of attrition. The rifle’s greater range lengthened battlefields, 
and prompted commanders to give up tactical formations in favour of long 
front-lines which allowed each soldier to do his part in slowly and steadily 
wiping out enemy forces and materiel.^® Further development of machine guns 
in World War I led to that war’s infamous reliance on trench warfare. The 
stalemate which ensued owed much to the fact that the unprecedented firepower 
that machine guns made available allowed both sides to remain sequestered 
behind impregnable defences and fend off their opponents almost indefinitely.^*
Guerlac, Hemy. “Vauban: the Impact o f Science on War.” in Paret. Makers o f Modern
28
Strategy, p.65; Cf. also Clausewitz. On War, p.343 
Asprey. War in the Shadows, p.36
Laughridge. “Recent and Not-so-recent Thinking on Information Operations and the 
Knowledge War.” p.32 
Van Creveld. Command in War, p.53
Weigley, Russell F. “American Stiategy from its Beginnings through the First World War.” 
in Paret. Makers o f Modern Strategy, p. 419; Parker. The Cambridge History of Warfare.
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106
The MTR as Enhancer of Cost-Effectiveness
A third consequence of military technology revolutions is their capacity
to enhance the efficiency and cost-effectiveness of warmaking. To a certain 
extent, this factor is a corollary to MTRs’ force multiplying and firepower 
advantages: if each soldier and each weapon individually can accomplish more, 
then the military receives more value for the cost of each. The 1906 launching 
of the HMS Dreadnought and others of its class illustrates the cost-effectiveness 
of innovation, since, according to contemporaries, the ship’s firepower equalled 
that of three older ships combined.Even if building the dreadnought^^ were 
twice as expensive as building 19th century battleships, manning and 
maintaining one ship would certainly have been more cost-effective than 
running three separate ships.
The appearance of the Dreadnought also illustrates a fourth common 
effect of military technology revolutions: they often indirectly increase cost- 
effectiveness by dealing the slate of military advantage, thus adding to the value 
of new investments. In the case of dreadnoughts, since the new ships were both 
more cost-effective and more powerful, they rendered older ships obsolete. As 
the older ships became indevant to the reckoning of naval might, Britain’s own 
innovation virtually erased her historical advantage as the greatest naval power. 
This allowed Germany, who had only begun seriously developing naval power 
during the mid-1890’s, to compete as an equal for domination of the North Sea. 
Although Germany could not hope to match Britain’s fleet of conventional 
battleships or her store of seafaiing wisdom. Admiral von Tirpitz could nearly
^^Buzan. An Introduction to Strategic Studies, p.22 
The proper name Dreadnought came to encompass all the ships o f this type, and, used thus as 
a general term is given in lower case.
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equal Britain’s production of dreadnoughts/"* Each investment the German 
Hochseeflotte made in the new class of ships was therefore worth more than its 
cost, since it gave Germany an ability to challenge Britain’s naval supremacy 
which, in the absence of the new technology, the Germans could not otherwise 
have hoped for. Other military innovations have wiped the slate of military 
advantage clean in a similar way. From the first use of iron swords against 
softer bronze to the dropping of the atom bomb on Hiroshima, militaiy 
technology revolutions have altered the balance of advantage in war by 
nullifying old patterns of supremacy in the face of new means for 
predomination.
The MTR as Surprise Advantage
Lastly, such new means to militaiy superiority often hold the additional
advantage of surprise over the enemy. If a military technology revolution is 
truly unexpected, it may prove to be not only a cost-effective, firepower- 
enhancing force multiplier, but also a powerful tool of surprise. An enemy who 
does not anticipate a new tool or weapon will not know how to defend against 
it.^  ^ The longbow was so effective at Agincourt not only because it offered 
added ‘firepower,’ but also because the French did not how to defend 
themselves against a weapon they did not have.^® Rifles, poison gas, and 
torpedoes all had a similar impact when they first came into use. Likewise the
^  By 1914 Britain had 19 dreadnoughts at sea and 13 under construction; Germany had 13 at 
sea and seven under construction. Palmer, Alan. Penguin Dictionarv o f Modern Historv. 
Hamraondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin, 1985. p. 102 
Cf. Kiepinevich, Andrew F. Jr. “The Coming Military Revolution.” Delivered at the JCISS 
and Security Studies Revolution in Military Affairs Conference, Monterey, CA: 26-29 Aug 
1996. p .l3
Despite the fact that the longbow had been in common use in England since about 1300, the 
French were still relying on crossbowmen at Agincourt. Delbrück, Hans. Historv o f the Art
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eaiiy use of tanks was especially effective because no one knew how to react to 
them. Tanks, however, are an unusual case of technological surprise, because 
both the suiprisers (Germany) and the surprised (France and Britain) possessed 
the technology and the vehicle itself. The surprise lay in the fact that the former 
developed a doctrine specifically to exploit the advantages of tanks, while the 
latter simply added tanks to their arsenals as if they were just another weapon^^ 
like all the others. Britain and France fell to the Panzer divisions in 1940 not 
because the technology suiprised them, but rather because Gennany’s 
innovative use of tanks was revolutionary.^^
The RMA - Military Revolution not by Technology alone
The adversaries’ divergent use of tanks in 1940, in fact, provides the 
classic illustration of the axiom that changes in technology alone are not 
sufficient to transform warmaking. Though technological innovation is a 
significant driving force behind military change, a true alteration of warfare 
occurs only when innovation on the physical plane combines with various other 
factors, from strategy to organisation, tactics to doctrine.^^ For this reason, 
many cunent strategic thinkers refer not to a military technology revolution, but 
to a revolution in military affairs (RMA), thus de-emphasising the role of 
technology in military innovation and encompassing the various other elements 
required to revolutionise warfare.
of War, Within the Framework o f Political History. Vol. 4, “The Modern Era.” Renfroe, 
Walter J., Jr., trans. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1975. pp.465-6 
The A llies’ abysmal failme to exploit the new technology in its own right serves as a lesson 
against the adoption of information weapon systems without a concuiTent adjustment of 
doctrine and organisation.
Arquilla, John. “The Strategic Implications o f Information Dominance.” Strategic Review. 
Vol22, n3. Summer 94: 24-30. p.29
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One such element involves the recognition of an invention’s particular 
advantages and limitations, and the adaptation of strategy, doctrine, and 
organisation to exploit them. As the French ably illustrated in 1940, employing 
a new tool of war without understanding how it can influence the course of a 
battle or implementing corresponding revisions in the art of war can be worse 
than useless. Conversely, Germany, by organising specifically trained units of 
soldiers into Panzer divisions and deploying these divisions according to tactics 
particularly formulated to capitalise on the tank’s strengths, created a decisive 
advantage with the same tool. Germany’s ability convincingly to defeat the 
Allies with the Panzer divisions is a prime example of the need to adopt military 
practices to new military tools, particularly because the Allies actually possessed 
better tanks. This, however, proved to be an empty advantage in the face of the 
Panzer units’ superior deployment of the inferior German tanks."*® Thus 
France’s defeat by Germany dealt the French a difficult lesson in the cost of 
failing to develop a doctrine and tactics specifically designed for tank warfaie.
The danger of using outmoded methods with updated technology is, 
moreover, still more evident when neither side makes the necessary revisions in 
strategy and tactics. In the case of the US Civil Wai', the North and South were 
locked in stalemate for years because neither knew how to turn the new 
firepower of the breech-loading rifle into a winning edge. Both sides possessed 
the technology which nullified the strategic advantage previously held by the
Aftergood, Steven. “Monitoring Emerging Military Technologies.” Federation of American 
Scientists, Public Interest Report. Vol48, n l. January/February 1995. p.4 , Arquilla. “The 
Strategic Implications o f Information Dominance.” p.29 
Cohen, Eliot. “A Revolution in Warfare.” Foreign Affairs. Vol75, n2: 37-54. p.46 The 
Germans also had fewer tanks in many situations, but this advantage was decisively mitigated 
by Germany’s use o f superior tactics, as well as their incorporation o f the radio into the tanks 
themselves as well as in tactical deployment.
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defender, but neither Union nor Confederate army immediately realised that 
they needed to change the way they used the new rifle technology in order to 
translate the defender’s new disadvantage into an advantage for the attacker.
For much of the war, therefore, political progress remained negligible while 
thousands of men lost their lives in battles that changed little of the strategic 
picture."** This was a bitter lesson on the fact that no RMA can occur if no one 
recognises and adapts to the uniqueness of the innovation.
Recognition of the need for a new approach to a new tool is thus 
necessary if a revolution in military affairs is to occur, but it is not sufficient. In 
order for an RMA truly to take hold, there must also be some impetus to 
recognise and adapt to new techniques. To return to the case of the interwar 
tank RMA, Eliot Cohen has argued that the Germans - and to a lesser extent the 
Soviets - developed Panzer divisions and tank warfare doctrine because they had 
a goal toward which to direct the new weapon. Both Germany and the Soviet 
Union aimed to regain old lands and conquer new territory while France and 
Britain remained stubbornly convinced that appeasing the German dictator’s 
increasingly greedy demands would preserve peace in Europe and avert 
repeating the devastation of world war."*^
Without such impetus, an army may never capitalise on weapons 
potentials, even if it possesses the means to build them. For example, neither 
the United States nor the (now former) Soviet Union have chosen to develop 
prompt radiation weapons, though both have had the technology and the 
capability to do so since 1960. Despite the tension of the Cold War, the
'** Weigley. “American Strategy from its Beginnings through the First World War.” p.419 
Kissinger, Henry. Diplomacy. London: Simon and Schuster, 1994. p.310
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political and moral arguments against employing a weapon designed specifically 
to cause the slow and agonising death of civilians have proved decisive factors 
in prohibiting their development/^ This is only one very cleai-cut instance out 
of many where the cost in lives, treasure, and even political standing may 
outweigh the benefits of developing available technologies for new weapons. 
Consequently, as a rule even a recognised innovation will only be adopted for an 
RMA if there are compelling political, strategic, and moral arguments in its 
favour.
Lastly, in emphasising the non-technological aspects of military 
revolution, one should of course remember that non-technical innovations not 
only play an important role in adapting the ait of wai' to new inventions, but that 
the innovations which spark a revolution in military affairs may themselves be 
non-technological developments. For instance, France’s introduction of the 
levée en masse in 1793 was made possible by the social reordering of the French 
Revolution,"*"* yet its impact on warfare was profound. Mass conscription - by 
allowing states to field aimies 10, 20, even 50 times larger than ever before - 
dramatically increased the scale of battle, thus transforming warfare as 
significantly as the breech-loading rifle, the railroad, or any other mechanical 
invention of the 19th century."*^
Baylis, Booth, Garnett, and Williams. Contemporary Strategy, p.93 
In 1793 France was still in crisis after the upheayal o f the Reyolution, and had little hope of  
ensuring security without mobilising all the manpower and resources at its command. France 
justified this dramatic departure from traditional military practice by claiming that the new 
Republic meant not only new rights and freedoms for its citizens, but new obligations as 
well. Epstein, Robert M. Napoleon’s Last Victory and the Emergence o f Modern Warfare. 
Lawrence, KS: Uniyersity Press o f Kansas, 1994. p. 13 
'*^ So significant was the impact o f the leyee en masse on warfare that many strategic thinkers 
yiew it - along with the operational leyel o f war and Napoleonic organisation - as one of the 
hallmarks o f modern war. Epstein. Napoleon’s Last Victory and the Emergence o f Modern 
Warfare, p.3
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The list of non-technological factors which contribute to the 
revolutionisation of war therefore extends from the obvious revisions in 
strategy, tactics, doctrine, and organisation requisite for incorporating 
innovations throughout waif aie, to the recognition of the need for such wide- 
ranging changes and the impetus to implement them, to some of the very 
innovations behind the revolutions. Since all of these patently non- 
technological factors have played important roles in military revolution, this 
phenomenon of radical change in war is most aptly categorised not as a mere 
revolution in military technology, but, more comprehensively, as a revolution in 
military affairs.
lAW as Military Revolution
Having established the many and various characteristics of military 
revolution (whether one wishes to describe the phenomenon as a military 
technology revolution or a revolution in military affairs), it is now possible to 
examine the extent to which this classic model of change does account for the 
emergence of information age war. It is, of course, also possible to analyse how 
information age war, if it truly is a paradigm shift, would introduce changes in 
warfare which transcend the patterns of both MTRs and RM As.
Proponents of the military revolution explanation of lAW predict that 
the information age’s influence on war will alter conflict in much the same way 
that revolutions in military affairs have reshaped warmaking for centuries. 
Indeed, the RMA analysis is perhaps the most widely supported explanation for 
the changes that lAW is introducing in warfare. Especially in the warform’s 
initial phases of development, where information age military techniques appear 
alongside the tactics of conventional war (as was the case during the 1991 Gulf
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War)/® the effects of introducing the new war form should, in fact, correspond 
closely to those of traditional RMAs. That is to say, the changes in technology, 
doctrine, organisation, strategy, and tactics that mark the emergence of lAW 
should initially serve as force multipliers which enhance firepower and augment 
cost-effectiveness as well as the advantage of surprise.
Most notably, several information age militaiy innovations could act as 
valuable force multipliers. lAW’s great advances in intelligence, for instance, 
should multiply available force by leveraging sophisticated sensor meshes, high 
magnification surveillance satellites, and networks of smart weapons to enable 
information armies to collect more and better intelligence than ever before. 
Moreover, improvements in communications should be better able to 
disseminate this information to the right people at the right time, allowing 
commanders to lead battles with real-time decision-making."*^ In addition, 
precision guided munitions (PGMs) and stealth technology will facilitate 
increasingly surgical strikes that, because of their precision, can optimise the 
effectiveness of each shot fired. Just as in past revolutions in militaiy affairs, 
these elements multiply the force projected by infonnation age soldiers by 
enabling them to attack and defend where and when action is most needed, thus 
amplifying the utility of each soldier and each activity.
Information age war enthusiasts also tout the dramatic increase in cost- 
effectiveness made possible by the adoption of LAW’s tools and methods. First, 
since many technologies used in information age war - notably computers and 
telecommunications - are mass-produced on the open maiket, militaries will not
Cf. p. 119
Aftergood. “Monitoring Emerging Military Technologies.” p.4
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have to support as much expensive research and development/^ Consequently, 
the main cost of certain components of lAW attacks - such as hacking into 
enemy command systems at a crucial moment before an aerial bombardment - 
will arise not from the price of munitions or troop deployment, but from the 
relatively minuscule price of a specialist’s computer expertise. While such 
attacks must be supported by traditional military force to be effective, shutting 
down an enemy’s radar systems as an attack begins, for instance, could produce 
significant benefits for a relatively insignificant price. Secondly, the cost of 
producing even many formerly expensive weapons systems is predicted to 
become comparatively inexpensive due to the rise of computerised production. 
Leveraging information to facilitate production cuts costs by increasing the 
efficiency of industry and reducing waste."*® Thirdly, computer integrated 
information management can be similarly employed to decrease logistics costs 
since computerised tracking and streamlining of the supply process can reduce 
the chronic problem of wasted, mis-delivered supplies as well as cut down on 
the infrastructure and number of people required to manage logistical 
concerns.®® Fourthly, the same augmented intelligence which acts as a force 
multiplier could also reduce deployment costs. If troops have more precise 
infonnation on where to attack and defend, military forces should be able to 
decrease their expenditure of wasted munitions, fuel, and effort.
Fifthly, and perhaps most notably, information age developments like 
virtual reality simulation can greatly help to reduce costs by training troops both 
more effectively and more cheaply. In virtual reality, soldiers can experience
Morton. “The Information Advantage.” p. 14 
Krepinevich. ‘T he Coming Militaiy Revolution.” p. 17
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situations much doser to battle conditions than traditional simulators have 
achieved without the expense of munitions or fuel/* Furthermore, full strategic 
simulators like the Synthetic Theater of War (STOW), by allowing militaries to 
test new weapons in virtual reality, spare the cost of putting an expensive 
prototype in the field and limit weapons acquisition to only those weapons 
which have proven effective/^ This opportunity to train and test is especially 
valuable at the end of the 20th century, not only because defence budgets have 
shrunk since the end of the Cold War, but also because wai' now changes so 
quickly that many innovations have never been tested in real combat/^
Another, less publicised, result which information age war shares with 
military revolutions is the advantage of surprise. Information age military 
forces derive this benefit principally from the pace at which they should be able 
to prosecute war. That pace is unlikely to stun any opponent completely, since 
the coalition’s performance in the 1991 Gulf War effectively gave notice that 
the capacity for unprecedented speed and accuracy already exists. However, the 
comprehensive integration of information which will characterise mature lAW 
has not yet been applied to full-scale war; it is therefore not unlikely that the 
first true information age war will exhibit yet more surprising advances in pace. 
Even failing further advances, the pace of lAW should hold another, indirect 
surprise-related advantage for information age militaries. Like the French who
See the introduction’s note 13, also ‘Efficiency’s Rise to Power’ in chapter three.
Steven Aftergood cites the fact that teaching a soldier to drive a real tank costs $55 per mile, 
whereas driving a virtual reality simulator costs only $2.50 for ‘virtually’ the same 
experience. Aftergood. “Monitoring Emerging Military Technologies.” p.lO
Aftergood. “Monitoring Emerging Military Technologies.” p.9
Buzan. An Introduction to Strategic Studies. p.30 Cf. also Campen, Alan D., ed. The First 
Information War: the Story of Communications. Computers, and Intelligence Systems in the 
Persian Gulf War. Fairfax, VA: Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association 
International Press, 1992. p.xi, Everett
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did not understand how to defend against the longbows they did not themselves 
employ,®"* military forces who have not adapted to lAW’s changes will not only 
be physically un-equipped to function at the pace of their more advanced 
counterparts, but are likely also to be conceptually unprepared to fight at this 
pace. Lacking the information systems or, more likely, the recognition of the 
need to leverage these systems in synergy throughout all levels of military 
activity, non-information age militaries will be ill-qualified to formulate 
adequate tactics and strategy to drive off the fast, accurate attacks of their 
information age opponents. As a result, information age militaries may be able 
to surprise some of their adversaries even with capabilities of which the world 
has already become aware.
Those championing the view that information age war is a revolution in 
military affairs can also point to the fact the current changes in war, like those 
historically evident in RMAs, have resulted not only from the introduction of 
new technology, but also from innovations in doctrine, strategy, organisation, 
etc. Military publications like the Air Force’s Cornerstones o f Information 
Warfare and the Navy’s Copernicus Forward, as well as organisational shifts 
like the institution of an information-intensive squadron of Air Force 
servicemen or the Pentagon’s own establishment of an office for Information 
Operations provide ample testimony that such innovations are already 
underway.®® Moreover, the implementation of these changes owes itself to a 
growing recognition of the need to adapt warfare to the information age, as well 
as a practical impetus to do so. Though information technologies fuel the
54 See also p. 108
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information age RMA, forward-minded military forces have already perceived 
the need to look beyond technology to the development of strategy, doctrine, 
and organisation designed to accommodate the new capabilities of information 
age technologies.^^ The present heated debate in the US military over the 
development of a suitable doctrine for information age war is evidence that 
strategic thinkers have recognised that new weapons alone are not sufficient 
factors to revolutionise war.^^
Further evidence that militaries have recognised the importance of 
incorporating both the technologies and the practices of information age war is 
ample in the annals of the Gulf War. The United States and its allies used 
nascent lAW principles at the heart of some of its most decisive offensives: 
stealth bombers led the all-important first strike which, significantly, targeted 
Iraq’s information infrastructure of air defence radar, computerised command, 
and general electrical grids. Catching the Iraqis by surprise, the strike proved so 
effective that it disrupted Iraqi air defences and secured the coalition’s 
information dominance for the duration of the war.^  ^ Furthermore, the use of 
sophisticated intelligence systems employing networked sensor meshes as well 
as surveillance and communications satellites helped to insure that the allies’ 
information superiority nullified a great deal of Iraq’s home field advantage of
The 609* IW Squadron. Scott, William B. “Information Waifare Policies Called Critical to 
National Security.” Aviation Week and Space Technology. 28 Oct 96. p. 62 
James, Lieut. Shawn D., USN. “Information Warfare: A Phenomenon, an Innovation, or a 
New Paradigm?” US Naval Post-Graduate School Web page. 24 Mar 95. p.2 
Cf. Jensen, Owen. “Information Warfare: Principles of Third-Wave War.” Airnower Journal. 
Vois. 1 Jan 94: 35-44. p.35. Aftergood. “Monitoring Emerging Military Technologies.” 
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knowing the desert terrain.^^ These methods, and the tools with which they 
were implemented, indicated a budding acceptance and application of 
information age tactics.
The military success of 1991, moreover, also served as an important 
impetus for the further development of full-fledged information age war 
doctrines, tactics, and s t r a t e g y B y  affording a preview of what might be 
possible with information tactics, the Gulf Wai' “crystallised awareness” among 
US military planners that the adoption of lAW’s tools and practices could offer 
valuable advances in warmaking.^^ The evidence of unexpectedly easy victory 
also provided a strong incentive to investigate the potential of information age 
war more thoroughly in the years that followed. This impetus has been further 
augmented by lAW’s particular attractiveness as a post-Cold War military 
investment. In an era of diminishing Great Power threats and down-sizing 
defence budgets, the relative cost-effectiveness of information age war, in 
addition to its promising potential for creating decisive military advantage, has 
made the emerging war form a popular choice for maintaining traditional 
military superiority amidst military spending cuts.^^
Information age war, therefore, seems to possess all the hallmarks of a 
military revolution. Like a military technology revolution, the radical changes 
that lAW has already begun introducing to warfare incorporate technological
Laughridge. “Recent and Not-so-recent Thinking on Information Warfare, p.3 
James. “Information Warfare: A Phenomenon, an Innovation, or a New Paradigm?” p.3 
Cohen, Eliot. “A Revolution in Warfare.” p.39
Johnson, Stuart, E. “DBK: Opportunities and Challenges.” in Johnson, Stuart, and Martin 
Libicki, eds. Dominant Battlespace Knowledge. Washington, DC: National Defense 
University World Wide Web Page, 1996. Ch.2, p .l, see also Wirtz, James J. “RMA: Caveat 
Emptor.” Monterey, CA: Naval Postgiaduate School RMA Conference Proceedings, August 
1996.9, For further elaboration of this topic, see ‘First Order Reasons for Waging I AW' in 
chapter five.
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advances like the introduction of stealth and precision guidance technologies, as 
well as the explosion of improvements in communications and surveillance 
satellite technologies. Moreover, the recent proliferation of information age- 
minded doctrine like the US Army’s FMlOO-6 on Information Operations and 
Joint Vision 2010^  ^illustrates that LAW also meets the prerequisites for 
categorisation as a revolution in military affairs - in that it enjoys the recognition 
and impetus for incorporating information age innovations throughout military 
strategy, tactics, and organisation. One can, consequently, characterise the shifts 
behind the emergence of information age war as representing at the least a 
military revolution.
The concept of military revolution thus holds demonstrable explanatory 
power for the current changes in warfare. Yet is this concept able to account for 
the expectations of information age paradigm shift? Again, the answer is no - or 
at least, not entirely. If lAW is actually a military paradigm shift, the changes it 
introduces to warfare should be the result of more than a common revolution in 
military affairs. History has shown that even a rare, radical military technology 
revolution like the development of air power is insufficient cause for rewriting 
the very principles of war. Witness the fact that, despite enthusiasm to the 
contrary, airpower was largely absorbed into the traditional methods of attrition 
and manoeuvre in conventional modem war.^ More pragmatically, one can 
also infer from the rarity of paradigm shifts that a military revolution cannot 
alone transform the paradigm of war. Military revolutions have occurred scores
^  United States. Department of the Aimy. US Army Field Manual 100-6: Information 
Operations. Washington, DC: ATSC-Aimy Worldwide Web page, 27 August 1996, 
Shalikashvili, John, M. Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Vision 2010. Washington, 
DC: United States Department of Defense, 1997.
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of times since the beginning of warfare, but, according to the criteria used 
here,*^  ^military paradigm shifts have occurred only twice - at the beginning of 
the agricultural and the industrial ages.
More significantly, the concept of military revolution cannot account for 
information age war’s potential to cause a paradigm shift because military 
revolutions - even revolutions in military affairs - account for changes only in 
the tools of war. Shifts in the weapons, tactics, strategies, and even 
organisational forms that are decisive in war will affect only how militaries 
wage war, confining their impact within the realm of war itself. As this thesis 
illustrates, however, a paradigm shift of war should witness transformations not 
only in how militaries wage war, but also in who wages it, at what, and why. 
Only a transformation profound enough to alter these factors external to war 
could be sufficient to transform the very model through which the world 
understands waifare. Thus, although the military revolution explanation for the 
emergence of LAW does much to elucidate how and why that war form is 
changing the tools of war, the inability of this argument to account for shifts in 
any other aspect of conflict proves it finally to be an inadequate model for 
explaining the expectation that information age war could constitute a paradigm 
shift of war.
Taking lAW in Context
Claims that information age war will introduce a military paradigm shift 
can therefore no more be fully explained by the military revolution analysis than
Arquilla. “The Strategic Implications o f Information Dominance.” p.26 
See the ‘Paradigm Shift’ section of the introduction.
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by the historical infonnation warfare analysis of the changing relationship 
between information and war. Both explanations have certain explanatory 
powers, but critical failings. The military revolution interpretation of lAW’s 
emergence has an advantage over the historical IW interpretation in that the 
foiTner accounts for how radical change affects war, but it lacks the latter’s 
ability to explain how information came to be the critical element behind the 
military revolution. Yet, while the historical interpretation can explain the role 
of information in information age war, it lacks the military revolution version’s 
ability to account for the occurrence and character of the changes lAW brings. 
Any hybrid of these two explanations would combine the advantages of both, 
but it would also share the principal failings of its components. By 
characterising lAW as a military revolution which augments information’s 
traditional critical role in war through newly sophisticated information age 
technologies and practices, a hybrid explanation is valuable to the extent that it 
accounts for information’s crucial part in war, as well as for the revolutionary 
changes LAW is introducing. Yet, this composite analysis paints the emergence 
of information age war as a continuation of long-standing historical patterns of 
revolution and evolution. That interpretation is patently at odds with the claim 
that lAW, as a paradigm shift, should represent a departure from the past so 
profound that it requires a new model for understanding war. Moreover, like its 
two component arguments, the hybrid explanation is also unable to account for 
shifts beyond the means level of warfare - that is to say, shifts not only in the 
question of ‘how’ war is waged, but in the what, why, and who of information 
age war. By ignoring these questions, the hybrid explanation, like the historical 
information warfare and the military revolution arguments that compose it, fails
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even to consider the very factors that are the hallmarks of military paradigm 
shift.
Ultimately, the insufficiencies of these explanations are traceable to the 
fact that none of them acknowledges the role which the changing context of the 
information society plays in today’s transformation of war. The belief that 
information age war could represent a paradigm shift of war is, however, 
predicated largely on the idea that the information revolution, having already 
profoundly influenced modern society, might have a similar effect on war. 
Thus, any attempt to explain information age war as a paradigm shift must take 
into account the context in which these changes are occurring.
Significantly, such a contextual reading of lAW’s emergence, unlike the 
historical and military revolution arguments, does hold the capacity to explain 
the emergence of information age war as a paradigm shift. The changing 
context of warfare - the individuals, states, and other actors who wage war, as 
well as the international system within which it is waged - could plausibly 
account for fundamental, paradigmatic shifts in warfare because such shifts in 
war should occur either as a result of the same forces which have affected war’s 
context, or secondarily, in reaction to the pervasive shifts in its context. If the 
information revolution is extensively transforming modem society, it may have 
the same impact on warfare - that most violent of societal interactions - by 
creating an imperative for information efficiency in conflict as in business, 
government, and other realms of social activity. Alternatively, the products of 
the information revolution’s transformation of society - for instance, the 
information age’s empowerment of individuals, its newly credible challenge to 
the primacy of the state, and its erosion of the hierarchical organisation form -
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may themselves spark shifts in waifare, since the means and objectives of wai* 
tend to mirror the societies which wage it.^ *^  Such a contextual reading of the 
emergence of lAW therefore not only accounts for both the fundamental nature 
of the predicted shifts in information age war, and for information’s role in 
those shifts, but also offers a means of understanding changes in the what, why, 
and who, as well as the how of lAW, thus finally providing a more thorough 
explanation for information age war’s claims to the status of paradigm shift.
War is, in fact, particularly vulnerable to such contextual changes. 
Clausewitz characterises war as a non-linear phenomenon, one in which an 
input may yield a totally disproportionate o u t p u t . A s  such, the “very nature or 
definitions of the system can change” quite rapidly. According to Michael 
Handel’s reading of Clausewitzean non-linearity, such transitions usually 
depend less on the variables within the system (which in any case cannot be 
meaningfully isolated for analysis) than on the parameters that set the 
boundaries of the system; i.e., on the context in which the system occurs.^^ War 
is thus highly sensitive to changes in its context due simply to the nature of 
warfare itself. This argument underscores the claim that conflict will change 
more radically now in the changing context of the information age than it has 
throughout all the content-shifting military revolutions of the past two centuries.
Perhaps the most compelling evidence for the pertinence of the 
contextual reading of military paradigm shift, however, derives from historical 
precedent. Again, the transition period between the agricultural and industrial
Libicki. The Mesh and the Net. Ch6. p .l. Cf. also Clausewitz. On War. p.709 
Clausewitz. On War, p. 139. This is a factor inherent in Clausewitz’s famous ideas about 
friction in war. Cf. also Beyerchen, Alan. “Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, and the Nature of 
War.” International Security. V oll7 . Winter 92-93: 59-90. p.67
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ages provides a valuable point of reference for the shifts occurring today.^^ 
Warfare began the transformation from an agricultural to an industrial age 
phenomenon not because new weapons emerged, nor because of new tactics, 
new doctrine, or new organisation. Instead, agricultural age waifare ended with 
the crumbling of the feudal social institution. The decline of feudalism in the 
waning years of the agricultural age transformed warfare by reordering society 
and therefore altering the context in which conflict occuiTed. The contextual 
shift produced new standaids for how, why, and by whom conflict was waged, 
creating a uniquely new industrial age warform long before the first mass 
production of war machines.
Compare, for instance, the actors and their reasons for fighting before 
and after the industrial revolution. Agricultural age feudal warfare was typically 
fought by knights under a liege lord who engaged in battle out of a sense of duty 
and honour. The knights took up arms because they owed the service to their 
liege in return for the lands granted them by that lord. Lords, in turn, owed their 
vassals protection and security under the code of noblesse oblige. Both viewed 
war as a religious and moral duty to the Church, which at the time reigned 
supreme over feudal politics throughout Western Europe.^^ By contrast, the 
crumbling of the manorial system of obligation (vassal to liege as well as liege 
to vassal) upon the decline of the agricultural age led to the rise of a money 
economy and, consequently, of a new kind of army as well. Under this new 
system, soldiers began to fight for pay and plunder, rather than for honour and
in Beyerchen. “Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, and the Nature of War.” p.65 
Cf. also the ‘Understanding Paradigm Shift in Context’ section o f the introduction and the 
‘Information Revolution’ section o f chapter one.
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duty. As more and more such mercenaries emerged, it became possible to 
establish professional armies. Feudal lords who were eager to free themselves 
from dependence on the donated service of their vassals (which generally held a 
time limit of 40 days) enthusiastically encouraged this trend because it allowed 
them to build up a more permanent base of power.^^
At the same time,^^ the Reformation challenged both universal 
Catholicism and the political power of the Pope, thus paving the way for the 
emergence of nation-states bound by secular loyalties and politics.^^ States soon 
replaced feudal lords as the main actors in war, making warfare a matter of 
national interest rather than of personal glory or gain. These new entities, with 
money and professional standing armies at their disposal, enjoyed a new liberty 
to experiment with the tools of war. The nation-states, more highly centralised 
and formally organised than their feudal predecessors, were able to invest more 
money in warfare. The comparatively regular and abundant flow of money 
allowed post-feudal militaries to purchase more and better weapons, and to take 
risks on new inventions. Likewise, the ability of the nation-state to salary full­
time soldiers and administrators encouraged the establishment of a much larger 
core of thoroughly trained, professional soldiers who were equipped - or had 
ample time to be trained - to handle more innovation and greater complexity in 
their weapons and in their battles. It was in this context that gunpowder
Devries, Kelly. Medieval Military Technology. Peterborough, Ontario: Broadview Press, 
1992. p.96. Gilbert. “Machiavelli.” p. 12 
Gilbert. “Machiavelli.” p. 14 Cf. also Clausewitz. On War. p.709. Delbrück, History of the 
Art of War, p.224
Feudalism in Europe crumbled during the 13th-15th centur ies, depending on where one was. 
Der Derian, James. On Diplomacy: a Genealogy o f Western Estrangement. Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1987. p. 110
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weapons took root in the West as popular tools of war7"  ^ Thus conflict’s new 
actors, with their new reasons for fighting, also altered the ait of war itself, yet 
the importance of these alterations remains not with the technological 
innovations, but with the context in which they occurred/^
Still more significantly, the new context of the industrial age also caused 
a shift in the nature of power itself. As discussed in chapter one, the 
progression of industrialisation caused production and money to replace land as 
the primary source of both wealth and power. The new power base in turn 
altered the traditional ends of war; with the growing primacy of industry over 
agriculture, the principal motivation for war increasingly shifted from the 
agrarian goal of capturing surplus wealth and land for its own sake to the 
conquest of land bearing resources crucial to industrial production.^*^
The Renaissance historian J R. Hale notes that, “Changes in weaponry and tactics [attendant 
with the popularisation of gunpowder] called at least for a core o f trained men who could 
help recruits to adapt to methods no longer part of quasi-folklore behaviour.” This training 
function became increasingly important as new recruits became more and more numerous, 
owing to the fact that firearms both increased the usefulness of infantry, and raised the 
demand for foot soldiers. The core of professional soldiers who provided this training was 
the forerunner o f the modern standing army. Thus, the adoption o f firearms - with their need 
for a permanent coterie o f craftsmen and administrators to keep militaries supplied with the 
new weapons - helped establish the idea o f “consistent annual military expenditure.” 
However, the increased bureaucratic and financial capacity o f the post-Westphalian state 
played a significant role in allowing this change in military methodology to become standard 
practice. Hale, J.R. War and Societv in Renaissance Europe. 1450-1620. Leicester: 
Leicester University Press, 1985. Pp. 65, 67, 64, 47. Cf. also Delbrück. Historv of the Art 
of War, p.224.
This state o f affairs stands in stark contrast to that during the earlier Middle Ages, when armies, 
often hastily cobbled together to meet whatever challenge was at hand, were comprised o f a 
small core o f trained, privileged knights and a lai'ge collection o f peasants who knew little of 
the art o f war.
Gilbert. “Machiavelli.” p. 14
In the agricultural age, land was a goal o f war ‘for its own sake’ because the land itself was the 
key to economic, strategic, and even status-based power. In the industrial age, the resources 
extractable from the land became the more important keys to the various manifestations of 
power. Lynn, John A., ed. Tools of War: Instruments. Ideas, and Institutions of Warfare. 
1445-1871. Chicago: University o f Illinois Press, 1990. p.238 See also th e ‘Understanding 
Paradigm Shift in Context’ section o f the introduction and the ‘Information Revolution’ 
section o f chapter one.
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Consequently, warfare at the end of the industrial revolution was a 
fundamentally different art from that practised during the agricultural age. Not 
only did soldiers have new tools and methods for warmaking, the soldiers 
themselves were different kinds of people, with different reasons for fighting, 
different goals to achieve, and different institutions to fight for. The transition 
from agricultural to industrial age was itself largely responsible for the 
emergence of the new war paradigm, since altering the context of conflict 
produced a chain reaction throughout the many variables of waifare. Once the 
contextual parameters of this non-linear system shifted, war’s content had to 
adapt accordingly if warfare was to remain a relevant instrument of politics. In 
light of this historical example of the impact of contextual change on the content 
of warfare, it is easy to understand how proponents of the paradigm shift 
argument have come to expect the information age to introduce similar 
paradigmatic transformations to warfaie under similar conditions of widespread 
contextual change.
Yet while the evidence of historical precedent does successfully explain 
the potential for causing paradigmatic change, this precedent alone does not 
prove that the present information age contextual shift has the capacity to foster 
changes in warfare as fundamental as those of the industrial age. Two factors 
from the present augment the evidence of the past to complete the argument that 
the information age indeed holds at least the potential to introduce a paradigm 
shift of war.
The first revolves around the nature of the information revolution and 
the changes it is capable of introducing. The meteoric rise of computers and the 
internet, the success of networked organisation in business, and the popularity of
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niche markets are all testimony to the already extensive influence of the 
infonnation revolution on the global economy. Advances in information 
technology have, moreover, pervaded virtually aspect of life in advanced 
societies, as testified by the profusion of government services on-line, academic 
collaboration in cyberspace, and even internet romances. While the ultimate 
consequences of these shifts are not yet fully evident, the changes, as the 
previous chapter illustrated, have already inaugurated distinctly infonnation age 
trends toward widening and weakening both individual and state power.^^ The 
profound impact that the information revolution has already had upon 
individuals and states illustrates that the present transformation of context is at 
least as significant as that of the industrial revolution. This evidence establishes 
that the historical precedent could feasibly apply to the present circumstances.
The second factor is also concerned with the nature of the information 
revolution and, more specifically, with its relationship to the nature of war. 
Information is, of course, the pivotal factor in the information revolution, a 
revolution so named because the innovations it introduces in information 
technologies are transforming the role information plays in society - what 
information can do, how important it is, and even what part it plays in the 
composition of power. Likewise, as the previous sections have detailed, 
information is also a crucial element of warmaking. Recent innovations in 
information technology have further increased information’s established 
importance in functions such as command and control, intelligence, and 
psychological operat ions.The central role of information in both the current
See the ‘Man’ and ‘State’ sections of chapter one. 
Cf. p.93
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revolution and in warfare augurs that the latter will be highly sensitive to the 
influence of the former, since the information revolution introduces changes 
which affect not the periphery of conflict, but one of the keystones of 
warmaking. War’s own reliance on information may thus cause it to be more 
receptive to the information revolution’s forces of change. Ironically, although 
some sceptics refute claims that lAW is a new conflict paradigm on the grounds 
that information has always been a vital part of warfaie, that very fact may 
render war more susceptible to the transforming forces of the information 
revolution.
Taken together, these contextual arguments illustrate better than any 
other available explanation that the information age holds the potential to 
produce a new paradigm of war. The historical example of the transition from 
agricultural to industrial age warfare ably demonstrates that context can serve as 
the definitive factor in the emergence of a new military paradigm. History, 
moreover, also details the character of the context and content shifts which 
herald a new conflict paradigm: from changes in the nature of power and the 
shape of the political system to alterations of the actors and their tools and goals 
for conflict, the transition to the industrial age sets many precedents for the 
dawning of the information age and its own war paradigm. Elements from the 
present also augment the evidence of the past, since both the nature of the 
information revolution and that of war itself indicate that the information 
revolution and information age warfare fulfil the prerequisites for introducing a 
paradigm shift to war. Whether or not this paradigm shift actually occurs 
depends now on the extent to which lAW fulfils its potential to transform the 
model by which the world understands war. Thus it is to the barometers of
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paradigm shift, the how, what, why, and who of information age war, to which 
the investigation now turns.
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Chapter 3
NEW MEANS to an END? 
How Information Age War is Waged
“The first, the supreme, the m ost far-reaching act o f  judgem ent that the 
statesm an and com m ander have to make is to establish ... the kind o f  
w ar on which they are embarking, neither m istaking it f o r  nor trying to 
turn it into, something that is alien to its nature. That is the f ir s t  o f  all 
strategic questions and the m ost comprehensive. ”
- Carl von Clausewitz^
Changes in how war is waged constitute the first and most obvious sign 
that a military paradigm shift may be occurring. Such changes take the foim of 
shifts in the means soldiers use to prosecute war, a category which includes not 
only physical tools of war like weapons, transportation, and communications 
systems, but also more intangible tools like doctrine, command structure, 
tactical objectives, and training practices. Over the past decade or so, alterations 
in these aspects of war have become a marked component of military activity in 
many parts of the world. From the United States to China, the Soviet Union to 
Great Britain, the profusion of efforts to update military forces for the 
infonnation age is a strong indication that the revolution in information 
technologies is indeed affecting the means of war. However, what that effect is, 
and how profound it is, remains a popular source of debate. This chapter will 
therefore begin the investigation into the potential information age military 
paradigm shift by examining these two issues, with the intent of establishing 
what lAW’s changes in the means of war may mean for conflict in the 
information age. Specifically, the following pages will concentrate on one trend 
which has been conspicuous throughout the emerging changes in how war is
* Clausewitz, Carl von. On War. Michael Howard and Peter Faret, eds, tians. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1976. p.596
waged - information age war’s emphasis on the decisiveness of efficiency. The 
significance of this trend as a departure from traditional means of war will play 
the primary role in determining whether or not information age war fulfils the 
first criterion of an information age military paradigm shift.
The Changing Means of W ar as the First Criterion of Paradigm Shift
The investigation into the criteria for military paradigm shift begins here
for several reasons. Firstly, changes in how information age war will be waged 
are the easiest and quickest changes to implement, and therefore are typically 
the first to appear. Shifts in the actors who will be able to engage in full-scale 
war or in their motives for doing so remain but distant forecasts, but changes 
designed to accommodate predicted shifts in the means of information age war 
have in fact already begun to occur. Evidence of this fact may be found most 
prominently in the profusion of efforts by the United States military to update 
the American war machine for the information age’s potential challenges. The 
US military’s use of technologies like stealth and precision guided weaponry, its 
establishment of information savvy organisations like the Defense Infonnation 
Systems Agency (DISA), and the Air Force’s 609* IW Squadron,^ and its 
publication of doctrines - like Joint Vision 2010 and the Army’s Force XXI - 
designed to accommodate infonnation age military capabilities, are all among 
the first clear indications that the revolution in information technologies is 
indeed affecting war to a considerable extent.
Secondly, on a practical level, changes in how war is waged are also the 
easiest to recognise and to measure. Compared to the task of quantifying
 ^Scott, William B. “Information Waifare Policies Called Critical to National Security.” 
Aviation Week and Space Technology. 28 Oct 96. p.62
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changes in what war targets, why it is waged, or who wages it, measuring both 
the changes in means themselves and the effect these changes have on the 
waging of war is relatively straightforward. Of the actual changes in means, 
new practices - from the procurement of sophisticated sensors and the 
implementation of networked organisation to the deployment of stealth and 
precision guided munitions and even the prevalence of strategic decisions to 
blind an enemy’s command and control systems -are all tangible changes which 
can even be physically counted. The effects such changes have are slightly 
more difficult to quantify but - from decreased casualties in battles against a 
blinded enemy and decreased collateral damage when using PGMs to improved 
battle reaction times and reduced materiel losses - many effects of the changing 
means of war are also visible and, to some extent, measurable for their 
contribution to warmaking.
In addition, the question of how information age war will be waged 
should be examined first because changes in other criteria of the paradigm shift 
might possibly result from a significant transformation of the means of war. For 
instance, a shift in the kind of systems which constitute a critical military 
vulnerability could influence a related change in what militaries will target in 
the information age. Likewise, a considerable change in the cost or accessibility 
of weapons for future wars might encourage new actors to consider employing 
war as a means to an end, thus affecting who will wage information age war. 
These possibilities will be considered in future chapters;^ the present chapter 
will confine itself to establishing that lAW is indeed changing how war is 
waged, and investigating the significance of those changes.
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Before this inquiry can begin, however, it is necessary to remind the 
reader that there is a notable limitation to using changes in the means of war as a 
barometer of paradigm shift. That limitation arises from the fact that such 
changes have occurred hundreds of times without requiring a new model for 
understanding war. The majority of these changes, as the previous chapter 
details, have instead produced scores of military revolutions over the centuries. 
The fact that men have witnessed and studied hundreds of technological, 
organisational, and operational changes in war makes the well-known model of 
the military revolution a logical, but confusing starting point for studying the 
changing means of information age war. The example of military revolution is 
a logical frame of reference because the military revolution’s changes - and their 
impact on the means of war - are relatively familiar. This viewpoint, however, 
is more likely to confuse one’s understanding of lAW’s means changes because 
the present investigation is examining these shifts not in the context of the 
familiar revolution in military affairs, but as potential components of a much 
wider phenomenon.
If information age war truly is a new paradigm of war, it will by 
definition require a new model for understanding warfare. Military revolutions, 
however, engender no such paradigm shift because they traditionally alter the 
calculation of military advantage within the bounds of time-honoured military 
principles, and therefore do not affect the nature of war itself. Because both 
lAW and military revolution have a very similai' initial influence on how wai* is 
waged (in fact, chapter two established that LAW can be characterised as a 
military revolution at the least), many strategic thinkers have embraced the idea
 ^Chapters four and six, respectively.
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that the emergence of information age war represents a revolution in military 
affairs, without even entertaining the possibility that the current changes in 
warfare might signify an even more profound shift.'  ^ Beginning the paradigm 
shift investigation with the changing means of war may therefore cause 
confusion by tempting the reader to just such an early conclusion.
There is evidence, however, that a profound shift may indeed be 
underway. If it is perhaps not yet obvious in warfare, this shift certainly is 
obvious in other aspects of social interaction. Chapter one’s account of the 
infonnation age’s effect on the roles of man and the state in society is testimony 
to this fact. These contextual changes, chapter two demonstrates, provide 
preliminary justification for the assumption that the information age may 
introduce a new paradigm of warfare.
Endeavouring either to prove or disprove that assumption, this chapter 
will examine the current changes in how war is waged not for their independent 
significance, but for their significance as one of four barometers of military 
paradigm shift. For this reason the chapter aims not simply to illustrate the new 
capabilities that information age war may offer militaries, but rather to establish 
what the new means of lAW mean for conflict in the information age. With that 
intent in mind, the following pages will largely forego recounting the myriad 
developments in specific tools of war, as well as the numerous innovations in 
military practices. Others have done this in great detail elsewhere.^ Instead, the
Eg. Kiepinevich, Andrew F. Jr. “The Coming Military Revolution.” Delivered at the JCISS 
and Security Studies Revolution in Military Affairs Conference, Moneterey, CA: 26-29 Aug 
1996. Fitzsimonds, James R. “The Coming Military Revolution.” Parameters. Vol25, 
Summer 1995; 30-36.
 ^E.g. United States. Department o f the Army. US Armv Field Manual 100-6: Information 
Operations. Washington, DC: ATSC-Army Web page, 27 August 1996. Krepinevich. “The 
Coming Military Revolution.”, Everett, Charles D., Moss Dewindt, and Shane McDade.
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chapter will focus on a larger trend in the changing means of information age 
war that, if it truly does represent a fundamental shift in the waging of war, 
would constitute the first indication of an information age military paradigm 
shift. That trend is defined by an ever-increasing emphasis upon the potentially 
decisive role of efficiency in future military operations.
EFFICIENCY over MASS
This emphasis on efficiency in the waging of information age war 
parallels a similar trend inherent in the rise of information power. The growing 
supremacy of information in the recipe for power is based primarily upon the 
ability of modern information technologies to create efficiency. Under this 
configuration of power, advantage is achieved depending on the speed and/or 
the accuracy with which an ever growing number of tasks can be completed.
The acquiring and maintaining of almost every form of information age power 
should, as a result, come to depend less and less on the industrial age quotient of 
mass, relying instead on the capacity for efficiency now made available through 
sophisticated information management. From computer-integrated 
manufacturing to electronic inventory-tracking to guided missiles, the precision 
attainable through the use of modem information technologies promises to 
obviate a great deal of waste. This should reduce not only the need for physical
“The Silicon Spear: An Assessment o f Information-based Waifare and US National 
Security.” Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1997. National Defense 
University Web page. Martin Libicki has also contiibuted several useful sources on the more 
tactical side o f lAW , including Libicki, Martin C. The Mesh and the Net: Speculations on 
Armed Conflict in a Time o f Free Silicon. Washington, DC: Institute for Strategic Studies, 
National Defense University, McNair Paper 28, March 1994. Cooper, Jeffrey. “Dominant 
Battlespace Awareness and Future Warfare.” in Johnson, Stuart, and Martin Libicki, eds. 
Dominant Battlespace Knowledge. Washington, DC: National Defense University Web
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resources, but also the dependence on them as quotients of power.^ As a result, 
the accurate and fast may increasingly be able to challenge the traditional 
advantage of the lai'ge and strong, dissolving the old correlation between power 
and size in favour of a new link between power and efficiency.
The waning military applicability of the old mass-power correlation is to 
date most obvious in the case of the 1991 Gulf War. During this conflict, the 
coalition forces drove the Iraqi army back to Baghdad with relative ease, despite 
the fact that the Iraqis at the time possessed the world’s fourth largest army - an 
army which many predicted before the war would be no easy opponent.^ This 
conflict provided the first tangible evidence that militaries (like businesses and 
governments) must learn to compete according to the rules of the information 
age if they are to survive in the efficient contests of that age. Information age 
war, defined as a conflict in which victory falls to the force most effective at 
leveraging information, should ideally represent the epitome of such decisively 
efficient competition. In order to comprehend how lAW will be waged in the 
future, therefore, one must understand first and foremost the efficiency intrinsic 
to that new warform. However, since efficiency plays a pivotal role not only in 
infonnation age military power but in all forms of information age power, it will 
be useful to establish an understanding of efficiency’s contribution to power in
page, 1996. Chapter 6, and Libicki, Maitin C. “What is Information Warfare?” ' 
Washington, DC: National Defense University, 1995.
 ^See the introduction, ‘Conceptions o f War in the Information A ge’ and ‘Understanding 
Paradigm Shift in Context.’
 ^Biddle, Stephen. “Victory Misunderstood: What the Gulf War Tells Us about the Future of  
Conflict.” International Securitv. V ol21,n2. Autumn 1996: 139-79. p. 142 Campen, Alan 
D., ed. The First Information War: the Storv o f Communications. Computers, and 
Intelligence Svstems in the Persian Gulf War. Fairfax, VA; Armed Forces Communications 
and Electronics Association International Press, 1992. p.xx. Cf. also Cohen, Eliot. “A 
Revolution in Warfare.” Foreign Affairs. Vol75, n2: 37-54. p.53
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general, before moving to a more specialised investigation of its role in 
information age military power.
Efficiency’s Rise to Power
The first step to understanding how efficiency may supersede mass as 
the decisive factor in power is establishing a grasp of the role which mass, until 
recently, has played in the power equation. Throughout the industrial age, the 
advantages of mass provided the key to success - for the military as for most of 
advanced society. Bigger was better, whether it meant more tanks, more guns, 
and more bombs for the security forces, or more cars, more factories, and more 
gadgets for the public. The primary war-winning strategy of the age reflected 
this emphasis: attrition targeted mass, aiming to conquer an enemy by 
destroying so many of his tools for war (and for war production) that he could 
not afford to fight back.^ Likewise, private business reflected this attitude, 
focusing marketing attempts on reaching as many people as possible, and sating 
this mass market with quantity if not quality.^ This is not to say that the 
industrial age ignored the benefits to be had from efficiency - indeed, both the 
standardised assembly line and the machine gun were lauded for their capacity 
to increase efficiency.^® In the final assessment, however, the benefits of these 
and other innovations came to be felt most in the mass results they produced.
Nascent information age society, on the other hand, has already begun to 
show signs of moving away from the cult of ‘bigger is better’ toward the newly
® Howard, Michael, ed. Restiaints on Wai~: Studies in the Limitation o f Ainied Conflict.
Oxford; Oxford University Press, 1979. p. 10 
 ^Toffler, Alvin. Powershift: Knowledge. Wealth, and Violence at the Edge o f the 21st Century. 
New York: Bantam Books, 1990. p.25 
Ellis, John. The Social Historv o f the Machine Gun. London: Pimlico, 1976. pp. 174, 126
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decisive edge of efficiency/^ Manufacturing increasingly aspires to produce not 
more, but more cost-effectively. Niche markets (such as, for example, the 
internet trade in gourmet food)^^ have sprung up, providing small, distinct sets 
of customers with tailored products and services .The  booming service market 
is itself a reflection of this trend toward efficiency, dealing in specific expertise 
to help people maximise the resources they have. The success of small 
businesses within the market also provides testimony that size is no longer 
necessarily a positive congelation to success, as evidenced by the many thriving 
internet companies, like Amazon.com, which rely on comparatively^"  ^small 
physical infrastructure to achieve a wide reach throughout the consumer market.
Nor has the military been left out. Innovations such as, most famously, 
the development of precision-guided munitions (PGMs) and computerised 
inventory-tracking enable soldiers to destroy their targets and supply the troops 
in the field more effectively with smaller losses of materiel. Likewise, the use 
of prototype simulations and computer-organised equipment production allows 
for greater stream-lining of military procurement by reducing both the waste 
generated in the production of an inappropriate system and in the manufacturing 
of needed systems. In the first instance, waste can be reduced by simulating the 
performance of a prototype. If that prototype does not meet the required
“ Cf. Peter Drucker in Coates, Joseph F. and Jennifer Jarratt. What Futurists Believe. Mt Airy, 
MD; Lomond Publications, 1989. p. 130
See sites such as www.gourmetmarket.com, which offers everything from chocolate to cigars 
to wine; or www.freshcaviar.com, which sells not only caviar, but pâté de foie gras and 
truffles, among other exotics; or www.unclfred.com, which specialises in spicy foods from 
Habanero pepper sauces to gouimet South Texas salsa.
The 21st Centurv Aimy: Roles. Missions, and Functions in an Age o f Information and 
Uncertaintv. Ann Aibor, MI: Vector Research, 1995. p.x
Small as compared to, say, IBM or Toyota, or even Barnes and Noble. While neither Barnes 
and Noble nor Amazon require the large factories or research and development centres of the 
other two companies, Amazon further benefits from the fact that, unlike Barnes and Noble, it 
does not have the overhead cost o f maintaining stores.
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standards, militaries can forego manufacturing it before incuning the cost of 
further production. In the second instance, techniques such as computer- 
integrated manufacturing can more precisely determine the amount of an input 
needed and track that input to increase efficient production. This practice 
should prevent waste both from purchasing excess inputs for the output 
required, or from failing to employ those inputs optimally.
These innovations have been made possible by the complex information 
technologies now available to facilitate the management - processing, sorting, 
analysis, and use - of information. Information management methods as basic 
as merchandise bar codes can track which products are selling and in what 
amounts, as well as gauge what is left in inventory and how much more must be 
ordered or produced. In addition, collating the data from bar codes with credit 
card accounts can give a merchant detailed infonnation about who buys what 
kind of product and when.*^ By using such information in the setting of 
production schedules, manufacturers can produce a precise accounting of 
demand and thus virtually eliminate the need to maintain large inventories of 
g o o d s . I t  is precisely this kind of ability to create advantages through 
efficiency which should replace the industrial age dependence on mass.
These same methods should also help the information age military to 
function more efficiently. Logistics provides a parallel example, since 
information management may forestall the need for large back inventories of 
military supplies as well. For instance, computerised tagging and tracking of 
supplies sent to the front can insure that each unit gets exactly the amount of
‘^Toffler. Powershift. p.lO
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food, ammunition, and fuel that it needs. There should then be no need to send 
extra supplies in case some get lost or mis-routed. Compare this scenario to the 
relatively unsophisticated logistics system still in use at the time of the Gulf 
War. Of the 40,000 supply crates shipped during the seven months of Desert 
Shield and Desert Storm, 22,000 had to be opened in order to find out what they 
held.^  ^ In the future, nearly all the time and manpower required to reorganise 
those supplies for use in the theatre can be eliminated simply by better 
management of supply information.
Information management may, moreover, also be able to replace the 
cumbersome logistics infrastructure traditionally established in the theatre of 
conflict to manage supply distribution. If military suppliers can monitor 
distribution remotely via computer, satellite, and e-mail, the main supply base 
need not be located near the supplies. This so called “focused,” or “split-based 
logistics” should obviate the need to send entire coips of logistics managers to 
the theatre. Such a program could not only reduce the number of one’s soldiers 
that are placed at risk, but cut the risk to the soldiers actually in the theatre by 
rendering them much more mobile and flexible, and thus better able to avoid 
threats .This  is just one of many examples in which efficiency - bom of 
information management - could yield a more effective fighting force.
The capacity to create advantages such as these is gradually making 
efficiency the decisive edge in many forms of infonnation age power. This
Molander, Roger C., Andrew S. Riddle, and Peter A. Wilson. “Strategic Information
17
Waifare: a New Face o f Wai." Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1996. p. 17 
Franks, Frederick M., Jr, Gen USAimy. “Winning the Information Wai ." Vital Speeches. 15 
May 94, v60, n l5: pp453-459. p.457 
Shalikashvili, John, M. Chairman, Joint Chiefs o f Staff. Joint Vision 2010. Washington, DC: 
United States Department o f Defense, 1997. pp.24-5, 18. The 21st century Army, p.xi-
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increasingly vital efficiency began as a novelty and a luxury, enabling the 
pioneers of modem information technology to operate a bit faster and a bit 
smarter. Once businesses learned to translate that extra time and productivity 
into a leverage over competitors, however, the power of information 
transcended luxury to become the “critical difference between success and 
f a i l u r e . T h i s  dependence on efficiency as the principal source of advantage is 
increasingly replacing the historical role of mass in the accrual of power. 
Already a competitor who possesses higher quality market reseaich, more 
accurate product targeting, and an optimised production schedule can out-sell 
another company even if the latter possesses more factories and produces more 
goods.Likewise the number of one’s tanks and guns should mean 
considerably less against an enemy whose information power tells him the exact 
moments and places where one is most vulnerable, and guides him to strike 
those targets with deadly precision. Thus the key to economic, social, political, 
and military survival is shifting from what resources one has, to how one uses 
them. This shift should ultimately spell a decoupling of the link between mass 
and power.
The information age’s potential decoupling of the mass-power link can 
be further illuminated by comparison with the last such shift in the composition 
of power, the industrial revolution. The shift from mass to efficiency reflects 
the industrial age shift from land to mass as the critical component of power. 
Though it is still uncertain whether the later of the two shifts will contribute to a
The US military has, in fact, already devoted considerable study toward the development o f 
focused and split-based logistics.
The 21st centurv Aimv. p.xi
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militai'y paradigm shift, both of these power shifts clearly result from the fact 
that societal revolution introduced new tools which broke the monopoly of the 
privileged on the old sources of power. Just as the industrial revolution 
introduced machines which made agiiculture exponentially more productive 
(and therefore cheaper per unit of production),^^ the information tools 
introduced by the information revolution streamline industry, enabling it 
efficiently to produce more with less. And, as the industrialisation of 
agriculture rendered farming a relatively insignificant factor in the industrial age 
economy, so the informationalisation of manufacturing may dwarf the role of 
industry - and its emphasis on the power of mass - in the information age.
Efficiency in War
The dissolution of the link between mass and military power, in 
particular, is most evident in information age war’s departure from the mass- 
centred means of industrial age wars. The strategy of attrition, “apotheosised” 
as it was by industrial age war, will likely be significantly challenged by the 
emergence of information age war.^  ^ Attrition aimed to exhaust an enemy by 
striking at everything that contributed to the enemy’s war effort,^^ or 
alternatively, by striking at anything a military force could hit and justify. The 
premise behind this strategy was that a military needed the force of mass to gain 
victory. In industrial age war, one prevailed in a conflict by destroying more of 
the opposition’s essential military mass than he could feasibly replace. Because
Amazon.com, for instance, boasts 4.5 million customers in 160 countries, even though it was 
only established in 1995, and does not operate one single store!
See ‘Understanding Paradigm Shift in Context,’ in the introductory chapter and ‘The 
Information Revolution’ in chapter one.
Arquilla, John. “The Strategic Implications o f Information Dominance.’’ Strategic Review. 
Vol22, n3. Summer 94: 24-30. p.26
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firepower was usually more effective than the means to deliver it, militaries 
often accomplished this attritional exhaustion by destroying entire areas in 
which military targets were situated. They rationalised this practice with the 
argument that destruction of any enemy property furthered war aims. '^  ^
Industrialised states built up larger and larger armouries (culminating in the 
“total war” of World Wars I and 11)^  ^in the belief that the more massive military 
force would be the more difficult to defeat, as it would require more time and 
effort to batter such a military below its critical mass.^^
Information age war’s emphasis on efficiency over mass, however, 
seems to herald a return to more decisive combat.^^ As the Gulf War (whether 
one views it as the first war of the information age or the last of the industrial 
age)^  ^illustrated, information technologies can open a different path to victory. 
This path lies not through blanket destruction of the enemy, but through the 
selected elimination of the critical elements without which the enemy cannot 
fight effectively.^^ In Operation Desert Storai those elements proved to include, 
notably, radar and other components of air defence systems, as well as 
command and control nodes and the electricity grids that powered them.^° The 
ability to strike such targets - in the Gulf War as in fully mature lAW - relies
Howard. Restraints on War, p. 10 
Ibid.
Pearton, Maurice. The Knowledgeable State: Diplomacy. War, and Technology Since 1830. 
London: Burnett Books, 1982. p. 160 
This was obviously not always the case, otherwise the victory of the larger force would have 
been a foregone conclusion, and many wars would not have occurred. However, the belief 
that the larger force should triumph has remained prevalent. Handel, Michael I ,  War. 
Strategy, and Intelligence. London: Frank Cass, 1989. p.399 
Cooper. “Dominant Battlespace Awareness and Future Warfare.” Chapter 6, p.6 
^  Howard. Restraints on War, p .l 
Or at least, not as effectively, or at the same pace, as an information dominant militaiy force 
could. Cf. chapter five, ‘Tending to Extremes: How War Acts as Final Arbiter.’
Parker, Geoffrey., ed. The Cambridge History o f Warfare: the Triumph o f the West. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995. p.363
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heavily on information to inform military planners what and where these critical 
targets are/^ as well as to guide their strikes precisely to the point of greatest 
vulnerability. Information age militaries should be able to leverage such 
information to produce decisively efficient strikes that ideally expend energy 
only on those targets that directly contribute to the subduing of the enemy. By 
allowing soldiers to ignore objectives that are unlikely to impact the enemy’s 
decision to continue the wai', however, this information efficiency may not only 
push back the limits of military effectiveness, but could even supplant the 
industrial age need to sustain massed power in war. Military forces that can 
fulfil the same (or greater) objectives with less mass simply should not need as 
much mass to create credible information age military power. Thus the 
imperative for efficiency in lAW may alter the balance between mass and 
information in the foundations of military power.^^
Martin Libicki sums up the potential decisiveness of information 
efficiency in future war with the statement that, “the more we know about the 
other side, the more economical our strikes against it can be; if we can par alyse 
the head we need not take on the arms.”^^  An expansion of this analogy 
provides a still clearer, if rather graphic, illumination of the point: in an ideal 
situation, lAW should be able to accomplish in one clean shot between the eyes 
what industrial age warfare could not complete without dozens of shots to the
In I AW, a military’s most vulnerable targets are generally components o f its Command and 
Contiol network, for reasons which will become clear in the following pages. One must 
recognise, however, that as lAW  progresses, such points o f critical vulnerability will 
increasingly be dispersed and more difficult to target.
Cf. The proposition that lAW  is changing the equation o f energy and information in military 
power in Singer, Abe, and Scott Rowell. Information Age War: An Old Operational 
Concept With New Implications. Washington, DC: National Defense University Web page, 
December 1996. p.2
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limbs as well. lAW’s advantage lies in the advanced information technology - 
from sensor networks to human spies linked by a global telephone network, 
from hackers to laser-targeted PGM’s - that enables information age militaries 
first to identify the head as the vital target, then to recognise and track it, and 
finally to sight and deliver the shot straight to the brain. By contrast, attritional 
forces in the industrial age often did not have the capability even to find the 
head, let alone to deliver the critical shot. Hence the soldiers of that age made 
do by bombarding the entire body with bullets, aiming eventually either to hit 
some organ vital enough to elicit a concession of defeat or, barring such a shot, 
to cause so much blood loss as to render the enemy too weak to fight.
In considering the implications of this analogy, however, one must keep 
two caveats in mind. The first concerns the fact that pre-infoimation age 
warfai'e never possessed a head that presented such a decisive and vulnerable 
target. Destroying the command and control system (the typical “head” in lAW) 
of Hitler’s or Napoleon’s or Caesar’s armies would not have had nearly the 
fantastic effect it had on Saddam’s army. The relative invulnerability of the 
former was, ironically, a product of their unsophisticated communications 
systems. Since these systems were not very good in the first place, the 
commanders of history did not rely as much on them. To be sure, attacks on 
command and control systems were not without their effect, as historical 
evidence attests,^ "  ^but they did not alone inflict strategic defeat. The fact that 
such an attack may be so decisive in modem inforaiation age war is a reflection
Libicki, Martin. “DBK and its Consequences.” In Johnson and Libicki, eds. Dominant 
Battlespace Knowledge. Chapter 3, p.9 
See ‘Historical Manifestations o f Information Warfare’ in chapter two.
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of information age militaries’ increased dependence on their sophisticated 
command and control systems, and of the vulnerability which results.
Secondly, one must remember that the ideal upon which this analogy is 
predicated rarely exists amidst the realities of war, even in the information age. 
For one matter, the Clausewitzian notion of the ‘fog of war’ will almost always 
interfere to a certain degree in the identification, targeting, and delivery of a 
perfect shot between the eyes. A more significant obstacle, though, arises from 
the likelihood that, as information age war matures, it will move further and 
further from fulfilling this ideal. A fully information-integrated military force 
should have little trouble with the precision necessary to deliver a shot between 
his opponent’s eyes but, if that opponent is equally equipped to wage lAW, the 
‘head’ of his military operations should become more and more difficult to find 
in the first place. As increasingly information-savvy militaries recognise the 
critical vulnerability of their information systems, they will, in all likelihood, 
respond by dispersing and hiding command and control systems as well as other 
tools critical to waging information age war. At this slightly more evolved stage 
of LAW, a shot between the eyes should again become impossible, because there 
will be no single pair of eyes, nor one brain directing the course of such a war.
Molander, Riddle, and Wilson. “Strategic Information Waifare.” p. 17 It should be noted that 
less sophisticated militaries also confront this same vulnerability in lAW  - both as a factor to 
guard against and to exploit. Consider the likelihood that silencing the internet propganda of 
Subcommandante Marcos in the Zapatista conflict would have considerably reduced the 
international exposure - and the benefits the Zapatistas gained from this - o f the conflict. 
Moreover, such less sophisticated militaries are unlikely to ignore their information age 
enemies’ heightened vulnerability to decapitation. Though the former may not have the 
speed, accuracy, or technological sophistication for a finessed interdiction o f command and 
control, judging by the fact that combatants like the Zapatistas and the Chechens have 
already shown an understanding o f information age military principles, it seems likely that 
future asymmetrical lAW  combatants will capitalise on the vulnerability o f their opponents’ 
heads, even if  their own command systems have not yet reached a comparable level o f 
sophistication and vulnerability. See chapter six, ‘The Widening Role o f Lesser-state and
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Instead, experienced information age military forces will likely have scattered 
the critical functions of the brain (and also reinforced them with redundant 
back-up systems) to establish a control system that resembles more the 
dispersed synapses of the spinal cord.
Yet while true infoimation age militaries may have no one vulnerable 
“head,” the analogy of the shot between the eyes should remain an apt 
description for mature I AW. Even fully developed, the war form should rely 
more on precision strikes at critical targets - the principle behind the analogy - 
than on massed offensives designed to bleed an opponent to death. For this 
reason, proponents of information age war predict that the decisive efficiency 
available through the various nodes of the lAW spinal cord could pave the way 
for knowledge and skill to replace brute force as the key ingredient in military 
power.^^ James Adams quotes one unnamed, but obviously enthusiastic 
Pentagon official as asserting that, “the age of mass meeting mass, which is how 
wars have been fought for centuries, is almost over. In the future, victory will 
go to the force which has harnessed the information revolution and mastered 
control of cyberspace.”^^  That victory over mass could only become possible 
through the mastery of information and the tools of the information revolution 
which enable a military to wield force with unprecedented efficiency.
Speed & Accuracy
Efficiency’s replacement of mass as the decisive element in information
age power manifests itself in warfare primaiily through lAW’s imperative for
non-state actors: in Real Terms,’ for further discussion of the Zapatistas’ and Chechens’ use 
of nascent information age military tactics.
Cooper. “Dominant Battlespace Awareness and Future Warfare.” p.6 
Adams, James. “Anoraks’ Apocalypse.” Sunday Times. 16 Mar 97: 5.9
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speed and accuracy. In order to win wars by relying on efficient, rather than 
massed force, information age military forces must strike quickly and precisely 
at their opponent’s critical vulnerabilities. This military imperative, like its 
counterpart in commercial business,^^ has its roots in the simple convenience of 
sophisticated information technology. As the example of the private sector 
illustrates, however, convenience breeds dependence, which creates 
vulnerability.^^ This cycle leaves the military facing a potentially significant 
disadvantage if it does not develop the speed and accuracy available through 
lAW. Such a disadvantage may arise because, as others develop information 
age military forces, viable military competition could increasingly close to all 
but those who can keep pace. Proponents of the paradigm shift explain this 
exclusivity of lAW with the argument that, while an lAW offence is very likely 
to succeed against an attritionist opponent, only an LAW defence can repel an 
lAW attack.'^  ^ According to this view, no military force following an industrial 
age strategy of attrition can realistically hope to prevail against a true 
information age war fighting force. This claim is based on the assumption that 
information age militaries will have the capacity to defeat such an opponent so 
efficiently as to end a war long before that opponent could even begin to inflict 
the exhaustion of mass upon which attrition hinges."^ ^
See p. 143
Molander, Riddle, and Wilson. “Strategic Information Warfare.” p. 17 
Libicki. “DBK and its Consequences.” p.3, Cohen, William S. “Remarks Prepared for the 
Defense University Joint Operations Symposium, QDR Conference.” Fort McNair, 
Washington, DC: Defenselink Web page, 23 June 1997. p.3 
This reading of lA W ’s exclusivity largely ignores the prospect that asymmetric strategies - 
like, most classically, guerrilla warfare - will likely pose as significant a challenge to 
militaries preparing to fight ‘conventional’ battles in the information age as they did in the 
industrial age. While the question o f information age war’s role in low-intensity and other 
asymmetric conflicts is a provocative one, it is an issue that remained laigely unexplored in 
the open literature when this thesis was completed. Consequently, this study for the most 
part treats lA W ’s role against asymmetric opponents as a matter for future research.
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Although this is a characteristically radical claim from the paradigm 
shift camp, examples from nascent information age wars do seem to support the 
assertion that the pace of lAW could allow information age aggressors to outrun 
any attempts by their opponents to defend themselves. Consider, again, the Gulf 
War, the conflict which to date provides the closest example of industrial age 
forces pitted against information age forces in full-scale battle. The lessons of 
this war, however, must be taken with a grain of salt for two reasons: firstly, the 
war was not a clear-cut competition between industrial and information age 
forces, as some future information age wars may be, owing largely to the early 
stages of information age military strategy, and the fact that the US military 
employed only certain information age tactics in combination with many older 
methods. Secondly, the Iraqi military was to some extent a ‘perfect enemy’ 
upon which to test these nascent information age tactics. Gulf War era Iraqi 
forces have been variously described as “militarily incompetent,” “hopelessly 
outdated,” “unmotivated,” “dispirited,” and lacking in mora le .These  internal 
problems, many argue, were compounded by the fact that the desert terrain was 
ideally suited to a form of war heavily reliant on manoeuvre and on signalling."^ "^  
Despite these caveats, however, the 1991 conflict with Iraq remains the most 
useful (indeed, the only full-scale) foreshadowing for the expected plight of an 
industrial age military facing an information age military.
Firstly, the industrial age military’s lack of speed and mobility is likely 
to detract from its ability to attack an information age military force, or rebuff
Cf. Mueller, John. “The Perfect Enemy: Assessing the Gulf War.” Security Studies. Vol5, 
n l. Autumn 1995: 77-117.
Biddle, Stephen. “Victory Misunderstood: What the Gulf Wai" Tells Us about the Future of 
Conflict.” International Security. V ol21,n2, Fall 1996: 139-179. p. 148
151
an attack from said opponent. The Iraqis’ inability to mobilise sufficient 
numbers of their air force in time to meet the coalition’s first air strikes, for 
instance, handed the coalition almost uncontested air superiority over Kuwait 
and parts of Iraq."^  ^ That air superiority - maintained throughout the war - 
allowed the coalition easily to better even Iraq’s best attempts at achieving 
speed with ground vehicles.
Secondly, the defenders’ organisation will likely also add to their 
vulnerability to information age attack. Many of the Iraqi ground forces were 
organised to fight a very static war, dug in behind barriers to wait for the ground 
war to begin."^  ^ When the coalition proved able to break through these defences 
with relative ease, it exposed the Iraqi ground forces to some of the highly 
mobile manoeuvre tactics that are likely to be a keystone of lAW. While the 
vulnerability of a static force to such a manoeuvrable opponent is not unique to 
the information age,"^  ^this example does illustrate the advantage held by the 
mobile offensive, and offers a lesson which is increasingly important in 
infonnation age war: that force without mobility is a sitting duck. Thirdly, the 
defenders will almost certainly suffer from a negligence in recognising the 
particular vulnerabilities and assets of information age war. For example, Iraq’s 
failure to acknowledge the easy target presented by the Baghdad electricity grids 
that powered haq’s command and control and air defence systems"*^  ^contributed
Johnson, Stuart, and Martin Libicki, eds. Dominant Battlespace Knowledge. Washington, 
DC: National Defense University World Wide Web Page, 1996. Chapter three, p.5 
Mazarr, Michael J., Don M. Snider, and James A. Blackwell, Jr. Desert Storm: the Gulf War 
and What We Learned. Boulder: Westview Press, 1993. p.93-97 
Mazarr, Snider, and Blackwell. Desert Storm, p. 130
France’s vulnerability after the breach o f the Maginot Line is a classic example from the 
industrial age.
Cf. Arquilla. “The Strategic Implications of Information Dominance.” p.27, Mayfield, Terry.
Senior Fellow, IDA. Interview with the author. 17 December 1996.
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to the ease with which coalition forces disabled these systems in the very first 
minutes of the war. These strikes in turn gave the coalition a significant 
advantage in information supremacy against a nearly blinded opponent.
The asymmetry evidenced here between the strategies of attrition and 
lAW is a direct product of the information age war maxim that, “anything that 
can be seen can be hit.”"^  ^ Much of the West (among others) already possesses 
this capability in the form of Precision Guided Munitions (PGMs). Gulf War 
media coverage provided impressive testimony on the effectiveness of these 
weapons, filming laser-guided and satellite-tracked missiles which slipped into 
two metre chimney openings despite the fact that the coalition had launched 
them from hundreds of metres away.^  ^ When information age militaries 
combine this deadly precision with the looming capacity for one hundred 
percent visibility, Libicki posits that eventually an lAW force may be able to 
track and destroy enemy military platforms fast enough to wipe out a non­
information age opponent’s entire military before it can even mobilise.^^
Against such impressive capabilities, the best hope for victory - or even 
successful defence - in a conventional conflict would be a response in kind, with
Alford, Jonathan, ed. The Impact of New Miltarv Technology. Hampshire: Gower Publishing 
Company, Ltd., 1981. p.81 
Cf. Hauss, Charles. Beyond Confrontation: Transforming the New World Order. Westport, 
CT: Praeger, 1996. p.28. Snow, Donald M. Uncivil Wars: International Security and the 
New Internal Conflicts. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996. p.46. also Lambert, 
Andrew, Grp Capt, RAF. “The Psychological Impact o f Airpower.” University o f St 
Andrews: Post-graduate seminar, 10 March 1997.
Libicki. “DBK and its Consequences.” pp. 11-34 In an information age twist on the classic 
principle of the preemptive strike, the speed and accuracy available to the information age 
force should theoretically allow it to destioy more o f an enemy’s war machine more 
accurately during the period o f mobilisation. Failing a response in kind, such a strike could, 
in an extreme case, disable enough o f an opponent’s weapons platforms to prevent him from 
deploying them.
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the same emphasis on speed and accuracy.While a slow, massive, and 
centralised attritional military is highly vulnerable to lAW attack, a force which 
defends itself also according to lAW principles should hold a much more 
credible potential to rebuff that attack. Such a defender must tailor its defence 
expressly to foil the speed and accuracy which attacking information age 
militaries will intend to leverage for victory. In this kind of defensive 
information age war, the “name of the game... is to avoid being seen.”^^  Since 
modem information technologies create the capability reliably to hit anything 
that can be seen, the best way to escape being hit is to escape being seen in the 
first place. In answer to this challenge, some strategists have advocated the 
waging of manoeuvre-intensive battle in small, molecular units. Units of this 
sort would be well-suited for avoiding detection because they can move swiftly 
and nimbly either to strike or to hide.^ "^  This kind of force structure should 
enjoy a higher potential for escaping detection while on the defensive, but 
should also be apt for an LAW offensive, since troops organised to optimise 
mobility and flexibility can seize opportunities of enemy vulnerability as they 
arise. Here too, speed and accuracy are imperative if troops are to stay a step 
ahead of their opponents.
The combined necessity of leveraging speed and accuracy while 
remaining unseen on LAW’s increasingly transparent battlefield therefore
Alternatively, an asymmetrical response - from civilian-intensive attacks to guerrilla strike- 
and-hide manoeuvring in jungles or cities - would likely also be effective against lAW, in 
much the same way that Vietnamese guerrilla tactics proved effective against the US 
military’s conventionally-focused war machine. In the interest o f understanding lA W ’s 
status as the likely successor to conventional industrial age war, however, this discussion will 
focus primarily on the conventional full-scale battlefield, leaving discussions o f the 
information age’s influence on low-intensity conflict for future study.
Ibid., p.6
Alford. The Impact of New Miltarv Technology, p.82
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“places a premium on mobility, agility, flexibility, and rapid generation of 
combat power .Information age militaries must be capable of a high degree 
of mobility to enable them to move equally swiftly out of harm’s way or into 
striking position. They must develop agility and flexibility in order to exploit 
advantages as they emerge out of the ebb and flow which characterises the non­
linear realm of information dominance.^^ Most importantly, information age 
soldiers’ quick access to precision force improves their potential to exploit each 
advantage over the enemy.
In addition to mobility, agility, and flexibility, the need for speed and 
precision on the battlefield will in turn likely place a premium on speedy and 
accurate intelligence. All the speed and accuracy of precision guided weapons 
and manoeuvrable troops can go to waste if commanders do not have access to 
exact information with which to guide strikes to the right time and place. 
Consequently, information age military commanders will likely have to rely 
more than ever before on the information they receive from intelligence - 
whether it takes the form of sensor readings, satellite mappings, or analyses of 
enemy morale and intentions - to tell them where and when the enemy is most 
vulnerable. Under the fast pace of lAW, victory is likely to belong most often 
to the force which is able to strike first at the precise points that can bring the 
enemy most swiftly to his knees.Intelligence is the sine qua non that allows 
commanders to optimise this effort.^^
Silvasy, Stephen, Jr., Maj. Gen., USArmy. “AirLand Battle Future: the Tactical Battlefield.” 
Military Review. Vol71, n2. Feb 91: 2-61. p. 10 - in this respect, lAW  shows itself to be a 
close descendant of AirLand Battle indeed.
Brown, Michael, (Senior Fellow, SAIC). Interview with the author. 16 December 1996.
Silvasy. “AirLand Battle Future: the Tactical Battlefield.” p.4
Jones, R. V. Reflections on Intelligence. London: Heinemann, 1989. p. 146
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One should note, however, that the unique challenge of efficient 
intelligence in the infonnation age is not, as in ages past, collection of data. 
Rather, the most difficult aspect of information age intelligence production is 
likely to be the task of sifting through an abundance of information from myriad 
sources, with enough speed and accuracy to match the high demands of 
information age battle/^ With so much data available, the process of 
ascertaining which pieces are relevant and which are useless overtakes 
collection as the highest priority of the intelligence com m uni ty .T he  
information revolution’s explosion of sophisticated information technologies 
has greatly magnified the classic problem of separating the ‘signals from the 
noise’ in intelligence. This magnification of noise levels increases the difficulty 
of quickly processing intelligence at the very point when timely intelligence 
becomes more crucial than ever. For, “regardless of the amount of data 
collected, the targets identified or the accuracies achieved, information has no 
value unless the commanders and appropriate fire support elements receive it in 
time to react.”^^
Organisation to Maximise Efficiency
The combined need for flexibility and for access to information should
influence not only the course of battle in information age war, but the
configuration of the forces that enter into such a war as well. Military
Not surprisingly, information age war’s demands for intelligence, especially precision 
intelligence, are higher than any previous form o f war’s. The information age military’s 
reliance on efficiency to create advantage leaves it open to considerable vulnerability when it 
is unable to create that efficiency - for instance, in a situation where no precision targeting 
information is available, all the speed and accuracy o f an information age force’s PGMs are 
wasted. Such a situation could leave that force with a tiny aimoury (relative to historical 
industrial age standards) pitted against a mass of potential enemy targets, likely rendering it 
an open and highly vulnerable target.
Jones, R. V. Reflections on Intelligence. London: Heinemann, 1989. p. 146
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organisation, like military doctrine, must shift if it is to accommodate the 
increasing complexity which lAW is predicted to introduce to waifare.^^ This 
shift is likely to take two opposite forms - toward greater strategic centralisation, 
but also toward greater tactical decentralisation. Both types of organisation will 
be necessary in information age wars if, as expected, lAW battles are 
characterised by millions of independent elements trying to work together. On 
the offensive, this swaim character of the war machine may be necessary to 
exploit near total visibility for accuracy, or to capitalise on mobility and 
flexibility for speed.*^  ^ Moreover, smaller, more mobile forces (including not 
only the soldiers themselves, but the tools they use, from sensors to transports to 
weapons) may be essential not only for capitalising offensively upon lAW’s 
advantages, but also for escaping defensively from the enemy’s own information 
age advantages. In particular, the capacity for almost one hundred percent 
visibility may virtually necessitate the use of smaller, agile forces suited to 
avoiding detection, as explained above. "^^
On both the offensive and defensive, these smaller units would require a 
high level of co-ordination to insure that they all work toward the strategic 
objective of the force as a whole. Such co-ordination has been necessaiy since 
Napoleon first split his mass conscripted forces to converge upon an enemy 
from different directions, but the complexity of information age battle may add 
considerably to the challenge of this task. In the long range, the need to 
integrate the many elements of an information age military into a coherent effort
Campen. The First Information Wai'. p .71
Van Creveld, Martin. Command in War. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985. p.234 
^  Cf. Ronfeldt, David F. Senior researcher, RAND Corporation. Interview with the author. 24 
June 1997.
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introduces a heightened mandate for the centralisation of strategic command. 
Successful integration of the synergised infonnation required by such 
information age military concepts as the ‘system of sy s tem sw il l  likely 
necessitate the direction of a leader who - through access to an overview of all 
these interwoven components - can form a focused understanding of the whole 
effort. A commander with a clear view of the bigger picture should be better 
equipped to lead his forces to victory through the complexities of information 
age war.
However, the same complexity that mandates more centralised strategic 
command may also necessitate the decentralisation of tactical command.^^ 
Military tactics have commonly been as centralised and hierarchical as military 
strategy.^^ This centralised system had its benefits in the days when battlefield 
communications were too slow to accommodate significant departures from 
operational orders. However, if troops are to exploit infonnation age 
advantages of speed and accuracy, they should be allowed a degree of tactical 
initiative to act as soon as opportunities arise. Lower-level commanders on the 
ground ought to be able to act and react to a situation as it unfolds, without 
pausing for approval from central headquarters.^^ Such pauses might waste 
countless moments of enemy vulnerability while high-level commanders
See p. 154
Owens, William A., Adm., USN. The Emerging U.S. Svstem-of-Svstems. Washington, DC; 
National Defense University Web page, February 1996.
Cooper. “Dominant Battlespace Knowledge and Future Warfare.” p.7 
Cf. Franks. “Winning the Information War.” p.455. Van Creveld, Martin. The 
Transformation Of War. New York: Free Press, 1991. p.7, and Brodie, Bernard. Strateev 
in the Missile A ge. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1965. p.98 With some 
noteable exceptions - including the Prussian army in the early 19^  ^century and, noteably, 
Napoleon's own forces from time to time. Van Creveld, Martin. Command in War, p.274 
See also chapter two, ‘Historical Manifestations o f Information Warfare?’
Cooper. “Dominant Battlespace Knowledge and Future Warfare.” p.6
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attempt to sift through the myriad messages from the battlefield. Under the 
decisive pace of information age war, militaries can afford less and less to waste 
such moments, a circumstance that erodes the usefulness of the historically 
hierarchical military command system. Consequently, as it enters the 
information age, the military, like the private sector, is discovering the benefits 
of networkisation.
On the tactical level, the network organisational form is as well suited to 
capitalise on the advantages of abundant information for the military as it is for 
business.^^ In a network, each cell has equal access to all available 
information,^® and equal authority to act on that information according to its 
suitability for the task. By granting each component the responsibility to 
complete its own part of the mission, the networkisation of tactical command 
should largely obviate the need to await approval from a cumbersome central 
command structure for each separate action within an operation. Under this 
organisational form, information age soldiers should be able to pursue centrally 
engineered strategy within a framework of established doctrine, while relying on 
their own initiative and ingenuity during combat itself. Such tactical freedom 
should encourage soldiers to act swiftly and decisively in the battles of future 
infonnation age wars.^^
This interplay of decentralised tactics and centralised strategy, of 
networked battle formation and hierarchical theatre planning, should facilitate 
the speedy and precise application of force by creating a more coherent
See the last pages o f the ‘Information Revolution’ section in chapter one.
Preferably according to a ‘pull’ system which would allow soldiers to request the information 
they need, rather than flooding them with all the information that the intelligence community 
deems relevant, as in the current ‘push’ system of intelligence dissemination.
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awareness of war. Under such a system, the strategists who formulate a 
conflict’s long-term aims should be relatively free to form a clearer picture of 
general themes, uncluttered by the detail of war’s everyday workings. At the 
same time, the battle commanders who make the tactical decisions about the 
conduct of the battle should be better able to focus on situational awareness, 
since they would be left responsible for their own missions without the 
distraction of constantly updating headquarters. Thus equipped with the most 
relevant information, both strategists and tacticians should respectively be in the 
best possible positions to exploit the advantages of speed and accuracy in 
information age war.
This “perversely interlocking”^^  mix of command styles emerges 
partially in response to the new kinds of intelligence which modem information 
technologies make available in LAW. Sensors and satellites largely replace the 
soldier as the primary line of sight on the information battlefield,^^ thus shifting 
intelligence collection from a bottom-up process to one that is more aptly top- 
down. The fact that high-investment assets like satellites function best under 
central administration means central command should typically be better able to 
monitor the progress of information age battle. Meanwhile, combat soldiers, 
freed from the need to apprise their superiors of every situation, should be better 
able to concentrate their information and their efforts on their own missions. In 
this way, information age intelligence capabilities encourage the establishment
Franks. “Winning the Information War.” p.454 
Van Creveld. Command in War, p.274
This is not to discount the importance o f the soldier as sensor, nor the importance o f humint in 
general. Though these sources are invaluable in providing the nuances and details for 
situational awareness, the wider outline of the battle is provided more effectively by sensors 
and other centrally controlled technical intelligence sources. - Campen. The First 
Information War, p.53
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of a combined system of centralisation and decentralisation which facilitates 
more comprehensive awareness for commanders in both hierarchies and 
networks, resulting in an increased capacity to act with speed and precision.
Furthermore, such complete awareness could enable commanders to 
operate more by intuition than they have done since command first retreated 
from the front line of battle. According to Army TRADOC’s General Frederick 
M. Franks, the réintroduction of intuitive C2 could spark a shift from employing 
command as a science, to employing it as an art.^ "^  Industrial age commanders 
once employed rigid battle formations and calculated tactics according to enemy 
force structure in an attempt to impose scientific reason on war/^ Equipped 
with the real-time intelligence of dominant battlespace knowledge (DBK), as 
well as the communications capacity to transmit orders instantly, infonnation 
age commanders might be able to forego merely co-ordinating their troops for 
possible contingencies. They should instead be able to rely more on intuition 
and on reactions to immediate circumstances to orchestrate precision combat 
power at decisive points.^® This too should augment a commander’s ability to 
react with decisive speed and precision by fostering a higher quality of 
command in real time.
A Sign of Paradigm Shift?
Having established how the information age will affect the waging of 
war, the investigation can at last assess the significance of these changes and 
address the first question upon which lAW’s status as a paradigm shift hinges:
Franks, “Winning the Information War.” p.457 
Van Creveld. Command in War. p .l06
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will the manner in which information age war is waged challenge the 
established principles of warfare, thereby requiring a new model for 
understanding war? The answer is simply, no. The nascent information age 
tactics of the Gulf War, the proliferation of information-intensive war games, 
and the introduction of new doctrines and organisations to meet the military 
challenges of the infonnation age are all testimony that the information age is 
already introducing significant changes in how the world wages war. Those 
changes, however, affect the character of war, not its nature. That nature has 
remained unchanged since long before William Tecumseh Sherman pronounced 
that “war is cruelty, and you cannot refine it.”^^  In the information age as for 
time immemorial, war will still be about compelling the enemy to do one’s will, 
and doing so through force and bloodshed.
Despite predictions to the contrary both from members of the narrow 
school of information warfare^^ and from those dazzled by the surgical strike 
capacity of precision guided munitions, information age war can not depart from 
the bloody, forceful nature of war for two reasons .F i r s t ,  war by definition 
entails the use of force. From the time of Sun Tzu to that of Clausewitz, Liddell 
Hart, and even the present day, strategists and soldiers have defined war as “an
Cooper. “Dominant Battlespace Knowledge and Future Warfare.” p. 1 
Sherman in a letter to the people o f Atlanta. Best, Geoffrrey. Humanity In Warfare: The 
Modern History Of The International Law Of Armed Conflicts. London: Weidenfeld And 
Nicolson, 1980. p.209. For more recent remarks in a similar vein, cf. General Frederick M. 
Franks, the former head o f the US Army’s Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), 
who has remarked that war is “direct, it’s sudden, and it’s lethal,” as well as being “tough, 
uncompromising, and sudden.” Franks. “Winning the Information War.” p.454 
See the introduction’s ‘Other Views in the Debate.’
Lambert, Andrew, Cmdr, RAF. “The Psychological Impact of Airpower.” Presentation to the 
Department of International Relations, University of St Andiews. 10 March 1997. Rogers, 
A.P.V. Law on the Battlefield. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996. p.65
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act [or threat] of force to compel an enemy to do our will.” ®^ War by any other 
name is simply not war, but rather a separate phenomenon. Proponents of the 
paradigm shift interpretation of lAW might argue that information age war 
requires a reassessment of this definition, but such an effort would be 
misguided. Even the efficiency of information age war requires some force of 
mass to be delivered against the target - albeit with the greatest possible speed 
and accuracy that the available information can convey - in order to be effective.
Second, war by definition involves force because only the extreme 
physical violence of military force is sufficiently indisputable^^ to grant war its 
status as the final arbiter of intractable disputes. An expanded definition of war 
elucidates why this circumstance prevails: war is not merely the generic use or 
threat of force, but the use or threat of force in order to compel an enemy to act 
against his will in situations where there is no other recourse for compellance, 
no higher power than physical force to determine which contestant’s will should 
prevail.^^ This is most classically exhibited by the competition of sovereign 
state actors within the anarchical international system, though sub-state contests 
in situations where the authority of the sovereign has eroded - and thus, like the 
anarchical international system, provides no mutually recognised court of appeal 
- are hardly anomalies in the category of war.^  ^Therefore, since war is by
Clausewitz. On War, p.83. Although Clausewitz did not explicitly include the threat of force 
under the rubric o f ‘war,’ this inclusion has become customary among modern scholars of 
war. Cf. Howard, Michael. The Causes of Wars. & Other Essays. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1983. p.25 
Though not utterly indisputable, as World War IPs occurrence on the heels o f the 1918 
Versailles Treaty illustrates.
Lider, Julian. Military Theory: Concept. Structure. Problems. Aldershot, Hants: Gower 
Publishing Co. Ltd., 1983. p.70, Blainey, Geoffrey. The Causes o f War. New York: Free 
Press, 1988. 3ed. p. 120, Brown, Seyom. The Causes and Prevention o f War. New York:
St Martin’s Press, 1994. p.66 
^ Please refer to chapter 5 “why” for further discussion of this subject.
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definition the last resort for forcing an opponent against his will, the 
phenomenon must be at least potentially violent. "^  ^ If information age war is to 
deserve its title, it must necessarily keep the nature of war intact at this most 
fundamental level.
Proponents of the paradigm shift view may be tempted to argue here that 
information age war’s adherence to the nature of war at its most fundamental 
does not necessarily mean that the war form can not challenge the cuiTent 
military paiadigm on some less basic level. This may be true, although lAW 
would have to transform more superficial aspects (such as the principles, rather 
than the nature) of war quite profoundly indeed to fulfil such an assertion. The 
point is moot, however, because information age war clearly does no such thing. 
In fact, far from defying the established principles of war, information age war 
comes closer than any previous form of war to attaining the ideal of several 
military principles. For instance, the very concept of efficiency which is so 
decisive in lAW epitomises the principle of maximising the injury one inflicts 
on the enemy while minimising the injury to oneself, a principle which has been 
emphasised by strategists from Sun Tzu to Clausewitz.^^ Several of Tzu’s other 
famous precepts - including such legendary quotes as “Know the enemy, know 
yourself; your victory will never be endangered” and “All warfare is based on
Conflicts without violence deserve the title o f ‘war’ only if there exists a credible threat that 
violence would have been involved had the conflict continued. Along these lines, 
psychological operations, information infrastructure attacks, and other non-lethal elements 
associated with warfare should only be considered components o f actual war in situations 
where violence or the credible threat o f violence are involved. In all other situations they are 
simply (not particularly gentle) tools o f suasion.
Cf. especially Sun Tzu. The Art of War. Griffith. Samuel B.. trans. London: Oxford 
University Press, 1963. p.77
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deception” - are also clearly evident in the cardinal role which information and, 
especially, intelligence plays in the information age war* form.^®
In addition, information age war’s reliance on the advantages available 
from information rather than from mass echoes Frederick the Great’s advice to 
his generals that, “In war the skin of a fox is at times as necessary as that of a 
lion, for cunning may succeed when force fails.”^^  Basil Liddell Hart’s 
enthusiasm for an indirect approach to war is also evident in lAW’s use of 
cunning to strike the enemy at the right place and time. Similarly, some of 
Liddell Hart’s advocacy of manoeuvre warfare is clearly heeded by information 
age war’s emphasis on mobile combined strikes against the enemy’s critical 
vulnerability.^^ Perhaps ironically, this mobility is more important in LAW for 
its capacity to manoeuvre away from the enemy’s precision weapons and his 
“god’s-eye view” of the battlefield,^® than for its capacity to move friendly 
forces into better position for attack, as in more classical interpretations of 
manoeuvre.®® This twist in the interpretation of the manoeuvre principle does 
not profoundly alter how the principle fits the established military paradigm, yet 
one might find it worthy of noting that the twist does foreshadow some of this 
dissertation’s final conclusions about lAW’s influence on the understanding of 
war. For the conclusion of the present chapter, however, suffice it to say that 
the continued application of these principles to information age war should
Sun Tzu. The Art of War, p. 106,84. Cf. also Asprey, Robert B. War in the Shadows: the 
Classic History of Guerilla Warfare from Ancient Persia to the Present. London: Little, 
Brown, and Company, 1994. p.23 
Asprey. War in the Shadows. p.50
Cf. Strachan, Hew. European Armies and the Conduct of War. London: George Allen and 
Unwin, 1983. p. 152 
Campen. The First Information War, p.58 
^  The latter function is, o f course, not irrelevant, just relatively less important than the former.
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banish any expectations that the information age’s changes in how war is waged 
fulfil the criteria for a paradigm shift of war.
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Chapter 4
T h e  CIVILIANISATION of WAR:
At What Information Age War is Waged
If information age war is to represent a paradigm shift in war, the war 
form must also fulfil the second criterion for a new military paradigm. This 
criterion requires that lAW exhibit a profound shift in what warfare is waged at 
- that is, what warfare targets. Signs that information age war possesses the 
potential to produce such a shift are manifesting themselves in the 
‘civilianisation’ of warfare, a phenomenon that increasingly blurs the distinction 
between the civilian and military realms. Civilianisation in information age war 
arises from the convergence of a historical trend challenging the delineation 
between combatant and non-combatant with uniquely information age trends 
that heighten the importance of civilian information and infonnation 
technologies in war. lAW’s civilianisation is both a continuation of the 
strategic targeting of civilians which was accepted at new levels under industrial 
warfare, and a product of a distinctly information age overlap of civil and 
military information and infonnation technologies. This chapter will examine 
each of these developments in turn, with the aim of establishing the significance 
of their convergence and whether that convergence will produce a challenge to 
civilian war-time immunity which represents merely a dangerous extension of a 
historical pattern or a fundamental departure from established targeting 
practices. The answer to this question will determine whether the civilianisation 
of information age war necessitates a change in the way the world understands 
war and, therefore, whether or not the information age civilianisation of war 
fulfils the second criterion of paradigm shift.
In order to answer this question, however, one must also ask a second 
question. If one is to understand how what lAW targets differs from what other 
forms of war have targeted, one must not only find a solution to the query, ‘at 
what is information age war* waged?,’ but also for the query, ‘at what was war 
waged before information age war emerged?’ This second question must be 
addressed in concert with the first because it is impossible to understand lAW’s 
changes to warfare without understanding the precursor of those changes. 
Moreover, to the extent that the civilianisation of information age war represents 
a continuation of a historical pattern, it is especially important to comprehend 
the development of the pattern itself in order to grasp what further changes 
lAW’s civilianisation impends.
To that end, the following pages will provide a cursory glimpse into 
history’s accounts of the long, troubled relationship between civilians and the 
military, a relationship that has by no means been static across the centuries. 
From the pre-industrial age, when civilians’ role in war was predominantly 
auxiliary and the targeting of non-combatants played a largely peripheral role in 
strategy, to the onset of industrial age warfare, when the pivotal role of industry 
in sustaining total war produced a new incentive for the strategic targeting of 
civilians, the distinction between combatant and non-combatant - hardly ever 
sacred in practice - has been subjected to significant reinterpretations. With that 
background established, the chapter will then examine how specifically 
information age trends, particularly the increased prevalence of dual-use 
technologies, will contribute to the civilianisation process. Lastly, the final 
section will investigate how these two trends together will affect what warfare is 
waged at in the information age.
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Following Historical Precedent
Civilians have always suffered the ravages of war, but the extent to 
which they suffer, and the extent to which militaries calculate their suffering 
will influence the outcome of war, has changed considerably over the centuries. 
These changes aie, for the most part, directly related to shifts in the importance 
of non-combatants’ contributions to the waging of wax*, and to the capacity of 
combatants to affect those contributions. Despite the long-cherished ideal that 
civilians should be immune from the effects of war,  ^the reality for centuries has 
been that civilians will suffer - and even become deliberate targets - in war to 
the extent that such practices are militarily expedient. In this, the civilianisation 
of information age war marks not a departure from the norm, but an extension 
of the trend.
That trend, however, does not represent a simple and inexorable 
geometric progression toward increased civilian targeting. In the modem era 
alone, in fact, the expediency of targeting non-combatants in war has been 
subject to multiple reinterpretations. If one considers the Middle Ages, for 
instance, the question of the proper standing of non-combatants in a conflict was 
largely subsumed by scholars’ preoccupation with the status of the war itself as 
a just or unjust use of organised violence.^ If a war was considered ‘just,’ then 
the means employed in waging it “derive[d] the complexion of their moral
* Green states that the law o f civilian immunity is the oldest on the books. Green, L.C. The 
Contemporary Law o f Armed Conflict. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993. 
p.l8
 ^Bull, Hedley, Benedict Kingsbury, and Adam Roberts. Hugo Grotius and International 
Relations. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992. p. 184
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character from the nature of the end to which they lead.”  ^ Provided a war was 
fought for a noble and honourable purpose, even theory - which frequently 
idealises practice - allowed for considerable liberty of method in the prosecution 
of medieval wars.
Consequently, despite chivalric codes that dictated protection for the 
weak and innocent, and canon law that invoked immunity for those whose 
employment contributed to the public good,"^  medieval military standards 
sanctioned attacks against civilians to a considerable extent. Such attacks 
manifested themselves primarily in the forai of plundering and marauding 
throughout the countryside, practices which were considered necessary for 
feeding the army on campaign and adding incentive for the soldiers (especially, 
as chivalry collapsed, those not fighting primarily for the honour of battle). The 
fact that these practices also constituted an early form of economic warfare was, 
of course, also a beneficial contribution to medieval military campaigns.^ 
Civilians were also likely to suffer from other types of attacks levied against 
enemy supplies and, to a certain degree, popular morale. Many of these have 
become familiar in more formalised guises during more recent eras of warfare, 
including naval blockades and scorched earth campaigns.
Of the challenges to non-combatant immunity during the Middle Ages, 
economic warfare had perhaps the most pervasive effect on civilians, for the 
simple reason that wars were then comparatively well confined to the 
battlefield. The tools of war in that day had ranges measured in metres rather
 ^Grotius, Hugo. The Rights o f War and Peace (De Jure Belli ac P ads). Campbell, A.C., trans. 
Washington; M. Walter Dunne, Publisher, 1901. p.290 
This category included professionals as diverse as clerics, farmers, and artisans. Grotius (244) 
p.362
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than miles, and were therefore likely to hit non-combatants only if they got in 
the way.^ Moreover, outside of basic living supplies and, to a lesser degree, 
morale, non-combatants made little contribution to the success of a military 
campaign, so the direct strategic returns of targeting them were relatively small. 
For this reason, medieval military forces had comparatively little incentive or 
justification to classify civilians as deliberate targets. Indeed, as late as the time 
of the Thirty Years War, Grotius held that the only legitimate purpose of 
targeting non-combatants was for retaliation or punishment of obstinate 
resistance.^ Illegitimate purposes did not extend far beyond the instilling of 
tenor and the above-mentioned intent of inflicting economic damage.^
However, one can infer from the existence of statutes regulating the 
treatment of non-combatants that medieval civilians were in some jeopardy, 
despite the comparatively low expedience of targeting them. For example, 
chivalric standards called for a certain obeisance to the principle of “double 
effect,” a rule which resembles modern conventions on collateral damage in that 
it obliged soldiers not deliberately to target civilians, but acknowledged that 
incidental injury to non-combatants in the path of a military target may be 
unavoidable. The Church also attempted to mitigate the plight of non- 
combatants in medieval warfare by establishing the Peace of God during the 
10th and 11th centuries. This movement encouraged the principle that “the
 ^Best, Geoffrey. Humanity In Warfare: The Modern History Of The International Law Of 
Armed Conflicts. London: Weidenfeld And Nicolson, 1980. p.65.
 ^The obvious exception here was sieges on cities.
 ^Grotius. De Jure Belli ac Pacis. p.363
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weak who could do no harm should not themselves be harmed.”  ^ Given the 
extent to which theory differed from practice, especially in the Middle Ages,^ ® 
these rules are interesting not as signs of any particular military temperance 
toward non-combatants, but as indications of the need for such regulations, 
necessitated only by a dearth of such temperance. Ironically, the very rules 
intended to protect non-combatant immunity illustrate that medieval civilians 
were indeed military targets.
With the close of the Thirty Years Wai* and the advance of the modem 
state system in 1648, attitudes toward non-combatants shifted away from the 
standards of the Middle Ages. In the 17th and 18th centuries the principle of 
“limited war” replaced the medieval “just war” ideal. This age saw the 
institutionalisation of professional armies and a concurrent move to wage war 
only for strictly defined political objectives, thus limiting who and what would 
be involved in war.^  ^ Again, though, any salutary effect this policy had on 
civilians owed almost entirely to shifts in the expediency of targeting non- 
combatants, and was merely a fortunate by-product of necessity rather than 
ethics.
® Grotius also noted that no such attack should occur for whatever cause unless it ultimately 
served a strategic purpose: “Though there may be circumstances in which absolute justice 
will not condemn the sacrifice o f lives in war, yet humanity will require that the greatest 
precaution should be used against involving the innocent in danger, except in cases of 
extreme urgency and utility.” However, Grotius’ idea of proportionality was to remain an 
ideal of theory rather than practice for several centuries after his death. Grotius. De Jure 
Belli ac Pacis. p.361 
 ^Howard, Andreopoulos, and Shulman, eds. The Laws o f War. p.41 
Keen notes that England’s Henry V was a notable champion o f non-combatant immunity, but 
concludes that he was an exception, not the norm, for “the observance o f the rules was much 
more remarkable than their breach” in the chronicles of contemporary historians. Keen, 
M.H. The Laws o f War. p .l9 I .
Typically only professional soldiers were permitted to wage such limited wars, and only for 
militaiy targets. Asprey, Robert B. War in the Shadows: the Classic Historv o f Guerrilla 
Warfare from Ancient Persia to the Present. London: Little, Brown, and Company, 1994. 
p.48
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The ravages of the Thirty Years War, combined with the increasingly 
prohibitive expense of waging war, created an overriding incentive for the 
leaders of Europe voluntarily to limit the means and ends of war in the first 
years of the state system .Indeed, the expense of warfighting left rulers little 
choice but to place limitations on war: military technology had developed far 
enough to require that armies build elaborate machines for war (such as 
muskets, cannons, and “artful fortifications” like the Italian traces designed to 
confound the use of gun powder by besiegers)^but had not developed so far as 
to permit the cheap mass production of these machines. Consequently, armies 
remained small and professional because states could only afford experienced 
soldiers who knew how to accomplish militaiy objectives effectively. In 
addition, local economies and the civilians who ran them were left largely 
unmolested because states needed their taxable profits to finance the limited 
wars.^ "^  Non-combatants, therefore, developed a de facto immunity during this 
age of limited war, though their legal rights and immunities were not to be 
formalised until the 20th century.
Ironically, the move to foimalise civilian immunities coiTesponded with 
the réintroduction of vast threats to those immunities. At the same time 
conferences in Geneva and the Hague attempted to mitigate the horrors of war, 
the scope of violent conflict expanded far beyond the traditional front line.
Weigley, Russell F. The Age of Battles: the Quest for Decisive Warfaie from Breitenfeld to 
Waterloo. London: Pimlico, 1991 (1993). p.46 
Parker, Geoffrey., ed. The Cambridge History o f Warfare: the Triumph of the West.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995. p. 168 
Howard, Andreopoulos, and Shulman, eds. The Laws of War, p.3
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extending both the territory and the people involved/*^ This new challenge to 
the rights of non-combatants emerged as the industrial revolution’s impact on 
wai' reached its peak, for it was the culmination of industrial warfare in the 
world wars of the twentieth century which raised the targeting of civilians and 
‘civilian objects’ to a whole new level.
These industrial, ‘total’ wars challenged civilian immunity in two ways. 
First, the industrial revolution created the means for delivering destruction to 
civilians more completely and directly than ever before. Railroads, long-range 
artillery, and most especially, air power gave industrial age militaries the ability 
to deploy firepower farther and deeper into enemy territory. Mass production 
manufactured vast supplies of weapons with greater range and dependability, as 
well as long-range accuracy unknown to pre-industrial age so ld iers.A im ed 
with these weapons, and the new feasibility of air delivery, industrialised 
militaries gained the capability to strike targets fai* beyond the boundaries of the 
traditional battlefield and became able, for the first time, to threaten the de facto 
sanctuary which civilians had retained behind the front line for time 
immemorial.
While the new range of firepower alone was a great menace to non- 
combatant immunity, the combination of this threat with a second industrial age 
development held implications for the civil/military distinction which were dire 
indeed. Industrial warfare’s second, and much greater, threat to civilian
It should be remembered that, although non-combatant immunity was not formalised until the 
international law conventions o f the 19'*' and 20* centuries secured its international 
acknowledgement, the principle o f non-combatant immunity had existed and been recognised 
for centuries, most notably by Gentili and by Grotius in the 16the century. Bull, Kingsbury, 
and Roberts. Hugo Grotius and International Relations. 1990. p l74  also. Best. Humanitv 
In Warfare, p.56 
“’ Howard. Restraints on War, p. 10 
Ellis. Social Historv o f the Machine Gun. London: Pimlico, 1976. p.23
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immunity derived not from the increased capability to strike civilians, but from 
a new incentive to target them. This incentive was rooted in the totality of the 
industrial age war effort, which in turn encouraged the totality of targeting made 
available by industrial technology. The industrial war form’s profound 
dependence on the products of industry presented a highly exploitable 
vulnerability, leading military strategists to view the destruction, or at least 
disruption, of that industry as a significant influence on the outcome of a war. 
To that end the targeting of industry became a seminal point of industrial age 
military strategy. However, the factories which produced the tanks and jeeps, 
the bombs and machine guns - the very factories which had become prime 
targets of industrial age attrition - employed and relied on thousands of people 
who fit the traditional definitions of non-combatants. ^  ^  As a consequence, 
civilian activities acquired a new strategic importance in the war effort, a role 
which conferred on civilian targets a status of material significance 
unprecedented in previous ages of warfare.
This strategic significance implicitly controverted both the practical 
immunity of civilians established in the age of limited war and the legal 
immunity established in the Hague and Geneva conventions around the turn of 
the century. As justification for this violation, many decision makers adopted 
the position that, the “activities of civilians, in so far as they made possible the 
belligerent acts of governments, were a perfectly legitimate target for military 
activity.”^^  This policy, however, raised an even more intractable question: if a
Rogers, A.P.V, Law on the Battlefield. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996. 
p .l l
Howard. Restraints on War, p.9
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civilian in a bomb-making factory is legitimate collateral dam age,bu t he is not 
legitimately targetable on the streets of Dresden, at what point on his way from 
home to the factory does he become legitimately targetable?^^ This question 
illustrates just how arbitrary the civil/militaiy distinction became in industrial 
warfare.
Nowhere was this arbitrariness more apparent than in the practice of 
strategic bombardment. The philosophy behind this doctrine of air warfare 
apotheosises the industrial age’s growing disregard for distinctions between 
military and civilian. According to the early American air power enthusiast 
Billy Mitchell, “[t]o gain a lasting victory in war, the hostile nation’s power to 
make war must be destroyed - this means the factories, the means of 
communication, the food producers, even the farms, the fuel and oil supplies, 
and the places where people live and carry out their lives.”^^  Mitchell, Italy’s 
Giulio Douhet, Britain’s Sir Hugh Trenchard, and other proponents of aerial 
strategic bombardment, were among the first to raise the prospect of targeting 
civilians on such a scale. Moreover, their scale was remarkable not only for the 
degree of destruction it advocated inflicting on civilians, but for the extent to 
which such destruction was actually achievable, as well as for the level of 
influence such destruction was proposed to have on the final outcome of war.^^
It must here be emphasised that under no circumstances do the laws o f war justify the 
targeting o f the civilian himself, they only allow the targeting of the factory which civilians 
may occupy.
Pearton. The Knowledgeable State, p. 186
Warner, Edward. “Douhet, Mitchell, Seversky: Theories o f Air Warfare.” in Earle, Edward 
Meade, ed. Makers of Modern Strateev: Militarv Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler. First 
edition. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971. p.498
The very name ‘strategic’ implies that air power used in this way would be sufficient to decide 
the outcome of an entire war, not merely a single tactical battle. Douhet himself championed 
the idea that air power would be both necessary and sufficient to win a war. Freedman, 
Lawrence. The Evolution o f Nuclear Strategv. London: Macmillan, 1981. p.5-6
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Interestingly, however, many of the early air power theorists placed 
increased emphasis on civilian tai'gets more for the impact such strikes would 
have on civilian morale than for their effect on the industrial war machine 
Douhet, especially, believed aerial bombardment of urban centres could drive 
civilians to urge their governments to end a war. Yet the industrial-targeting 
emphasis of strategic bombardment has endured into modem air power theory, 
while the morale emphasis has been all but discounted^^ - not least due to the 
empirical evidence of World War II that Douhet significantly over-estimated the 
effect of aerial bombing on civilian morale.^^
Regardless of the early air power proponents’ reasons for advocating 
strategic bombardment and its targeting of civilians, the strategy first came to be 
used in World War II primarily out of necessity. Britain, the most prominent of 
the strategic bombers, adopted a policy of strategic bombardment in 1942, 
arguing that aerial raids against urban centres were Britain’s only recourse for 
inflicting pain on Germany and preventing her own loss of the war.^  ^ The Royal 
Air Force targeted cities because they simply did not have the technology to hit 
smaller targets with reliable accuracy, especially given the fact that “an 
understandable desire to avoid” the devastating losses of World War I led them 
to fly high and at night when risk to their own airmen was lower, as was target
^  Brodie, Bernard. Strategy in the Missile A ge. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1965. p.92
^  Warner, Edwai'd. “Douhet, Mitchell, Seversky: Theories o f Air Warfare.” in Earle. Makers 
of Modern Strategv. p.490 
Freedman. The Evolution o f Nuclear Strategy, p . l l .  Warner. “Douhet, Mitchell, Seversky.” 
p.490. In fairness to Douhet however, David Maclsaac notes that Douhet posited his 
descriptions on the assumption that the next war would use not only conventional explosive 
bombs, but also incendiary and chemical gas bombs, a practice which would, in all 
likelihood, have had a much greater effect on civilian morale than conventional explosives 
alone. Maclsaac in Paret, Peter, ed. Makers of Modern Strategv: from Machiavelli to the 
Nuclear A ge. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986. p.630 
Rogers. Law on the Battlefield, p . l l  and Best. Humanitv In Warfare, p.278
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accuracy?^ Britain attempted to make a virtue of this necessity, claiming that, 
even where inaccurate raids did not impede wartime industry, they would batter 
civilian morale and hasten the end of the war/^ Civilian immunity was thus 
sacrificed in the name of winning a total war few had wanted to fight.
Conventional aerial bombing, however, was not the worst of World War 
n ’s challenges to the distinction between civilian and military. The worst 
emerged only at the end of the war, with the dropping of atomic bombs on 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki.^® These bombings flattened two entire cities, bringing 
the horrors of war home with a terribleness hardly conceivable before 1945. Yet 
the true horror of this new step over the boundary between combatant and non- 
combatant became clear only after the war ended, as first the United States and 
then others began to develop strategies for the possible future use of these 
weapons.
Like conventional strategic bombing, these early nuclear strategies were 
constrained by technology. In the first years of the Cold War, nuclear weapons 
were too scarce and targeting was too inaccurate to risk dropping a nuclear 
warhead on anything but the concentrated mass of a city.^  ^ Later, when it 
became possible to consider attacking enemy military installations, and 
especially enemy nuclear capabilities, the ‘counterforce’ strategy was deemed to 
carry too great a risk for encouraging a pre-emptive strike against the
Brodie. Sti'ategy in the M issile Age, p. 120, and Howard, Andreopoulos, and Shulman, eds.
The Laws of War, p .131 
Rowen, Henry S. “The Evolution of Strategic Nuclear Thought.” in Martin, Laurence.
Strategic Thought in the Nuclear A ge. London; Heinemann, 1979. p. 136 
This was initially seen as only an extension o f earlier strategic bombing practices, “greatly 
compressed in time, magnified in effect, and reduced in cost.” Rowen. “The Evolution of 
Strategic Nuclear Thought.” p. 137 Although initially the atomic bombings were no more 
deadly than the fire bombings in the European theatre, their reduction o f time, cost, and 
effort for greater effect (psychologically, if  not necessarily physically) added to the already 
considerable strain on the principle o f civilian immunity.
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aggressor’s own cities. Consequently, the Eisenhower administration adopted 
the doctrine of Massive Retaliation, designed to serve as a deterrent by placing 
strategic emphasis primarily on holding a second strike, response-only 
capability. However, in order to instil confidence that this second strike 
capacity could not also be used to launch a first attack against enemy military 
installations, the weapons of Massive Retaliation were necessarily designed to 
suit not a precise ‘counterforce,’ but a more general ‘countervalue’ attack 
against civilian population c en tre s .N o r did this trend improve with the 
passage of time or the development of new technology. From Massive 
Retaliation to Mutual Assured Destruction to Star Wars, strategies 
contemplating the use of nuclear weapons for whatever purpose have placed 
civilians, and indeed, mankind, in greater jeopardy from warfare than the world 
has ever known.
In response to this exponentially higher danger to non-combatant rights, 
international lawmakers came out in force after the end of World War n. The 
more pacific members of the international community were so horrified at the 
increased destructiveness of war that many even sanctioned attempts to outlaw 
war altogether. The post-World War n  United Nations Charter placed this 
ultimatum in slightly less unequivocal terms than its inter-war predecessors in 
the Kellogg-Briand Pact and the League of Nations Charter, but the message 
was the same: the means of war* in the industrial age had lost all proportion to its
Freedman, Lawrence. The Evolution o f Nuclear Strategy, p.24
The primary difference lay in the degree of precision the weapons could sustain. Freedman,
Lawrence. The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, p. 194
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political ends, and as such had rendered total war all but unthinkable.^^ Indeed, 
the recent advent of nuclear weapons further underlined the urgency of the UN’s 
message, as burgeoning nuclear strategy seemed to portend that any future war 
would hold consequences more dire than any yet known.
However, given the likelihood that members of the international 
community would not all universally abjure the use of their ultimate policy tool 
- even in the face of nuclear holocaust - the United Nations also passed 
resolutions to govern the treatment of non-combatants should wai' again erupt. 
Likewise, the general mood of the immediate post-war period spuixed the 
convening of more laws-of-war conferences in Geneva. The participants at 
these conferences, like the delegates who drafted the UN Charter, could not 
escape the idealism that prevailed after the Allies’ victory in World War n. As 
a result, the 1949 Geneva Convention on the “Protection of Civilian Persons in 
Time of War” went so far in safe-guarding civilian rights that many jurists 
believed the convention would instead jeopardise them further. According to 
one respected jurist, the convention’s protection of civilian immunities went too 
far because no belligerent could realistically uphold it:^ "^  the “new rules will
Reisman, W. Michael, and Chris T. Antoniou, eds. The Laws of War: A  Comprehensive 
Collection o f Primary Documents on International Laws Governing Armed Conflict. New  
York: Vintage Books, 1994. pp. 3-5. Also Howard. Restraints on War, p. 10 
For instance, the 1949 convention mandated against the long-standing practice of taking 
hostages and prisoners of war, (Article 34) and prohibited its signatories from conbolling 
protected persons with measures any more strict than “assigned residence and internment.” 
(Article 41) In addition, Geneva IV required states to observe rights for internees which 
often the state's citizens did not themselves enjoy: Article 82 stipulated that families be 
housed together, and provided “with facilities for leading a proper family life;” while Article 
93 provided for “complete latitude in the exercise of [internees’] religious duties.” 
Furthermore, the convention required that states protect civilians during war to a degree that 
exceeded what many could provide even during peace: Article 24 charges signatories with 
providing for all orphans under age 15, and with insuring that “their maintenance, the 
exercise o f their religion, and their education are facilitated in all circumstances.
[Moreover,] their education shall, as far as possible, be entrusted to persons o f a similar 
cultural tradition.” Reisman and Antoniou. The Laws of War. Collected Primary 
Documents, pp. 239-60.
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contribute to more anger, more accusation, more reprisal, more deviation from 
valid law.... it gives the misleading feeling of safety, although humanity was 
never more threatened.”^^
Largely to redress this dangerous idealism, both the United Nations and 
the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)^^ reopened the question of 
non-combatants’ wartime rights during the 1970s. In 1977 the international 
humanitarian laws of war were augmented by a further UN resolution, as well as 
by Geneva Protocols I and n, called Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 
1 9 4 9  37 Yhis time, Geneva produced a more realistic program to protect the 
rights of non-combatants, reforming many overly ambitious 1949 prohibitions,^^ 
and establishing a much more fair system of protection.
The 1977 Protocols - the current word on the international laws of war - 
define military objectives in unprecedented detail, differentiating them from 
civilians and ‘civilian objects,’ which are themselves never to be the explicit 
objects of attack. The Protocols also mandate that, in cases where civilian status 
is in doubt, military forces must assume the target to be civilian.^^ However, 
where military status is certain but civilians may be involved, the 1977 
conventions do permit forces to strike, provided their objective is military and 
the damage to civilians is incidental. The Protocols deem that civilians 
necessarily share in the dangers of war, just as they share the benefits of victory;
Best. Humanitv In Warfare, p.296
“Custodian” o f the Humanitarian Law of Aimed Conflicts, and the initiators of the previous 
Geneva convention series.
Roberts, Adam, and Richard Guelff. Documents o f the Laws o f War. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1982. p.387. also, Howard. Restiaints on War, p. 144 
e.g., the prohibition against the taking o f hostages and prisoners o f war.
Article 48, and Article 50, et al. Reisman and Antoniou. The Laws of War. Collected 
Primary Documents, pp. 87-88.
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they are due all the protection which reasonably can be offered them, but it 
must be acknowledged that civilian immunity can never be absolutely delimited, 
for “the resort to war in the first place mark[s] an entry into a realm where limits 
[are] vague and wavering,... [a realm] which is of its very nature least 
illimitable.”^^
According to Geoffrey Best, however, the protection of civilian rights 
established by the 1977 Geneva Protocols is perhaps the best available under the 
circumstances. In fact. Best writes, some (perhaps those leery of repeating the 
mistakes of 1949), believe the Protocols are even “too good to be true.” Best 
rebuts this belief, maintaining that, “Our surprise at [the 1977 convention for 
civilian rights in armed conflict] - if we are suiprised - should be understood not 
as a comment on its military irrealism, but as a measure of the extent to which 
we have become accustomed to excesses and horrors.”"^^
This surprise, then, is the legacy of industrial warfare, a war form whose 
keystone strategy of attrition necessitated the targeting of industry’s contribution 
to the enemy war effort - regardless of non-combatant involvement - and whose 
tools made possible the pursuance of this strategy. By introducing, and 
institutionalising, the strategic targeting of civilians, industrial age warfare 
fostered a treacherous blurring of the distinction between civil and military 
which serves as a dangerous precedent for the civilianisation of conflict in 
information age war.
Rogers. Law on the Battlefield, p.34 
B est Humanity In Warfare, p.63 
'^^Ibid., p.325
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Strategic Civilian Tools in lAW
This industrial age precedent, however, is not the only factor behind the 
civilianisation of information age war. In fact, the civilianisation of lAW results 
as much from the information age’s blurring of the distinction between military 
and non-military technology as it does from the industrial age’s precedent for 
obscuring the distinction between military and non-military targets. By 
confusing the issue of what technologies and systems contribute to information 
age war efforts, the civilianisation of the tools of war may, in turn, encourage 
the same trend in targeting, magnifying the industrial war form’s precedent. 
Together the two civilianisations forecast a level of military emphasis on the 
civilian realm unknown in any previous model of warfighting.
Interestingly, these changes in what warfare targets, unlike the changes 
in how warfare is waged, are not direct products of the shift to more 
information-intensive power. Rather, the trend toward the civilianisation of 
information age war is perhaps more aptly characterised as a by-product of that 
shift. Whereas the decisiveness of efficiency reflects how information age 
power is conveyed, the civilianisation of war reflects what conveys that power: 
the tools of information age influence, the information and information systems 
which are used by military and civilian alike.
These shared information technologies represent the information age’s 
contribution to the class of dual-use technologies - a class whose extensive 
growth is the primary factor behind the blurring distinction between civil and 
military technology. Dual-use technologies are not necessarily information- 
based; they can be any technology which has applications to both military and 
non-military functions. Lasers, for example, are useful both for the precision
183
targeting of missiles and the precision placement of surgical cuts. Yet, while 
dual-use technologies are not unique to the information age - the aeroplane, the 
telephone, and the railroad have all been coveted by soldier and civilian alike - 
they have become exponentially more prevalent since the information 
revolution."^^
The militai*y’s shift from relying on technologies which produce greater 
masses of firepower to technologies that leverage information for greater 
efficiency"^ "^  has put soldiers in the same market as civilians more than ever 
before. This overlap between military and non-military demand arises largely 
from the flexible nature of the information technologies upon which the military 
now increasingly depends. The flexibility of these technologies is, in turn, 
rooted in the non-linear character of information itself. Information is infinitely 
shareable: no matter where, when, how, by whom, or how many times a piece of 
information is used, it retains the same value."^  ^ In principle, therefore, anyone 
and everyone can use the same information, even if they have very different uses 
for it. Likewise, the technologies that allow the collection, manipulation, 
storage, and dissemination of that information have themselves acquired 
multiple uses. For example, the same operating system that the military uses on 
computers designed to facilitate navigation and group co-ordination in military
Cf. Pearton. The Knowledgeable State, pp.246-7
This shift, although presently driven largely by monetary considerations in most advanced 
militaries, will become a dependence if  war shifts to pivot around the advantages of speed 
and efficiency, as forecasted in the previous section.
Cf. Fast, William R. Lt. Col. "Knowledge Strategies: Balancing Ends, Ways, and Means in 
the Information Age.” Sun Tzu Art o f War in Information Wai fare Prize. Washington, DC: 
National Defense University Press, 1997. p.7
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operations, civilians use to run the computers on which they write essays/^ 
Satellites that militaries use to gather strategic intelligence, civilian 
organisations employ in the global transmission of television signals. 
Moreover, civilians may employ the same database management tools for 
tracking consumer demand that the military apply to facilitating ordnance 
maintenance,"^  ^and the networked computing capabilities on which civilians 
rely for long distance business collaboration, the militaiy employs for relaying 
medical information to units in the field."^ ^
The spread of dual-use information technologies is not, however, 
significant merely as a sign of the flexibility of modem ITs. Rather, the dual- 
use proliferation is material because it undermines the military’s traditional 
monopoly on the tools and technologies for waging war. In so doing, the 
civilianisation of military tools further erodes the rationale for maintaining the 
distinction between civilian and military targets. The civilianisation which 
results from the information age growth of dual-use technologies manifests 
itself in two ways. First, many dual-use technologies and systems may be
For instance, US Marine Corps helicopter pilots and special forces have been using a hand­
held computer known as Pathfinder to facilitate navigation, message exchange, and location- 
finding. The second generation o f this device, known as MicroPathfinder, “incorporates a 
mission planner in the form of a Microsoft Windows-based personal computer...” The US 
Aimy was also able to cut the time soldiers required to generate and submit reports by 99% 
by using a “commercially available personal digital assistant” as part o f its ‘Mini-Eyesafe 
Laser Infrai'ed Observation Set’ (MELIOS) designed for target location and reporting. 
Hewish, Mark. “Wearable Information Tailored to Battlefield.” International Defense 
Review. Jane’s Information Group, Ltd. V o ll, n i l .  1 Nov 96: 1- 12. p .7 ,4.
The Israel Defense Force, US Air Force, and UK ministry of Defence have all employed an 
Israeli developed system called Techmate, which combines on-line documentation, fault- 
isolation systems, and other programs with database management tools. By facilitating the 
identification of problems, the tracking o f inventory, and the sharing of lessons leained, this 
system helped military maintenance workers improve their performance level by 32.5% in 
field trials. Ibid., p.3
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targets because their status as purely civilian objects is difficult to verify - either 
because attackers are unable to discern whether such systems have a civilian or 
a military use, or because legitimately civilian operated systems also double for 
military ends. Secondly, the tendency to target dubiously civilian systems will 
likely be exacerbated by the fact that the infiltration of civilian technologies into 
the military encourages further reliance on civilian-developed versions of dual- 
use technologies. The more the military relies on non-military development and 
non-military systems, the easier it becomes to justify targeting these systems, 
and thus further weaken the civil/military distinction."^^
To expand on the first manifestation of the civilianisation from the 
proliferation of dual-use technologies, many civilian information systems may 
become targets on the grounds that they could possibly contribute to a war 
effort. This potentiality arises because one cannot judge the military or non­
military nature of many modem information technologies and systems from 
their design, but only according to their use. Some primarily civilian systems 
do, in fact, also play pivotal roles in military operations,and as such constitute 
legitimate targets under international law. This de facto extension of military 
targets further amplifies the justification for targeting non-combatants which
For example, as part o f a US army initiative, called Meditag, to improve medical care to 
remote unites, KPMG Peat Marwick and Apple Computers have developed “softwai'e that 
provides access to patients’ medical records and laboratory results over wireless links via 
Apple Newton hand-held computers.” Hewish, Mark. “Military Medicine Goes Digital.” 
International Defense Review. Jane’s Information Group, Ltd. V o ll, n5. 1 May 96: 1- 5. 
p.3
Some may be tempted to argue that the problem is solved if one considers that once a system 
is appropriated by the military it is classified as military, and until that point it is non­
military. However, such an argument would ignore the stated first impact o f dual-use 
technology, which is that the distinction between militai y and civilian use o f a system is 
increasingly difficult to verify in the information age.
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was originally manufactured for the industrial war strategy of striking civilian- 
run factories. At that time, the classification of the enemy’s war industry as a 
legitimately “military” target presented a controversial blow to civilian 
immunity - even when the factories in question manufactured such obviously 
military products as tanks and bullets.^^ In future wars, the fact that many 
products of the information revolution can simultaneously support both military 
and civilian applications could serve only to increase confusion over the 
civil/military distinction and challenge the immunity of non-combatants to an 
even greater extent.
The second manifestation of the dual-use civilianisation trend derives 
from the fact that the military increasingly faces competition from private 
enterprises eager to develop systems that have civilian as well as military uses. 
In the future, the world’s military forces may have a significant potential to 
choose between military- and civilian-developed versions of the same 
technologies. To the extent that military forces choose the non-military 
engineered option, they will encourage the tendency to target the civilians and 
civilian systems behind that option. Yet in the information age this choice will 
be highly tempting for a variety of reasons.
At its most elemental, this dual-use dilemma results from the fact that 
the non-military applications - and therefore marketability - of many lAW 
technologies have provided incentive for private companies to take over the
For example, the Public Switched Network is a civilian operated system with primarily 
civilian functions, but since the US Department o f Defense relies on this network for 95% of 
its non-classified telephone communications, disruption o f this primarily civilian system 
would hinder military operations - a factor which is a key criterion in classifying targets as 
‘military,’ even if the system itself technically is not military controlled. See also p.205 
See also p. 175, Rogers. Law on the Battlefield, p . l l
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research and development of numerous military projects for their own ends/^ 
The most famous evidence of this phenomenon is the backbone of the 
information revolution itself, the Internet, which began as the brain-child of the 
US’ Defense Advanced Research Projects A g e n c y a n d  is now home to 
millions of commercial web pages and even advertisements. The Internet is only 
the most celebrated of many information technologies which were first 
developed under military auspices, but later turned over to private enterprise.^"  ^
Although military imperatives ‘jump started’ much of the research and 
development which sparked the information revolution, that revolution now 
thrives because of its commercial possibilities.^^ “Military requirements no 
longer dictate the direction and speed of technology” since the world’s militaries 
have begun abrogating their monopoly claim to such technologies as high- 
resolution satellites and electronic mail.^^ Instead, the private sector drives the 
state of the art and, not infrequently, surpasses the sophistication of the 
military’s information technologies.^^ For instance, the first bomb damage 
assessment of Operation Desert Storm reached the Cable News Network’s 
airwaves before it arrived on many generals’ desks, laigely because CNN’s
To be distinguished from the numerous private companies contracted by the government to 
build systems specifically for the militaiy.
Molander, Roger C., Andrew S. Riddle, and Peter A. Wilson. “Strategic Information 
Warfare: a New Face o f War.” Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1996. p.2 
Others include satellites, many computing peripherals like advanced LCD [liquid crystal 
display] screen technology, and, indeed, computing itself. Steven Aftergood suimises that 
much of the recent privatisation o f military projects is the result of the Cold War’s end, and 
the consequent slashing of defence budgets. After the Cold War, states generally retained 
their monopolies only for the most militarily sensitive o f information technologies, such as 
stealth, leaving the rest to the open market. Aftergood, Steven. “Monitoring Emerging 
Military Technologies.” Federation o f American Scientists. Public Interest Report. vol48, 
nl; January/February 1995. p .l 
Freedman, Lawrence. Information Warfare: Will Battle Ever Be Joined?. London: 
International Center for Security Analysis, October 1996. p.9 
Scott, William B. “Information Warfare Policies Called Critical to National Security.” 
Aviation Week and Space Technologv. 28 Oct 96. p.60
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reporters had portable direct broadcast satellite systems and flexible 
organisation, whereas the US military relied on over-tasked modems and a 
stove-piped intelligence system for information distribution.^^ The established 
ability of CNN to televise a story before it has entirely progressed through the 
military hierarchy highlights the fact that, in certain cases, the equipment (and 
the organisation) available in the private sector has a capacity for efficiency 
which significantly surpasses that of the military.
Moreover, the information capabilities of the private sector will continue 
to increase regardless of military progress in this area. Since the consumer 
market functions according to customer demand, it will persist in developing 
more and more sophisticated information systems as long as there are customers 
to buy them.^^ On the contrary, militaries, however much they might wish to 
govern their purchases according to demand, do not. Militaries remain subject 
to the availability of tax money ,and  consequently cannot always afford either 
to build or to buy the state of the art - especially now that the Cold War’s 
justification for defence spending has ended, and the state of the art is not 
publicly, but privately dictated.^^ This situation may create intense pressures for 
military strategists in so far as it forces them to develop martial applications for 
technologies that emerge not from military planning, but from the whim of the 
open market. Indeed, these private technological innovations may not only be 
unexpected, but sometimes also unwanted. Militaries rarely welcome outside
Kraus, George F., Comdr., USN (Ret); Senior Fellow, SAIC, Interview with the author. 16 
December 1996.
Campen, Alan D., ed. The First Information War: the Storv o f Communications. Computers, 
and Intelligence Systems in the Persian Gulf War. Fairfax, VA: Armed Forces 
Communications and Electronics Association International Press, 1992. p.xvi.
Freedman. Information Warfare: Will Battle Ever Be Joined?, p.9
That is, militaries rely on taxes if they are state run; otherwise their spending may depend, for 
example, on the lucrativeness of donations, or o f drug sales.
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innovation when, for instance, it nullifies years of accumulated wisdom on the 
use of now obsolescent technology, and when it compels strategists to devise a 
use for technologies they never wanted in the first place.*^ ^
Even if militaries could both afford and anticipate all the private sector’s 
new technologies, military technology would necessarily lag behind that 
available on the open market. Private computer companies can produce new 
models of software and hardware almost as quickly as the public is willing to 
buy them. The combination of soaring consumer demand and the lightening 
pace of micro-technology innovations means that a technology that is on the 
cutting edge one month may be all but in'elevant six months later. This state of 
the art is governed almost entirely by an innovation’s impressiveness and its 
marketability. The general public is not concerned with more than a minimum 
of computer security and, since models become obsolete within just a few years, 
they are not greatly troubled over the “robustness” - the survivability - of their 
systems.
The military, however, cannot afford to sacrifice security and robustness 
for new gadgets, because it faces a much greater potential for disaster if its 
systems are compromised. In a military computer system, an error in a line of 
software code might accidentally launch a missile over a false alarm; a loophole 
in a password protection program could give a hacker access to vital military 
plans; a weak link in a network could mean the difference between a C2 system
Aftergood. “Monitoring Emerging Military Technologies.” p .l
Buzan, Barry. An Introduction to Strategic Studies: Militarv Technology and International 
Relations. London: Macmillan Press, 1987. p.29 Such an invention was the development 
of steam power ships, which rendered useless the centuries o f knowledge accrued on the use 
of sail-power.
^  Munro, Neil. “The Pentagon's New Nightmare: An Electronic Pearl Harbor.” Washington 
Post. 16 Jul 95. p.3
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which survives an electromagnetic pulse weapon and one that does not.^ "^  The 
process of eliminating all these flaws takes time however, time which the 
private sector spends not on making a prototype ready for the market, but on 
developing still more new technologies. Consequently, the information age 
military must make a difficult choice between buying the state of the art on the 
open market and using military-issue technologies which may lag years behind 
the cutting edge. If information age forces choose the former option, they risk 
relying on systems which simply may not withstand the rigours of war, which 
may hide accidental flaws causing them to fail unexpectedly, or which may even 
conceal viruses and “backdoors” planted by enemy spies.^  ^ However, if 
militaries choose the latter option - which will often mean older and slower 
technologies - they may fatally sacrifice too much of the efficiency vital to 
winning an information age war.
To a very great extent, therefore, civilians now command the 
development of the tools for information age war. Civilian innovations will 
guide - if not dictate - the directions, pace, and sometimes even the form which 
military developments take in the information age. In an age where a military 
force can feasibly buy the majority of its command and control system from the 
shelves of a commercial shopping mall, and civilians can hack into top secret 
military records with their home computers, the civil/military distinction may
Din, Allan M. “Strategy, Security, And Advanced Computing.” In Jacobsen, Carl G., Ed. 
The Uncertain Course: New Weapons. Sti'ateeies, And Mind-Sets. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1987. pp.271-275 It was concerns such as these which the US public 
ignored in the late ‘80s scandals over the Pentagon’s spending for coffee makers and toilet 
seats. Shocked public opinion utterly disregarded the fact that the $500 or so which DOD  
spent on coffee makers went toward the reseaich and development o f coffee makers - and 
other technologies - which could survive a nuclear attack!
These assertions may at first sound like the delusions o f science fiction addicts; however, the 
CIA has already planted such devices in computers which Russia imports from America. 
Adams, James. “Anoraks’ Apocalypse.” p.5.9
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become more a source of confusion than a guideline for humanitarian waif are. 
Consequently, the civilianisation of lAW’s tools amplifies the difficulty of 
discerning not only between military and non-military tools, but also between 
military and non-military uses of those tools. This increasingly murky line 
between civilian and military may serve to extend the justification - already so 
drastically expanded during the industrial age’s two world wars - for targeting 
marks that may not strictly fit traditional definitions of ‘military objectives.’ 
Thus, the civilianisation of the means of infonnation age war could contribute to 
an erosion of the distinction between combatant and non-combatant even greater 
than that of the industrial age war form, for the more difficult it becomes to 
discern what constitutes a military tool, the easier it may be to justify attacks on 
objects which are not distinctly military.
Converging Trends: Civilians as Strategic Targets in 
lAW
Time'% Douglas Waller neatly summarised the implications of lAW’s 
civilianisation with the statement that “in some respects, information age war 
may only refine the way modern warfare has shifted toward civilian targets.” 
The convergence of the industrial age trend with the information revolution’s 
civilianisation of the tools of war certainly advances the trend a few steps 
further, but whether or not it marks a fundamental departure from past targeting 
practices (a departure which would require a new paradigm for understanding 
war) depends on how the convergence manifests itself - as an incremental shift 
or as a qualitative transformation in what war is waged at. The early phases of
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this manifestation should primarily take two forms: targeting of civilian 
information through psychological operations (psyops), and targeting of civilian 
information systems through electronic, conventional, and computer hacking 
tactics. The striking of similar civilian targets has been a military objective for 
centuries but, as the following pages argue, both civilian information and 
information systems are acquiring a more important role in information age war, 
a role which could also render them more important targets of war.
Group Captain Andrew Lambert of the Royal Air Force vigorously 
disputes this assertion. He argues that, on the contrary, lAW will facilitate 
better observance of non-combatant immunity. With precision weapons and 
detailed intelligence, information age military forces have a new capability to 
discern between military and non-military targets, and to strike, with surgical 
exactitude, only the military targets. As supporting evidence, Lambert cites 
coalition forces’ “meticulous” efforts to spare civilians during the Gulf War.^  ^
Pilots had strict orders to attack only with positive identification of targets, and 
some military targets were not attacked at all because the coalition deemed the 
potential for collateral damage of non-combatants to be too high.^^ The 
coalition also went to great lengths to insure accuracy, using a majority of 
expensive PGMs when attacking populated areas and, significantly, suffering 
heavy losses in attacking low (which improves targeting at the price of increased 
vulnerability) over Iraqi airfields.*^  ^ As a result of these practices, writes A.P.V. 
Rogers,
Waller, Douglas. “Onward Cyber Soldiers.” Time. V oll46. n8. 21 Aug 95. p.7 
Lambert. “The Psychological Impact of Airpower.”
Taylor, Philip M. War and the Media: Propaganda and Persuasion in the Gulf War.
Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992. p.213 
Rogers. Law on the Battlefield, p.63
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“Even critics admit that ‘one claim has survived the tarnished 
aftermath of the Gulf War intact - namely, that the Coalition used 
modern military technology to comply with the fundamental legal 
requirement to distinguish between civilians and combatants more 
effectively than any belligerent in any past war.’”^ °
Both Rogers and Lambert view this as a positive portent for wars to come.
Members of the Gulf War coalition - and perhaps a few dozen other
advanced and primarily Western states - may, in truth, have every intention of
fighting future wars with equal or better regard for civilian immunities.
However, the West will not always be able to fight its wars on its own terms.
Indeed, the most probable future threats are likely to be from non-western actors
who view the prospect of shifting war to their own terms as their first objective,
because this is an effective counteraieasure to the West’s insurmountable
conventional military advantage. These enemy terms entail a shift to a more
labour-intensive kind of war, and one which is a more broadly social
phenomenon than the West can accept. Such a war would rely on sheer
manpower to strike not so much at an opponent’s military as at the very fabric
of his society, targeting the civilian population and jeopardising not only their
lives but their way of life as well. This is precisely the kind of war which
dictators of poor, high population countries can best support, and democratic
leaders of media-linked, public-opinion conscious Western countries can least
afford.^^ It is also precisely the kind of war to which lAW’s civilianised
targeting could most obviously lend itself. The West must therefore understand
™ Ibid., p.65
Freedman, Lawrence. Information Warfare: Will Battle Ever Be Joined?, p.7 
Such tactics are not infallible, as evidenced by WWII civilians’ strengthened resistance in the 
face of strategic air attacks, yet they are least amenable to the Western way o f wai'. Cf. 
Larson, Eric V. Casualties and Consensus: The Historical Role of Casualties in Domestic 
Support for U.S. Militarv Operations. Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1996. p.xvi
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and prepare to meet this strategy of information age war, regardless of whether 
it plans only to defend, or to retaliate in kind/^
Targeting Civilian Information
The targeting of civilian information revolves largely around the use of 
perception management to influence popular opinion and the public will to 
continue a war. As chapter two notes, such psychological warfare is not a new 
tactic; however, early signs indicate that both the extent of psychological 
warfare’s capabilities and of its effects may increase considerably as a result of 
information age technologies and influences.
Psychological operations have historically targeted both combatants and 
non-combatants, spotlighting the former in an attempt to erode the enemy’s war 
machine by chipping away at his soldiers’ morale and will to continue the war, 
and targeting the latter in an effort to defeat the willingness of the people to 
sustain the war or allow its continuation. In focusing psyops specifically against 
civilians rather than enemy troops or leaders, the “object of policy [becomes] no 
longer to convince ministers and officials that wai' [is] too hazardous in the 
given circumstances, but to induce populations in an ‘enemy’ state to demand 
peaceful solutions of their own governments.” '^^  This strategy may become even 
more desirable in the information age than it was in the past if public opinion 
fulfils its infoimation age potential to play a larger and more influential role in
In the face o f this dangerous trend toward civilian-targeting, Western countries should 
especially be aware that good intentions can falter under the horrors o f war. Though 
unfortunate, history proves that it does happen. In the Second World War, for instance, so 
strong was the desire to avoid the devastating stalemate o f WWI, that commanders took 
actions to spare their troops whenever possible, even at the cost o f enemy civilians’ lives. 
One such step was Britain’s practice o f high flying carpet bombing, a tactic in which planes 
flew high enough to avoid enemy ground defences, but too high to target with any accuracy. 
Howard, Andreopoulos, and Shulman, eds. The Laws o f War, p. 131 
^''Pearton. The Knowledgeable State. p.202
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government decision-making, and particularly in the making of those decisions 
involved in the beginning and conducting of war.
As discussed in chapter one,^  ^the spread of information which 
accompanies the crumbling of hierarchies holds a capacity to grant individuals a 
greater voice in decision-making. The proliferation of information sources - 
ranging from traditional newspaper, television, and radio news reports to more 
innovational multi-media web sites, interactive news bulletin boards, and on­
line “chat” rooms that permit the exchange of wide-ranging opinions across a 
broad base of the population - should encourage the development of more 
informed opinion on the part of the general electorate. Moreover, individuals in 
the information age, armed with a greater awareness of their government’s 
actions, will also be better able to transmit their opinions about these actions to 
their representatives, and encourage more direct representation of the public’s 
will.^  ^ In the United States, e-mails, faxes, web-polls, and even 1-800 
freephone numbers have already begun to supplement the slower and more 
cumbersome means of paper mail and telephones through which constituents 
have been accustomed to contact their representatives. While in many cases 
governments will continue to implement some policies regardless of popular 
approval the increasingly abundant availability of informed public opinion in 
the information age should render the popular voice more and more difficult to 
ignore. Furthermore, the growing media interest in public opinion is a sign to
See chapter one, ‘Man.’
Wriston. “Technology and Sovereignty.” p.67 
Cf. the case of the Haiti intervention in 1994
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politicians that popular approval is, in many cases, becoming an increasingly 
crucial component of political success
Already the satellite transmission of the sight of one American soldier 
being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu has caused a public outcry 
sufficient to compel the American government to withdraw peacekeeping troops 
from Somalia/^ This broadcast almost single-handedly ‘upped the ante’ of US 
involvement in Somalia, brutally shattering widely-held popular expectations 
that American troops were on a low-risk humanitarian mission to aid Somalis 
left starving by years of violent conflict. After months of growing 
disillusionment with a peace operation many had initially only supported on the 
condition it would be brief,^® the graphic coverage of Somali crowds swarming 
around the American soldier’s body galvanised popular opinion with all the 
immediacy of the sight itself. Overnight, public sentiments swung from 
resigned disapproval to vocal outrage. Fuelled by all of the emotion conveyed 
in that infamous broadcast, the horrified popular reaction swiftly persuaded the 
government that the cost of convincing the public to support the mission was 
higher than US interests in Somalia warranted, leaving the Clinton
This is especially true in an era where constituents can easily access information monitoring 
whether representatives acted on the people’s opinion or not, drawing a more explicit link 
between a politician’s compliance with the public will and his or her potential for re-election. 
Adams, James. “The Role o f the Media.” Ethnic Conflict and Regional Instabilitv. 
Pfaltzgraff, R.L. and R.H. Schultz, eds. p. 164 
A USA Today/CNN poll in December 1992 showed that nearly three out o f every four people 
polled supported the mission to Somalia, but 51% of them also believed the mission would 
be over one month later. A similar poll conducted on 5 October 1993, the day after the 
broadcast in question, showed that 52% of the 525 people polled believed it was a mistake to 
get involved in the mission in the first place, and 66% believed the mission had been 
unsuccessful. Furthermore, 43% wanted US tioops to withdraw right away, and another 26% 
supported gradual withdrawal. “Somalia Rescue Begins; US Troops Four Ashore.” USA  
Today. 9 Dec 92. and “US: Return Our Men.” USA Todav. 6 Oct 93.
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administration no option but to withdraw.^  ^ This incident conspicuously 
illustrated the powerful links between new information technologies, public 
opinion, and decision making. In an age when television stations can rapidly 
shape opinions by broadcasting the progress of a battle in real-time, and 
constituents can reach government leaders moments later with their opinions via 
fax, internet, and e-mail, the swaying of public support holds a greater potential 
to influence governments’ decisions about war than it ever has before.^^
The significance of public opinion’s increasing role for the 
civilianisation of lAW lies in the fact that, if popular opinion does take on a 
more important role in decision-making, such a shift may also increase the 
expediency of targeting civilians with propaganda. Civilians may someday 
become targets for psychological warfare to the same extent that they hold 
power to persuade their government to stop fighting: in cases of extreme civilian 
influence over government decision-making, the swaying of popular opinion 
might even win a war - all unwittingly - for the other side. Ironically, the very 
leverage which information age civilians might enjoy over their own 
government’s ability to wage war could render them unable to avoid 
involvement in infoimation age wars.
Admittedly, the administration’s seemingly obedient reaction to the outcry was heavily 
influenced by cost-benefit decisions to spend its political capital on something other than 
convincing popular opinion to support operations in Somalia, namely the passing o f  
Clinton’s coveted health care bill. Yet the importance of public as well as Congressional 
support for both these endeavours further highlights the gi owing importance o f popular 
opinion in political decision-making. Feaver, Peter. “A New Theory o f Civil/Military 
Relations.” University o f St Andrews Post-graduate Seminar, 14 Oct 97.
One must remember, however, that this impact o f swaying popular opinion may only apply in 
certain kinds o f military involvement. Eric Larson posits that popular support for militai y 
operations is a function o f an implicit cost-benefits analysis. In situations where the public 
deems the stakes o f military involvement to be high enough, Larson shows a trend o f public 
opinion supporting bloodier measures than the government sanctions. Larson. Casualties 
and Consensus, p. 199
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The targeting of non-combatants with psychological warfare may also 
become a more tempting strategy with information age war not only because the 
returns from influencing civilians could be higher, but also because many 
technologies introduced by the information revolution make psyops both easier 
and more effective. This facilitation of psychological warfare manifests itself in 
two ways. First, the proliferation of information technology assists the spread of 
information and therefore, of propaganda, the central tool of psyops.^^ Access 
to low-cost, effective methods of distribution like direct broadcast satellite 
television and the internet has grown relatively easy and inexpensive to obtain, 
allowing even disadvantaged groups like Mexico’s Zapatistas a ready medium 
for broadcasting infoimation and propaganda with an unprecedented reach. In 
addition, growing databases of computerised information - listing details which 
range from one’s medical, educational, and tax histories to the occupations one 
holds and the political beliefs to which one subscribes - also present new 
opportunities for targeting specific groups with tailored propaganda. 
Psychological operators might target regions around military bases with 
propaganda about the plight of their soldiers in battle, while regions heavily 
populated by immigrants with tenuous loyalty to the government might receive 
propaganda about the futility of that government’s programs, and still other 
areas with a history of political liberalism could be bombarded by stories and 
images depicting the suffering of innocent enemy civilians. By utilising more 
precise, computer-managed information, perception managers in the information 
age should find it easier not only to disseminate their manipulated information, 
but to guide its distribution to the people it is likely to affect most.
Molander, Riddle, and Wilson. “Strategic Information Waifare.” p.23
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Secondly, the sophistication of new information technologies peimits a 
highly elaborate manipulation of information, and the creation of ever more 
persuasive propaganda. Techniques like video morphing - a visual blending 
technique which makes computer generated images indistinguishable from real 
life images on video - can project leaders onto the evening news, saying things 
they never said, in places they have never v is i ted .N ew  technologies can also 
enable information age warfighters to spread disinformation through, among 
other methods, the interruption and overriding of satellite signals, the 
anonymous and untraceable falsification of orders, and transmission of footage 
documenting a humiliating - and fake - defeat in battle around the globe.^^ 
Although the effects of such techniques in war remain matters of 
speculation, by examining the effects of recent and comparatively primitive 
propaganda methods one can infer that the impact of the new psyops capabilities 
would be at least as significant if not more so. Coalition forces in the Gulf War 
applied one of the most simple propaganda forms - the leaflet - to induce 
thousands of Iraqi soldiers to desert their posts. Coalition planes dropped 
millions of these leaflets over Iraqi troops, usually broadcasting where and when 
an attack would occur, and offering the soldiers an opportunity to escape. 
Post-war assessments indicated that 100-160,000 did. However, the propaganda 
was only effective because the coalition had the means to attack where and 
when it said it would, thus fulfilling the promise of the leaflets. By alternating 
leaflet drops with attacks with follow-up leaflet drops (the latter commonly read 
along the lines of ‘We told you so,’ emphasising that the attackers had fulfilled
^  Schwartau, Winn. Information Warfare: Chaos on the Electronic Superhighway. Thunders 
Mouth Press, 1994. p. 35 8 
^  Libicki. “What Is Information Warfare?” ch6, p. 1
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the promise of the previous leaflets and were now offering a second opportunity 
to flee before the attack was repeated)^^ battered away at the already tenuous 
morale of the Iraqi military f o r c e s . I f  this simple propaganda, in combination 
with the decapitation of Iraq’s command and control, could reduce much of 
Iraq’s forces to chaotic anarchy, one can imagine that more sophisticated psyops 
techniques like morphing - which can create so many contradictory “facts” that 
it becomes impossible to discern the truth, let alone to act on it - could have an 
enormous impact on the conduct of information age wars.^^
Consider a situation in which television stations broadcast fabricated 
pictures of a hideous massacre brought on by the foolish policies of a 
government that has failed to fulfil its war aims and keep its promises; covert 
radio stations portray themselves as the voice of dissident groups within the 
state, offering an alternative to the current war-fraught leadership; hackers 
penetrate the computer systems of a trusted newspaper planting false stories 
detailing how the country’s ruler is deliberately ignoring civilian suffering in 
prosecuting the war and is secretly in negotiations for a peace that will leave 
him wealthy and safe, but will betray the security and ideals of his nation. Such 
an onslaught of calumnious information could create a chaos of confusion that 
would add great weight to the voices of those opposing the war, as well as to 
those who oppose the government itself.
Johnson and Libicki, eds. Dominant Battlespace Knowledge. Chapter 3, p.9 
^  Taylor lists the following as an example o f the actual text o f such messages: “Tomorrow if 
you don’t surrender we’re going to drop on you the largest conventional weapon in the 
world.” After dropping a 15,000 lb. BLU-82 “Daisy Cutter” bomb that was the size o f a 
Volkswagen bug and produced a blast resembling a nuclear bomb’s mushroom cloud, 
coalition pilots would drop a second round o f leaflets which read, “You’ve just been hit with 
the largest conventional bomb in the world. More on the way.” Taylor. War and the Media. 
p.l55.
^ Lambert. “The Psychological Impact of Airpower.”
Molander, Riddle, and Wilson. “Strategic Information Warfare.” p.23
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Similar bombardments of disinformation (and censored truth) have, of 
course, been part of war throughout the ages, and have followed the same 
principle of galvanising doubts and dissension already present among the 
enemy’s own citizens.^^ These rules for success continue to apply to 
information age psychological operations: to insure achievement of the 
objective, the doubts sowed through psychological warfare should find parallel 
sentiments upon which to capitalise in the target population, encouraging and 
validating opposition to the war, fuelling the cause of government dissenters, 
and in general undeiinining the war effort by striking at popular morale and the 
will of the people to sustain the wai ’s costs.^  ^ As in wars for time immemorial, 
these efforts will be more likely to succeed in cases where the ruling 
government is unpopular, its war aims are unclear, its progress with the war is 
difficult to measure, and the electorate does not consider vital interests to be at 
stake in the conflict.^^ Advanced information age psyops could further improve 
the opportunities for influencing the enemy population - and thereby the length 
of the war - under these conditions as well as under circumstances less 
favourable to the success of propaganda. This improved capacity for 
influencing the target population results from psyops’ information age ability to 
achieve an unprecedented level of pervasiveness and convincing “authenticity.” 
Potentially ubiquitous and often indiscernible from legitimate information
An established principle o f psychological operations is the fact that propaganda that is most 
credible - or in other words, closest to the target population’s conception o f reality - has the 
highest chances of success. Rothgeb, John M., Jr. Defining Power: Influence & Force in 
the Contemporary International System. New York: St Martin’s Press, 1993. p. 119, also 
Taylor. War and the Media, pp. 150-4. and Speier, Hans. “Ludendorff: The German 
Concept o f Total War.” in Earle. Makers o f Modern Strategy, p.317 
This tactic was used enthusiastically in World War II, as well as in the more recent 1991 Gulf 
War. Taylor. War and the Media, p. 150 
Mazarr, Michael J., Don M. Snider, and James A. Blackwell, Jr. Desert Storm: the Gulf War 
and What We Learned. Boulder: Westview Press, 1993. p. 170
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supplies, inforaiation age psychological operations may both reach a much 
greater number of people and sway a much greater number of people, thus 
amplifying the effectiveness of psychological warfare through the higher 
quantity and higher quality of psyops available with the tools of information age 
war.
Targeting Civilian Information Systems
In addition to psychological warfare’s threat to civilian information, 
future information age wars may also pose a considerable threat to civilian 
information systems. Under the strategies of lAW, conventional military 
attacks, hacker attacks, electronic warfare, and economic information age war 
will likely all target non-military information systems as well as military. This 
targeting follows the same principle as did the World War air strikes against 
factories: destruction of an enemy’s primary tools for waging war should 
eventually subvert his ability to resist. The prime targets, in an age where 
martial victory depends on the means of speed and accuracy, are the information 
systems which process the knowledge vital to such efficient battle. Due to the 
inherent non-linearity of information power, however, combatant and non- 
combatant often share information from the same system, as the following 
paragraphs illustrate. This sharing again blurs the distinction between civilian 
and military and, following the strategic precedents of industrial warfare, creates 
a tricky justification for the inclusion of civilian information systems as military 
targets.
The information age emphasis on targeting civilian information systems 
will likely be fourfold. Some of the impact on civilian information 
infrastructures will be incidental, simply because the civilian system got in the
203
way. For instance, an electromagnetic pulse will affect all electricity within a 
wide radius, blacking out homes and businesses, as well as disabling the 
electrical equipment upon which the militaiy relies to strike back. Some cyber 
attacks on civilian systems could also be intentional: cutting off electricity in 
several major cities, interrupting long-distance phone service, causing cuiTency 
exchange rates to plummet, and crashing planes by blocking air traffic control 
signals could cause enough chaos in a country to distract the military from its 
enemy at least until the forces can restore domestic order and internal security.^^ 
In addition, information age wars may also call for intentional attacks on 
non-military information systems because they are easier to strike than military 
systems are. A 1994 Pentagon report on the dangers of information age war 
concludes that:
An adversary determined to harm the United States through the use of 
information age war techniques may choose to completely ignore 
military systems because of the higher likelihood of success with 
civilian systems. Major dislocations in American society could be 
caused by targeting sensitive but unclassified data, such as power 
systems, electronic funds transfer systems, the PSN [Public Switched 
telephone Network] and the national airspace management system.
Since the West’s probable future enemies are unlikely to be its equals militarily,
they will be inclined to choose the battle which most evens their odds. At least
until the private sector recognises the seriousness of lAW’s threat and
implements stronger security precautions (as Libicki-esque theorists predict they
will),^  ^non-military information systems could present much more tempting
96targets than military systems.
“Cyber Wars.” Economist. v 3 ,13 Jan 96: 89
Mumo. “The Pentagon's New Nightmare: An Electionic Pearl Harbor.” p.3 
For further elaboration of Libicki's viewpoint, see ‘Other Views in the Debate’ in the 
introduction.
Freedman, Lawrence. Information Warfare: Will Battle Ever Be Joined?, p.8
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Furthermore, the susceptibility of civilian information systems also 
leaves the military dangerously vulnerable. The fourth strategic reason 
information age military forces may target non-military systems is rooted in the 
fact that militaries rely on civilian systems almost as much as on their own 
systems in certain cases. In the United States, for example, 95% of the 
Pentagon’s telephone communications run on the same lines civilian telephones 
use,^  ^American militaiy bases are powered from the same electricity sources 
which power civilian homes and towns; soldiers’ pay is distributed through the 
same federal banking network where Mrs Smith and Mr Jones keep their 
savings .This  overlapping means not only that civilians are likely to be 
affected by information age war attacks aimed at the military, but that the 
military is vulnerable to the lack of security in civilian systems. Even the most 
sophisticated information age military cannot protect systems it does not 
control.
The universal vulnerability to information age war means that not only 
the military, but individuals, businesses, and private organisations must increase 
the security of their computer networks if a country is to have any true hope of 
safeguarding its citizens from information age war.^ The military, however, is 
unique in its tendency to predict and prepare for threats in advance. Those 
outside the military are much less accustomed to pre-empting danger and 
securing against trouble that has not yet materialised. Ironically, the rise of
”  Security Policy Board. “White Paper on Information Infrastructure Assurance.” Federation of 
American Scientists. Project on Government Secrecy. Dec 95. p.2 
“Cyber Wars.” p.89
^^Szafranski. “A Theory of Information Warfare.” p.l
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computer crime may decrease vulnerability for that very reason .H ack ing  into 
telephone computers for free long-distance calling, or tapping credit companies’ 
databases to steal someone else’s credit card number raises general awareness of 
the vulnerability of today’s non-military computer networks. If individuals are 
driven to increase their information security practices in order to guard against 
computer crime, they will also help to secure the systems employed both 
privately and by the military against information age war.
Civilianisation’s Implications for Paradigm Shift
In these ways historical precedent and information age trends converge 
to encourage the targeting of civilian information and information systems.
This emphasis in information age war does, to a certain extent, represent a 
change in what it is that war is waged at. Civilian information systems, on the 
one hand, constitute a significantly new class of military target. Civilian 
information, on the other hand, is a familiar objective of military activity, but 
the degree to which the targeting of civilian information may be expedient in 
lAW is new to warfare. Far from constituting a fundamental departure from the 
established understanding of war, however, both of these shifts are in fact 
continuations of the time-honoured principles governing wai\
In the case of civilian information systems, the shift in what war is 
waged at is a change in kind rather than in principle. From the Mongols to 
Britain’s Bletchley Park codebreakers, military forces have targeted information 
systems throughout the history of war; the information age merely alters which
Morton, Oliver. “The Information Advantage: Defence Technology Survey.” Economist. 
v335, 10 Jun 95: 8-17. p. 14
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systems may influence the course of war. lAW’s emphasis on civilian 
information systems in addition to military is an unfortunate increase in war’s 
threat to the civilian realm, but what amounts to a change in ownership by no 
means represents a challenge to the principles of war.
In the case of civilian information, the shift in question is in the first 
place only a matter of degree. Military strategists have attempted to affect the 
outcome of war by influencing civilian opinions from the time of the Huns to 
the days of Radio Free Europe and beyond,employing the same principles - if 
not exactly the same tools - as those behind lAW’s heightened emphasis on 
targeting civilian information.^®  ^ This change in degree alone does not itself 
necessarily preclude challenges to the current military paradigm, because a 
radical and, particularly, a very sudden leap in the importance of targeting 
civilian information could conceivably challenge the paradigm’s ability to 
explain what war is waged at.
If, to take an extreme example, attacks on civilian information were to 
become the cornerstone of military operations, relegating attacks on political 
decision-making, military infrastructure, industrial productivity, and other 
traditional targets to mere supporting roles - perhaps in a situation where 
propaganda could be either so confusing or so persuasive as to sway mass 
opinion, and thereby government decisions, inexorably - then such a change in 
degree could fulfil a criterion for paradigm shift. This, however, is not the case 
with the role of civilian inforaiation in information age war, since attacks on 
civilian information remain one of many tactics employed in lAW. As the 
previous chapter illustrated, fast and accurate military strikes are also predicted
See chapter two, ‘Historical Manifestations of Information Warfare.’
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to play a cardinal role in future wars. While attacks on civilian information 
could certainly augment these actions/®^ they are unlikely to supplant such 
military attacks (prosecuted with information age efficiency or otherwise) for 
the simple reason that, where the stakes are sufficiently high, people will 
continue to fight - for their lives, for their beliefs, for their ways of life - 
regardless of all the chaos modem information technologies can generate.’®'^
Failing such extremes, lAW’s emphasis on civilian information, far from 
challenging the principles of war, instead marks the continuation of a long 
pattern. Throughout history, military forces have generally targeted civilian 
perceptions in direct proportion to the expected ability of the popular voice to 
sway the course of the conflict. Any heightened emphasis on civilian 
inforaiation in LAW would therefore represent an adherence to established 
principle rather than a departure from it, since the principle in fact mandates that 
the military targeting of popular opinion ought to expand in response to such 
increases in the political influence of public opinion as those possible in the 
information age. The heightened expediency of attacking civilian information 
in information age war is therefore a dangerous, but incremental civilianisation 
of what war is waged at.
Furthermore, even the significance of this incremental change is in 
doubt, because the utility of swaying public opinion in warfare is itself 
uncertain. Since the early air power theorist Giulio Douhet famously presented 
his arguments that strategic aerial bombing would be most decisive by instilling
See the previous section, particularly p.202
In proportion to the public’s ability to sway government opinion and actions, as noted above.
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fear in civilian populations, scholars and strategists have puzzled over the role 
of popular opinion in war and the susceptibility of that opinion to outside 
influence. Empirical evidence, most notably that of the extensive World War II 
Strategic Bombing Survey, has overwhelmingly indicated that public opinion 
does not respond to the stresses of war in the manner Douhet predicted. 
Significantly, several studies have shown that strategic bombing could have the 
opposite effect to that proposed, fostering greater resistance to enemy incursion 
rather than resistance to involvement in the war.^ ®^  This seems to be 
particularly true in cases, such as that of the Londoners in the Battle of Britain, 
where the stakes are perceived to be high and failure in war means loss of one’s 
freedom or way of life. Such evidence augurs that, even with information age 
increases in public opinion’s role in government decision-making, attempts to 
influence the outcome of wars by swaying the public voice are as unlikely to 
achieve the strategic significance claimed by enthusiasts of non-violent ‘cyber’ 
wars as that claimed by Douhet. In the absence of such strategic significance, 
shifts in targeting civilian information will do little to challenge the present 
understanding of what war is waged at.
In the final analysis, the civilianisation of information age wai' falls short 
of fulfilling the second criterion of military paradigm shift. The heightened 
emphasis on targeting civilians in war does represent a noteworthy change in 
war, deserving of study in no small part because it signifies a dangerous 
extension of historical risks to non-combatants in war. That extension,
This is not to say that wars can never be won on the basis o f propaganda alone. However, if 
such a conflict is to be called a war, it must involve at least a credible threat that force will be 
used. In order for that threat to be credible forceful, if efficient, military tactics must still 
play a role in military capability.
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however, remains within the bounds of the established models for understanding 
war and thus, despite the heightened challenge it poses to the civil/military 
distinction, information age war’s civilianisation cannot be a paradigmatic 
change.
105 Freedman. The Evolution o f Nuclear Strategy, p. 11, Warner. “Douhet, Mitchell, 
Seversky.” p.490. See also p. 177
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Chapter 5
WHY INFORMATION A G E W A R ?
“The im pact o f  the information revolution on the sources o f  co n flic t... is 
both more and less obvious than its im pact on pu rely  m ilitary operations. ”
-Jeffrey Cooper^
The analysis moves now to a more abstract aspect of warfare, one which, 
unlike the two previous criteria, has little to do with changes in technology. The 
third criterion of military paradigm shift deals instead with the question of why 
information age wai* will occur. This question poses a unique challenge for the 
paradigm shift analysis in that there aie two very distinct ways to investigate the 
‘why’ of information age war, two approaches so widely differing that they 
amount in practice to two separate questions. The first addresses why 
information age war, in particular, will be waged rather than other forms of war. 
This approach emphasises the unique content of information age war, and how 
that content may affect the reasons for resorting to war. The second approach 
addresses why war will be waged in the information age, examining how war’s 
altered context - as well as its content - may affect the motivations and 
objectives for war. Together the two questions are intended to form a multi­
dimensional picture of why this wai* form will be waged in this age, in order to 
establish more thoroughly if and how this picture differs from the current 
paradigm’s projections. As in the previous two chapters, the extent of the 
difference will determine whether or not the information age changes in the 
‘why’ of war fulfil the third criterion of military paradigm shift.
Following the pattern of the preceding chapter, this third appraisal of the 
paradigm shift will begin the investigation into why infoi*mation age war will be
 ^Cooper, Jeffrey. iDominant Battlespace Awareness and Future Warfare.! in Johnson, Stuart, 
and Martin Libicki, eds. Dominant Battlespace Knowledge. Washington, DC: National 
Defense University World Wide Web page, 1996. Chapter 6, p.6
waged by examining historical answers to that question. History provides a 
necessary background for understanding lAW’s effect on the reasons for waging 
war, because it is impossible to determine the import of information age war’s 
changes without a clear conception of why other foims of war have been waged 
in the past. Here one must begin at the most basic level with an understanding 
of why any war is ever waged. This subject has, of course, been treated at great 
length by others who have held it as their primary focus. Geoffrey Blainey, 
Seyom Brown, Anatol Rapoport, Quincy Wright, and Julian Lider are among 
those who have addressed the question of why war is waged in far more detail 
than could be attempted here within the context of examining the information 
age’s potential for military paradigm shift.^ Hence the discussion that follows 
will aim only to present an overview of the canon’s answers to why war is 
waged in order to lay a foundation for understanding the whys of information 
age war.
Why Wage War?
"... f o r  better or worse, the grea t issues regarding how men 
ought to live have been settled  by war... ”
- Paul Seabury and Angelo Codevilla^
War, understood most basically as organised violence in pursuit of some
political objective, has been used as a means to some end since before the
2 Cf. Blainey, Geoffrey. The Causes o f War. New York: Free Press, 1988. 3ed. Brown,
Seyom. The Causes and Prevention o f War. New York: St Martinis Press, 1994. Rapoport, 
Anatol. The Origins o f Violence: Approaches to the Studv of Conflict. New York: Paragon 
House, 1989. Lider, Julian. On the Nature o f War. Farnborough, Hants: Saxon House, 
1979. as well as Brodie, Bernard. War and Politics. New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 
Inc., 1973. Waltz, Kenneth N. Man. the State, and War: A Theoretical Analvsis. New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1954.
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record of histoiy began. Given its often horrifying costs in human life and 
treasure, the popularity and the lasting nature of this phenomenon may seem 
counterintuitive - until, that is, one factors in the consideration that war has long 
served as the final arbiter of conflict.^ No other form of persuasion or coercion 
can put an end to disagreement as convincingly as the violence and physical 
force inherent in war. War has endured, despite all attempts to invalidate it, 
because time and again the force brought to bear through warfare has proved the 
best way to compel another actor to comport with one’s own wishes, regai’dless 
of the other’s preferences. War succeeds where other methods fail because, in 
destroying opponents’ will and ability to resist, it proves concretely and beyond 
doubt that the loser has no choice but to abide by the decisions of the victor.^ 
Such a result can only be contested by a return to war. War is waged, therefore, 
most fundamentally because it acts as the ultima ratio f  the final judge of who is 
right, who is most powerful, whose will should predominate.
This forceful final court of appeaP has enjoyed particular demand on the 
level of the international system. That collection of interactions between states 
and other actors has been dubbed an ‘anarchical system’ by realists^ since it 
possesses no overarching authority with a mandate to rule over the interactions 
between its various actors. Anarchy prevails because the main actors here have
 ^ Seabury, Paul, and Angelo Codevilla. War: Ends and Means. New York: Basic Books, Inc., 
1989. p.8 
 ^Lider. On the Nature o f War, p.64
 ^Geoffrey Blainey argues that “a decisive victory tends to promote a more enduring peace.” 
The more decisively a victor defeats his opponents, the more obvious is the power 
differential between them. As the following pages illustrate, when the distribution of power 
is deal", conflict tends not to occur, since it is obvious without the contest which actor holds 
the capacity to impose his will. Blainey. The Causes of War, p. 17 
 ^Brown. The Causes and Prevention o f War, p.66, also G.E. Hudson. The Hard and Bitter 
Peace: World Politics Since 1945. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1976. p.9 
 ^Cf. Blainey. The Causes of War, p. 10
 ^Cf. Bull, Hedley. The Anarchical Society. London: Macmillan, 1995.
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historically been sovereign states who hold recognised authority to regulate 
everything that occurs within their own tenitory. However, since states, 
regardless of size, wealth, or military might, are all equally sovereign, none has 
the jurisdiction to regulate the actions of another. The precepts controlling the 
workings of the international system have therefore come to consist only of 
those which the states have imposed upon themselves and each other. Owing to 
the anarchical nature of the system, the methods for establishing such rules 
necessarily involve either persuasion (for example, economic incentives or 
diplomatic measures aimed at consensus building) or coercion (for example, 
trade sanctions or the use of military force). In the 350 plus years since the 
inception of the states system, the sovereign states have employed persuasion 
and non-violent coercion to accumulate an impressive number of treaties, 
conventions, and supranational charters which they have agreed to observe as 
guidelines for the orderly running of international affairs. War, however, has 
superseded almost all of them.^ Nowhere is it more obvious than within the 
anarchical context of the international system that regulations only stand so long 
as either the relevant actors agree to abide by them, or they can be enforced; 
thereafter war is the more tmly decisive judge of appropriate behaviour, for only 
military force can eliminate avenues of resistance to deliver a verdict that 
dissenters cannot immediately contest,
 ^Clausewitz, Carl von. On War. Michael Howard and Peter Paiet, eds., trans. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1976. p.83
Of course, the defeated may, and not infrequently do, contest defeat once they have 
recovered, as World War Ills occurrence on the heels o f Versailles illustrates. However, the 
fact remains that Germany was incapable o f contesting the Versailles Treaty at the time, 
precisely because it was decisively defeated in war. Blainey. The Causes of War, pp. 118- 
119
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At the most basic level of understanding, therefore, the answer to the 
question ‘why is war waged?’ is rooted in the fact that war acts as the final 
arbiter of intractable disagreements. The decision to wage war does not, 
however, rest solely on the prognosis that a matter of dispute cannot otherwise 
be resolved. Several other calculations regarding the wisdom of going to war 
come into play for both the aggressor and defender. First, the decision to 
impose one’s will through military force rests on the prediction that one’s effort 
will succeed, and succeed easily. Nations who have provoked war have 
historically set out buoyed by immense optimism for their ability not only to 
accomplish their objective, but to do so with alacrity. However, martial action 
would not be necessary at all were it not for the fact that other actors are rarely 
as convinced in the ability of one actor to assert itself over the others. Geoffrey 
Blainey posits that wars usually begin because the participants cannot agree on 
who is stronger, and end only when war impels them to reach an agreement.
At the outset each believes there is at least a possibility that he may be able to 
force his opponent to abide by his decisions, hence he chooses to fight for that 
potential outcome; he ceases to fight once he recognises unavoidably that such a 
potential no longer exists.
In understanding why wai* is waged, one must also remember that 
implicit in such predictions of success is the belief not only that one will win, 
but that one will win at an acceptable cost for the objective. According to Basil 
Liddell Hart, “[n]o acquisitive state is likely to embark on war unless it has
 ^^ Blainey. The Causes of War, p. 35, 41 ,47; Sociologist Ralph K. White lists among 6 
preconditions for a state’s choice o f war the characteristic o f “military overconfidence.” in 
Brodie. War and Politics. p.305
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reason to believe that it will gain an adequate result for its e f f o r t s . ” ^^ Judging 
what constitutes an ‘adequate result’ is, however, particularly difficult, due to 
the fact that the efforts in question invariably necessitate the sacrifice of human 
life, in addition to vast destruction of property and wealth. Moreover, history 
testifies that achieving military victory does not necessarily translate into 
fulfilling one’s objective,as has been the case in Pynhic victories like the Tet 
Offensive in Vietnam or the British, French, and Israeli collusion to seize 
Egypt’s Suez Canal. In such cases, tactical success failed to yield the 
achievement of war aims, and in these particular instances, actually brought 
political failure. The disparity between military means and ends that prevails 
under such circumstances renders the calculation of success still more 
problematic. In answer to this conundrum, writers on the subject have almost 
universally arrived at the conclusion that the prospect for success in war is most 
perfectly measured by the determination that an actor “can achieve more by 
going to wai* than by remaining at peace.’’^  ^ This measurement of success, 
however, must be tempered by one additional consideration: that is, “that the 
ends for which we fight are reasonably to be sought through the kind of war that 
it is reasonable to fight.” <^^ The measure of success hinges not only objectively 
on the calculation that a goal is worth its cost, but also subjectively on the
Blainey. The Causes o f War, p. 122, Cf. also Brown. The Causes and Prevention o f War. 
p.70 - who holds that decisions to wage war depend on perceptions o f one’s own and one’s 
enemy’s power
Liddell Hart, Basil. Thoughts On War. London: Faber and Faber, Ltd., 1944. p. 14
Liddell Hart. Thoughts On War, p.42
Howard, Michael. The Causes o f Wars, and Other Essays. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1983, p.22. Cf. also Blainey. The Causes o f War, p. 119, Liddell Hart. 
Thoughts On War, p.43, and Brodie. War and Politics, p.3 - all o f which state such 
concordant sentiments as to sound like they are merely paraphi asing each other (of course, 
some of them are).
Brodie. War and Politics, p.6
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determination that an actor is willing to pay that cost to achieve that particular 
goal.
Each of these factors plays a role in an aggressor’s decision to start a 
war, yet that decision alone is not enough to cause war to erupt. The resolution 
to wage war is ultimately a two-way decision which depends as much on the 
choice to defend as on the choice to a t t a c k .  j u s t  as more than one participant 
is required for a tango, so wai* requires (at least) two actors, because military 
action would be pointless unless one participant chooses to resist the aggression 
of another. In making the decision to resist, defenders perform many of the 
same calculations their attackers do when determining their own prospects for 
success. Here the equation is perhaps more suitably stated in the negative: an 
actor will choose to defend itself through force if it determines that “more evil... 
will ultimately result from not going to war than from doing so.”^^  As 
Thucydides noted almost 2400 years ago, this determination is most often 
driven by fear, particularly by the fear that allowing an enemy to impose his will 
may create an intolerable sort of peace.
These same calculations are also sometimes made below the anarchical 
level of the international system, in arenas where there are conceivably 
alternative forms of regulation and arbitration. Here the determination to wage 
war also involves the conclusion that the available non-violent forms of 
achieving justice are unacceptable. Especially in the case of conflicts internal to 
states, such a decision represents, on the part of the challenger, a crisis of faith 
in the legitimacy of the ruling government and its right to impose its will, and
Seabury and Codevilla. War: Ends and Means, p.46 
Brodie. War and Politics, p.3
Seabury and Codevilla. War: Ends and Means, p.49, 7
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its version of justice, on the people. In such instances, war, within states just as 
among states, serves as a final court of appeal providing for the settlement of 
differences when all other means prove incapable of reaching a verdict to which 
both sides will adhere.^°
Tending to Extremes: How War Acts as Final Arbiter
The relative finality of the verdict imposed by war lies in the 
Clausewitzian dictum that wai' tends to the extremes of violence.^! Violence 
itself represents the most absolute form of coercion, and war theoretically takes 
that coercion to its limits by employing the height of violence available in each 
era. Functioning as it does at the pinnacle of violent coercion, war nullifies 
opponents’ ability to gainsay the arbitration it imposes by leaving dissenters no 
higher resort for immediate appeal. Of course, no matter how total the effort or 
the destruction, this final arbitration has never yet given rise to permanent 
peace. As the history of the two World Wars illustrates, even the most decisive 
wars rarely establish peace for more than a generation; in that span of time the 
cost of past wars generally fades from memory, as does the acceptance and 
understanding of the power balance that resulted from those w a r s . 22 Yet despite 
the relatively ephemeral nature of its arbitration, wai" is still used as a means to 
an end for the simple reason that, when actors sign a peace treaty at the 
conclusion of hostilities, they can be fairly well assured that none of the
20 Cf. Hauss, Charles. Bevond Confrontation: Transforming the New World Order. Westport,
CT: Praeger, 1996. also Bell, David V.J. “Global Communications, Culture, & Values: 
Implications for Global Security.” pp. 159 - 184. In Dewitt, David, David Haglund, & John 
Kirton, eds. Building a New Global Order: Emerging Trends in International Security. 
Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1993. p. 193, and Brown. The Causes and Prevention of 
War, p.79
21 Clausewitz. On War, p.85, also 289.11, Liddell Hart. Thoughts On War, p.43
22 Blainey. The Causes of War, p. 118
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vanquished parties will be capable of challenging that peace for some time. The 
more total the destruction, the more concrete has been this assurance.
Perhaps driven by the aim of cementing that assurance, war’s tendency 
toward the extremes of violence has been especially marked during the reign of 
industrial age war. Over the course of that era, states mobilised higher and 
higher percentages of their populations and their resources, and armed them 
with increasingly deadly tools of war which allowed them to field ever greater 
levels of destructive power. That capacity for destruction ultimately 
culminated, of course, in the late industrial age’s unused stockpiles of nuclear 
missiles which carry the potential of blowing up the whole world several times 
over. This mad drive to achieve more and more total destruction springs from 
the status of wai* as the ultima ratio of the international system and from the 
manner in which this last court of appeal has reached its decisions during the 
industrial age. In that era, the primary factor determining the victors in war and, 
therefore, the actors whose will should prevail in the international system, was a 
competitor’s ability to bring mass to bear in order to destroy the mass of his 
enemy’s forces and thus not only his will, but his capacity to resist. 
Consequently, during the industrial age the principal extreme to which war 
tended was that of mass destruction.
The primacy of destruction in industrial age war supplanted the pre­
industrial age approach to war which, from trial by combat among selected 
medieval knights to limited warfare between early 18th century professional 
armies, could often accept as final a verdict delivered by something less than the 
utmost of available force. The decisiveness of such limited conflict rapidly 
came to an end once states began to mobilise every resource they could in the
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hopes of tilting the scales of war in their favour. Beginning with Napoleon’s 
levée en masse, even before the industrial age had fully permeated warfare, 
clashes involving anything other than full military capacity came to be seen as 
little more than “incidental reverses” by states which grew increasingly adept at 
drawing on more and more of their national resources to redress damage done. 
Consequently, “against a fully mobilised and determined adversary, nothing 
short of the erosion of his entire physical and moral resources to a point of 
virtual impotence could be effective in reducing him to a condition in which he 
could be truly ‘coerced.’”23 By the time of the world wars at the height of 
industrial age warfare, the verdict of war could only achieve a degree of 
permanence if every conceivable resource was sacrificed to it; anything short of 
total effort and total destruction would always leave room for more fighting to 
change the decisions reached.
The persistent desire to inflict total destruction was perhaps the ultimate 
motive behind the creation of nuclear weapons at the pinnacle of destructive 
power. Ironically, however, the nuclear threat nearly ended the importance of 
destruction as the deciding factor in war, because it created a destructive force 
that was rationally unusable. The devastating power of nuclear weapons 
brought Clausewitz’ extremes of war closer to reality than he could have ever 
imagined, and transformed full-scale military force from being the only lasting 
arbiter of international affairs into a barbarous possibility to be vigorously 
avoided. By thus severing the link between the extremes of violence and war’s 
utility as the height of coercion, the dawning of the nuclear age seemed almost 
to bring war full circle back to the more limited manner of final arbitration
23 Howard. The Causes o f Wars, p.87
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characteristic of the pre-industrial era. In the shadow of this terrifying 
destructive power, limited warfare returned to the battlefield.
The re-emergence of limited warfare, however, had little to do with a 
renewed acceptance of limited measures as decisive, and everything to do with 
the paradoxical desire to pursue the Cold War conflict forcefully, but cautiously. 
The modern ‘limited warfare’ doctrine answered this dual need to stave off the 
advances of Cold War opponents while avoiding nuclear war. By limiting the 
objective, means, geographical scope, and/or the targets of war, limited warfaie 
doctrine offered a useable alternative to total war and its concomitant danger of 
Ai*mageddon.24 Industrial age conventional limited warfare was, however, still 
a tool for deciding the outcome of conflicts based on destruction. The only 
difference was that, in the limited wars of the bi-polar contest, the combatants 
endeavoured not to destroy their opponents’ whole capability to resist, but 
rather to destroy enough of his resources to raise the cost of continuing the 
conflict beyond what the enemy was willing to pay. In this, participants in 
limited warfaie were aided by the fact that the objective was, by definition, a 
limited one.^s
The ethos of destruction, then, has not significantly changed during the 
whole reign of the industrial age military paradigm. Throughout this era, the 
answer to ‘why wage war?’ has been grounded in the fact that war is the final 
arbiter of disputes between the sovereign actors of the anarchical international
24 Baylis, John, Ken Booth, John Garnett, and Phil Williams. Contemporary Strategy: Theories
and Concepts. New York: Holmes and Meier, 1987. p. 191
25 It should be noted that the small state and non-state actors facing the constrained great nuclear
powers in these conflicts often held distinctly non-limited objectives, like their survival as 
free agents. In these cases the former continued to levy the extremes o f military power 
available to them (none o f them had independent nuclear capability at the time of their 
involvement in limited warfare), though not the extremes of power available in general.
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system, and the answer to ‘why wage industrial age war?’ has lain in the 
stipulation that this final arbitration could only be delivered through that war 
form’s extremes of destructive force. Significantly, information age war will 
not fundamentally change those answers. War will remain the ultima ratio of 
world affairs, no matter what kind of tools are used to fight it or what kind of 
actors dominate the international system. Moreover, contrary to the claims of 
some infoiTnation warfare enthusiasts, 2 6  war will continue to be a lethal activity 
that delivers its final arbitration by destroying the enemy’s will and physical 
capacity to resist. 2 2
The one notable difference in the information age answer to ‘why wage 
war?’ lies instead in how war wreaks the destruction with which it imposes its 
most final of decisions. While information age war will not alter the reasons 
why man wages war in general, its changes in the means of war point to a shift 
in the reasons why combatants would choose a particular foim of war over 
another. Not surprisingly, the significance of this shift lies predominantly in the 
reasons why military forces might choose to wage information age warfare 
rather than other forms of war. Principal among these reasons is the fact that 
lAW, when employed leveraging fully synergised information, may introduce a 
new interpretation of the decisive extreme of force, one centred not around mass 
destruction, but around precise, selective destruction. War will continue to be 
waged for the purpose of incapacitating the enemy, but instead of aiming to 
obliterate as much of the enemy war machine as possible - as was the practice in
2<5Cf. Magsig, Daniel E. ilnformation Warfare In the Information A ge.î p .l,  and Waller, 
Douglas. iOnward Cyber Soldiers.i Time. V oll46 , n8. 21 Aug 95, p .l
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the industrial age - information age militaries should ideally go to war in order 
to effect selective and highly disruptive paralysis of those critical elements 
without which the enemy cannot fight.
The targeting of nodes critical to the functioning of military operations 
has, of course, long been a central tenet of war. This information age emphasis 
on selective destruction therefore does not, at first glance, seem a noteworthy 
change in why war is waged. Whether capturing military leaders and 
strategically important strongholds in the agricultural age, or destroying 
railroads, bridges, command centres, and munitions factories in the industrial 
age, the principles of war have always dictated that soldiers should apply force 
at the most decisive points.28 The idea of inflicting maximum damage to the 
enemy at minimum cost to oneself is, in fact, the central premise behind the 
strategy of manoeuvre. Conventional manoeuvre warfare, however, has never 
been able to fulfil this axiom to its ideal, lacking as it has the precision requisite 
dependably to locate the enemy’s centre of gravity, and/or to assure hitting it 
when the opportunity arises. By contrast, the capacity for efficient action 
available through lAW’s synergistic leveraging of infoimation should bring the 
ideal closer to fulfilment than it has previously come.29 One might, as a 
consequence, be tempted to attribute the reasons for waging lAW solely to the 
fact that information age technologies are expected to confer a new ability to 
strike accurately (and more dependably) where and when an attack will do most
2"^ In the information age, as in the industrial age, war might feasibly be decided in some cases 
by non-Iethal forms o f suasion, like propaganda and other psychological operations. 
However, as stated above, in order to be classified as ‘war,’ this suasion must be 
accompanied by at least a credible threat to use military force.
28Cf. SunTzu. The Art o f War, pp.79, 111
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damage. However, while this ability should certainly be a cardinal feature of 
information age war, no mere change in the feasibility of a time-honoured 
principle wanants the claims that information age war will radically alter the 
world’s understanding of why war is waged and, in so doing, of war itself.
Instead, the potential significance of any shifts in why war is waged is 
rooted in the changes which have already begun to occur on the level of how 
war is waged. Efficiency’s replacement of mass as the decisive factor on the 
tactical level not only foreshadows the introduction of new strategic-level 
reasons for waging information age war, but also necessitates it. As discussed 
in chapter three,^^ the precision and speed born of leveraging information 
eclipses the decisiveness of mass by allowing warfare to do more with less. In 
the information age, one remote-launched, precision-guided ballistic missile can 
destroy an enemy military installation more effectively (and certainly more 
quickly) than several hundred World War Il-era bombs boasting target 
accuracies not within five miles.^i Advances in firepower do play a role in this 
heightened effectiveness, but the information which delivers the missile to its 
target is vastly more crucial to the success of the strike than is the sheer mass of 
the missile. While a certain minimum essential mass will, of course, always be 
necessaiy in order to deliver destructive force to a target, information age 
military forces, leveraging sophisticated information and information 
technologies in synergy, should increasingly be able to achieve victory through
29 Information age war will, o f course, never completely fulfil the ideal o f efficiency in war, 
since it, like all other forms o f war, will still be impeded by the Clausewitzian friction in wai*. 
Cf. Clausewitz. On War, p. 138 
20 See chapter three’s ‘Efficiency Over Mass’ section.
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smaller quantities of higher quality. This distinctly information age capacity 
could largely free advanced militaries from reliance on the vast numbers of 
men, machines, and munitions requisite to bomb the enemy into oblivion during 
the reign of industrial age war.
Significantly, with the end of reliance comes the end of vulnerability. If 
an infoimation age actor does not rely so much on mass to win a war, losing 
mass should not have the crippling effect it once did. This equation is the 
keystone for understanding how information age war may reinterpret the 
extremes of military force, and thus the operational reasons for why this war 
form is waged. Selective destruction should replace the destruction of mass as 
the deciding factor in information age war not simply because modem militaries 
have found a favourable alternative, but because the obliteration of mass alone 
is becoming an impracticable tool for forcing the submission of an information 
age adversary.
The utility of destroying mass as the principal vehicle toward defeating 
an enemy is likely to be void in information age war for two reasons. First and 
most fundamentally, given mass but no capacity for leveraging information to 
use that mass quickly and accurately, a military force must rely on what seems - 
by comparison to the information age force’s near transparent view of the battle 
- remarkably like blind luck to destroy the enemy’s centre of gravity.
Employing the accuracy and speed of information in place of mass and patience, 
an infoimation age opponent equipped to avoid the wasted effort of attrition 
could almost certainly defeat such an information-blind force long before the
2^  Rowen, Heniy S. iThe Evolution o f Strategic Nuclear Thought.! in Martin, Laurence.
Strategic Thought in the Nuclear A ge. London: Heinemann, 1979. p .l36 . Only l/5th o f the
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latter could do any real damage. Second, the inutility of mass should be even 
more obvious in conflicts between equally equipped information age military 
peers, because “mass,” per se, should become extremely difficult to target in 
such two-sided information age wars. In an age where seeing is killing on the 
lAW battlefield, military commanders will be less likely to mass their forces for 
pitched battle in the first place. With mass dispersed, the cost of attacking it 
vastly outweighs the utility of actually destroying it, since each fire launched 
will destroy less and less of the objective as the target becomes more dispersed. 
Together, these factors may render mass an undesirable information age target 
indeed.
Efficiency could thus replace mass not only as the primary tool of 
information age war, but also as that war form’s most decisive target. Since 
combatants can no longer dependably prevail against information age 
adversaries through the destruction of mass, they must instead disable their 
opponents’ capacity for efficiency - that is, the infoimation, information 
systems, infrastructure, and even decision-makers that enable a military force to 
act with the speed and precision requisite for competing in information age war. 
lAW’s reinterpretation of war’s extremes according to the rigours of efficiency 
could potentially manifest itself in two ways: first, the decisiveness of efficiency 
should necessitate a pace of war which capitalises on the extremes of speed and 
accuracy. As chapter two established, this shift would alter the scale and tempo 
of wai' at its extremes. 2 2  Second, information age war introduces the theoretical
bombs dropped at the beginning o f World War II fell within five miles o f their intended 
targets.
22 See chapter three, ‘Speed and Accuracy.’
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possibility of redefining the extreme efforts of war not according to the capacity 
for destruction, but according to the capacity for disruption.
If fulfilled, this second reinterpretation of war’s extremes would be 
revolutionary, because it could entail incapacitating the enemy’s wai' machine 
not by destroying it, but simply by disabling it. This reinterpretation is 
predicated upon the assumption that an attacker may be able to decapacitate an 
adversary simply by demonstrating mastery and control of the information 
advantage. In theory, victory could precede destruction because an information 
age military force with blatant ‘information superiority’ 2 2  could ‘force’ 
capitulation by vividly displaying his capability of annihilating an enemy who, 
once blinded, would be all but helpless to resist.24 Because mass without 
efficiency should have little influence in lAW, the victor would not necessarily 
need to press his advantage in order to vanquish the paralysed military.
This second reinterpretation of war’s extremes is, however, unlikely to 
be fulfilled on a practical level. Violence and destruction aie embedded in the 
very nature of warfare, and will remain intrinsic to information age war for the 
simple reason that no mere threat of annihilation will ever win a war unless a 
military force has the capacity - and the will - to carry that threat out.
Disruption and paralysis may substitute for destruction in certain cases, 
particularly in those involving blatantly unequal matches of military p o w e r . 2 5
22 A concept analogous to lair superiority,! in which one force has obvious control over the 
realm in question. Cf. Campen, Alan D., ed. The First Information War: the Storv of 
Communications. Computers, and Intelligence Svstems in the Persian Gulf War. Fairfax, 
VA: Aimed Forces Communications and Electronics Association International Press, 1992. 
p.xi, Libicki, Martin C. The Mesh and the Net: Speculations on Armed Conflict in a Time of 
Free Silicon. Washington, DC; Institute for Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 
McNair Paper 28, March 1994. Ch2 p.6
24 See chapter three, particularly the section ‘Speed and Accuracy.’
25 Cf., for example, the success of the coalition’s propaganda leaflet campaign in the Gulf War.
See also chapter four, ‘Targeting Civilian Information.’
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But disruption will never supersede destruction (whether mass or selective) as 
the vehicle to military victory because no amount of speed and precision will 
ever decide a war unless a military force also possesses the capability to employ 
that efficiency toward destroying the enemy’s ability to resist.
The answer, then, to why information age war in particular will be 
waged is likely to be simply that the war forai’s efficiency offers a pace of war 
which should be decisive in most, if not all, instances of full-scale, pitched- 
battle warfare. Given the description of how lAW will likely be waged, this 
answer marks neither an unexpected development in the whys of war nor a 
fundamentally different development. While waging a form of war for the 
express reason that information technologies lend it a decisively fast and 
accurate pace represents a certain departure from past reasons for employing a 
particular war form, the decision to exploit a new decisiveness, or for that 
matter, to exploit new vehicles of speed and accuracy, are as old as the first 
militaiy revolution. On a small, tactical scale, the adoption of the stirrup - 
which facilitated speed and mobility in battle - was one such decision, as was 
that of the long bow, which lended long-range accuracy significantly greater 
than that of the crossbow. On a wider, strategic scale, the move toward mass 
conscription and the more intensive industrial war form was likewise dictated 
by its decisiveness - first in Napoleon’s hands, and later in those of his 
opponents. This being the case, the first of information age war’s changes in 
why war will be waged - that is, the introduction of reasons for waging the 
information age warform rather than other incarnations of warfare - are worthy 
of note, but by no means worthy of being called signs of paradigm shift.
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First Order Reasons for Waging lAW
As information age war matures and the inforaiation age progressively
becomes entrenched throughout more of the world, military strategists will 
likely choose to wage lAW because the war form offers evident advantages in 
the pace and efficiency of military action. The recognition of information age 
war’s utility in many military arenas, however, is likely to be gradual, halting, 
and uneven, like the transition into the information age itself. To date, although 
many actors have begun studying the potentials of lAW,^^ only a handful have 
progressed far enough along the path of information age development to be able 
to implement anything resembling true information age war. In the near future 
therefore, only an advanced few may have the capacity adequately to pursue 
information age war’s efficient extremes of force, and thus also the ability to 
demonstrate the advantages of leveraging accuracy and speed in waging, and 
winning, war. The preceding pages establish that lAW is eventually likely to be 
waged for the simple reason that its information-efficient selective destruction 
could conspicuously provide the most decisive path to military victory in many 
situations. In these initial days of the emerging information age, however, one 
cannot assume that the question ‘why wage information age war?’ can be 
answered in the same way now, when the decisiveness of information age war 
has not yet become obvious.
If, in these early stages of lAW’s emergence, actors will not wage 
information age war simply because it has proved itself a highly effective (and, 
in certain cases, perhaps even superior) way to defeat an armed enemy, then one 
must ask why anyone would wage lAW in the absence of such evidence.
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Several reasons prove compelling. First and most obvious is the fact that, 
especially in comparison to conventional industrial age war, information age 
wai' is a relatively cheap and easy-access form of warfare. lAW’s decreased 
reliance on mass, for instance, renders the war form less costly almost by 
definition. Before the middle of the 2F‘ century, information age militaries, 
with fewer troops and less machinery, should be spending millions less than 
their industrial age counterparts did on maintenance alone - from feeding and 
housing soldiers, to building, repairing, and safeguarding equipment, even to the 
infrastructure required to sustain all of this. In addition to these savings, many 
of the tools that will be critical for the more stream-lined forces can be obtained 
much more cheaply than the key tools of the previous military paradigm. 
Infoi-mation systems, the very basis of lAW’s decisiveness, are in particular 
relatively inexpensive, in no small part because many of them are developed 
commercially, with costs driven by the market incentive for profit, as chapter 
four explains.27 Certainly in some instances - the millions spent on the B-2 
stealth bomber being a prominent example - the higher quality which lAW 
demands of its smaller quantity tools will equal, if not surpass, the massive 
military investments of the past. In the aggregate, however, information age 
militaries, like lAW strategy, should yield more for less.
The cheap, easy-access nature of information age wai' is likely to 
influence why actors wage this war form in three principal ways. First, this 
factor may permit the great military powers to maintain their military forces 
near their accustomed level of capability, despite the necessity of downsizing
2^  Security Policy Board, iWhite Paper on Information Infrastructure Assurance.! Federation of 
American Scientists, Project on Government Secrecy. December 1995. p .l 
27 See chapter four’s ‘Strategic Civilian Tools in I AW ’ section.
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after the disappearance of the Cold War’s justifying threat.28 Since the 
decisiveness in information age war lies not in how much one has, but in how 
one uses it, smaller force sizes and procurement budgets should prove 
comparatively small impediments to projecting information age militaiy power. 
In the case of force sizes, smaller - though more elite and highly trained - forces 
should, in fact, be not a burden but a requisite for successful information age 
militaiies. In the case of procurement budgets, even significantly reduced 
defence budgets should be able to accommodate the comparatively small 
investments in the information systems which form the keystone of lAW’s 
potential. The decisiveness of these and other low-cost components of 
information age military power should allow the great powers to maintain high 
levels of military sophistication even as they introduce requisite reductions in 
their post-Cold War defence budgets.
Secondly, as the following chapter will explore in greater detail,29 the 
relative inexpense of waging lAW may permit many smaller actors to pose a 
credible international challenge, even many of those who could never before 
afford to compete at full-scale war. Since these actors might otherwise only 
have recourse to smaller-scale forms of violent coercion like terrorism and 
guerrilla warfare, infoimation age war may be the obvious, and indeed the only 
viable choice in the event that these smaller actors choose to challenge the
28 Johnson, Stuart, E. “DBK; Opportunities and Challenges.” in Johnson, Stuart, and Martin
Libicki, eds. Dominant Battlespace Knowledge. Washington, DC: National Defense 
University World Wide Web Page, 1996. Ch.2, p .l
29 See chapter five’s section on ‘Widening’ under the heading ‘Small State and Non-State
Actors.’
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larger powers on an open battleground 40 Lastly, the compaiatively low cost of 
information age war may make it an attractive choice for its appeal to popular 
opinion. If, with fewer forces, less materiel, and smaller infrastructure, 
information age war requires fewer taxes and fewer lives spent in winning a 
conflict, lAW should not only be a rational choice for any military, but a 
politically expedient one as well.
The second reason that may motivate the waging of lAW in the near 
future arises from the fact that many of the emerging changes in war, like 
numerous past military innovations, should serve as a force multiplier - 
particularly in situations where only one of the combatants takes information 
age methods into consideration.^! As several conflicts waged over the past 
decade have shown, even primitive and ad hoc efforts at leveraging information 
can act as force multipliers which improve a military force’s effectiveness. 
Neither the 1991 Gulf War, nor the Chechen or Zapatista insuiTections^^ 
represented fully mature information age wars integrating information in the 
holistic, decisive manner defined here as the hallmark of true I AW, yet in each 
of these conflicts the side which most thoroughly incorporated information into 
its operations gained important advantages. In the Gulf War, the US-led 
coalition was able to drive Iraq out of Kuwait with the expense of considerably 
less time and bloodshed than industrial age calculations might have predicted.43
4!! This is by no means to suggest that guerrilla warfare and other tactics o f low intensity conflict 
are likely to become irrelevant in the information age. On the contrary, such tactics seem to 
be gaining increasing currency in the worldfs various conflicts. However, if  smaller actors 
wish to engage in the pitched battles o f ëhigh intensity conflicti with large military powers, 
their best opportunity to meet these larger opponents as peers may be to wage information 
age war.
4! See chapter two, ‘The MTR as Force Multiplier.’
42 See chapter six, ‘The Widening Role o f Lesser- and Non-State Actors: In Real Terms’
42 Libicki. The Mesh and the Net, ch.2 p.2
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In Chechnya and Chiapas, the information-savvy insurgents drew international 
attention and sympathy, requiring their opponents to expend much more effort 
in defeating the rebels than they might otheiwise have done. The success of 
information tactics in these three cases, despite the widely differing chaiacter of 
each conflict, seems to imply, moreover, that information age military methods 
- employed in the true, integrated spirit of lAW - may increase not only an 
advanced military force’s chances of success, but those of less sophisticated 
militaries as well. Information age war’s status as a general force multiplier 
may thus provide an incentive for military forces form a wide spectrum of 
military capacity to adopt lAW’s practices, even if some can initially only do so 
piecemeal.
To What End War?
Thus far, this chapter’s investigation has addressed the ‘why’ of 
information age war solely with respect to the purposes the war form is likely to 
serve. The answer, at its most fundamental level, has emerged to be fairly 
straightforward: information age war will be waged in cases where it is the most 
effective available tool for achieving final arbitration on matters of contention in 
the anarchical international system.44 In order truly to fully grasp why 
information age war will be waged, however, it is necessary also to understand 
what subjects of dispute may warrant such a final, dire court of appeal in the 
information age. This section therefore looks beyond the purposes and 
justifications for war to the objectives and motivations which drive political 
actors to seek war’s ultimate judgement.
233
As this investigation has emphasised over and over, to comprehend the 
future one must look to the past. The inquiry therefore turns again to history to 
cement this third piece of the puzzle that is the question of information age 
paradigm shift. Chroniclers have recorded numerous and varied motivations 
and objectives for war over the a g e s , 45 many of which are hardly less relevant 
today than they were during the agricultural age. Many others, however, have 
shifted as the passing years altered political orientations, legal conventions, and 
power calculations. Significantly, these shifts have, often coincided with the 
widespread societal changes that have divided the modem age into two, now 
three, distinct eras: the agricultural, industrial, and information ages. As the 
Tofflers and others have illustrated,46 the coinciding of these societal 
revolutions with past changes in the whys of war provides the basis for 
paradigm shift enthusiasts’ expectations that the information age will produce a 
repetition of such far-reaching and fundamental changes in warfare. The survey 
of historical objectives and motivations for war will therefore follow the same 
three-part pattern.
Since history does not record the details of wars before the agricultural 
age, the investigation must necessarily begin after the first societal revolution. 
Through the development of agriculture, this ‘agricultural revolution’ granted 
nomad hunters and gatherers a static, dependable means of subsistence and
44 On the state level as well as on the supra- and sub-state levels.
45 Cf. Luard, Evan. War in International Societv: a Studv in International Sociologv. London:
LB. Tauris and Co., Ltd., 1986. Levi, Werner. The Coming End o f War. Beverly Hills,
CA: Sage Publications, 1981. Holsti, K.J. International Politics: A Framework for Analysis. 
Englewood Cliffs, NJ; Prentice Hall, 1983. (esp. pp.400-403)
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allowed them to sustain stable civilisation and political organisation for the first 
time 47 According to Seyom Brown, the ability to provide for oneself through 
stable cultivation of the land fostered, indeed necessitated, the rise of social and 
political group identity; the stationary agricultural system required common 
language for communication among neighbours, shared norms for trading, 
mutual understanding of work/reward ratios, and general acceptance of 
organisation; in other words, a commonality of values and a sense of 
community. Thus emerged a way of life which people felt a need and desire to 
defend,48 a development which had a significant impact on the reasons people 
waged war in the agricultural age. Before this occurrence one can assume that 
conflicts over the means of subsistence - the rights to roam lands where hunting 
was most productive and gathering most plentiful - dominated wars of the pre- 
agricultural age. From the agricultural revolution onwards, however, two 
distinct categories of motivations for war can be identified: political motivations 
related to the prosperity and security of a polity - be it republic, empire, city- 
state, or monarchy - and abstract motivations related to the furthering of ideals 
cherished by members of the polity or, more specifically, the elite that governed 
it.49
The more concrete, political motivations for war are more familiar in 
any era. In the agricultural age these included, in particular, the quest for land.
46 Toffler, Alvin, and Heidi Toffler. War and Anti-War: Making Sense o f Today’s Global
Chaos. Boston: Little Brown, 1993. pp.22-23, 27. Jensen, Owen. “Information warfare: 
Principles o f third-wave wai.” Airpower Journal. Vol8. 1 Jan 94: 35-44. pp.35-
Cf. also Luard. War in International Society, p. 133, Biddle, Stephen. “The RMA and the 
Evidence.” Institute for Defense Analyses. Delivered at the JCISS and Security Studies 
Revolution in Military Affairs Conference, Monterey, CA: 26-29 Aug 1996. p.5.
47 Brown. The Causes and Prevention o f War, p.34
48 Ibid.
49 Van Creveld, Martin. The Transformation Of War. New York: Free Press, 1991. p .142
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for dynastic succession, and for survival as an independent political entity. The 
conquest of land, always significant in war,5o was especially important during 
this age since land was the primary coin of both political and economic power. 
Territory caiiied with it not only prestige and security, but also expanses of 
fields for the production of tradable agricultural goods and, especially during the 
feudal age, the men tied to the land as serfs or as vassals owing fealty and 
military service to the liege.^i The matter of dynastic succession, of continuity 
in leadership, also held special importance in the agricultural age. Organised 
political entities being in the first place a product of this era, the matter of who 
should rule them became the subject of war early on. Moreover, in the centuries 
before the birth of nation-states, much of the political identity of these entities 
was invested in the person of the dynastic leader,52 as was the control over the 
decision to wage war. As evident in 15* century England’s Wars of the Roses 
between the Houses of York and Lancaster, and in Charles the Bold’s 
campaigns against France to re-establish an autonomous Burgundy,52 the 
reasons for war were often closely tied in with the individual desires of 
“monarchs and dynasts” to achieve personal prestige and wealth, or to reap 
honour for their own dynastic house,54 as well as with their more broadly 
political aims of establishing their ‘rights’ to rule over particular kingdoms.55 
Since these hereditary autocrats usually held sole jurisdiction over the decision
56 Levi. The Coming End o f War, p. 179, Brown. The Causes and Prevention o f War. p.50 
5! Lynn, John A., ed. Tools of War: Instruments. Ideas, and Institutions of Warfare. 1445-1871. 
Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1990. p.238 also Hollister, C. Warren. Medieval 
Europe: A  Short Historv. New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1994. p. 102, 120-21,164.
52 Democratic Greece and Republican Rome being probable exceptions 
52 between 1455-1485, and 1465-1477, respectively
54 Of. Seabury and Code villa. War: Ends and Means, p.41, Luard. War in International
Societv. p .l35 , also Blainey. The Causes of War, p.68
55 Luard. War in International Societv. p. 138
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to go to war, their motivations for making such a choice often paid little regard 
to that end’s appeal for the masses who actually went to battle to achieve it . ^ 6
This principle of dynasty was, however, closely related to the motivation 
for self-preservation which spurred both individuals and entire polities to wage 
war. Although newly conceived as the source of group identity and shared 
loyalty, and often so amoiphous as to be defined only by allegiance to a 
paiticular leader, agricultural age polities early on learned to support their 
leaders’ self interests, especially where they matched the interests of the group. 
In such cases the conununity itself often chose to fight for the continuity of 
leadership and with it the preservation of their way of life, as occuired in the 
Anglo-Saxons’ failed attempts to fend off the Norman invasion in the 11* 
century, and in the Scots’ more successful efforts at rallying behind William 
Wallace and then Robert the Bruce to end English overlordship two and a half 
centuries later. As these examples illustrate, preservation of the security and 
integrity of even an amorphous political entity was an important objective of 
war at the onset of political organisation just as it is today.
The abstract reasons for war in the agricultural age are perhaps less 
obvious, though hardly less prevalent. They encompass ideals like religious 
beliefs, justice, honour, and prestige. Religion, of course, stands out as a 
divisive issue across the ages. The agricultural age was well acquainted with 
wai's to this end, being the scene of the original Islamic "jihad’ which united all 
of North Africa and Asia Minor under Muslim rule, encroaching ominously on
56 Ibid., p. 133
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Europe.57 Between the 11* and 14* centuries the West, under the universal 
Roman Catholic Church, responded with an intermittent series of Crusades 
against the ‘infidel’ in the Holy Land with the intent of establishing the primacy 
of Christianity as well as Christian suzerainty over the lands of pilgiimage.58 
Later, as the agricultural age waned and the Church split, the Reformation 
sparked a series of ‘wars of religion’ during the 16* and eaiiy 17* centuries, 
pitting Christians against fellow Christians in the name of defending the faith 
against heresy from within and, not infrequently, in the name also of political 
interest.59
Wars of justice were similarly fought over the conviction that others 
should universally shaie one’s own beliefs, here in the case not of mysticism 
and divine rule, but of the worldly rule of law, morality, and justice. In the 
Middle Ages especially, war was viewed as a continuation of justice, fought 
ideally for noble purposes like punishing another’s misdeed, avenging an injury.
57 The word ëjihad,î it must be remembered, should more properly be translated as either the 
struggle against evil or temptation, or as the defence o f Islam. As used here, however, 
ëjihadi conveys the more conventional understanding of ëholy war,! specifically that spate of 
war through which believers in Islam attempted to propagate the message o f the Prophet 
Mohammed. The Muslim holy war began in the 6th century at the behest o f the Prophet 
Mohammed, and ended only when the Ottoman armies were driven back from the gates of 
Vienna in the late 17th century. Bowker, John, ed. The Oxford Dictionarv o f World 
Religions. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997.
28 Pope Urban II called the First Crusade in 1095, and the age o f crusade is most logically dated 
as ending with the fall o f Acre - ithe last Christian city in the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem! - 
in 1291. A  Western Christian presence continued in the East, however, throughout the 14th 
century, as did the popes! calls for a new crusade. Nicholas, David. The Evolution of the 
Medieval World: Societv. Government, and Thought in Europe. 312-1500. London: 
Longman, 1992. p.263, 273
59 Luard. War in International Society, p. 141, also note that wais fought ostensibly over
abstracts often also had political motives - for example. Catholic France fought on the side of 
the Protestants during the 30 Years Wai', for the simple reason that it was politically 
expedient.
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or defending oneself.60 This view of why war should be waged was likely a 
heritage from Roman times, when much of war was justified because it upheld 
Roman law. Those who considered this to be the principal end of war believed 
that the victor not only won the privilege of asserting his will over the 
conquered, but also proved his cause to be right and just.^i
Lastly, honour and prestige lay behind many wars of the agricultural 
age, motivations befitting an era in which society placed great emphasis on the 
character of its men and, above all, its waiiiors. In the West, the centrality of 
the chivalric code reached its peak during the years of feudal rule, but honour 
was an important theme through much of the agricultural age, as evidenced 
early on by Biblical stories of wars fought to avenge the compromised honour 
of women. More famously, accounts of the Trojan wars cite the beautiful Helen 
as a key prize because winning her would not only preserve her own honour, but 
would also redeem that of the victor.62 With this preservation also came 
prestige, for the ability to prove one’s honour in battle was a matter of 
considerable respect in an era when honour served as the chief barometer of 
great men and great leaders. The lure of honour and prestige as motivations for 
waging war was, moreover, intensified by the fact that political group identities 
in the agricultural age were very narrowly entwined with the individual 
personalities of their leaders,62 thus the prestige and honour which those rulers
66 Grotius lists these as iDefence, indemnity, and punishment.! Giotius, Hugo. The Rights of 
War and Peace fP e Jure Belli ac P acisl Campbell, A.C., trans. Washington: M. Walter 
Dunne, Publisher, 1901. p.75 see also Bull, Hedley, Benedict Kingsbury, and Adam 
Roberts. Hugo Grotius and International Relations. Oxford; Clarendon Press, 1992. p. 184.
6! Grotius. De Jure Belli ac Pacis. p.73. Van Creveld. The Transformation Of War, p .153, 
131
62 Van Creveld. The Transformation Of War, p. 151
62 Cf. Sorensen, Georg. “An Analysis o f Contemporary Statehood: Consequences for Conflict 
and Cooperation.” Review of International Studies. Vol23, n3, July 1997: 253-270. p.260
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won both singularly on the battlefield and at the head of an army engaged in an 
honourable war, reflected on the international prestige of the entire polity, as 
well as on the ruler’s standing and the legitimacy of his rule among his own 
subjects.
The coming of the industrial age introduced many changes in these 
motivations and objectives for warmaking; some of them were radical, but none 
were sudden and certain from the outset. For, the transformation from the 
agricultural age to the industrial age, like that of the present reconfiguring for 
the information age, was a long, gradual, and often all but imperceptible 
process. The transition, in fact, spanned centuries, from the first crumbling of 
feudalism to the appearance of the mass-production factories usually viewed as 
the hallmarks of industrialisation, and even beyond, to the machinations of the 
Cold War and the first signs of the next transition to a new age. The new whys 
of waging industrial age war, likewise, evolved throughout this entire period.
Some agricultural age motivations, of course, persist as ends of war to 
the present day. Most prominently, religion remains a highly incendiary factor 
in conflict, as evidenced by the religious issues accompanying the deep 
nationalist sentiments that divided the former Yugoslavia, and by the religion- 
tainted politics that continue to trouble the floundering Arab-Israeli 
reconciliation process. Prestige, credibility, and the desire for self-preservation 
also continued to be pivotal, if in slightly different guises as nuclear weapons 
stockpiles and industrial infrastructure replaced the honour of knights and 
rulers’ personal military prowess as gauges of prestige and power in military 
affairs. Other motivations continued to play an important role in war causation 
during the burgeoning of the industrial age, but found their role shifted slightly
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as that age progressed. In the case of land, for instance, the industrial age 
gradually transformed both the degree and the reasons for its importance over 
the passing years, as the following paragraphs will detail.
The first watershed marking a discernible change in the motivations and 
objectives for war appeared, aptly, at the Peace of Westphalia which laid the 
groundwork for the states system that has ordered international affairs 
throughout the industrial age. This treaty was the first concluded in the modem 
age without mentioning God, a fact both ironic and eminently fitting since it put 
an end to thirty years of bitter fighting over religious differences.64 The Peace 
of Westphalia proved, in fact, to be the first of many treaties ending war without 
reference to religion. Despite the persistence of religious wars even to this day, 
high politics and the motivations for war among the great powers have moved 
decisively toward secular issues since the birth of the Westphalian system.65 
Among these were political considerations like the balance of power between 
the various states in the newly secular international system. The waning power 
of the universal church and the secularisation of international affairs deprived 
the Westphalian international system of authoritative papal oversight, leaving it 
to rely increasingly on the principle of power balancing to order the anarchy of 
international affairs. 6 6  States felt their security reasonably assured when the 
balance of power was stable or, preferably, when it weighed in their favour. As 
the previous section details, however, in a system with no overarching regulator, 
states can only maintain such a balance through war. Thus the thoroughly
64 Van Creveld. The Transformation Of War, p. 139
65 Luard. War in International Society, p. 159
66 Der Derian, James. On Diplomacv: a Genealogy o f Western Estrangement. Oxford: Basil
Blackwell, 1987. p. 106
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political and secular concern of balancing state power distribution became a 
primary motivation for industrial age war.67
Moreover, once instituted, the preservation of the state itself became a 
powerful seculai* incentive for wai'. Ironically, however, Westphalia’s 
establishment of states was itself lai'gely a product of the growing complexity of 
mechanised warfare. As the industrialising war machine became more complex 
it required greatly increased efforts of organisation and bureaucracy to sustain 
it; the first institutions of modern statehood were therefore a response to the 
needs of industrialising war, though war itself rapidly became a tool to maintain 
the security of the state.^s Just as agricultural age polities had been moved to 
defend their way of life, so the citizens of industrial age states mobilised to 
protect the security of their nation-states. In the industrial age, however, the 
objectives of defence were much more concrete, for states had developed 
institutionalised governments, definitive territory, and in most cases, unifying 
language and culture, all attributes which people have fought heatedly to 
preserve from the Napoleonic wai's to World War II. Thus the wholly political 
and secular ideal of state security - defined in various forms from the 
“preservation of territorial and political integrity,”69 to the ability to protect a 
state’s own land, people, and possessions,^^ to the maintenance of the “capacity
67 Blainey. The Causes o f War, p. 109, Brown. The Causes and Prevention o f War, p.69: See
also Levy, Jack S. iThe Causes o f War: A Review of Theories and Evidence.! In Tetlock, 
Philip E., Jo L. Husbands, Robert Jervis, Paul C. Stern, and Charles Tilly, eds. Behavior. 
Societv. and Nuclear War. New York: Oxford University Press, 1989. for a survey o f the 
wealth o f literature dealing with the balance of power and its role in causing war.
68 Sorensen, Georg. lAn Analysis o f Contemporary Statehood: Consequences for Conflict and
Cooperation.! Review o f International Studies. Vol23, no3, July 1997: 253-270. p.258
69 Reynolds, Charles. The Politics o f War: A Studv of the Rationality of Violence in Inter-State
Relations. New York: St Martinis Press, 1989. p. 156 
76 Hauss. Bevond Confrontation. p.31
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to function as independent actors in the international system”'^  ^ - has gained a 
significance among the motivations for war that is proportionate to the state’s 
own importance as a unit of political organisation.
Interestingly, many of these newly prevalent secular interests also 
reflected a shift in war’s primary objectives away from the concerns of 
individual leaders to the interests of groups, typically those in the form of 
n a t i o n - s t a t e s . '^2 This motivational shift was also a product of statehood, since 
that institution in turn fostered the emergence of national identities built less 
upon the personality of the leader than upon common cultural and linguistic 
bonds among people living within recognised (if not entirely static) borders. As 
a result, the communal interests of these newly grounded collective identities 
came to dominate the objectives for industrial age war, replacing the highly 
personal motivations which had often chaiacterised the causes of agricultural 
age wars. This group interest is openly evident in each of the main secular 
motivations for industrial age war cited above, as both the position of the state 
within the international power balance and the security of the state as a stable, 
independent entity came increasingly to be valued because they served the 
collective good of the state and its people.
Later, as the industrial age progressed and connective technologies from 
telegraphs to railroads to mass-distributed newspapers further cemented the 
bond of national identity, 3^ that group identity itself became a value worth 
fighting for, and nationalism grew to become an incendiary motivation for war.
Howard. The Causes of Wars. p .l3
Luard. War in International Society. p .l35 , Van Creveld. The Transformation Of War.
p.216
243
Especially during the years between the French and the Russian Revolutions, 
peoples increasingly viewed war as a mechanism for promoting the interests not 
merely of the state, with its political institutions and legal borders, but of the 
‘nation,’ the human collective of shared history, culture, and language's 
Bernard Brodie describes this motivation as a fact of human nature, a simple 
manifestation of “[t]he common desire of peoples everywhere to be ruled by 
persons who, whatever their shortcomings, are at least not felt to be 
f o r e i g n er s . A n d  indeed, this nationalist sentiment still sparks wars, as the 
1990’s teiTible spate of conflicts in the ethnically divided Balkans attests.
The advancing of the industrial age introduced further changes in the 
more concrete political motivations for war as well. Of these, one of the most 
significant was the shifting importance of land as an aim of warfare. Since 
industry increasingly replaced agriculture as the chief means of wealth 
production, land gradually came to be valued less for its own sake than for the 
resources it held.'^ '^  This transformation, like many of the changes predicted for 
the information age, resulted from a re-balancing of the critical components of 
power. As chapter one details,^^ resources superseded land as decisive factors 
in power because the industrial machines built from those resources could
3^ Benedict Anderson in Shapiro, Michael J. and Hayward R. Alker, eds. Challenging 
Boundaries: Global Flows. Territorial Identities. Minneapolis: University o f Minnesota 
Press, 1996. p.348
74 1789-1917
75 Luard. War in International Society, p. 161
76 Brodie. War and Politics, p.3
77 Rothgeb, John M., Jr. Defining Power: Influence and Force in the Contemporary
International System. New York: St Martin’s Press, 1993. p. 153. Bell. “Global 
Communications, Culture, and Values.” p. 209. Also Klare, Michael T., ed. Peace and 
World Security Studies. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, Publishers, 1994. p .lO l, and Toffler, 
Alvin. Powershift: Knowledge. Wealth, and Violence at the Edge o f the 21st Century. New  
York: Bantam Books, 1990. p.331.
78 See especially the ‘Information Revolution’ section o f chapter one; also the ‘Understanding
Paradigm Shift in Context’ section o f the introduction.
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negate the wealth and power available from land alone. The machines of the 
industrial revolution made farming faster, cheaper, and easier, allowing farmers 
to produce more for every square foot of land. With this advantage, 
industrialised agriculture soon eclipsed the competition from manual 
agricultural ventures which, no matter how much land they possessed, were 
unable to rival the quantity and speed of production possible with the aid of 
industrial tools. As a consequence, resource-dependent industry replaced 
agriculture as the chief means of achieving prosperity and a higher standard of 
living, shifting power from those who had land to those who possessed the 
modes of production. Given this industrial age composition of power, the 
importance of land as an objective for warfare became increasingly coloured by 
its capacity to provide needed resources for industrial production.79
The role of resources as an industrial age motivation for war is closely 
related to another martial objective which took on new prominence in the 
industrial age, that of economic gain. While wealth and profit have almost 
always been an aim of war, from Napoleon’s mercantilist blockades to the 
colonial wars that extended into the early twentieth century, economic 
motivations seemed to play a more central role in industrial age war than they 
ever did during the agricultural age.^o Many have refuted the claim that the 
struggle for colonies was driven by expanding industrial capitalism’s desire for 
new markets, offering as supporting evidence the fact that many colonial
7  ^Cf. Rothgeb. Defining Power, p. 153. Also Brown. The Causes and Prevention o f War.
p.31, and Holsti. International Politics. p.401 
80 Van Creveld. Technology and War: From 2000 BC to the Present. New York: Free Press, 
1991. p. 138. Cf. Also Hynes, William G. The Economics o f Empire: Britain. Africa, and 
the New Imperialism. 1870-1895. London: Longman Group, Ltd., 1979. p .l
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possessions actually proved to be a drain on cap i t a l .Yet  despite such lessons 
from hindsight, imperialism remains linked to economic motivations for conflict 
because, at the time, many of the imperialists fighting for imperial expansion 
did so convinced that new colonies promised economic gain as well as prestige 
for the home country controlling the empire.8^  After the end of imperialism, 
wars clearly motivated by economic gain certainly waned, though some 
maintain that a conflict as recent (and as near the information age) as the 1991 
Gulf War was driven by the economic consideration that Kuwait’s oil in Iraq’s 
hands would benefit no one but Saddam H u s s e i n .^ 3
Although a certain dubiousness taints the assertions that direct economic 
gain from warfare can be a motivation for waging industrial age w a r , 4^ is a 
large body of literature which claims that indirect economic improvement is 
very much a central aim of war even in the present day. Dependencia theorists 
like Organski and Kugler, Johan Galtung, and George Modelski have argued 
that the unevenness of industrial development has created a volatile spai'k for 
conflict. They maintain that states, especially foimer colonial possessions of the 
developed world who have been unable to attain the latter’s standard of living,
Hobson, J.A. Imperialism: A Study. London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1902. 
pp.46,48. Morgenthau, Hans. Politics Among Nations: the Struggle for Power and Peace. 
Thompson, Kenneth W., revised. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1985. pp.63-4.
Hynes. The Economics o f Empire, p.7 also Langer. Diplomacy o f Imperialism, p.76.
3^ Spero, Joan E. and Jeffrey A. Hart. The Politics o f International Economic Relations. New  
York: St Martinis Press, 1997. While oil was o f course an important factor in that conflict, 
one cannot ignore the fact that, unchecked, Saddamis invasion o f Kuwait posed a serious 
threat to the balance o f power in tlie already volatile Middle East. It is this threat which 
provides a more plausible explanation for the motivation behind Operation Desert Storm.
4^ Hans Morgenthau, for instance, maintained that, during the late industrial era, only the Boer 
War was motivated primarily by economics. Morgenthau does acknowledge, however, that 
economics did play at least a small role in many late 19th - early 20th century conflicts. 
Morgenthau. Politics Among Nations, p.63
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will turn to war to redress that i n e q u a l i t y  .^ 5 others, like Walt Rostow and Ted 
Robert Gurr, posit that the true threat lies not in the unequal distribution of 
wealth, but in the recognition of that inequality, and the realisation that it need 
not continue. According to this theory, the danger of economically motivated 
conflict arises not from utterly backward states largely unaware of development 
potentials, but from half-developed nations who have progressed far enough to 
be aware that a better standard of living exists, but not yet so far that they have 
achieved such a level of industiialised prosperity for themselves. 8 6  Both 
theories support the assertion that uneven industrial development may spark 
conflicts over economic objectives, wars which aim not for direct profit from 
the fighting, but for evening the global distribution of wealth.
The last of the industrial age’s changes in why war is waged emerged 
during the Cold War period which capped the final phase of that age’s 
evolution. At the opening of the Cold War, industrial age development and 
technology had progressed to the point of producing nucleai' weapons. So 
unfathomable was the destructive potential of these weapons that their existence 
essentially froze the great powers in the status quo established at the end of
85 Levy. “The Causes of War: A  Review of Theories and Evidence.” pp.251-2 Renner,
Michael. Fighting for Survival: Environmental Decline. Social Conflict, and the New Age of 
Insecurity. Worldwatch Environmental Alert Series. New York: W.W. Norton and 
Company, 1996. p.77. See also Organski, A.F.K. World Politics. New York: Knopf, 1968. 
And Organski, A.F.K. and J. Kugler. The War Ledger. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1980. Modelski, George. Long Cycles in World Politics. Seattle: University of 
Washington Press, 1987. Galtung, Johan. A  Structural Theory of Revolutions. Rotterdam, 
1974. Galtung, Johan. Essavs in Peace Research. Copenhagen: Eljers, 1975.
86 Snow, Donald M. Uncivil Wars: International Security and the New Internal Conflicts.
Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996. p.52 Gurr, Ted Robert. Why Men Rebel. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973. Rostow, Walt W. The United States in the 
World Arena. New York: Harper and Row, 1960.
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World War n.87 This circumstance, in combination with the global ‘shrinking’ 
fostered by connective industrial age technologies like air travel and 
automobiles, and by nascent information age technologies like long-distance 
telephony and satellite t e l e v i s i o n , ^ ®  encouraged a new interest in external affairs, 
and in security on a global scale. This shift of interest in turn affected both 
abstract and political motivations for late industrial age war.
On the abstract level, the ideologies of communism and capitalism 
largely replaced the old ideals of justice and honour - and even, to some extent, 
religion - as primary motivators for war.®^  Typical of the industrial age, both 
ideologies represented very secular ideals of life. Furthermore, communism and 
capitalism are themselves products of the industrial age to the extent that they 
focus on making sense of the monetary culture which was born of the industrial 
age’s extensive capacity for surplus production and t r a de . Ka r l  Deutsch ably 
illustrates the power of these two doctrines as motivation for war by explaining 
that communism and capitalism, like any ideologies, provide their subscribers 
with an image of the world that is clear and understandable, as well as 
consonant with their own preconceptions. Communism and capitalism became 
the subject of heated wars over the past half century simply because, “in
87 Cf. Dellums, Ronald V., Rep., US Congress. “Toward the Post-Transition World: New
Strategies for a New Century.” SAIS Review. Winter-Spring 1995: 93-108, Van Creveld. 
The Transformation Of War, p. 10
88 Bankes, Steve, and Carl Builder. “Seizing the Moment: Harnessing the Information
Technologies.” The Information Society. Vol8, 1992: 1-59. p.4 Cf. also Handel, Michael 
I., War. Strategy, and Intelligence. London: Frank Cass, 1989. p. 192.
8^  Brown. The Causes and Prevention of War, p.54 
Cf. Rapoport. The Origins o f Violence, p.98
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politics, national and international, many people have preferred losing power, 
wealth, or life to losing their illusions.”^^
None of the Great Powers, however, were threatened with such a fate, 
yet nearly all were involved in one or more of the many small wars which 
punctuated the Cold War period. This involvement was a product of the Cold 
War’s redefinition of national security to include external political interests. In 
the burgeoning global village of the late industrial age, security of one’s own 
territory and way of life satisfied few of the major military powers. Given both 
the nuclear stalemate and the tension between Communism and Capitalism, 
most of the industrialised states woiried less about invasion than about the 
encroachment of the enemy’s ideology from abroad and the threat it posed to 
their ways of life.^  ^ As a result many of the industrialised players in the bi-polar 
contest redefined their political interests in the security and integrity of their 
own states in terms of the stability of the world order, and the distribution of 
belief in one ideology or another. Ideology thus motivated war during the late 
industrial age not only as an abstract, but also as a concrete political threat to 
security.
Why Wage War in the Information Age?
To understand how these historical objectives will change in the 
information age one must first recognise one simple commonality: each of the 
objectives listed above is inexorably connected to the desire for power. This 
connection is most obvious in the political motivations for war like the quest for 
land or resources, since each of these has constituted the primary currency of
Deutsch, Karl W. The Analysis o f International Relations. 3rd edition. Englewood Cliffs, 
NJ: Prentice Hall, 1988. p.55
249
power in its age. The relationship between power and abstract motivations for 
war is slightly more difficult to discern, but no less important. While most of 
the abstract ideals which have motivated war throughout history have not, like 
land, resources, or even prestige, directly contributed to the power of those 
fighting for them, power is requisite both to achieve these goals and to sustain 
them.93 Implicit in the characterisation of ideals as motivations for war is the 
understanding that these goals - whether the spreading of a religious faith or the 
imposition of a just punishment, the unification of national peoples or the 
containment of an inimical ideology - can only prevail over the resistance of 
others, because otherwise there would be no need for the wai'. In order to defeat 
such resistance, one must by definition have access to some form of power, 
because power, in its simplest form, is understood as the ability to influence 
others to do that which they would not otherwise do . ^ 4  Hence, power, as a 
means rather than an end, is just as critical to the achievement of abstract 
martial objectives as it is to that of more obviously political aims.
To the extent that war in the information age will continue to be waged 
with the aim of fulfilling objectives which cannot otherwise be attained, 
information age war will follow precedents set by previous eras of warmaking. 
War, the final aititer, will remain the ultimate manifestation of power, 
employed because only its forceful judgement can compel an actor to concede
Luard. War in International Society, p. 172, Cf. also Aron. The Great Debate, p.53 
3^ Cf. Leyy. iThe Causes of War: A Reyiew o f Theories and Eyidence.î p.224 
^4 Robert Dahl in Nye, Joseph S. Bound to Lead: the Changing Nature o f American Power. 
New York: Basic Books, 1991. p.26. Cf. Hans Morgenthau distinguishes power from 
influence by the fact that the former implies only the capacity to persuade, while the latter 
implies the ability to compel another by means o f promised benefits or threatened 
disadyantages. Morgenthau. Politics Among Nations, p. 34 also Rothgeb. Defining Power, 
p. 19, Knorr, Klaus. Military Power and Potential. Lexington, MA: DC Heath and Co.,
1970. p.3
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that which it does not wish to concede. Power is thus, in the information age as 
for time immemorial, the foundation and the most elemental aim of wai . ^ 5  
What the information age changes, of course, is the nature of that power. This 
is the key to the shifts both in why information age war may be waged, and in 
why war may be waged in the information age.
As chapter one d e t a i l s , ^ ^  the current changes in the recipe for power are 
products of the information revolution and its incorporation into information 
age society. While many of the ingredients of power will remain the same in 
the coming age, the ratio of their importance is likely to shift c o n s i d e r a b l y ^ ^  
information becomes the pre-eminent component in the power equation.
Though rare, this dramatic shift is not without precedent. In fact, information 
will likely supersede the importance of industrial resources just as the latter 
replaced the primacy of land in the last great societal revolution at the dawn of 
the industrial age. Michael Howard traces this earlier shift, noting that, “[fjrom 
the time of Thucydides until that of Louis XIV there was basically only one 
source of political and military power - control of territory, with all the 
resources in wealth and manpower that this provided.” The advent of the 
industrial age, however, began a transformation in the land-based resources 
society deemed important: with the rise of manufacturing, extractable minerals, 
metals, and fossil fuel sources replaced agricultural wealth and manpower as 
land’s most critical assets. This, Howard notes, reflected a more general shift in 
the character of power from an agricultural, land-based construct to one more 
reliant on industry and natural resources. The extent of territory in one’s
5^ Blainey. The Causes o f War, p. 109, 196.16
6^ See the ‘Information Revolution’ section o f chapter one in particular.
7^ Levi. The Coming End o f War. p.90
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possession did remain important, though because industrial age tools conferred 
a far greater capacity of production per unit of land, power calculations became 
increasingly concerned not with acreage, but with “the effectiveness with which 
the resources of that territory could be e x p l o i t e d . ” ^^ As industry came to match 
and exceed the advantages possible from agriculture alone, it increasingly 
replaced the latter as the critical source of influence in the power equation.
Information has begun to eclipse the advantages of industrial resources 
in much the same way, enabling a level of efficiency which, like the industrial 
tools before it, will allow enteiprises to improve the quantity and quality of 
output possible per each unit of input. Land and resources, though 
proportionately less important, will remain part of the power equation, but their 
roles will likely be tempered by a decreased emphasis on size resulting from 
information power’s hallmark capacity to ‘do more with less.’^^  This capability 
arises from the fact that leveraged information can create efficiency: from the 
employment of simulators to reduce the trial and error of prototype development 
to the use of computer networks to track inventories and eliminate the need for 
surplus stockpiles, to the application of computer databases to chait consumer 
preferences and target market strategies, information efficiency prevents the 
waste of resources, time, and effort, thus maximising the utility of all the other 
components of power.
Since wai* in any age revolves around power as both a means to an end 
and, to a certain extent, an end in itself, the information age’s changes in the 
composition of power will presumably affect both why certain types of wai’ are
8^ Howard. The Causes o f Wars, p. 16 
See p.225
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waged, and what their aims are. The previous section has already illustrated 
that information age changes in the military content of power may alter how 
influence is wielded in war, affecting the tactical, operational, and strategic 
objectives of warfighting. This section will complete the puzzle by examining 
how information age changes, by changing power in general, may affect the 
purposes for which influence is wielded, the political and abstract motivations 
for war.
Information Age Motivations for War
The effect of these power shifts on the motivations for war should be
most readily apparent in the concrete political objectives for information age 
war, those that are most directly connected to the quest for power. This should 
come as no surprise, as land and resources, the central political motivations for 
war in the agricultural and industrial ages, were both closely linked to the 
composition of power in each age. One might, therefore, logically predict that 
information (as the principal component of information age power) should 
become not only a crucial tool of lAW, but also a vital aim of war in the 
information age. A war fought purely over information, of course, has yet to 
occur - and such a contest will be difficult to imagine or comprehend until it 
does actually occur - but the historical precedent of the agricultural and 
industrial ages seems to indicate that such a war should be expected, at least 
after the passage of several decades has allowed the information age to mature 
more fully.
Interestingly, even though the eventuality of waging war over 
information remains difficult to envision, signs have already begun to emerge 
that territory, whether in its guise as a source of agricultural wealth or as a
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source of industrial resources, may be slowly losing its significance as a goal for 
war. Since the great reordering of territory at the end of the two World Wars, 
borders have become increasingly s a c r o s a n c t , and territorial conquest has 
often been feasible only by those who could claim some previous right to the 
land. Furthermore, throughout the Cold War neither bloc claimed land or 
resources as their primary aim in the bipolai' competition;io^ instead the declared 
goal in the most significant conflict of the past half century was to convert the 
world to the abstract ideology espoused by one side or the other. 103 These are 
telling signs that, as the industrial age has waned, so also has the motivation to 
wage war over that age’s most fundamental vehicle of power.
With the declining importance of land as a motivation for war, there may 
emerge a gap in the political objectives for war in the information age. 
Information, succeeding as it does the role of land and resources in the 
composition of power, seems at first tailored to fill their role as the predominant 
political objective in war as well. The very nature of information, however, 
exhorts caution in assigning such a status to the primary component of 
information age power. While information will certainly be the key to 
information age influence, unlike its land-based predecessors information is an 
intangible commodity. It cannot, therefore, be meaningfully ‘won.’ Moreover,
100 Yan Creveld. The Transformation O f War, p. 154 Even where, as in Africa, borders were 
highly arbitrai y at the outset.
101 c f .  The historic ai'guments over the establishment of a Palestinian state. Other new borders 
that have recently appeared in the former Soviet Union and the Balkans, for instance, have 
similarly been justified through historical, national, or ethnic claims to legitimacy.
This is not to say that neither land nor resources were at stake in the skirmishes of the Cold 
War, but rather that they were rarely aiticulated as the principal end o f a conflict. Indeed, in 
many cases (Vietnam, for example), the conquest o f territory was seen to be a victory for 
ideology, rather than a source of power or wealth.
Aion. The Great Debate, p.53
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as illustrated in chapter four,^04 information is also non-linear, and as such is 
infinitely shareable. The same piece of information can be leveraged multiple 
times, for a multitude of purposes, by many different users, without depleting its 
value. Though military force can deprive an opponent of access to certain 
information (such as satellite imagery, or networked financial data), nothing can 
erase his past knowledge of that contested information. Furthermore, even if an 
attacking force wins access to infoimation for itself, in many cases (for instance 
the theft of information or infoimation systems used to streamline industrial 
production, or the destruction of military training and planning simulators) the 
defeated enemy will retain the knowledge to rebuild or otherwise restore their 
own a c c e s s . 9^5 How, and more importantly, why one would go to war to fight 
for such a commodity is therefore very difficult to fathom. The challenge of 
conceiving how wars can usefully be fought over information logically raises 
doubts over whether information will, in fact, replace territory’s role as an 
objective for war, despite the fact that information has already replaced it 
among the leading components of power.
If the most important component of information age power cannot be 
won in battle, one might consider the happy possibility that the information age 
could see a radical decrease in the incidence of war. And indeed, rational 
choice calculations based on the amorphous nature of infoimation power point 
to the conclusion that the coming era might witness far fewer wars fought with 
the intent of augmenting the victor’s concrete supply of power. Before one even
6^4 See chapter foui', note 46, in ‘Strategic Civilian Tools in lA W .’ Cf. also chapter six’s section 
on the widening of small and non-state actors.
This argument refers, o f course, to the strategic, not the tactical level o f war. In the case of 
the latter, gaining information superiority and depriving the enemy of information access at 
critical moments - such as during a troop advance or air strike - certainly may prove decisive.
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begins to dream of world peace, however, it must be remembered that the aims 
of war do not encompass only the direct aggrandisement of one’s power. While 
politically motivated wars fought explicitly to win power seem - due to the 
nature of information age power - likely to become more difficult to fight and 
more rarely fought, wars waged to achieve more abstract objectives are unlikely 
to become any less prevalent and, indeed, may become more so in the 
information age.
Two separ ate sets of factors could contribute to a higher incidence of 
war over abstract ends (as opposed to concrete political goals) in the coming 
era. These factors, like the changes in information age power, stem less from 
the information age’s influence on war, than from its influence on the context of 
war. The information age’s changes in the abstract motivations for war should 
result primarily from the kind of actors - and the number of actors - empowered 
to wage war in the information age, and from the highly connected nature of the 
information age international system. Interestingly, neither results from a direct 
change in war’s abstract aims themselves. Many of the abstract motivations 
behind why war will be waged in the information age should, in fact, remain 
essentially unchanged. The maturation of the information age should have little 
effect on the lure of such time-honoured ideals as religion, nationalism, prestige, 
liberty, or self-preservation as goals for war. Nor will the emergence of lAW 
greatly influence new abshacts, like the quests to preserve the global 
environment or to enforce universal human rights, which some scholars posit 
may become motivations for future wars.^^ G other ideals will lose their status as
9^6 Klare. Peace and World Security Studies, p. 100; also Dewitt, David, David Haglund, and 
John Kirton, eds. Building a New Global Order: Emerging Trends in International Securitv. 
Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1993. p .l92
256
ends of war due to changes unrelated to the information age. The fierce 
motivation of ideological struggle, for instance, has paled drastically since the 
end of the Cold War contest between the champions of Capitalism and 
C o m m u n i s m .  107 The information age, then, will not change why war is waged 
by directly introducing new ends for war.
Changes in why war will be waged in the information age may, 
however, result from information age shifts in the kinds of actors motivated to 
wage war for the relevant objectives, and from lAW’s affect on whether or not 
they are empowered to do so. In this, information age war’s changes in the 
abstract motivations for war are closely connected to the fourth criterion of the 
paradigm shift, the information age war form’s changes in who will wage war.
If, as the next chapter argues, new actors become more viable participants on the 
stage of full-scale war, they will add an element of uncertainty to warfare in the 
information age. While small states and non-state actors seem unlikely to 
introduce wholly new aims for war, they will quite probably use new 
calculations for determining the expediency of waging war. For instance, 
recently empowered information age military actors may have unaccustomed 
triggers for starting war: with less to lose, small actors, especially dispersed 
non-states, may be harder to deter and perhaps more apt to resort to high-risk 
wars with odds of success lower than those that have usually tempted traditional 
state actors to launch campaigns of organised v i o l e n c e . This introduction of a
®^7 Brown. The Causes and Prevention o f War, p.55 Cf. also Snow. Uncivil Wars, p.55. In 
place of this ideological objective, a newly predominant emphasis on the spread o f world 
democracy and freedom has emerged. US Congress, Office o f Technology Assessment. 
American Militarv Power: Future Needs. Future Choices - Background Paper. OTA-BP- 
ISC-80. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, October 1991. p.3 
Morton, Oliver. iThe Information Advantage: Defence Technology Survey.! Economist. 
v335, 10 Jun 95: 8-17. p .l8
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new calculation for the cost-benefit returns of warfare may render objectives 
like universal human rights or mandatory environmental protection (which 
heretofore have been considered largely hypothetical goals for war because their 
costs are too high for slim chances of success^^^) reasonable war-aims in the 
view of the new actors. Likewise, these actors may have different pain- 
thresholds for ending war, and may be willing to pay a much greater cost to 
achieve their objectives than previous combatants have deemed rational. This is 
especially probable in the case of groups fighting to preserve their existence (or 
assert their right to exist) either as states or as legitimate sub-state collectives. 
Such a pursuit could potentially become more common in pace with lAW’s 
predicted empowerment of traditionally marginalised actors.
The information age expansion of viable military actors may also affect 
the incidence of war because of the particular aims which motivate the new 
actors. Just as small and non-state actors are the most probable source of threat 
in the information age,i^  ^ the sorts of goals that these actors fight over are liable 
to be the most prevalent sparks for future wai's. Scholars have identified certain 
pressures likely to have a growing shaie in the motivation of war.^’  ^ Among 
these are included; the globalisation of the market economy, with all of its 
implications for the uneven spread of development and the widening of the gap 
between the world’s rich and poor; the intensification of religious and ethnic
^^ 9 Particularly acute in the case of human rights since the aggressor would normally be fighting 
for benefits which would not directly accrue to him.
Van Creveld. The Transformation Of War, p. 148 
 ^Kraus, George P., Comdr., USN (Ret); Senior Fellow, SAIC. Interview with the author. 16 
December 1996., See chapter six, ‘On Balance, Who Can Wage lAW ?’
Builder, Carl. iToward a Theory o f Aerospace Power for a More Disorderly World.! Rand, 
Project Air Force Briefing, 5 February 1997. p. 10, Klare. Peace and World Security 
Studies, p .100-101. Lider. On the Nature o f War, p.69, Binnendijk, Hans, ed. Strategic 
Assessment 1995. Washington, DC: National Defense University World Wide Web page, 
1995. ch. 14, p .l
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tensions, often coincident with demands for national self-determination; and the 
looming environmental and population crises, with all the potential for conflict 
inherent in insupportable population growth, resource scarcity, and mass 
refugee migrations. "3 All of these pressures are more likely adversely to affect 
marginalised small state and non-state actors who do not possess the monetary 
or organisational resources to deflect or manage the impact of such pressures in 
the same way that more advanced states c a n . ^^ 4 Although predicting how these 
actors will react to such pressures is beyond the scope of this study, given their 
predicted empowerment, one can reasonably argue that the stresses particularly 
affecting small states and non-states deserve heightened attention as potential 
motivators of war in the information age.
Additionally, in considering what may motivate empowered small actors 
to wage lAW, one must also recognise the possibility that these actors will 
simply seek further aggrandisement of newly acquired power. While the 
previous pages have already dismissed as unfeasible the potential for war over 
the conquest of infoimation, this may not be the only source of power actors 
will seek through information age war. The spread of the information age 
society, as previously noted,ii5 will proceed gradually and unevenly. As a 
consequence, actors who have adopted enough of infoimation age technologies 
and methodologies plausibly to wage lAW may still have not advanced far 
enough along the path to information age society to have abandoned industrial 
age conceptions of grandeur through territorial conquest. As a result, territory
^^ 3 Klare. Peace and World Securitv Studies, p.100-101
*^4 Renner. Fighting for Survival, p.55
^^ 5 See ‘The Information Revolution,’ chapter one.
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and resources may still be objectives for information age war, though not 
actually information age objectives for war.
Lastly, in examining the impact of new actors on the whys of 
information age war, one should consider the popular apprehension that the 
information age’s numerical increase in martial actors may itself be a cause of 
wai'. Following the proverbial adage ‘too many cooks spoil the soup,’ many 
expect that more actors capable of waging full-scale wai' could lead to more 
i n s t a b i l i t y .  1 1 6  Theorists raised this concern early in the nuclear age when, at the 
height of war’s irrationality, many worried that the risk of an actor making an 
irrational decision or even starting an accidental war was multiplied by the 
number of actors in possession of nuclear weapons.H7 In the information age, 
as the preceding paragraphs have demonstrated, the influx of unaccustomed new 
actors should, according to some theories,H8 lead to still more complexity and 
uncertainty in the international system, and a larger set of stresses liable to spark 
war. This uncertainty (and the consequent raised probability of war) may, 
however, be mitigated by the interdependence of the complex information age 
international system. Several scholars have proposed that an expanded number 
of actors in the system might actually lead to greater stability, and a decline in 
the use of force to settle disputes.ii^ in fact, Quincy Wright has maintained that 
the probability of wai' may actually decrease in inverse proportion to the number 
of independent political organisations in the international system, due to the fact 
that the system’s increased number of interactions allows more opportunity for
 ^^ 6 Levy. iThe Causes of War: A Review of Theories and Evidence.! p.214, 234. 
^^ 7 Aron. The Great Debate, p.63
118 Levy. iThe Causes o f War: A Review o f Theories and Evidence.! p. 234.
^^ 9 Levi. The Coming End of War. p.71.
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tensions to be expressed peacefullyd^o Like many of the future effects of 
information age war, then, the ultimate impact of lAW’s multiplication of the 
viable militaiy actors in the international system is impossible to predict with 
any real certainty until it can actually be observed. A second set of factors may 
also influence why war will be waged in the information age; these are related 
not to the number of actors in the information age international system, but 
rather to the highly connected nature of that system. Through its facilitation of 
information dissemination, the information age may add two further changes to 
the whys of infoimation age war. Firstly, the wide reach of information in the 
information age could potentially encourage actors’ to wage war by encouraging 
their hopes for success in war. Nationalists, religious fundamentalists, non-state 
actors with global agendas like protecting the environment, and others whose 
organisations have been augmented and expanded by the internet and other 
communications technologies will not only be empowered on the military level 
to wage war for their ideals, but might be spurred on to wage that war by a 
conviction, bom of information age connectivity, that they are justified in that 
pursuit. Small, and often dispersed, actors from the Zapatista rebels and left- 
wing environmentalists, to right-wing white supremacists and religious 
terrorists have garnered international attention, support, and in some cases, 
membership through their increasingly prominent presence on the internet.
This growing support and participation may in the future sponsor the belief that 
a disaffected actor is almost democratically entitled to its goals by the sheer
120 Wright, Quincy. A  Study of War. Vol2. Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 1942.
p. 1275 Blainey. The Causes o f War, p. 110 
3^1 See chapter 4, ‘Targeting Civilian Information’ and chapter one, ‘Man.’
261
force of numbers in its favour. Such an optimism could prove to be a heady 
impetus for embarking on an infoimation age war.
Secondly, the connectivity of the information age international system 
may significantly facilitate the recognition of relative deprivation, a 
phenomenon which has already been identified as a potential motivation for 
w a r .  The dispersion of information via modem ITs may foster resentment 
among the disadvantaged to the extent that they are increasingly confronted 
with what they lack. The technologies which allow disadvantaged actors to 
observe and recognise what they lack will not, however, present any significant 
prospect of improving their development in the short run. This would leave 
these actors with the awareness of their disadvantage, but without any ready 
capacity to address their situation peacefully. The sense of helplessness and 
resentment this situation may foster is, moreover, likely to be further intensified 
by the fact that many of the world’s poorer nations will skip entire phases of 
industrial development in their race to catch up to the ‘first w o r l d , ’123 a jump 
which will leave many particularly ill-equipped to deal with the information 
age. Together, these phenomena can only exacerbate the economic motivation 
identified for industrial age war, wherein the real danger of violence lies in 
actors’ recognition of relative deprivation, rather than in deprivation i t s e l f . ^ 2 4  
Information age connectivity may bring that recognition faster, closer to home, 
and more vividly, further fanning the flames of resentment that already 
characterise the gap between the world’s rich and poor.
2^2 See above, p.247
2^3 Cf. Snow. Uncivil Wars, p.57. Parts of Indonesia, for example, went from having no phone 
service to regular use o f cellular phones, completely skipping the phase o f land-line 
telephony.
2^4 Rothgeb. Defining Power. p,52
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Conclusion
Having established how information age war is likely to change the 
‘why’ of warfare - both on the level of why information age war will be waged, 
and why war will be waged in the information age - it is now possible to assess 
the significance of those changes, and their contribution to the argument for 
paradigm shift. In the final analysis, the infoimation age’s shifts both in the 
reasons people choose war as a means to an end and in the motivations for 
which people go to wai* do not challenge the established understanding of 
warfare. As with its changes in the how and what of war, information age wai*’s 
changes to the why of war still fall well within the explanatory power of the 
current military paradigm.
The infoimation age’s changes in why people wage war do not fulfil the 
third criterion of paradigm shift primarily because they do not introduce 
fundamental alterations to the principles of warfare. In the case of why 
information age war will be waged, the preceding pages have illustrated that the 
reasons people will choose to wage war as a solution to their disputes are, on the 
most basic level, no different from the reasons given for war throughout history. 
The information age war form, like all past forms of war, will continue to be 
waged because its extremes of force constitute the final arbiter of dispute and 
conflict; this fact is a strong signal that lAW will in essence conform to the 
established models for explaining war.
The chapter has shown that the war form is, however, more likely to 
introduce noteworthy changes with respect to more superficial aspects of the 
why of war, namely, the reasons why people may choose to wage this 
information age form of war in particular. lAW’s introduction of a new 
efficient dimension to the extremes of warfare - a product of the war foim’s
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reliance on the speedy, accurate pace made possible through the concerted 
leveraging of information - may indeed add new answers to the question ‘why 
wage war?’ by rendering information age wai*, rather than other forms of war, 
the best available path to military victory in some cases. However, although 
these shifts in the reasons for waging war are noteworthy for their influence on 
the choice to wage lAW, they do not require new models for explaining war 
because they alter only the reasons why a specific form of war is waged, not, 
more fundamentally, the reasons why war itself is waged.
In the case of why war - in any form - will be waged in the information 
age, the motivations behind why people will wage war in the information age 
aie also likely to remain largely unchanged in principle. The greatest potential 
for change in this aspect of the ‘why’ of war, according to the pattern of past 
paradigm shifts, lies in the likelihood that shifts in the composition of power 
will introduce parallel shifts in the main aim of w a r .  *2 5  Yet the information age 
renders information, an intangible, non-linear, infinitely exchangeable 
commodity, the primary component of the information age power equation. 
Since this commodity cannot be meaningfully won in battle, it very obviously 
cannot become the primary aim of the new war form. Thus, despite widespread 
societal changes in the role and influence of information, information age war 
will introduce no profoundly new political objective for the violent conflicts of 
the future.
Other likely aims of information age war, moreover, also show little sign 
of significant change as a result of information age influences. Neither the 
influence of information age war nor the information age itself seem likely to
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resolve, nullify, or otherwise alter any of the more abstract issues over which 
people wage war. Consequently, wars in the near future will undoubtedly 
continue to be motivated by religion, by nationalism, by the quests for influence 
and wealth, and by the ubiquitous desire for freedom and autonomy, among 
other time-honoured war aims. However, while these motivations are 
themselves unlikely to change (at least, as a direct result of information age 
influences), their role in sparking wars may shift indirectly as a result of 
information age changes in who can wage war. The next chapter will argue that 
information age war is likely to alter the balance of relative military power 
between large state actors and small- and non-state actors. If this prediction is 
fulfilled, such a shift may affect the ‘why’ of war to the extent that different 
actors choose to wage war for different reasons, and may have different 
calculations of the costs and benefits of waif are. New actors on the stage of 
full-scale war may therefore have different triggers for beginning and ending a 
war, if not necessarily different aims for the war itself. This shift may be both 
significant and dangerous to the extent that it could alter the incidence of war, 
but because it does not affect the basic motivations for waging war, information 
age changes on the level of why war will be waged in the information age, like 
those on the level of why information age war in particular will be waged, 
should not require a new paradigm for explaining warfare.
125 The waning importance of land as a goal for war after the agricultural age is a primary 
example o f this phenomenon.
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Chapter 6
DRAMATIS P E R S O N A E :
Who Can Wage Information Age War?
The fourth, and final, criterion of paradigm shift deals with the question 
of who can wage infoimation age war. This last barometer of the information 
age’s effect on war is the one criterion which exhibits some genuine potential 
for introducing profound changes in the conventional understanding of wai*. 
Those changes, however, are unlikely to involve any surprisingly new answers 
to the question ‘who can wage war?.’ Rather, lAW’s influence on the cast of 
actors capable of waging full-scale war will more likely manifest itself in the 
form of shifts that affect the various actors’ capability for war in the information 
age. The actors in question fall primarily into two general categories: state 
actors, and lesser- and non-state actors. ^ Perhaps not surprisingly, the projected 
shifts in the military standing of these two sets of actors seem to follow the 
same pattern as that identified in chapter one to describe the information age’s 
influence on man and the state: both state and lesser- and non-state actors are 
likely to face a paradoxical widening and weakening of their roles in waging 
war. The net effect of these contradictory influences should alter state and 
lesser- and non-state actors’ capacity to wage wai* both relative to their own
 ^ The former should be understood here mainly as traditional ‘great power’ states. Lesser state 
actors should be understood to be states that boast less than peer capability to compete 
militarily with the great powers. Typically less developed and comparatively recently 
invested with statehood, these states are not necessarily small in terms of territory, 
population, or resource base. They are, however, small in terms of ‘power’ (usually 
measured militarily, but lesser states often have small economic power as well). Primarily 
for this reason, the current chapter examines lesser-state actors and non-state actors 
concuiTently, as one set o f actors, since both occupy a disadvantaged position vis à vis great 
power states and traditional measurements o f power. While these two actors’ differing 
sovereign status does pose a challenge for this concurrent approach, the overlapping effects 
of lAW  on both lesser- and non-state actors seems to outweigh the disadvantages of 
examining the two together. In recognition o f these disadvantages, however, lA W ’s 
differing implications for non-sovereign actors in particular will be examined later in the 
chapter.
previous capacity for war, and relative to each other’s capacity. The resulting 
balance will define who can wage information age war, as well as indicate the 
actors’ positions of relative advantage in the waging of that contest.
This chapter will examine the widening and weakening influences of 
lAW on both state and lesser- and non-state actors as a step towards calculating 
the balance of military advantage between these two sets of actors, and thus 
toward establishing how the information age may influence their absolute and 
relative capacities for waging war. This calculation should determine the extent 
and significance of information age war’s changes in who can wage war, and 
indicate whether these changes challenge the current understanding of war 
sufficiently to fulfil the fourth and final criterion of military paradigm shift.
The State
The investigation into who will wage information age war begins with 
state actors, because scholai's of warfare have also traditionally chosen states as 
their point of focus. In fact, throughout the three and a half centuries of the 
Westphalian state system’s existence, war and the state have been inextricably 
intertwined in western scholarly literature. Writers on the subject of warfare 
have viewed the relationship between the two to be so close that they have more 
often than not defined one in terms of the other. For instance, war is most 
typically described as “an act of force taking place between sovereign states.”  ^
The phenomenon has even been more narrowly characterised as a violent
2 Van Creveld, Martin. Technologv and War: From 2000 BC to the Present. N ew York: Free 
Press, 1991. p.285
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contest designed to win “control of a state’s powers, its actions, or its assets. 
Similarly, a state, according to Max Weber, is “a human community that 
(successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within 
a given tenitory.”'^  From the origins of the modern state system to the present 
day, most scholars of war have deemed states to be the only kind of actor under 
whose aegis humanity could and should wage war.^
This is not to say, of course, that no actors besides states have waged 
war throughout the reign of the modem state system. On the contrary, 
insurgents, guerrillas, revolutionaries, and other ‘non-state actors’ have been 
waging war longer than the state system has existed, and they certainly did not 
stop with the inception of the state and its declared monopoly over the 
legitimate making of war. Over the past 350 years, however, formal attempts to 
answer the question ‘who will wage war’ have overwhelmingly focused on state 
actors, to the exclusion of all others.^ This bias has led to the accumulation of a
3 Libicki, Martin C. “What is Information Age War?” Washington, DC: National Defense 
University Press, 1995. p. I
Brown, Seyom. The Causes and Prevention o f War. New York; St Mar tin's Press, 1994. p.40 
- from Weber 1946.
 ^Van Creveld. Technologv and War, p.285
 ^This is particularly true o f Western writers before World War II, but the trend has extended 
throughout the Cold War. However, the rash o f insurgencies and other non-state military 
conflicts which dotted the Cold War years have, in recent decades, sparked considerable 
interest in the field o f low-intensity conflict, a war form most typically involving non-state 
actors. Apt examples o f this interest include Van Creveld. The Transformation of War.
Coll, Albert R., James S. Ord, and Stephen A. Rose, eds. Legal and Moral Constraints on 
Low-Intensitv Conflict. Newport, RI: Naval War College, 1995. Hoffman, Bruce and 
Jennifer Taw. Defense Policv and Low-Intensity Conflict: the Development o f Britain’s 
“Small Wars” Doctrine During the 195Q’s. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1991. Snow, Donald 
M. Uncivil Wars: International Securitv and the New Internal Conflicts. Boulder: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 1996. For examples o f the more state-centric view o f war, cf. the 
literature on the causes of war, which until recently has overwhelmingly emphasised the 
character o f states and their regimes, as well states’ access to resources as primary causes of 
war. This literature includes such recent publications as: Seabury, Paul, and Angelo 
Codevilla. War: Ends and Means. New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1989. p.41, also Brown. 
The Causes and Prevention o f War. Blainey, Geoffrey. The Causes o f War. New York:
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profuse quantity of information regaining the state’s role in waging war, a 
foundation that makes state actors not only a logical starting point for the 
investigation into who will wage information age war, but also an easier one.
Widening
Information age war’s potential to widen the state’s position in warfare 
derives primarily from the centuries of experience that state actors have 
accumulated in waging war, and from the well-established infrastructures and 
institutions that states have tailored over years of seeking the best possible fit 
for efficient military operation. As the following section argues, this body of 
tradition might perhaps impede the innovation integral to the development of an 
information age military force.^ The present section will attempt to 
demonstrate, however, that the potential negative aspects of experience may in 
many cases be outweighed by the benefits derived from constructively 
employing that commodity towards the making of reasoned choices for 
progiess. If states can leverage their experience to make informed decisions 
about change, rather than allowing tradition to stand in the way of progress, that 
experience could serve to widen state actors’ role in war by facilitating their 
efforts to insure the optimal functioning of military activity.
Moreover, the particular changes information age war is predicted to 
introduce in the content of war might actually increase the value of experience, 
because constructively employed experience could actively foster the efficiency 
believed to be decisive to the information age war form. Consider the fact that
Free Press, 1988. 3ed. and Howard, Michael. The Causes o f Wars, and Other Essavs. 
Cambridge, MA: Hai vard University Press, 1983.
 ^See ‘Weakening’ under the State heading, beginning p.282
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States have honed their practices of strategic planning, of intelligence 
production, and of tactical training, preparation, and implementation through 
countless trial-and-error lessons conducted over decades of involvement in 
warfighting. With this background, soldiers in established state forces should 
be better able to assess situations and make decisions quickly, and will be more 
likely to have the tools they need to act on these decisions where and when they 
need them.^ For example, a matter as simple as an established doctrinal 
protocol, which can guide conduct in a situation such as an unexpected contact 
with the enemy, might sufficiently reduce uncertainty to give experienced 
soldiers an edge in reaction time and thus, perhaps, an advantage in such a 
confrontation. This is one of several ways in which experience may enable 
military forces to take greater advantage of the efficiency that integrated 
information makes available to them. While this capacity for quick, informed 
action has always been important, it has heightened significance in the 
information age, where the quality of action is crucial to a war form that relies 
on fast, precise strikes to overcome an enemy.
States! long experience with war should aid their capacity for efficient 
military action most noticeably by providing them with a substantial foundation 
upon which to expand. Established military powers in particular should be able
This, o f course, is not always true. Russian state military troops, for example, were often not 
even equipped with enough batteries to power their radios during Russia’s conflict with the 
Chechens. Herrera, Geoffrey L. “New Information Technologies and the Future o f State 
Security.” Monterey, CA: Proceedings o f the Security Studies Conference on Revolutions in 
Military Affairs, Naval Post-graduate School, August 1996. However, experience does 
prove advantageous often enough that Dunnigan and Bay include experience, along with 
military tradition and efficiency, among the intangible factors which contribute to an actor’s 
military power. Dunnigan, James F. and Austin Bay. A Quick and Dirtv Guide to War: 
Briefings on Present and Potential Wars. New York; William Morrow and Co., Inc., 1985. 
p.379
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to build many information age military capabilities upon institutions and 
infrastructures that are already in place.^ Physical infrastructures like secure 
power grids, intangible infrastructures like schemes and preparations for 
mobilisation, official institutions like organisations that co-ordinate combined 
military operations or regulate internal military order, and unofficial institutions 
like bodies of military tradition and databases of trial-and-error lessons all 
provide a groundwork which should allow established military forces to 
concentrate more on the business of providing security than on developing the 
accoutrements of this business. In addition, although the increasing un­
wieldiness of attritional warfare may greatly reduce the importance of weapons 
and platforms stockpiles held by states, ëstockpilesi of established systems 
designed for the organised dissemination of information - from training facilities 
and received doctnne^o to command and control apparati and secure telephone 
networks - could put states a step ahead on the path to leveraging information 
for military advantage. Systems, institutions, and assumptions such as these, 
which have already been tested and adjusted in war (regardless of which war 
form), should provide an edge simply because they are more likely to function 
with the speed and accuracy necessary for the efficient pace of information age
war.
The efficiency that such experience encourages is most obvious in the 
realm of intelligence, one of the potentially most pivotal components of lAW.
 ^As the following section details, this foundation can also be a distinctly negative influence in 
cases where it deters complacent actors from adopting needed changes. See p.282ff 
Even states that have not begun to consider I AW doctrine will benefit from the fact that they 
have a familiar doctrine system, and that their soldiers are accustomed to leaining and 
following doctrine to integrate roles within or among military forces.
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In intelligence the state will perhaps accrue its greatest advantages from 
embedded institutions, practices, and experience, since success in information 
age war (even more obviously than in past forms of war, because of lAW’s 
emphasis on precision) hinges not simply on intelligence, but on good 
intelligence. As one US military intelligence officer avers, “precision weapons 
need precision intelligence.”^^ If a military force is to depend on its ability to 
strike quickly and accurately as its primary means of defeating an enemy, then 
its intelligence must transcend ‘adequate’ to be thorough, detailed, and complex, 
as well as fast,^  ^ states have heretofore composed by far the majority of actors 
with access to the resources (both capital and labour) necessary for building an 
intelligence community which is capable of such a p roduct.H ence the actors 
with experience in producing this high level of intelligence will predominantly 
be state actors.
The benefits states may accrue from their experience in intelligence 
production are evident in each of the three steps in the intelligence process, from 
acquisition to analysis to dissemination and a p p l i c a t i o n .  the acquisition, or 
collection, phase, priority is increasingly being placed on imint (imagery
Campen. The First Information War, p.53
Mayfield, Terry; Senior Fellow, IDA, Interview with the author. 17 December 1996.
Toffler, Alvin. Powershift: Knowledge. Wealth, and Violence at the Edge o f the 21st 
Centurv. New York: Bantam Books, 1990. p.312 
1^  This is not to say that states are the only actors with experience in intelligence, nor that they 
necessarily have the best intelligence. Indeed, many covert organisations like terrorist 
groups and international organised crime gangs depend for their existence on the quality of 
their intelligence. As the following pages will argue, however, state actors stand to gain 
greater benefits from their experience in intelligence (though not necessarily from 
intelligence per se!) simply because states’ experience is longer.
Handel. War. Stratesv. and Intelligence. p.208
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intelligence) and humint (human intelligence)^^ Imint, which relies on 
satellites, surveillance aircraft, and other forms of sophisticated aerospace 
reconnaissance, carries obvious advantages for state actors with large budgets, 
established research communities, and stable organisational infrastructure.
Imint systems are expensive to build and expensive to deploy, especially in the 
instances where they must first be launched into space. They require long­
term investments in research and development, as well as in converting 
prototype to production. As chapter four noted, the information revolution’s 
explosion of information technologies may deflate some of the state’s advantage 
in procurement and in research and development by rendering many 
traditionally military technologies - like surveillance equipment - publicly 
available at an unprecedented level of sophistication and affordability. Such 
devices, however, are unlikely soon to compete as technological peers with 
military-developed systems like JSTARS (the Joint Surveillance and Target 
Attack Radar System). The crown jewel of US military imint, JSTARS can
Bondanella, J., E.M. Cesai', Jr., P.D. Allen, et al. Estimating The Aim v’s Intelligence 
Requirements and Capabilities for 1997-2001. Santa Monica, CA; RAND, 1993. p.49 This 
should not be taken to imply that other forms o f intelligence - signals, electronic, or even 
open source intelligence - will be less important in the information age than they have been 
in the past. Rather, that high level imint and humint are taking on an extra role as 
differentiating factors in states’ collection of intelligence. Sigint, elint, and especially osint 
collection have become increasingly available to lesser- and non-state actors. This, 
combined with the fact that imint is typically the source of the most detailed intelligence 
available on competitor activities, and the fact that humint remains the best source for 
intelligence on enemy intentions - one o f the most scarce and valuable forms o f intelligence, 
particularly amidst the information age explosion o f information - makes imint and humint 
collection paiticularly valuable to the state actors who enjoy access to them in the 
information age.
Such advantages will obviously be more prevalent among the ‘great power’ states and other 
developmentally advanced state actors. In some cases, small, young states barely hold an 
advantage over non-state actors in these aspects.
The United States’ National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) currently 
estimates space delivery payload costs at roughly $10,000 per pound. NASA World Wide 
webpage. November 1998.
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reportedly track a bicycle on the streets of Cambridge from the skies over Calais 
on a deal' day.^o Systems like this, which require substantial investments of 
time, planning, and money - assets that states typically have far more abundantly 
than non-state actors - could give state actors a significant edge over non-state 
actors in infomation age war.
Like imint, human intelligence collection is another projected source of 
advantage for the state. Despite the amazing capabilities of modem 
technological intelligence collection, humint is becoming more, not less, 
important to information age intelligence.^^ In this era of abundant information, 
it is not enough to see numbers of tanks, shape of terrain, or even preparations 
for mobilisation; information age militaries must also have access to 
information about their enemy’s intentions, and about his intelligence. While 
the need to understand intentions is not unique to the information age - Sun Tzu 
recognised its importance almost two and a half millennia ago^  ^_ deception 
and surprise that are so important in lAW battle manoeuvre particularly depend 
upon the capability to know what the enemy knows about one’s own forces. 
Moreover, in order to undermine an opponent through his dependence on 
information, soldiers will need to understand not only what information that 
opponent has, but how he uses information, and where he is most vulnerable to 
its lack.23 No sensor could acquire this kind of intelligence, only a human agent
Libicki, Martin C. “What is Information Age War?” Washington, DC: National Defense 
College, 1995. Chapter6, p.2 
Lambert. “The Psychological Impact o f Airpower.”
Adams, James. The New Spies. London: Hutchinson, 1994. p.312
22 Sun Tzu. The Art o f War, pp. 144-5
23 Kraus, George P., Comdr., U SN (Ret); Senior Fellow, SAIC. Interview with the author. 16 
December 1996.
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with a knowledge of the culture and its fears, and of the people and their moods 
can provide such intelligence.
Again, non-state actors and even individuals certainly have access to 
humint, as the sophistication and success of such terrorist incidents as the 1993 
World Trade Center bombing and the 1998 bombings of US embassies in East 
Africa attest. These acts could not have surprised the United States and its 
intelligence community so successfully and on such a scale unless the 
perpetrators employed detailed and accurate intelligence themselves. However, 
states, who have spent the better part of the 20th century developing modem 
intelligence institutions, should still derive certain advantages from their longer 
experience in this field. Most notably, both the training of a state’s spies and 
their legacy of contact agents require time to develop,24 and this development 
profits greatly from the heirloom of trial-and-emor lessons passed down within 
each community. State actors have, in general, simply had more time to develop 
these legacies than non-state actors. The Great Powers, in particular, have 
maintained intelligence operations longer than most current non-state security 
threats have existed.25 The benefits available from experience in intelligence 
should therefore fall more to state actors for the simple reason that they typically 
have more of this commodity from which to benefit.
The advantages states may derive from their experience in intelligence 
become still more pronounced at the level of intelligence analysis. Always a
24 Bondanella, Cesar, Allen, et al. Estimating The Army’s Intelligence Requirements, p.xxvi
25 One o f the earliest was Cheat Britain, which has supported a permanent intelligence apparatus 
since the first decade o f the 20“* century. Britain’s intelligence community is thus older even 
than the IRA, which is perhaps the longest-running non-state threat still challenging a state’s 
security. While Britain’s long history in intelligence is perhaps somewhat extraordinary.
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realm that requires extensive training and a depth of background knowledge, 
intelligence analysis will likely become a greater challenge in the information 
age because, as chapter three describes, the information revolution exponentially 
magnifies the difficulty of separating ‘signals’ from ‘n o i s e . ’ 26 Even before the 
information revolution, analysis was a crucial step in the provision of useful 
strategic or tactical i n t e l l i g e n c e .22 In any era collected data can not become a 
functional intelligence product until an analyst has sorted that data to determine 
its relevance to a situation (and, not infrequently, its veracity), and then 
compared that information with intelligence from other sources in order to 
create a complete picture. While the information revolution’s increasingly 
sophisticated tools for information co-ordination and management should 
certainly aid in this process, the analysis stage of intelligence production - which 
entails not only making sense of the collected data, but conveying the correct 
sense of that information without undue reliance on the personal biases of the 
analyst nor on the tendency to produce worst-case s c e n a r i o s 2 8  - should require at 
least as fine a hand in the information age as in ages past.
In addition, the information age explosion of intelligence collection 
capability may further increase this established importance of analysis, and state 
actors’ experience with this task, in two ways. First, the analyst will likely 
become more pivotal because he or she has more data through which to sort.
most of the other Great Powers have maintained permanent intelligence institutions at least 
since World War II.
26 Cf. chapter three, ‘Speed and Accuracy.’ Jones, R. V. Reflections on Intelligence. London: 
Heinemann, 1989. p. 159 and Toffler. Powershift. p.317
22 Handel. War. Strategy, and Intelligence, p.237
28 ibid., p.242,246 The worst case scenario is a great temptation for intelligence analysts 
because it is not only the most easily quantifiable manifestation of a threat, but it is the best 
way to avoid being blamed for failing to predict a crisis.
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No one commander or leader could digest the flood of information collected 
today; consequently the data which an analyst must discard before creating a 
final intelligence product constitutes a considerably larger proportion of 
collected information than it previously has. Yet the more chaff a harvest 
produces relative to its yield of wheat, the more valuable are the useable kernels 
of wheat. As the relative value of each useful kernel increases, so does the 
detriment from mistaking a kernel for chaff and throwing it away. As arbiters of 
what decision makers do and do not need to know, information age intelligence 
analysts sifting useful information from the growing supply of extraneous data 
may face an increasingly weighty responsibility for conectly identifying the 
relevance of the information they a n a l y s e . 2 9
Secondly, and a weightier responsibility still, the increased ease of 
intelligence collection may mean that the calibre of analysis will play a more 
crucial role in the ultimate quality of the intelligence produced. In the days 
when collection was more difficult, knowing everything one could was a 
principal aim of intelligence production, and analysts added and subtracted 
comparatively little of the content and sense in the final product. Since the 
snowballing of the information revolution, however, knowing everything one 
possibly could has become a ludicrous aim, replaced by the requirement to 
understand what is important in what one knows. The accuracy and acuity of 
analysts’ interpretations from the raw collected data will therefore likely play a 
much greater role in the usefulness of the final intelligence product. Analysts 
with access to institutional experience, to vast catalogues of background
29 Johnson and Libicki, eds. Dominant Battlespace Knowledge. Chapter 3, p. 10
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information, and to long histories of intelligence’s effectiveness in situational 
context, should be far better equipped to analyse information and make 
decisions about what leaders need to know than are those analysts whose 
background knowledge extends little further than current collected information. 
Even more than in acquisition, then, states’ long traditions of producing 
intelligence should provide them with a formidable advantage in analysis.
In the third phase of the intelligence process, that of disseminating and 
applying the intelligence product, states’ established and tested communications 
infrastructures may enable them to retain an advantage over non-state actors.
As will be demonstrated, however, this is one advantage that may be 
considerably reduced in the information age. Dissemination has always been a 
crucial step in intelligence production, because intelligence that does not reach 
decision-makers in time - or worse, not at all - clearly cannot aid the making of 
decisions.3o In the information age, the capacity for good dissemination 
becomes still more vital due to the imperative for speed. Intelligence must be 
communicated quickly not only because it must keep up with the fast pace of 
battle, but because the proliferation of hi-tech communications - among enemy 
and ally alike - places a premium on the ability not merely to disseminate 
information, but to disseminate it before the other side learns what one knows.^^
This increasingly critical role of intelligence dissemination is 
emphasised again and again in assessments of intelligence performance in the 
Gulf War. The fact that communications systems were not designed to handle 
the sheer volume of intelligence dissemination proved to be a constant source of
30 Handel, Michael I., War. Strategy, and Intelligence. London: Frank Cass, 1989. p.237
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frustration during Operation Desert Storm.32 All too often, satellite images of 
terrain or of Iraqi troop activity were available at crucial moments before attacks 
or operational manoeuvres, but the information did not reach the commanders 
who needed it in time.33 The majority of these dissemination problems occurred 
because of simple miscalculations in preparation - such as non-interoperable 
communications networks wired with insufficient bandwidth to carry so much 
complex data, or troops deployed to the field with insufficient training to use the 
computer systems sent to aid them^^ - resulting from the fact that the coalition 
forces did not originally plan to fight such an information-intensive war. The 
ensuing frustration over the gap between intelligence collection and 
dissemination abilities has raised a call for the acquisition of even more and 
better military communication systems, despite the fact that commanders 
enjoyed better intelligence support in the Gulf War than in any other w a r .35 
If communications are to improve from their current high standards, 
states may hold an advantage in intelligence dissemination. Large, pre- 
established infrastructures like the Public Switched Network (which governs 
long-distance telephone calls) could serve as a significant building-block upon 
which to base further improvements. Furthermore, states typically have more 
capital available to invest in the researching and developing of such 
communications advantages as greater band-width capacity, camouflageable
31 Johnson and Libicki, eds. Dominant Battlespace Knowledge. Chapter 2, p.3
32 Campen. The First Information War, p.55
33 Cf. Odom, William E., Lt.Gen USAimy, retired. America’s Militaiy Revolution: Strategy
and Structure After the Cold War. Washington, DC: American University Press, 1993. 
p. 108, also Campen. The First Information War, p.xiv
34 Bondanella, Cesar, Allen, et al. Estimating The Aimv’s Intelligence Requirements, p.xxii,
p.49, also Laughridge, Gene. “Recent and Not-so-recent Thinking on Information 
Operations and the Knowledge War.” Army Communicator. Vol20. 1 Apr 95; 32-39. p.34
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signal transmitters, or un-crackable codes. Indeed, states - who hold centuries 
of experience in intrigue and secret-keeping - hold a potential edge in 
intelligence dissemination not only from their superior communications systems 
and research potential, but also from their long experience in equipping 
themselves for secure communications. While state actors are in many cases 
still unprepared for the magnitude of the current threat to their information 
security,36 long years of operating under an imperative for guarding the security 
of state information and communications should prove a valuable guide for 
those states hurrying to meet and counter the information age challenge to their 
communications systems.
The state imperative for security in communications, however, may also 
prove to be a disadvantage in states’ dissemination of intelligence. The 
exigency of using only systems that are invulnerable to penetration means that 
state-sponsored military development of information technologies necessarily 
occurs at a slower rate than that of private companies that do not need to wony 
about impenetrability, nor about reliability under battle conditions.32 Even if 
military production can keep up with commercial incentives for developing 
information technologies, the public sector will almost certainly require 
additional development time to insure its systems are secure both from
35 Campen. The First Information War, p .51
36 As is glaringly illustrated by the success o f hackers’ myriad attempts to break into the United 
States Department o f Defense’s computer systems. It is worth noting, however, that to date 
open sources still maintain that none of these attempts has actually constituted a strategic 
breach o f the restricted-access computer systems where classified information is stored. 
Waller, Douglas. “Onward Cyber Soldiers.” Time. Vol46, n8. 21 Aug 95. p.6 Cf. also 
“Security in Cyberspace III: the Threat.” US Senate Permanent Subcommittee on 
Investigations, Minority Staff Statement, 5 June 1996. p.3
32 See chapter four, ‘Strategic Civilian Tools in lA W .’ Munio. “The Pentagon's New  
Nightmare: An Electronic Pearl Harbor.” p.3
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intentional intrusion and from unintentional flaws. As a result, states’ military 
forces may all too often rely on out-of-date and even obsolete technologies to 
communicate intelligence. Meanwhile, as the following section details, non­
state actors can increasingly find cutting-edge technology on the shelves of 
Radio Shack that can perform many of the same functions and, while this 
technology may not fulfil even minimum security requirements, it may 
nonetheless prove a worrying challenge to states’ advantages in intelligence 
dissemination.
Weakening
This circumstance is, in fact, one of several instances in which states’ 
long history of experience may not always be to their advantage. In certain 
cases, where lessons learned from long experience have become so entrenched 
that they inhibit useful, or even necessary change, experience might actually 
hinder states’ development of the information age war form. As the previous 
section illustrated, when decision-makers employ the lessons of tradition and 
experience constructively, with a willingness to implement reasoned changes, 
states’ history of involvement in warfare holds certain obvious advantages that 
may widen their role in information age war. However, if experience instead 
blinds leaders to the changes around them and serves more to provide an 
incontestable excuse for avoiding change, that same experience may in fact 
present more problems than it solves. This is particularly true where experience 
stands in the way of replacing hierarchical bureaucratic organisation with the 
more stream-lined and efficient network organisational form that is more 
appropriate to the information age. In intelligence as well as in other
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components of the state’s war machine, the continuation of such obsolete, but 
entrenched, practices carries the potential to weaken states’ position in lAW by 
turning the state’s own experience in war against it.
As if to emphasise the paradox inherent in the dual widening and 
weakening of the state’s role in information age war, this negative potential of 
experience is openly evident within the realm of intelligence where, as just 
demonstrated, states may enjoy many of the greatest advantages available from 
long experience. While experience should grant states the advantage of 
knowing better what to do with their intelligence, that same experience could be 
detrimental to the extent that it makes bureaucratic systems reluctant to change 
their ways even in the face of fundamental shifts in the societies around them.
In intelligence communities, this reluctance to oppose tradition has stood in the 
way of replacing hierarchical, bottom-up dissemination regimes with 
horizontally networked, pull-down systems that would be much more suitable 
for the cunent practice of intelligence.^s This bureaucratic inertia has, until 
recently, prevented many state-run intelligence communities from revising the 
traditional pattern of “stovepiped” intelligence. This rigid, vertical system in 
which one division does all the collection, analysis, and dissemination of its 
particular type of intelligence, encourages neither integration nor cross-sharing 
of information.39 As a consequence, the rapidly changing use of information in 
warfare has, since the Gulf War, begun outstripping the structures states have 
built to govern this use. These out-dated, inefficient structures, as anyone who 
has read this far may readily understand, are highly unsuitable for information
38 Campen. The First Information War, p. 84
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age wai' and, if left unchanged, would only hinder states’ efforts to develop the 
new war form.
This unwillingness to combine experience with innovation could 
potentially produce a similar bureaucratic inertia in many state apparati, to much 
the same detrimental effect. Among the possible negative influences of 
entrenched experience, perhaps the most worrying is the contention by US 
Representative Newt Gingrich that governments as a whole actually have a 
disincentive to adopt some information age changes, particularly the more 
efficient network form of organisation. According to Gingrich, since 
governments usually establish a monopoly on the services they offer (e.g. public 
education, postal service, etc.), they are not driven by consumer demand. In the 
absence of the need to please customers, governments instead serve the interest 
of their employees. Employees, however, are notoriously opposed to change 
because of the danger it presents for job security.^o Preferring the known of 
established practices over the uncertainty of new ideas, employees tend to form 
a vociferous lobby in favour of upholding tradition, regardless of the long-term 
consequences from such a course of action. In the face of such a traditionalist 
lobby, the over-sized, inefficient, cumbersome bureaucracy that has so long 
characterised state government is likely to lumber into the 21st century well 
behind private actors who have already embraced and adapted to the 
information age.
By slowing state decisions and action, the continuation of hierarchical 
bureaucracy in state government could prove a disadvantage in infoimation age
39 ibid.,p.81
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war in its own right. The disincentive to adopt more efficient practices, 
however, will likely affect the state’s role in lAW most directly through 
government’s influence on the military. Since the military is consumer driven 
to the extent that it must produce a saleable product in the form of effective 
security, one might not expect it to suffer in the same way from the disincentive 
to change exhibited by government bureaucracy. However, the military (in the 
West, at least) is still controlled by the state and subject to its decisions, 
especially those regarding appropriations. Legislators hold a certain sway over 
state-run military forces through their control of defence budgets, and attendant 
influence on the pace and format of procurement. As a consequence of this 
influence, even an organisation like the US military - which is aggressively 
studying the options presented by infoimation age war - at times suffers from 
the excessive inertia of its controlling bureaucracy.^^ This inertia constitutes a 
potentially formidable obstacle in the path of state actors attempting to develop 
information age military capabilities.
Thus, where the state’s experience in warfare becomes entrenched and 
fosters a disinclination to capitalise on the opportunities of information age 
change, this experience - and the bureaucratic inertia it breeds - may prove to be 
a significant factor behind the weakening of the state’s role in information age 
war. However, certain factors beyond the control of the state may prove still 
more detrimental to that actor’s historical advantage in making war. These are
40 Gingrich, Newt. To Renew America. New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1995. p.59 
4^  Cf. the current debate both in the US Congress and in the Pentagon over whether the military 
should concentrate on selected high-technology and high cost investments for the long term, 
or on a larger number o f lower cost, more conventional systems for the near term.
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factors that contribute to the potential widening of non-state actors’ role in 
information age war. The strengthening of non-state actors’ position in lAW 
could serve as a challenge to the state because the war form carries the potential 
to alter the balance of relative advantage between the two types of actors.
During the reign of conventional industrialised warfare, this balance 
traditionally weighed in favour of states - with their characteristic advantages in 
size, resources, and established organisational infrastructure. As the next 
section will demonstrate, however, lAW may confer certain benefits on lesser- 
and non-state actors that allow these actors to challenge states’ historically 
favourable position in the balance of military power. Consequently, the 
weakening of the state’s role in information age war will likely occur not merely 
as a result of the state’s own reluctance to adapt to the information age, but also 
(and perhaps more significantly) as a minor reaction to the widening of non­
state actors’ role in the information age war form.
Lesser-state and Non-State Actors
Non-State actors have, of course, held a fairly prominent position in war 
during the industrial age and before it. From revolutionaries to resistance 
movements to guenilla insurgents, military forces unconnected to any state have 
proved themselves fierce opponents in countless wars. The involvement of non­
state actors in information age war therefore does not introduce a new actor to 
the stage of warfare. Rather, the information age war form may alter the answer 
to ‘who will wage war?’ by shifting the capacity of non-state actors to compete
Aftergood, Steven. “Monitoring Emerging Military Technologies.” Federation o f American
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against states in this contest. Since non-state actors have historically been 
smaller and weaker (according to traditional measurements of power) than any 
entity invested with statehood, their ability to compete in warfare, and 
particularly in full-scale warfare, has commonly been considered to be marginal, 
especially by scholars of war if not by practitioners.42 Likewise, lesser-state 
actors, defined as those actors possessing less than a peer capability to compete 
against the military great powers, have by definition been viewed as minor, of 
not implausible challenges to the military capacity of states.43 Any 
improvement that LAW introduces to lesser- and non-state actors’ position in 
warfare could therefore be significant if it successfully induces a revision of this 
view.44 In such a case, lAW’s changes in the ‘who’ of warfare might spark real 
changes in the established understanding of war, thus finally fulfilling one of the 
criteria for paradigm shift even if they introduce only small, relative shifts in the 
actual mechanics of warmaking.
The marginalised position of lesser- and non-state actors in the 
scholarship on war has been based both on empirical and theoretical grounds. 
Empirically, both non-state actors and young, lesser- state actors have been 
restricted45 from conventional military competition by limited manpower and
Scientists. Public Interest Report. vol48, n l; January/February 1995. p.23
42 Although history has often proved this assumption to be a naïve one, it persists - in part 
because it largely holds true with regard to the kind o f pitched-battle warfare which state 
military planners tend to prefer, if  not with regard to more indirect, low-intensity conflict.
43 Matthews, Lloyd J. “State on State Approaches.” and Schake, Kori N. “Beyond Russia and
China: A Survey o f Threat to US Security from Lesser States.” In Matthews, Lloyd J., ed. 
Challenging the United States Svmmetricallv and Asvmmetrically: Can America be 
Defeated? Carlisle, PA: US Aim War College Strategic Studies Institute Web page, July 
1998. pp.244, 303
44 Any profound weakening o f non-state actors’ role in information age war might also spark
such a revision, if they prove to be a significant departure from the status quo.
45 though not prohibited
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other physical resources, lack of sufficient industrial bases, and problematic 
organisational structures. A significant number of these actors are, moreover, 
located in the developing world, and have further been impeded from competing 
in large-scale warfare by struggling economies and shallow institutional 
infrastructure. Theoretically, the field of war studies has also largely dismissed 
non-state actors, in particular, as inapplicable competitors in high-intensity 
warfare not only by virtue of their smaller size and typically inferior access to 
the resources for war, but also by virtue of the conventional wisdom that only 
sovereign state actors have the right to wage war.46 As such, non-state actors 
have been considered to be outside states’ monopoly on the ‘legitimate’ use of 
military force, and thus legally unable to wage war.4?
Infoimation age war will by no means solve the problems that have led 
to the marginalisation of lesser- and non-state actors; it may, however, 
considerably alleviate the detrimental influence of these factors on non-states’ 
position in warfare. From the non-linearity of information and the information­
intensive power lAW projects, to its decoupling of the relationship between 
mass and power, to the cheap and easy access nature of the war form, to the de 
facto legitimacy confeiTed by evident military p o w e r ,48  information age warfare 
carries a significant potential to level the balance between the strong and weak. 
This levelling is the primary force behind the widening of lesser- and non-state
46 As Martin Van Creveld points out, conflict that does not originate with a state has customarily 
been denied the name ‘war.* Van Creveld, Martin. Nuclear Proliferation and the Future of 
Conflict. Free Press, 1993. p .l also Howard. The Causes o f Wars, p.34 
42 According to the ‘international laws o f war’ which are discussed more extensively in chapter 
four.
48 In the same way that force serves as the ultimate magistrate of the international system - 
settling quarrels by destroying opponents’ capacity to resist to one’s settlement - the
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actors’ role in information age war. In investigating the widening of non-states’ 
role, however, one must not forget that facets of lAW may also weaken non­
state actors’ position. Just as in its relationship with state actors, information 
age war holds the paradoxical capacity both to ameliorate and to impair non­
state actors’ position in warfare. Only the balance between the two effects can 
finally deteimine how non-states’ role in war may change in the information 
age.
Widening
Information age war’s first contribution to the widening of non-state 
actors’ role in war is its potential to decrease the “correlation between the size 
of an input and the size of the output.”49 Though war has always been 
unpredictable, information age war could foster a new non-linearity in the 
relationship between cause and effect.^o The nature of this war form as a 
product of an information revolution contributes to the discrepancy between 
cause and effect in conflict as in information age society as a whole. As chapter 
four explains, information, which can be endlessly exchanged and reused 
without degrading its significance, is itself non-linear.^i Consequently, power, 
increasingly dependent on information, should also become more non-linear. 
Signs of this non-lineaiity are, in fact, already becoming evident in, for instance, 
the disproportionate influence of small changes in production practices (like the
credibility o f non-state actors’ access to information age military force may buy them 
recognition as rightful military actors.
49 Toffler, Alvin and Heidi. War and Anti-War: Making Sense o f Today’s Global Chaos. 
Boston: Little Brown, 1993. p.331
Garden, Timothy. The Technologv Trap. London: Brassey’s, 1989. p.5 
See chapter four, ‘Strategic Civilian Tools in JAW’ and chapter five, ‘Information Age 
Motivations for War.’ Toffler and Toffler. War and Anti-War, p. 194
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introduction of CAD-CAM, for example) on a company’s economic power; and 
in the increasingly obvious influence of a small bit of leaked infoimation on a 
leader’s political p o w e r . 3 2
Such changes in the proportions of inputs and outputs in infoimation age 
power are strong indications that information age war, the definitive information 
age power struggle, will likely also be a highly non-linear contest. Many 
predictions about how lAW may be waged serve to strengthen expectations of 
information age war’s non-linearity; for instance, the prognosis that large 
masses of artillery or aeroplanes may not be able to insure victory in lAW 
without the right leveraging of information, while a few skilled computer 
hackers might be able decapacitate an enemy’s radar system sufficiently to 
allow a handful of precision guided missiles to destroy crucial installations. 
These predictions, and others like them,33 lay behind the belief that the 
information age war form will be characterised by the fact that “a small bit of 
the right information can provide an immense strategic or tactical advantage, 
[and] the denial of a small bit of information can have catastrophic effects.”34 
Secondly, the effects of information age war’s non-linearity and its 
interference with the traditional conelation between a large military and the
32 Consider, for example, the potentially disastrous effect o f the news story that revealed that 
Representative Henry Hyde - Chairman of the US House of Representatives Judiciary 
Committee which was in charge o f investigating President Clinton’s marital indiscretions - 
had had his own extra-maiital affair. What once would have been very personal information 
(in both Hyde’s and Clinton’s cases) raised calls for Hyde to step down from his post. 
Luckily for Hyde, the furore quieted before anyone listened to those calls. Had it been 
otherwise, this piece o f information might have made a considerably deeper dent in Hyde’s 
political power. Cf. Kurtz, Howard. "Report o f Hyde Affair Stirs Anger; Judiciary 
Chairman Admits '60s Relationship But Calls Story ‘Attempt To Intimidate Me.'" 
Washington Post. 17 Sept 1998. Page A15.
33 See chapter three.
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potential for victory^^ may be further multiplied by the fact that lAW is also 
predicted to sever the link between mass and militaiy power. The information 
age war foim’s emphasis on efficiency - fast and precise action that is decisive 
especially because it wastes nothing in hitting the enemy where it is most likely 
to produce an intended effect - places a higher value on how one uses what one 
has than on how much one has. As discussed in chapter three, by allowing 
militaiy forces to create their own advantages, the integration of high-quality 
infoimation throughout the spectrum of military activities should far outweigh 
the benefits of simple numbers alone. While mass will of course remain 
necessaiy to deliver efficient force to its target, the force-multiplying effects of 
information may now put the levels of mass necessary to make an impact in 
information age war well within the limits of lesser-state and non-state actors’ 
ability to obtain. In a conflict where a handful of precision-guided missiles 
might effectively wipe out an enemy’s main command posts and principal air 
defences, and one well-timed computer virus might decapacitate an opponent’s 
power grids at a crucial moment in military operations, lack of size should no 
longer present the same disadvantage it did in conventional waifare.36
Thirdly, the role of lesser-states and non-state actors in information age 
war is also likely to be strengthened by the cheap, easy access nature of lAW’s 
weapons. So many of the military technologies used in information age war
34 Take, for example, the confusion of Saddam Hussein’s army after the US-led coalition
crippled its command and control infrastructure in 1991. cf. Toffler, Alvin. “Perspective on 
Terrorism.” p. M5
33 This has never been a guaranteed, one-to-one relationship, though larger militaries have 
historically been more likely to win, especially when other factors (like morale, quality of 
doctiine, etc.) are relatively equal.
36 Simon, Joel. “Netwar could make M exico Ungovernable.” Pacific News Service, 1995? p.4 
Cohen, Eliot. “A Revolution in Warfare.” Foreign Affairs. Vol75, n2: 37-54. p.53
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overlap with information technologies in high demand on the civilian market 
that even small, poor states and groups can afford all but the most sophisticated 
tools of information age war.^? Laptop computers, mobile phones, and 
computer network access are obvious and readily available accoutrements used 
by information age soldiers and civilians alike, but the procurability and 
affordability of lAW’s tools does not end here. Primitive but effective guidance 
systems can be cobbled together from remote-controlled electrical toys, fairly 
sophisticated sensors may be obtained with home security systems, electronic 
countermeasures as simple but essential as flares and chaff can be found in local 
hardware stores, and even satellite imageiy can now be purchased commercially 
at high levels of resolution.38 All of these affordable and accessible tools may 
allow even the smallest and poorest of non-state actors at least to compete with 
the great states who dominate the international system, even if they cannot 
compete at quite the same level.
Fourthly, information age war may also relatively increase the leverage 
of historically marginalised elements by eroding one of the principal advantages 
left to the great powers: that of experience. As the preceding sections illustrate,
32 Cf. Munro. “The Pentagon's New Nightmare; An Electronic Pearl Harbor.” Washington Post. 
16 Jul 95. p.4 The Zapatista rebels in Mexico are an apt example o f just such a 
“disdavantaged” group that has been able to create notable advantages through accessible 
information technology. Cf. chapter four, ‘Strategic Civilian Tools in lA W ’ and chapter one, 
‘Man.’ McGrew, Anthony G. “Military Technology and the Dynamics o f Global 
Militarisation.” Global Politics: Globalisation and the Nation-State. McGrew, Anthony G., 
Paul G. Lewis, et al., eds. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992. p. 100 
38 The United States government sells images commercially through Landsat, an organisation 
managed by NASA which boasts an archive o f images back to 1972. As o f 1998, Landsat 
offered images at resolutions o f up to 30 metres, for prices starting from $475. France’s 
SPOT earth observation satellite was set up as a commercial enterprise in 1982 and, offering 
a historical database of images as well as cuirent images at 10 meter resolution, the company 
grossed FFr 208 million in 1995. http://www.spot.com The Indian Remote Sensing 
Satellite enterprise offers interested buyers earth resolution of 12 meters, and Russia has
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experience and tradition in warfare may be something of a double-edged sword 
in the information age. This chapter has already demonstrated that the negative 
influence of overly entrenched experience might mai'kedly detract from 
experience’s positive influence on efficiency. In addition, information age war 
may still further deplete the rewards of experience by actually nullifying states’ 
benefits from certain kinds of experience, particularly those arising from states’ 
head-start in developing the tools for war. Information age war may negate the 
utility of this head-start by introducing a largely new ar senal of weapons, tactics, 
and strategies to replace or transform much of the old. Since these innovations 
will in many cases supersede their predecessors, experienced military actors’ 
stockpiles will do little to help these actors wage an information age war 
themselves, and little to help them fight an enemy waging information age war.
In the case of building their own lAW capability, experienced state 
actors will certainly retain important benefits from knowing how to write and 
revise doctrine, from understanding how to train soldiers effectively, from 
surviving trial and error lessons in weapons production, and from appreciating 
the effort necessary to mobilise a people for war. However, information age 
warfare should considerably diminish the usefulness of the doctrine, training, 
weapons stockpiles, and mobilisation plans themselves, because, while these 
industrial age military preparations will likely comprise a valuable foundation 
upon which to develop lAW capabilities, a significant number of them may be 
useful in waging information age war only after considerable revisions adapt
begun a move to market imagery at resolutions o f up to two meters. London: International 
Centre for Security Analysis Worldwide web page.
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them to information age military methods and these methods’ emphasis on the 
decisiveness of efficiency.
By the same token, stockpiles of industrial age military tools and 
weapons should be of little benefit against an enemy who is waging information 
age war. Larger militaiy powers that do not develop information age military 
capabilities may be unable to compete effectively in such a situation, since their 
old attritional arsenals are unlikely to function at the necessary pace. For this 
reason, an lAW attack should be most effectively rebuffed by an lAW defence. 
Consequently, if the United States, for instance, were to remain unequipped for 
information age war, it might be rendered as helpless under an information age 
offensive as, say, Ethiopia would be under a conventional offensive. Like the 
military technology revolution caused by the introduction of the Dreadnought at 
the turn of the century, the innovations of lAW will be new for everyone. The 
superpowers of the Cold War and the nascent militaries of the post-Cold War 
states must all learn new lessons in how to conduct war for the information 
age.59
The industrial age military might that today’s great powers have spent 
decades amassing should therefore grant the experienced state powers a 
relatively smaller advantage in information age war than it could confer in 
industrial age war, where the old tools and methods were more directly relevant. 
This turnover should aid lesser- and non-state actors’ position in war to the 
extent that it at least partially clears the slate of militaiy advantage: if stockpiles
As discussed in the previous section, however, established military forces should enjoy 
significant advantages from their experience with other forms of war. Likewise, those who 
adopt I AW now should have an appreciable head start over late-comers.
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figure less in widening states’ military power, they will also figure less in 
weakening the military capacity of non-states. This blanking of the slate could 
reset the military balance in much the same way non-linearity and the 
decoupling of the mass-power link do, depleting the advantage of the large and 
the strong in favour of the new supremacy available from the information 
advantage.
Non-State Actors in Particular
The factors listed above will potentially widen any small actor’s role in
lAW, regardless of its sovereign status as a state or non-state actor. Several 
separate factors, however, may also widen the role of non-state actors without 
directly affecting that of their small, but sovereign cousins. These factors result 
mainly from infoimation age shifts in the components of advantage and in the 
distribution of these components among states and non-state actors. Some of 
these factors - such as perquisites arising from typically less bureaucratic 
organisational patterns and from non-sovereign status - relate specifically to the 
character of non-state actors, and may grant privileges to these actors that are 
not available to state actors under their cuiTent format. Others among these 
separate factors - such as access to high-quality information - may widen non­
states’ role in LAW but not lesser-states’ role, because they confer privileges on 
the former that are already held by state actors. While the distribution of such 
factors will not directly affect states (since state actors already enjoy the benefit 
of them), the more general dissemination of these privileges should contribute to 
the widened standing of non-state actors relative to that of state actors in 
information age wai\
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Among the factors separately influencing non-state actors’ role in lAW, 
several relate to information age changes in effective organisational patterns. 
First, and most prominent, smaller, non-state actors may actually possess an 
advantage over large, bureaucratic state actors, in that the former are more 
suited to the pace of the information age. In particular, non-state actors tend 
much more than states to favour the networked organisational form which is 
uniquely suited to the leveraging of information power.^^ Indeed, many non­
state actors - from businesses to drug cartels - have already adopted networkised 
organisation. Many have in fact done so for reasons independent of information 
age influences and unrelated to prospects of information age benefits.^*
Although such groups have not instituted networkised organisation because of a 
conscious decision to exploit information technology’s advantages in speed and 
accuracy, whether they realise it or not they have already begun to adapt their 
functions to the information age’s imperative for efficiency. Their networked 
structure can enable them (like those non-state actors who have deliberately 
chosen networkisation in order to leverage infoimation age benefits) to optimise 
effort by encouraging initiative and flexibility among the components of the 
organisation, while insuring coherent direction for the system as a whole.
Interestingly, even a non-state actor as fax* from the forefront of 
information age development as the Peruvian tenorist group Sendero Luminoso
John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt. “Cyberwar is Coming!” Santa Monica, CA; RAND, 1992. 
Also in Comparative Strategv. vo ll2 , 1993: 141-65. p. 17
For instance, networked organisation is standard for many terrorist groups and international 
organised crime organisations, based on the hope that isolating components into relatively ' 
autonomous cells will limit damage if any are caught. This is obviously far from an 
information age reason for networkisation, but the utility o f these non-state actors’ headstart 
in networkised organisation remains. Cf. Wardlaw, Grant. Political Terrorism: Theorv. 
Tactics, and Counter-Measures. Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1989. p. 134.
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can provide a useful example of such an efficient, networked enterprise 
established with no intention of exploiting information age advances, yet well 
structured for that very puipose. The tenorists have organised their lower-level 
cadres into cells that operate independently of, but in concert with, cells in other 
parts of the country. At the same time, a centralised leadership provides the 
dogma and the doctrine that integrates the cells’ efforts to present a credible 
national threat.^^ While Sendero Luminoso has exhibited no signs of 
developing a capacity for waging strategic information age war, it is noteworthy 
that, should the group decide to do so, it would require little restructuring. 
Regardless of their potential military strategic capabilities, however, the 
significance of Sendero Luminoso’s example lies in the fact that networked 
non-state actors (including some comparatively technologically primitive 
groups) are already organised to develop the efficiency for optimising their 
efforts. This networked efficiency could prove a notable advantage to such non­
state actors because it should enable them to operate at a tempo of which more 
bureaucratically organised states are not yet capable.
The information age rise of networked organisation may also widen non­
state actors’ role in LAW not by granting them advantages over states, but by 
granting them the same advantages as states. For instance, as discussed in 
chapter one,<^ 3 the information revolution’s popularisation of networks and their 
horizontal dispersion of information is predicted to erode the hierarchical 
structures established to regulate the flow of information. These information
Radu, Michael and Vladimir Tismaneanu. Latin American Revolutionaries: Groups. Goals, 
and Methods. Washington: Brassey’s International Defense Publishers, 1990. p.331 
See chapter one, ‘Man.’
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hierarchies (from classification of sensitive information to monopolies on spies, 
satellites, and other tools for information collection) have for centuries allowed 
the state to maintain priority access to the infoimational tools of decision­
making. The information revolution’s explosion of information technologies, 
however, challenges this state priority access by rendering much information 
readily accessible by the public. Access to information from library catalogues 
to government proceedings has become infinitely faster and easier not only 
because much more has been openly published, but also because almost all of it 
is less difficult to find on the internet than it was in basement filing cabinets. As 
a result, keen web watchers might, in some instances, enjoy an availability of 
information not unlike that of national leaders.<^ "^  This undermining of state 
prerogative could remove one of the key obstacles to non-state actors’ 
achievement of a wider role in military affairs, as well as in political, economic, 
and social matters.
In addition, information technologies like computer networking and low- 
cost, high-capacity long-distance communications may widen the position of 
non-state actors by facilitating access to the tools not only for gathering 
information, but also for distributing it. Before the information revolution 
introduced the internet, e-mail, fax machines, and other inexpensive but 
effective communications technologies, the means for spreading information 
were, in closed societies, generally monopolised by states or, in open societies, 
by those with the money to purchase print or broadcasting space. With 
information age linking technologies, however, non-state actors can cheaply
Bankes, Steve, and Carl Builder. “Seizing the Moment: Harnessing the Information
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build a capacity to disseminate information - as well as to mobilise action and 
resources - which equals, if not surpasses (especially considering the superior 
efficiency of networked organisation), that of entrenched state bureaucracies.*^  ^
For instance, the Zapatista insurgency in the Chiapas region of Mexico, thanks 
to the strategic broadcast of propaganda on the internet, raised global popular 
concern hugely disproportionate to the insurgents’ capacity to reach the public 
through more traditional broadcast media. One observer even noted that the 
rebels enjoyed equal or better access to the Mexico City press reporting on the 
conflict than did Mexico’s own government.^*  ^ In an age where public opinion 
may acquire a heightened importance in influencing the course of war, this 
improved access to information distribution, like access to information itself, 
may prove a useful aid to non-state actors’ position in information age war.
Three final factors, relating not to information age organisational 
patterns, but rather to the characteristic organisation of non-state actors, may 
also afford these groups a certain advantage in information age war. As 
established in chapter four, lAW is likely to increase the involvement of 
civilians in conflict, requiring states to extend their efforts to protect and shield 
their c i t i z e n s .* ) ^  However, most non-state actors have a largely amorphous 
constituency which is often not readily identifiable by borders or other physical 
signs. While almost all non-state actors do have a certain constituency of 
supporters to protect, in most cases that constituency should be so difficult to
Technologies.” The Information Society. Vol8, 1992: 1-59. p.5 
See chapter one, ‘Man.’
Herrera. “New Information Technologies and the Future o f State Security.” p. 16 
See chapter four, ‘Civilians as Strategic Targets in lA W .’
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identify that it is effectively untargetable by enemy military forces.*'  ^ This 
untargetability could considerably lighten non-state actors’ burden of protecting 
civilians. In comparison to state actors’ greater imperative to protect their 
civilians, non-state actors’ relative lack of obligation to physically safeguard a 
civilian population could prove a useful contribution towards the widening of 
non-state actors’ role in lAW.
Secondly, few non-state actors are connected to the international system 
in the same way states are. They do not have the same treaties and conventions 
by which to abide, nor the same trading partners and alliances to take into 
consideration. Consequently, they may escape many of the constraints that 
prevent states from launching some of the nastier components of information 
age war, like the truly cataclysmic infoimation infrastructure attacks designed to 
sow chaos among civilian populations in order to distract military forces. 
Hezbollah, for instance, would likely suffer less compunction against destroying 
a country’s standing on the international financial market than would Syria, 
which would be vulnerable to the same chaos if its victim retaliates in kind.^^
If a state actor were to launch such an attack, it would be susceptible to the very 
anarchy it inflicts. Non-state actors, lacking not only an identifiable citizenry, 
but possibly also an identifiable information infrastructure, trade routes, 
transportation systems, and other likely targets, would be much harder to deter 
from such a course of action, because they are unlikely to suffer the same
This may be more true if an enemy is seeking to target one’s population en masse. If, on the 
other hand, he is willing to seek out individual supporters, camouflage or dispersion can be 
only a deteirent, not a true barrier to attack.
Morton. “The Information Advantage.” p. 18
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consequences. In this scenario, retaliation in kind is simply much more difficult 
to inflict on non-state actors.
Thirdly, the relatively dispersed nature of many non-state actors may 
widen their role in information age war by rendering them still more difficult to 
deter. Non-state actors often have no obviously defined territory, and never 
clearly delineated borders; some have no evident permanent capitals or 
population, and some have headquarters that may be not only far removed from 
their area of operations, but unreachable on neutral tenitory. Untethered as they 
are to remain within set borders, non-state actors’ operations are often partially 
covert, and tend to be carried out by members who wear no uniform and blend 
easily with the surrounding populus.”^*^ Thus, not only are many non-state actors 
relatively unencumbered by the need to defend population, land, or 
infrastructure, but many may be difficult to find to attack in the first place.^* All 
three of these factors unique to non-state actors may provide them with valuable 
advantages in information age warfare.
The Widening Role of Lesser- and Non-state Actors: in Real Terms
When assessing the credibility of lesser- and non-state actors’ widening
role in information age war, it is vital to remember that even a small amount of 
information age expertise can make an appreciable difference in a small actor’s 
ability to challenge a traditionally stronger opponent. Although a handful of ill- 
trained soldiers equipped with elaborate satellite information and a 
computerised command and control system will be no match for a fully
Van Creveld. Nuclear Proliferation and the Future o f Conflict, p. 125 
The fact that the information infrastructure attack element of lAW  can be carried out by 
remote control adds fuither to the non-state actors’ valuable capacity to strike anonymously.
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information-reliant force, the addition of information leverage even on just a 
few isolated levels of military activity may be enough to allow lesser- and non­
state actors to present a much greater threat than they might without information 
age techniques.
For one example, the 1992-3 US intervention in Somalia presents 
persuasive, if slightly hackneyed evidence of the fact that a little information 
used well can sometimes go a long way. Neither the Somalis’ famed use of 
cellular telephones to co-ordinate their evasion of American search teams, nor 
the psychological blow represented by the potent image of an American soldier 
dragged through the streets of Mogadishu delivered a decisive Somali victory 
over the US peacekeepers. These information-reliant tactics did, however, 
effectively “up the ante,” raising the cost of American victory beyond what the 
United States was willing to pay, and eventually contributing to the US’ 
decision to withdraw without achieving their intended objective.^z Lesser- and 
non-state actors’ capacity to create even this sort of small advantage through 
information age techniques may foreshadow the still greater widening of their 
position possible through full-scale information age wai*.
Two further examples of the empowerment available to non-state actors 
from even small incorporations of lAW’s methods can also be found within the 
field of insurgency. Both the Chechen rebellion in the former Soviet Union and
The United States’ decision to withdraw was, o f course, heavily influenced by the fact that the 
US Congress was at the time also debating the highly charged issue o f health care reform. 
Some argue that American peacekeepers’ withdrawal from Somalia was heavily influenced 
by the fact that winning Congressional and popular support for both efforts would have 
required the investment o f more political capital than the White House commanded at the 
time. This view attributes the peacekeepers’ withdrawal from Somalia to the speculation that 
President Clinton decided his bargaining power would be better spent on the possibility of
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the Zapatista insurgency in the Chiapas region of Mexico aptly illustrate the 
advantages available to non-state actors from adopting information age war, 
even if they can only do so piecemeal. However, when considering how these 
cases illustrate lAW’s widening of non-state actors’ role in war, one must take 
into account the fact that, despite the cardinal role of information in the two 
insurgencies, neither was a true information age war. Rather, both the 
Chechens’ and Zapatistas use of information to aid their military activities 
represented a primitive foiTn of half-developed lAW. Neither of these non-state 
actors possessed the level of information technology or connectivity to pursue a 
fully integrated information age war decided on the basis of relative efficiency. 
Likewise, neither Russia nor Mexico yet possessed the doctrine or (especially in 
the case of the latter) the means to employ truly information age technologies or 
methods in their counter-insurgency operations. One must therefore take the 
lessons of these two struggles in context, remembering that they may be only 
vague portents of what real information age war could hold in store for the 
empowerment of non-state actors.
The evidence from the Chechen and Zapatista insurgencies seems to 
indicate that lAW’s empowerment of insurgents will primarily take two forms 
during the early days of the information age: information age tactics could either 
serve to augment the power of insurgencies that already possess considerable 
conventional military tools, or they could act as a proxy for traditional maitial 
resources in insurgencies that do not otherwise have access to military power 
sufficient to bring attention to their cause.
Congressional approval for his health care bill. Feaver, Peter. “A New  Theory of Civil
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The conflict between the Russian military and Chechen insurgents 
provides an apt example of the former instance of information age war’s 
empowerment of insurgent non-state actors. In this case, the Chechens had 
ample materiel to inflict significant physical damage on the R u s s i a n s , they 
increased their effectiveness still more by leveraging information to optimise the 
utility of the resources they had. Ironically, though the Russian army was the 
successor to the first military force ever to formulate the concept of information­
intensive warfighting,74 their rebel opponents proved much more adept at 
exploiting information to create a military advantage. The Chechens used low- 
cost cellular telephones and Motorola radio phones to organise a serviceable 
communications network which helped them outmanoeuvre Russian troops 
(many of whom lacked even batteries for their radios), as well as co-ordinate 
tenor operations for maximum shock impact.^s The insurgents also amplified 
the damage inflicted physically by striking a psychological blow to Russia’s 
image in the eyes of its fellow great powers. The same collection of telephones 
useful for tactical command and control also allowed the Chechens to maintain 
high access to the media, insuring immediate war coverage, preferably slanted 
to favour their cause. Moreover, in a quintessentially information age approach, 
the Chechens actually scripted many of their operations specifically for media
Military Relations.” University o f St Andrews Post-Graduate seminar, 14 Oct 97.
By the November 1994 outbreak o f the conflict, Chechens had already stolen “tens of 
thousands” o f weapons from former Soviet army stockpiles - especially those cached in 
contested Chechen territory where at least 21 nuclear storage sites were unguarded during the 
conflict. Sunday Times. 10 Nov 96. in the RAND-St Andrews Terrorism Database, also 
Herrera. “New Information Technologies and the Future o f State Security.” p. 19 
Freedman. Information Age War: Will Battle Ever Be Joined? p.7, inter alia, originally 
known to them as a ‘reconnaissance stiike complex.’
Specter, Michael. “Strolling at Will, Chechen Rebels Mock Russians.” New York Times. 2 
Feb 1996: A12
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impact, staging events like the discovery by tipped television newscasters of 
radioactive material in Moscow’s Ismailovsky Park'^ *> to turn Russian President 
Boris Yeltsin’s intent of making the conflict a propaganda victory into 
deliberate popular defeat^?
On a far smaller scale of insurgency, the Zapatista rebels in the Chiapas 
region of Mexico have become a famous example of the power of information 
even in the absence of significant traditional militaiy power. Anned with an 
antique collection of guns and an almost equal number of computer diskettes, 
the Zapatistas were able to affect the actions of the Mexican government beyond 
all proportion to their conventional military power.^^ In the quintessential 
example of the phenomenon that Arquilla and Ronfeldt have labelled 
“netwar,”'^  ^a handful of educated, computer-savvy members of the otherwise 
backward rebellion were able to supplement their small-time guemlla activities 
with, in the words of one observer, “a computer-enabled global media campaign 
that, in the context of peasant rebellions, can only be described as bizaiTe.’’^  ^
Out-gunned and out-manned, the Zapatista leader known as “Subcommandante 
Marcos” staved off defeat by posting on the internet a series of eloquent 
messages that captured attention world-wide, and elicited support from 
hundreds of scattered individuals as well as peace-minded non-governmental
Sanin, Grigori, and Aleksandr Zakharov. “Kontenyeriz Ismailovskogo Parka Blagopoiuchno 
Evakuirovam.” Sesodnva 25 Nov 95. in the RAND-St Andrews Terrorism Database. 
Aftergood. “Monitoring Emerging Military Technologies.” p. 15, Herrera. “New  
Information Technologies and the Future of State Security.” p. 19 
Robberson, Tod. "Mexican Rebels Using A High-Tech Weapon; Internet Helps Rally 
Support." Washington Post. 20 Feb 95: A1
Arquilla, John, and David Ronfeldt. “Cyberwar is Coming!” Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 
1992. especially pp. 4-6 and Arquilla, John. The Advent Of Netwar. Santa Monica, CA: 
RAND, 1996.
Herrera. “New Information Technologies and the Future of State Security.” p. 15
305
organisations as powerful as the Roman Catholic Church.^^ This attention was 
put to action in classic netwar offensives like ‘fax blitzes’ designed to overload 
government communications networks as well as to persuade the government 
that the rebels had too much support to be crushed brutally in the face of such 
international scrutiny. And indeed, the international spotlight drawn by internet 
activism proved a primary factor in compelling the Mexican government to halt 
its campaign to quash the Zapatista rebels long enough to allow the international 
media into Chiapas to document whether the region’s people had actually been 
subjected to state-ordered atrocities, thus providing a valuable delay for the
rebels.
In both Chiapas and Chechnya - two conflicts widely separated by 
geography and by means, but alike in their quest for status as legitimate 
autonomous governments as in their recognition of the leverage available 
through information age technologies - the insurgents reaped far more of an 
advantage from information than did opposing government forces. The lop­
sidedness of this advantage derives principally from the fact that both of these 
examples involved sophisticated infomiation technology new to non-state actors 
- especially such typically disadvantaged actors as insurgents - but well within 
even the late-industrial age capacity of state military forces. Both the Chechens 
and the Zapatistas were able to lessen the odds against them (if not quite to even 
those odds) through new access to information technologies, as well as levels of
Robberson. "Mexican Rebels Using A High-Tech Weapon; Internet Helps Rally Support." 
p.A l
Cleaver, Harry. "The Chiapas Uprising: The Future o f Class Struggle in the New World 
Order." University o f Texas web page. 1995. Simon, Joel. “Netwar could make Mexico 
Ungovernable.” Pacific News Service, 1995. (Discusses David Ronfeldt’s views on netwar
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communication, previously monopolised by s ta t e s .Y e t  while much was new 
about the way these assets were utilised, the actual technologies employed by 
the rebels were not new to their opponents. Since the infoimation technologies 
and techniques leveraged by the non-state actors in these two situations have 
long been available to states, the new benefits from their use fell unevenly only 
to the non-states who recently gained access to them.
For this reason too, one must take the lessons from the Chechen and 
Zapatista insurgencies as only preliminary signs of lAW’s capacity to widen 
non-state actors’ role in war. Further integration of infoimation and information 
age military tactics, as well as greater access to even more sophisticated 
infoimation technologies, promises to strengthen the position of non-state actors 
in war still more than the availability of half-formed lAW has done. Yet the 
states meeting such widened future challenges from non-state actors will likely 
also be equipped with more sophisticated technology, as well as with more 
highly information-integrated forces than those that met the Zapatistas, the 
Chechens, and even the Somalis on the battlefield. Here again the widening of 
each actor’s position in wai* will be relative, and the ultimate distribution of 
advantage will depend on the balances between the actors and between the 
information age’s paradoxical influences on them.
Weakening
Before one can assess this balance, however, it is necessary briefly to 
consider one last influence of information age war on who can wage war: the
in M exico.) Watson, Russel, et al. "When Words are the Best Weapon. How Rebels use the 
Internet and Satellite TV." Newsweek. 27 Feb 95: 36-40. p.39
307
weakening of lesser- and non-state actors’ role in warfare. Just as the widening 
of the lesser-state and non-state actor’s role in information age war served to 
weaken that of the state, the weakening of non-states’ position in war will likely 
result primarily from the widening of state actors’ position in war. The previous 
pages have already introduced the factors behind the widening of the state’s 
role, and have detailed how these factors may grant advantages to states that lie 
beyond the reach of non-state actors. With this in mind, it is finally possible to 
address the question of how information age war’s paradoxical widening and 
weakening of state and non-state actors’ positions in war may influence the 
balance of relative advantage between the two sets of actors, and thus the issue 
of who will wage war in the information age.
On Balance: Who Can Wage lAW?
Both state actors and lesser- and non-state actors are subject to the 
widening and weakening influences of information age war. Neither set of 
actors emerges as a cleai* winner or loser, and both are quite obviously capable 
of developing some form of information age military capacity. In order to 
answer the question ‘who can wage lAW?’ therefore, one must consider how 
information age war may impact the balance between these two sets of actors 
and their capabilities for war.
State actors begin from a position of relative advantage in warfare. The 
great state military powers, in particular, hold an obvious superiority over 
lesser- and non-state actors. These states are not only larger and better equipped
Herrera. “New Information Technologies and the Future of State Security.” p. 15 Cf. also
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with resources, manpower, and the institutions necessary to mobilise them, but 
most also enjoy the benefits of long experience in waging war. As this chapter 
has shown, these benefits include head-staits in developing the tools for war, 
established organisational infrastructures which aid the smooth running of the 
war machine and, perhaps most importantly, a legacy of trial-and-error lessons 
that should greatly facilitate states’ efforts - from training, strategic planning, 
and the writing of doctrine to the streamlining of logistics practices, the 
production of intelligence and the implementation of operations - to build 
information age military capabilities. The fact that information age war may 
actually heighten the value of this experience could serve to widen the state’s 
role in lAW quite considerably. Almost in counterbalance to this widening 
effect, however, state actors may see their role in information age war weakened 
to a very similai' extent. The negative influence from overly entrenched 
experience, and from the widening of non-states’ position in opposition to states 
might constrain state actors’ position in war almost as much as their experience 
may expand it. The comparatively even influence of lAW’s widening and 
weakening should therefore leave state actors in essentially the same position of 
military advantage relative to that which they enjoyed before the emergence of 
information age war.
Lesser- and non-state actors, on the other hand, begin from a position of 
disadvantage in warfare, relative to that of states. Smaller, younger, and often 
possessing fewer resources as well as less organisational infrastructure to 
mobilise them, these actors have suffered a distinct inferiority of odds in waging
Bankes and Builder. “Seizing the Moment.” p.5
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full-scale war against states, especially in the mass-centred contests of industrial 
age warfare. Where lesser- and non-state actors have traditionally excelled, 
however, is in employing their military arts with cunning. Information age war 
seems poised to reward this, because it emphasises not what a military force has, 
but how, and paiticulaiiy, how efficiently a force uses what it has. The new war 
form way widen the role of lesser- and non-state actors by rendering mass less 
decisive than efficiency. Non-state actors typically do not possess mass in any 
quantity rivalling that possessed by states; they can, however, at least potentially 
acquire a degree of efficiency sufficient to pose a credible information age 
challenge to traditionally dominant state actors. In some cases, non-state actors 
may also benefit further because their composition - be it networked and 
dispersed or merely small and flexible - may make them especially well-suited 
for exploiting the decisiveness of efficiency. These factors carry the potential to 
widen lesser- and non-state actors’ role in warfare very considerably.
As in the case of states, non-state actors’ role in information age war is 
of course subject to constraint by lAW’s widening effects on the other set of 
actors. Two factors, however, should mitigate this weakening influence in the 
case of lesser- and non-state actors. First, non-state actors have always been 
hindered from peer involvement in full-scale warfare by the superiority of state 
actors’ military capabilities. The continuation of this circumstance, therefore, 
will likely represent no great change in non-state actors’ military disadvantage. 
Consequently lAW’s weakening influences should diminish non-state actors’ 
role in war significantly less than it does states’ role. Secondly, considered 
individually, lAW’s widening influences on state and non-state actors should be
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on a fairly similar pai*.^ '^  The net effect of lAW’s widening, however, should be 
measurably greater for the lesser- and non-state actors, because its weakening 
effects are less. The sum of the two influences should weigh noticeably in the 
favour of widening non-state actors’ role in information age war, whereas in the 
case of state actors, the two influences may virtually cancel each other out.
Since lAW should widen non-state actors’ role in war more than weaken 
it, non-state actors’ position in war should accordingly improve relative to their 
previous position. Moreover, since information age war seems likely to widen 
lesser- and non-state actors’ role in war more than that of state actors, lAW 
should also improve non-states’ standing in waif aie relative to state actors.
This, then, is the significance of information age war’s influence on who can 
wage war: it can potentially shift the balance of relative advantage between state 
and non-state actors.
However, it is essential to emphasise that the empowerment of lesser- 
and non-state actors resulting from this shift is indeed relative. Infoimation age 
war’s reliance on efficiency rather than mass may tilt the balance of relative 
military advantage in favour of lesser- and non-state actors, but it will by no 
means make non-states more powerful than states. Infoimation age war should 
grant lesser- and non-state actors greater advantages in wai- than they have had, 
and gieater advantages relative to states than any modem iteration of full-scale 
war has allowed, but the international supremacy of states’ position in war 
should certainly remain intact for the near future at least. Information age war’s 
shifting of the balance of relative advantage in war is worth noting, though.
If anything, a greater balance o f lA W ’s benefits would seem to accrue to non-state actors.
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because its relative empowerment of lesser- and non-state actors in war may 
represent one of the greatest challenges to state actors’ military supremacy since 
the establishment of the state system.^^
This challenge is, moreover, also well worth monitoring because lesser- 
and non- state actors are by many accounts the most likely, and most 
troublesome, threats facing the international system at the turn of the new 
millennium. 8*^ While these actors are unlikely to pose a grave threat to the 
military giants - particularly those who have developed their own sophisticated 
information age wai' capability - there is a consensus that their threat to 
international stability is much more imminent than any deriving from the great 
powers that uphold the status quo.^  ^ Many scholais recently have argued that, 
while the security threat to states from other states seems to be in decline, non- 
traditional threats from non-state actors like terrorists, organised crime rings, 
and drug traffickers are on the rise.^s A similar, increasingly prevalent threat 
arises from the danger that conflicts internal to traditionally weaker lesser-state 
powers - particularly in those states undergoing developmental growing pains in
The other most obvious challenge being o f course the existence o f Weapons o f Mass 
Destruction (WMD) and the potential o f their possession by non-state actors.
Kraus, George P., Comdr., USN (Ret); Senior Fellow, SAIC. Interview with the author. 16 
December 1996.; Everett, Dewindt, and McDade. “The Silicon Spear.” p. 10; “Security in 
Cyberspace III: the Threat.” p.9; Bartlett, Holman, and Somes. “Force Planning, Military 
Revolutions, and the Tyranny o f Technology,” p.33
Snow. Uncivil Wars, p .l,  Cf. also Klare, Michael T., ed. Peace and World Securitv Studies: 
A Curriculum Guide. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994. p.97 
cf. Matthews, Jessica, (from Foreign Affairs Jan/Feb 1997: 50-66) in Builder, Carl. “Toward 
a Theory o f Aerospace Power for a More Disorderly World.” RAND, Project Air Force 
Briefing, 5 February 1997. p. 10. Martin van Creveld goes even further to assert that “the 
future belongs to wars fought by, and against, organisations that are not states.” Van 
Creveld, Martin. “Air Power 2025.” New Era Securitv. RAAF Air Power Studies Center, 
June 1996.
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the third wo r l d , o r  in the post-Communist states still fraught by the transition 
to open government and market economy^^ - will spill over to affect the stability 
of the international system in general.
The contemporary literature on peacekeeping and “operations other than 
wai'” (OOTW) is a clear indication that the danger from such non-traditionai 
threats has aheady become a subject of some concern.^^ Running the gambit 
from policing domestic borders for the purpose of waiding off illegal drugs 
traffickers to establishing a military presence in a troubled state in order to 
secure stability there, military preparations for Operations Other Than War 
implicitly recognise the danger inherent in the possible escalation of the post- 
Cold War era’s prolific internal conflicts. Yet this threat may become still more 
pressing if the non-state actors and marginalised, troubled states behind the 
threat develop an infoimation age waifighting capacity, with all its attendant 
potential to widen these actors’ role in wai’. 2^ With such a capacity in hand, 
lesser- and non-state actors could not only be the most likely threat, but also a 
still more dangerous threat. The heightened danger of the threat from non-state 
actors arises from the likelihood that lAW’s shifting of the net balance of 
military power will render these actors much more foimidable opponents than
Holsti. International Politics, p.8, Binnendijk, Hans, and Patrick Clawson. “New Strategic 
Priorities.” Washington Quarterly. V0II8, n2. 1995: 109-126. p .llO
Odom. America’s Military Revolution, p. 14
E.g. David S. Alberts, ed. Operations Other Than War: the Technological Dimension. 
Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1995. Taw, Jennifer M. and J.E, 
Peters. Operations Other Than War: Implications for the US Aim v. Santa Monica, CA: 
RAND, 1995. Sortor, R.E. Aimv Forces for Operations Other Than War. Santa Monica, 
CA: RAND, 1997,
This possibility becomes all the more believable when one realises that many rogue states 
have already adopted many o f the advances in information systems and computer 
connectivity sweeping the developed world, and several o f these actors may have begun
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they been in previous forms of war. While this empowerment will not enable 
lesser- and non-state actors to prevail invariably over states in infoimation age 
war, the shift could very well render them less likely to lose.
Conclusion
The importance of infoimation age war’s shift in the balance of military 
advantage lies ultimately in the fact that the relative empowerment of lesser- 
and non-state actors, together with the likelihood and increasing credibility of 
the threat they pose, may finally earn these actors a recognised place among the 
dramatis personae of war. This recognition could hold particulai' significance 
in the case of non-state actors. As noted above, non-state actors have played a 
role in war as long as warfare itself has existed. From the British Redcoats 
fighting the American Revolutionaries to the German Occupation Forces 
plagued by the Maquis resistance in World War II to the Soviet soldiers facing 
the Afghani Mujahedin gueiTillas during the 1980’s, soldiers in the field have 
long been confronted with this fact. Scholars, strategists, and the laws of war, 
however, have typically discounted the legitimacy, credibility, and indeed the 
viability of this threat from military forces unaccredited by any state actor. In 
fact, as late as 1993, Martin Van Creveld maintained that the state “might be 
defined as the only organisation that, in the modern world, possesses the legal 
right to resort to organised v i o l e n c e . ” 3^ The world has become so accustomed
actively couiting the building blocks o f an information age offensive military capability. 
Deutch. Senate Testimony. 25 Jun 96. p.2 
3^ Van Creveld. Nuclear Proliferation and the Future o f Conflict, p .l
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to this perspective that it has habitually denied the title of ‘war’ to any conflict 
that does not originate with a state. '^^
However, infoimation age war, with its tilting of the balance of relative 
military advantage between state actors and lesser- and non-state actors, has the 
potential finally to change all of that. By empowering non-state actors more 
than previous war forms ever have, lAW could force the world to recognise 
these actors’ real role in warfare by presenting it as a fait accomplis. If this is 
the case, information age war would truly change the conventional answer to the 
question ‘who can wage war?’ since that answer has so long been understood to 
exclude actors that are not states. Compelling the recognition of lesser- and 
non-state actors as viable competitors on the stage of full-scale war would, 
therefore, change the way the world understands war. With this, information 
age war’s changes in who can wage war would at last succeed in fulfilling one 
of the criterion for paradigm shift.
One should note, however, that the significance of this fulfilment 
remains to some extent in question, primarily because lAW’s shifts in who can 
wage war challenge the model for understanding war only with certain 
qualifications. The first of these qualifications is that information age war 
specifically contests only the section of the paradigm that explains who can 
wage conventional, full-scale warfare. Information age war is likely to 
introduce fewer, and less significant changes to the models for understanding 
war below this high-intensity level of war, in particular because the military 
paradigm has increasingly accommodated the fact that lesser- and non-state
cf. the common insistence that Vietnam was just a ‘conflict’ - for the almost idiotic reason
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actors have for centuries successfully waged war in other guises. Most notably, 
the proliferation of counter-insurgency doctrines among state military forces 
during the second half of the twentieth century is testimony to the growing 
recognition of lesser- and non-state actors’ especial success with those forms of 
war (like, for instance, guerrilla insurgencies) which favour more low-intensity 
approaches to conflict. Conflicts such as that in Vietnam have virtually forced 
state militaries to recognise that these actors’ small size and reduced access to 
resources has clearly not prohibited them from successful participation in forms 
of war that fall below the full-scale threshold. ‘Smaller scale’ war foims of this 
sort have brought belligerent non-state actors a greater measure of success 
because these lower intensity conflicts typically de-emphasise the need for mass 
quantities of men and materiaP^ - the very factors that have prevented lesser- 
and non-state actors from competing as peers in more higher intensity forms of 
war.
Information age war’s significant shift in the ‘who’ of warfare, therefore, 
lies in the fact that the war form de-emphasises mass in high-intensity conflict 
as well as low-intensity conflict, and thus confers on lesser- and non-state actors 
a more equal opportunity to compete viably on both levels of waifighting. 
However, because lAW’s de-emphasis of mass changes little of these actors’ 
recognised position with regard to smaller scale warfare, in order to consider 
information age war’s empoweiment of lesser- and non-state actors as a 
departure from past practices, one must qualify the argument that lAW will alter
that the United States government never declared war.
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who can wage wai' with the caveat that significant change in the ‘who’ of war 
occurs primarily on the level of full-scale warfare.
The second qualification constraining the fulfilment of this paradigm 
shift criterion is that, as suggested above, information age war’s changes in who 
can wage war are likely to alter the understanding of war, but not necessarily the 
reality of war. As this chapter explains, scholars have traditionally discounted 
lesser- and non-state actors’ capacity to wage war, either because of their status 
as non-sovereign actors, or because of their inability to accumulate the mass 
previously necessary to compete on a level with the great power states in war.
In reality, however, these actors have not been so easily dismissed from the 
stage of war. Actors not internationally recognised as sovereign states have not 
only enjoyed considerable success in low-intensity conflicts (as noted above), 
but have, in fact, taken part in full-scale wars throughout the industrial age. 
Whether non-state actors have employed full-scale war against full-scale war, as 
in the US Civil War, or used low-intensity guerrilla tactics against high-intensity 
pitched battle tactics, as in the French Resistance to Gei-man occupation in 
World War H, or even waged insurgent warfare against counter-insurgent 
strategies, as in Vietnam and El Salvador, the soldiers fighting these lesser- and 
non-state actors have of necessity subscribed to a model of war which allowed 
that lesser- and non-state actors can indeed compete with great power states in 
warfare. The heightened ability of these actors to wage information age war, 
therefore, entails a greater departure from the scholarly understanding of warfare
Such war forms often capitalise instead on cunning and guile, as well as on knowledge of the 
land and strength o f will, which small- and non-state actors typically have in comparative 
abundance.
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than from the reality of warfare. The purpose of a military paradigm, however, 
is explicitly to establish a common understanding of war; hence even though 
lAW’s changes in the ‘who’ of war may in reality only be a matter of degree, in 
principle they constitute a noteworthy change from the behaviour predicted by 
the current paradigm of war*.
The ‘who’ of information age war, then, does fulfil the fourth criterion 
for paradigm shift. However, it must be remembered that this fulfilment applies 
to only one out of the four criteria for military paradigm shift. With just one 
quar ter of the criteria only partially met, even lAW’s potentially profound shift 
in who can wage war cannot be said to signify the emergence of a new paradigm 
of warfare. This, then, leaves the question of just what sort of change the 
information age introduces to warfare for the last chapter.
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C O N C L U SIO N
This thesis set out to establish an understanding of information age war 
and how it may change warfare. More specifically, this study originally 
intended to prove that information age war constitutes a paradigm shift of war. 
In an attempt to present a more rigorous examination of the information age’s 
paradigm shift question than those previously available, the investigation 
detailed in these pages has combined current literature on information warfare 
studies with readings from the canons of international relations theory, the 
conventional laws of war, war causality, military strategy and doctrine, and 
military history. The study situated information age war within the context of 
the information age, and argued that this age’s profound - if paradoxical - 
influences on society, along with their paiallels to the circumstances behind 
previous militaiy paradigm shifts, are evidence of information age war’s 
potential to introduce a new paradigm of warfare. The more detailed 
examination of this proposal which followed, however, illustrated that, despite 
these indications of lAW’s potential for paradigm shift, information age war is 
unlikely to fulfil that potential. The information age war form will certainly 
bring significant and important changes for the future of war, but these 
innovations should not actually challenge the conventional understanding of 
warfare to the point of requiring a new model for explaining the phenomenon of 
armed conflict. This concluding chapter briefly reviews the evidence that led to 
that conclusion, and examines its implications for the current understanding of 
war, and indeed for the way the world is affected by war. Lastly, the chapter
318
will propose areas where further research is needed in order to understand the 
implications of information age war more fully.
Not a Paradigm Shift
Of the four criteria identified in this thesis as the most salient barometers 
of military paradigm shift, information age war has failed to fulfil all but one.
As chapters three through six argued, information age war’s noteworthy changes 
in the how, what, and why of warfare do not constitute evidence of a new 
military paradigm because, by and large, they comply with the principles that 
have traditionally governed the understanding of warfare. These chapters 
illustrate clearly that lAW confounds all claims of paradigm shift because the 
changes it introduces adhere closely enough to the established paradigm to 
allow one to recognise the principles under which these innovations fall.
For instance, one can perceive Sun Tzu’s axiom on the importance of 
maximising effort - “In planning, never a useless move; in strategy, no step 
taken in vain.”  ^ - in information age war’s particular emphasis on the 
decisiveness of speedy, accurate efficiency. lAW’s changes in how war is 
waged may in fact bring this old ideal closer to reality. One might just as easily 
recognise the industrial age practice of targeting civilians proportionate to their 
contribution to the war effort - or even the older, Grotian dictate allowing the 
targeting of civilians where it is both strategically expedient and unavoidable - 
in the civilianisation of lAW’s tools and targets. This information age blurring 
of the civil/military distinction actually continues a trend which has waned and 
waxed throughout the history of war. Similarly, the long-held idea that wai* is
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waged most fundamentally because its violent force is the final arbiter of 
disputes is still readily evident among the reasons for waging information age 
war, as are many historical motivations for war - from religion to nationalism to 
power. Just as the how and what - the means and targets - of war remain 
essentially unchanged by JAW, the reasons why people choose to wage war in 
the information age should continue to be on the most basic levels the same.
The who of information age war, on the other hand, may be a somewhat 
exceptional case. Chapter six’s investigation into information age war’s 
changes in who can wage war reveals that the new war form is likely to present 
one significant challenge to the current military paradigm. The chapter 
demonstrates that information age war may introduce its most profound changes 
to war by shifting the balance of relative military power to favour lesser- and 
non-state actors. This re-balancing should empower lesser- and non-state actors 
both relative to their previous standing in war, and to their previous position in 
relation to state actors. Although states will in all likelihood emerge from this 
shift still as the more powerful actors in wai*, this relative empowerment of non­
state actors represents a potentially significant challenge to the traditional 
superiority of state actors, as well as an important shift in the conventional 
understanding of who can wage war.
At the same time, chapter six notes, lAW’s empowerment of lesser- and 
non-state actors represents a challenge to the established paradigm only under 
certain conditions. First, the empowerment of non-state actors only really 
contradicts the paradigm on the level of full-scale war, because these actors
‘ Sun Tzu. The Art of War. Griffith, Samuel B., trans. London; Oxford University Press, 1963.
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have long played a significant role in smaller-scale, more low-intensity 
conflicts. Secondly, the increased role of non-state actors defies the military 
paradigm only when that construct is interpreted strictly to refer merely to the 
understanding of war. Non-state actors’ capacity to compete in information age 
war runs counter to the paradigm in the sense that the conventional 
understanding considers states to be the only actors rightfully entitled to wage 
war. According to this maxim, non-state actors are disqualified from rightful 
competition in armed conflict. However, the view that sovereign state actors 
hold a monopoly on the legitimate waging of war is neither a true principle of 
wai% nor a reality of warfare. In combination with the fact that information age 
war failed to satisfy the first three barometers of military paradigm shift, these 
two constraints on lAW’s fulfilment of the fourth paradigm shift criterion 
demonstrate persuasively that information age war does not constitute a new 
paradigm for warfare.
What Then?
Having fulfilled the fourth criterion of paradigm shift only with 
qualifications, and failing the first three criteria outright, information age war 
clearly does not meet the requirements for the establishment of a new paradigm 
of war. Yet despite the fact that lAW’s changes to warfare are not sufficiently 
fundamental to require a new paradigm for understanding this phenomenon, the 
changes it is predicted to introduce should still almost certainly be far-reaching 
and highly significant. From efficiency’s replacement of mass as the decisive 
component of military combat, to the increasing military importance of civilians
p.87
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and civilian targets, to the relative empowerment of lesser- and non-state actors, 
if the potential shifts identified by this study occur as expected, information age 
war could alter the conduct of warfare substantially. These changes may not 
require a new paradigm to understand warfare but, as the current debate over 
information warfare attests, they would assuredly challenge many long-held 
assumptions about war. Yet if such shifts cannot be called paradigmatic, then 
one must ask, what kind of change does information age war bring to warfare?
To begin with, lAW should alter warfare at least as significantly as any 
military revolution. Chapter two argued that, like military revolutions, the 
information age war form is projected to serve as a force multiplier and a 
surprise advantage, as well as an augmentation of destructive power and cost- 
effectiveness. Moreover, militaries preparing information age war capacities 
have already begun to introduce not only new weapons, but new doctrines, 
strategies, and organisational patterns - the very innovations which are the 
hallmark of revolutions in militaiy affairs. These are fairly clear indications that 
the emergence of information age war will revolutionise warfare at least as 
much as the innovations which accompanied war’s first encounters with 
gunpowder, with railroads, rifles and telegrams, and with machine guns, radios, 
and tanks, among many other inventions that have transformed the face of 
warfare.
Militaiy revolutions, however, typically alter only war itself. True, their 
changes do affect all aspects of wai' - from planning and training to organisation, 
logistics, tactics, strategy, mobilisation, and implementation - but, despite the 
importance of these changes to the soldiers who must adapt to them, simple
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military revolutions rarely affect any aspect of wai*’s relationship to society/ 
InfoiTuation age war, on the other hand, seems likely to affect the context of 
warfare much more broadly, as the next section will examine in greater detail. 
Suffice it to say here that the new war form’s projected empowerment of lesser- 
and non-state actors, its civilianisation of warfare, and its shifts in the reasons 
and motivations for war have the potential to bring changes not only to war 
itself, but also to many of the other elements of society that are affected by that 
phenomenon. lAW’s impact promises to touch not just the soldiers who wage 
war, but also the political actors who employ war to achieve their aims, the 
civilians caught in the middle of wars, and even the international system whose 
stability is governed by the prevalence and danger of the wars occurring within 
it. The far-reaching possibilities of these effects imply that information age war 
may alter warfare not only on the scale of a military revolution, but on a 
considerably larger scale as well.
InfoiTnation age war therefore constitutes a change less than that of a 
paradigm shift, yet greater than that of a military revolution. This leaves one 
with the conclusion that lAW’s effect on war must lie somewhere in between. 
Perhaps fittingly - or ironically - this thesis maintains that the framework of the 
paradigm shift investigation itself best illuminates where between these two 
kinds of military change information age war actually falls. In establishing this 
framework, the introduction to this thesis notes that the current dissension over 
information age war does not necessarily indicate that a paradigm shift is
 ^The one important exception is, o f course, that military revolutions frequently influence the 
outcomes of the wars that leverage their innovative methods, which can indirectly affect the 
societies that wage such wars.
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imminent. Rather, this discord more accurately signifies that there is currently 
no accepted model, either old or new, that adequately accounts for information 
age war. Aiiiving at such a model, it was argued, would entail either the 
introduction of a new paradigm, which this thesis has already discounted, or the 
reinterpretation of the cunent paradigm to accommodate the pattern of warfare 
in the information age. Following this framework, then, the changes lAW may 
introduce to waif are do not require the world to throw out the old paradigms for 
understanding war in favour of new models, but rather to reinterpret these 
paradigms in order to achieve new explanations of war according to both the old 
principles and the new conditions governing waif are.
This reinteipretation should generally follow the same pattern that a 
paradigm shift would, adapting the established model to changes in the how, 
what, why, and who of waif aie. Unlike a paradigm shift, however, the 
reinterpretation of the paradigm for war does not entail writing new principles 
of warfare, but instead requires translating the established principles to 
accommodate the new circumstances to which they apply. This reconciliation 
of war’s principles to information age war’s changes should, for the most part, 
be fairly straightforward, since lAW fails to fulfil its claims to the title of 
paradigm shift precisely because it constitutes no real challenge to the 
principles of war. That reconciliation will, however, be in some cases more 
easily accomplished than in others.
Of the former, inforaiation age war’s predicted changes in the ‘how’ and 
‘what’ of warfare fall should most closely to the old interpretation of the 
military paradigm. Indeed, as stated above, these shifts adhere closely to the
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established principles, if not in exactly the way militaiy thinkers have previously 
understood these principles. For instance, Sun Tzu’s emphasis on winning by 
cunning, on knowledge of enemy and friendly troops alike, and on the 
importance of intelligence^ might have foreshadowed information’s cardinal 
role of creating advantage in information age war. That same legendary 
strategist, had he known the capabilities of information age technologies, might 
also have predicted the decisive role which efficiency may play in information 
age war with his cautions that no military action should be wasted and no step 
taken in vain,"^
Similarly, the precepts contained within the codex of the laws of wax* - 
such as the medieval principle of double effect or the Grotian axiom that 
civilians could be attacked only for purposes of retaliation or punishment of 
“obstinate resistance”  ^- easily accommodate the information age’s blurring of 
the civil/military distinction. These laws have long allowed for the targeting of 
civilians where such action is vital to military operations. Even if they did not, 
the practices of industrial age warfare would have required the targeting of 
civilians to be incorporated into the military paradigm well before the
 ^On cunning, cf. “War is based on deception.” and, “For to win one hundred victories in one 
hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of 
skill.” and “those skilled in war subdue the enemy without battle. They capture his cities 
without assaulting them and overthrow his state without protracted operations.” On 
knowledge o f one’s own and one’s enemy’s forces cf. “He who knows when he can fight and 
when he cannot will be victorious.” and “Probe him and learn where his strength is abundant 
and where deficient.” and o f course, “Know the enemy, know yourself, in one hundred 
battles you will never be in peril.” On intelligence, “the reason the enlightened prince and 
the wise general conquer the enem y... is foreknowledge.” and “Secret [intelligence] 
operations are essential in war; upon them the army relies to make its every move.” Sun Tzu. 
The Al t o f War, pp. 106, 77,79,82, 100, 84, 144, and 149 respectively.
See also above. Sun Tzu. The Ait o f War, p.87.
 ^For further discussion o f Grotian justifications for just war, see chapter four, ‘Following 
Historical Precedent.’ Grotius. De Juri Belli ac P ad s. Campbell. A.C.. trans. Washington: 
M. Walter Dunne, Publisher, 1901. p.363
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information revolution was ever conceived of. As chapter four notes, industrial 
age war set a dangerous precedent for lAW’s civilianisation by instituting a 
practice of targeting civilians in proportion to their contribution to the war 
machine,^ Since the importance of civilian contributions to warfare is predicted 
to increase considerably as a result of the information age’s influences, one 
might construe this rule of action as almost mandating the civilianisation of 
warfare in the information age.
The principles governing the ‘why’ of warfare, on the other hand, can be 
classed neither as strictly easy nor as strictly difficult to reinterpret for 
information age, because they are likely to be both. In certain cases, the ‘why’ 
of LAW will present no challenge at all to the current understanding of war'. 
Notably, commanders will likely base the choice to wage the information age 
war form on the same considerations that have always dictated which military 
tools and strategies would be employed in a conflict: like all forms of war, lAW 
will be waged fundamentally because it represents a certain extreme of violence 
and because, as such, it should constitute the final arbiter of disputes which 
cannot be otherwise resolved. The war form will also conform closely to 
current models of warfare in respect to the primary goals for which it will likely 
be waged. Whether they employ information age methods or not, wars in the 
near future will undoubtedly continue to be motivated by religion, by 
nationalism, by the quests for power and wealth, and by the ubiquitous desire 
for freedom and autonomy, among other time-honoured war aims. As noted
 ^Or so it was justified. See chapter four, ‘Following Historical Precedent.’
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above, these should for the most part remain unchanged by information age 
influences.
The task of reinterpreting the ‘why’ of information age wai* is likely, 
however, to encounter greater difficulties in attempting to reconcile lAW’s 
changes in the cost-benefit equations of war to the cunent paradigm. These 
calculations influence why actors choose to resort to war, rather than some other 
solution, to settle their disputes. This choice has usually been governed by the 
axiom that an actor will resort to war when he concludes that the projected 
benefits from going to wai* outweigh the projected costs of the war.^ While 
information age war is unlikely to change this axiom itself, the war form’s shifts 
in the how and who of warfare may alter how the axiom applies to the why of 
war in the information age. Firstly, lAW’s precision and cost-effectiveness 
could potentially render war less costly in terms of men, in treasure, and perhaps 
also in political repercussions^ - a shift which could very well alter popular 
perceptions of wai*’s costs. Secondly, lAW may further alter these perceptions 
by adding new actors to the cast of those able to wage full-scale war, actors who 
may have new and different valuations for war’s costs and benefits. Neither of 
these changes is likely to be drastic, or even noticeable to the casual observer, 
but because they effect the calculations which influence decisions to go to war, 
these factors together could challenge cunent assumptions about the cost-benefit
 ^See chapter f iv e ,‘Why Wage War.’ Howard, Michael. The Causes o f Wars, and Other 
Essays. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983. p.22, Cf. also Blainey. The 
Causes o f War, p. 119, Liddell Hart. Thoughts On War, p.43, and Brodie. War and 
Politics, p.3,6
* Cf. chapter five, ‘First Order Reasons for Waging lA W .’ Both the domestic and international 
political repercussions o f waging war may be reduced in the case o f lAW  if, as predicted, the 
warform requires less tax money and fewer troop casualties than other forms o f war, as well 
as less collateral damage to the enemy’s civilian population.
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axiom and its applicability to predicting and understanding the incidence of war. 
This may require difficult alterations in the cunent models for predicting who 
can, and will, wage war.
Reinterpreting the current militaiy paradigm to accommodate 
information age war can be expected to be most difficult, however, in dealing 
with the one criterion which comes closest to fulfilling the requirements for 
paradigm shift, lAW’s changes in who can wage war. Over the course of the 
Westphalian state-system’s existence, the assumption that states aie the primary, 
if not the only legitimate actors in full-scale war has increasingly become 
implicit, and in some instances explicit, throughout the literature on warfare. 
Testimony that this belief has become entrenched despite empirical evidence 
(from successful civil wars, insurgencies, and resistance movements) to the 
contrary, is readily found in statements like Howard’s “the state has by 
definition a legitimate monopoly on the use of ... armed force,”  ^ Weber’s “a 
state is a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the 
legitimate use of physical force [i.e. war],” °^ and Van Creveld’s ‘the Treaty of 
Westphalia in the year “1648 marked the beginning of a 300-year period in 
which the dominant form of organisation under whose banners people went to 
wai' and were supposed to go to wai' was the state.” Since history itself has 
contradicted such sentiments more than once, the idea that the state holds a 
monopoly on the legitimate use of war may not deserve to be called a 
fundamental principle of war. It is, however, certainly a widely held perception.
 ^Howard. The Causes o f Wars, p.34
Weber in Brown, Seyom. The Causes and Prevention o f War. New York: St Martin’s Press, 
1994. p.40
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and one which holds a notable influence over the current interpretation of the 
paradigm for war. The information age reinterpretation of that paradigm must 
therefore account for the likelihood that lAW’s widening and weakening of the 
roles of states and lesser- and non-state actors may invalidate this assumption by 
conferring a greater net advantage from lAW to the latter than to the former. 
This invalidation should necessitate a reinterpretation of the paradigm which 
finally reconciles the popular understanding of war with the fact that neither an 
actor’s lack of sovereignty, nor, especially in this age, its lack of size or 
resources, precludes its viable and legitimate participation in war on any scale.
Implications
The investigation of information age war’s claims to the title of 
paradigm shift began with an inquiry into the information age changes in the 
context of war, and what these might foretell about coming changes in warfare. 
The introductory chapter noted that such contextual changes often may not only 
presage paradigmatic shifts in war, but also result from those sh i f t s .Yet ,  since 
this study has shown that information age war is in fact not a paradigm shift, 
one can infer that the war form will not influence its context as profoundly as 
such shifts have done, but will instead leave the role of war in society and in the 
international system for the most part intact. One should not assume, however, 
that the information age’s changes in warfare hold no implications for the 
individuals, groups, and states who wage war, or for the system within which it 
is waged. On the contrary, as previously argued, the information age war forai
“ VanCreveld. Nuclear Proliferation and the Future of Conflict. p.lO
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should be understood to constitute a reinterpretation of the military paradigm 
(rather than a less pervasive change like, for example, a military revolution) 
precisely because it has a noticeable potential to affect not only the content, but 
also the context of war in the information age.
Information age war’s primaiy implications for its context will likely 
follow a similar pattern to that identified in chapters one and six, affecting most 
noticeably the positions of individuals^^ and states in the information age.
These two sets of actors should face the same paradoxical widening and 
weakening that influences their positions both in information age society in 
general, and in the waging of war. Of the two actors, individuals seem to face a 
more pronounced impact from information age war. These actors will 
potentially be most obviously weakened by the civilianisation which may shift 
what war is waged at in the information age. The increased emphasis which that 
shift would place on targeting civilian information and information systems is 
likely to draw individuals further into war, placing them in even greater 
jeopardy from it.
This danger arises not only from the possibility that military forces will 
deliberately target civilians as audiences for propaganda and target civilian 
information infrastructures as accessories to the war effort, but also from the 
potentiality that lAW will have no front-line, and hence no sanctuary behind 
that line. lAW’s trade in information, its precise, long-distance stand-off 
weaponry, and its tactical emphasis on dispersion and deception are likely to
See the ‘Interplay o f Context and Content’ section in the introduction.
A category which, as chapter one explains, can often be understood to include non-sovereign
groups.
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render the battlefield borderless, indistinct, and perhaps even difficult to 
identify. Moreover, information age war’s potential to encourage strikes against 
critical information infrastructure may foster an especially dangerous extension 
of the battlefield into traditionally civilian space. Civilian information 
infrastructures will present a tempting target for information age opponents if, 
as expected, they offer efficient, cost-effective, and relatively easy means to 
facilitate the success of military a t tacks .Yet  such strikes may constitute an 
intrusion of the ‘home front’ that is not only more disruptive, more direct, and 
more pervasive than any previous foim of ‘deep’ offensive, but also (because 
infrastructures can be both anonymous and untraceable) more difficult to limit. 
All of these factors may significantly magnify the danger to non-combatants in 
war, because they could render the principle of civilian immunity in war 
increasingly tempting to ignore, as well as increasingly difficult to uphold.
The set of individual and small group actors also faces the greatest 
potential for a widening of their role as a result of inforaiation age war. This 
widening would principally result from the likelihood that lAW will make 
warfare more readily usable by smaller actors. As described in chapter six, 
information age war’s reliance on information-based efficiency largely removes 
size from the equation for military power. While true LAW requires a standard 
of co-ordination well beyond the capacity of a single individual or even a
*'* Such as a hack attack which decapacitates radar systems just as an air strike is launched, as 
noted previously. See chapter four, ‘Civilians as Strategic Targets’ and chapter two, ‘lAW  
as Military Revolution.’
Some argue that lA W ’s potential for precise, surgical strikes should make it easier for military 
forces to observe the laws o f civilian immunity but, as chapter four argues, many actors will 
have no intention o f making use o f that potential for such an end. See chapter four, 
‘Converging Trends.’
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handful of individuals/^ inforaiation age war’s de-emphasis of size may put a 
noteworthy measure of information age military capacity in the hands of larger 
groups of individuals and non-state actors. The comparative success of the 
smaller actors employing nascent lAW tactics in the Chechen and Zapatista 
conflicts hinted at this empowerment and provided a tantalising foreshadowing 
of what might become one of information age war’s most influential 
implications for its context.
On the state level of analysis, information age war’s implications follow 
the same paradoxical widening and weakening pattern, though the impact of 
these contradictory influences is perhaps less pronounced here than it is on the 
individual level of analysis. The most obvious weakening of the state’s role 
aiises from lAW’s widening effect on that institution’s closest rival for 
influence in the anarchical system: namely, the war foim’s potential to empower 
lesser- and non-state actors with a greater military capacity relative not only to 
the latter’s previous position, but relative to the position of state actors as well. 
By granting lesser- and non-state actors greater militaiy leverage against states 
than they have previously had, this empowerment could narrow the gap in 
military standing between states and non-state actors, and jeopaidise states’ 
accustomed supremacy in the waging of war. Moreover, to the extent that
Some members of the more narrow school o f IW assert that an actor could launch a 
formidable information infrastructure attack with just a handful o f hackers supplied with 
some pizza and a few cokes, but such an attack alone does not constitute an information age 
war. Winn Schwartau, for instance claimed the cost of such an attack should range around 
$100 million, a pittance compared to conventional military force projections. Another 
member o f the narrow school posited this cost could be even smaller, estimating it at closer 
to $1 million. Devost, Matthew G. National Security In The Information A ge. Washington, 
DC: Terrorism & Information Warfare Web page. May 1995. p. 18. Cf. Singer, Abe, and 
Scott Rowell. Information Warfare: An Old Operational Concept With New Implications. 
Washington, DC: National Defense University World Wide Web page, December 1996.
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military power brings a voice in international affairs, this empowerment of 
lesser- and non-state actors might perhaps also weaken the privileged position 
of states in the international system as well.
Information age war’s implications for individuals also lie behind a 
second factor that may weaken states in the information age. Somewhat 
incongruously, however, in this case state actors may be constrained by a factor 
which also weakens the position of individual actors. This factor is the 
predicted civilianisation of information age war and the heightened danger it 
would bring to individuals. By increasing states’ difficulty in fulfilling their 
obligation to protect their citizens, this civilianisation may prove as much a 
threat to the authority of the state as it is to the safety of the individuals the state 
must protect. The consequent weakening effect civilianisation could have on 
the state may not at first seem to be an implication that is particularly unique to 
information age wai\ since military opponents have long targeted civilians in 
attempts to distract state military forces from war. However, if, as projected, 
information age war presents even higher incentives for targeting non- 
combatants in war, the greater effort required for states to protect them 
adequately could prove an important detraction from states’ capacity to wage 
war effectively in the information age.
The greatest potential widening state actors can expect from information 
age war is likely to arise primarily from the new warform’s potential to alter the 
utility of war; that is, the feasibility of using war as a means to some political 
ends. Firstly, the heightened emphasis which lAW places on experience (where 
it is employed wisely in reasoned decision-making) should widen state actors’
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positions by raising the value of states’ longer experience with war, and thus 
adding to states’ faculty to achieve their ends through military means/^ 
Secondly, lAW may widen states’ positions by rendering war more useful as a 
means to political ends. As discussed above, the fact that information age war 
should theoretically be cheaper, in lives lost and in taxes spent, may render it a 
more politically acceptable solution to intractable international disputes within 
the context of both domestic and international politics. The relatively low 
projected cost of lAW holds an obvious appeal for decision-makers concerned 
with domestic politics and its attendant preoccupations with national morale and 
the economic price-tag of war. In addition, by decreasing the possibility of 
alienating allies with diplomatically untenable military actions, lAW’s potential 
for surgical strikes and lower collateral damage in enemy temtory may also 
make the wai* form more politically acceptable in the international arena. 
Consider, for example, the fact that the United States’ August 1998 bombings of 
weapons facilities in Sudan and Afghanistan raised a relatively small outcry 
from the international community. An industrial era bombing - which would 
have had to destroy much of a city in order to accomplish the same objective of 
incapacitating the chemical factories that were the target of this strike - would 
likely have caused a much greater furore among the US’ opponents and allies 
alike.
These signs that information age war may increase the usability of 
warfare also hint at one of information age war’s most potentially fai-reaching
This study predicts that states will enjoy less o f a net widening in their military role than non­
states. However, because they are beginning from a position o f relative superiority, state
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implications for the international system within which individuals and states 
wage war. This is the theoretical possibility that the less costly, more politically 
acceptable information age war form could heighten the incidence of war in the 
system. If lAW makes the waging of wai* more attractive as a solution to the 
many extra-legal disputes in the anarchical international system, one might 
reasonably expect that there may be more war in the information age. This 
conclusion seems to be further supported by the likelihood that the inforaiation 
age will render more actors capable of waging full-scale war, a potentiality 
which could significantly challenge the stability of the interaational system by 
adding to the uncertainty within that system. One should remember, however, 
that such projections remain highly theoretical (in no small part because, failing 
the occuiTence of a true information age war, reliable empirical evidence is in 
short supply) and that some theorists in fact make precisely the opposite 
prediction, that increases in the number of viable military actors could actually 
add to the stability of the international system. Hence those who study 
information age war and its implications can at this point only study the 
possibility of an information age increase in the incidence of war, and thereby 
attempt to come to terms with the potential consequences of such a shift.
Information age war’s second conspicuous influence on the international 
system is similarly uncertain and difficult to predict. This is the potentiality that 
lAW’s empowerment of lesser- and non-state actors will not only endanger 
states’ traditional militai*y supremacy, but will also challenge perhaps even the
actors should still enjoy a noteworthy enhancement o f their abilities to wage war as a result 
of information age influences.
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composition of the international system as a predominantly state-based 
institution. Of course, according to the Pluralist school of international relations 
theory this state-based view of international relations has been growing 
increasingly anachronistic since long before the information revolution. This is 
certainly true to an extent: non-state actors from multi-national coiporations to 
trans-national security alliances to sub-national terrorists have already gained 
much of their increasingly prominent voice in global affairs independently of 
the infoimation age and its influences. As chapter one explains, however, the 
connectivity of information technologies clearly ameliorates the efforts of such 
actors to build a more global presence .For  its part, information age war’s 
primary implication for this trend and its influence on the international system 
lies in the possibility that the war form’s accessibility to non-state actors may 
magnify the trend by granting these smaller, non-sovereign actors the physical 
power to back up the voice they are already building in international affairs with 
military force. In allowing these actors access to the final arbiter of political 
affairs in the anarchical system, lAW’s empowerment of non-states may have a 
significant widening effect on their role in the international system, and a 
consequent weakening effect on that of the state. This empowerment, when 
considered in combination with the already growing influence of non-state 
actors, may introduce information age war’s most profound impact on the 
context within which it is waged: the hastening of the end to state actors’
Levy. “The Causes o f War: A Review o f Theories and Evidence,” p.214, 234. See also 
chapter five, note 115, ‘Information Age Motivations for War.’
See chapter six’s section on ‘Widening’ under the heading ‘Small State and Non-State 
Actors.’
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monopoly over the workings of the international system which governs the 
order of war’s context in the present age.
Future Directions
Having established what kind of change information age war should 
bring to warfare, and identified some of its most salient potential implications, 
the field of information warfare should ideally be able to move onto developing 
and deepening the understanding of the information age war form and, 
particularly, its implications for war and for those touched by war. Several 
steps, however, must be taken before the field can progress beyond its cuiTent 
preoccupations.
First, and most importantly, the field of information warfare studies as a 
whole must establish a recognised consensus on what war in the information age 
is. This thesis has proposed one such definition of lAW; one which, as argued 
in chapter one, carries the benefits of defining the relationship between 
information and war within much more distinct and explicit parameters than 
those offered by other available definitions. This factor distinguishes the 
definition offered here as one well-suited for identifying how information age 
war differs from other forms of war. Other definitions offered by the militaiy 
and by prominent members of IW’s wide school, however, have become well 
entrenched, and will be difficult to depose despite their inability adequately to 
explain war in the information age and foster a consensus in support of that 
explanation.
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If the members of the information warfare field can ever hope to reach a 
realistic consensus on what they study, however, they will need not only one 
more usable definition, but two. Those who study the relationship between 
information and warfare are unlikely ever to agree until they agree to disagree; 
that is, until they recognise that they aie talking about two different phenomena. 
The field of information warfare studies could make a very positive step 
towards establishing a consensus if its members would only acknowledge that 
information infrastructure attacks against information and information systems 
are not the same thing as information age warfare that leverages information and 
inforaiation systems to some strategic (and by definition at least potentially 
violent) end. If they could also accept that the former is one significant 
component of the latter, that would be so much the better for the understanding 
of information’s changing relationship to warfare.
Once those definitions and their differentiations have finally been 
established and accepted, future research into information age war would be 
most usefully directed toward investigating the war foim’s probable 
consequences more thoroughly. As this thesis has argued, the implications of 
lAW that most require further research are the questions of war’s frequency in 
the information age, and its effect on the balance of power between great power 
states and lesser- and non-state actors. These are perhaps the most urgent 
subjects for further research because they aie not only among the most 
ambiguous and uncertain of information age war’s consequences, but also 
potentially the most profound and far-reaching. If the emergence of information 
age war could make warfare more, or even less frequent, such a fundamental
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shift may influence not only the governance of stability in the international 
system, but also the stability of states and the lives of their citizens. Similarly, if 
information age war’s empowerment of traditionally weaker actors alters the 
distribution of influence between them and the great powers that have 
customarily held primary custody of international stability, this too could have 
far-reaching repercussions, extending perhaps even to changes in the 
composition of the international system and in the kind of institutions to which 
individuals give their ‘national’ allegiance.
Many questions clearly remain unanswered about information age war 
and what it may mean for the world. It is hoped, however, that this study’s 
establishment of a more distinct conception of what information age war is, and 
what it means for war, has answered some of the more fundamental questions 
that have plagued the information warfare debate. If this is indeed the case, this 
thesis’s argument that information age war should require not an entirely new 
paradigm for understanding war, but rather a reinterpretation of war’s current 
paradigms ought then to serve as a more substantial foundation for further 
investigation into the war foim and its wider implications. That investigation, 
in turn, will hopefully help prepare the world not only to wage war in the 
information age, but also to meet the consequences of doing so.
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ABBREVIATIONS
AW ACS Air-borne Warning and Control System
CAD-CAM Computer Assisted Design and Computer Assisted Manufacturing
DBK Dominant Battlespace Knowledge
GPS Global Positioning System




IW Information Warfare (used most often in this study to represent the general
field of information warfare studies; also the narrow information 
infrastructure attack interpretation of that field)
JSTARS Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System
MTR Military Technology Revolution
PGM Precision Guided Munitions
RMA Revolution in Military Affairs
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